Book Cards

A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion Flashcards

Epictetus, a Stoic philosopher and former slave, argues that judgment and will are the only things truly up to us, and that progress lies in aligning them with nature. This deck covers his life in Rome, his key doctrines, and specific examples from the Discourses and Encheiridion.

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Chapter 1 · Question

According to the text, what was Epictetus's position in Rome early in life?

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Section 14 cards
  1. According to the text, what was Epictetus's position in Rome early in life?

    He was a slave in Rome, owned by Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the Emperor Nero. The text says the date of his birth is unknown and that the only recorded fact of his early life is this slavery. It rejects the story that his master broke his leg, trusting Simplicius, who says Epictetus was weak in body and lame from an early age.

    Chapter 1

  2. How does the text explain how a Stoic slave received a good education?

    Garnier argues that wealthy Romans of the late Republic and early empire kept grammarians, poets, rhetoricians, and philosophers among their many slaves, much as rich financiers later collected libraries. He says this whim is the only explanation for how a poor child like Epictetus got a good education and how a rigid Stoic belonged to Epaphroditus, an officer of the imperial guard.

    Chapter 1

  3. What did Epictetus do after philosophers were expelled from Rome in A.D. 89?

    He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city Augustus built to commemorate the victory at Actium, and opened a school or lecture room there, teaching until he was an old man. The text says he never married, per Lucian, and that he long lived alone before taking in a woman as nurse for a child a friend planned to expose.

    Chapter 1

  4. Which faculty alone can contemplate itself and judge other faculties, and why?

    The rational faculty. Grammar judges what is written and spoken, and music judges melody, but neither contemplates itself; grammar cannot tell you whether to write, nor music whether to sing now. Only the rational faculty examines itself, its nature, power, and value, and judges all other faculties, including what tells us golden things are beautiful.

    Chapter 1

Section 23 cards
  1. How did Agrippinus respond when told he had been condemned?

    When told his trial was proceeding in the Senate, Agrippinus said he hoped it would turn out well, but noted it was the fifth hour—his usual time for exercise and the cold bath—and went to exercise. Told afterward he was condemned, he asked whether to banishment or death, then about his property. Learning it was banishment and his property was not taken, he said, 'Let us go to Aricia then, and dine.'

    Chapter 2

  2. What does Epictetus say progress consists in, and what is not progress?

    Epictetus argues that virtue produces tranquillity, so progress toward virtue is progress toward tranquillity and happiness. True progress lies in desire and aversion (not being disappointed in desire nor falling into what you avoid), in pursuit and avoidance (committing no error), and in assent and suspension of assent (not being deceived). Merely reading many books of Chrysippus, or being able to read him alone, is not progress.

    Chapter 2

  3. What does Epictetus say follows from believing God is the father of all men?

    Epictetus argues that if a man truly assented to the doctrine that we are all sprung from God especially, and that God is father of both men and gods, he would never have ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. Since humans share body with animals and reason with the gods, most incline to the mortal flesh, but the few who think themselves formed for fidelity, modesty, and right use of appearances hold no mean thoughts about themselves.

    Chapter 2

Section 33 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what actually constitutes progress in philosophy?

    Epictetus argues that progress is not reading or expounding books but withdrawing from externals and training one's own will (proairesis) to conform to nature—making it elevated, free, unrestrained, faithful, and modest. He says the true progressor applies these principles in daily acts like bathing and eating, and learns that desiring what is not in one's power prevents freedom.

    Chapter 3

  2. What two kinds of hardening does Epictetus identify against the Academics?

    Epictetus distinguishes hardening of the understanding from hardening of the sense of shame—when a person resolves not to assent to what is manifest nor to stop contradicting. He observes that people fear bodily mortification and avoid it, but neglect the soul's mortification. He adds that when shame and modesty are deadened, people even call this power or strength.

    Chapter 3

  3. Why did God give humans the faculty of understanding, according to Epictetus?

    Epictetus argues God made humans not only users of appearances but spectators and interpreters of God and his works. Irrational animals need only use appearances—eating, drinking, copulating—but humans, having the intellectual faculty, must act in an orderly way conformable to nature. He says nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and one should not die without having been a spectator of these things.

    Chapter 3

Section 44 cards
  1. Why does Epictetus compare a journey to Olympia with everyday life?

    He argues people travel far and endure heat, crowds, poor bathing, and rain just to see Phidias's work at Olympia. Yet where a man is, the works of God are already before him, so he should not need a journey to desire to see and understand them, nor to perceive what he is and what he was born for.

    Chapter 4

  2. What faculties does Epictetus say God gave humans to bear events?

    He says God gave greatness of soul, manliness, and endurance, so that everything that happens can be borne without being depressed or broken. These faculties were given free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and placed entirely in our own power, with God reserving no power to hinder or impede them.

    Chapter 4

  3. Why does Epictetus tell the would-be suicide to wait for God?

    The imagined student, recognizing kinship to God, asks to be released from the body and its bonds. Epictetus answers: wait for God; when he gives the signal and releases you from this service, then go to him. For now, endure to dwell where he has put you, since the time is short and easy to bear for those so disposed. Do not depart without a reason.

    Chapter 4

  4. How does Epictetus define freedom, and what does he call its opposite?

    The author argues that the free man is one to whom everything happens according to his will and whom no man can hinder. Freedom is not wishing for things to happen as one inconsiderately likes; that is madness and most base. Instruction means learning to wish that everything happen as it does, as the disposer has arranged it.

    Chapter 4

Section 54 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what is the real prison for a person?

    Epictetus argues that a person is in prison wherever he is against his will, since being somewhere unwillingly is itself imprisonment. By contrast, Socrates was not truly in prison because he was there willingly. The punishment for those who do not accept their circumstances is simply to be what they are, such as a bad son or bad father who laments.

    Chapter 5

  2. What does Epictetus say philosophy promises, and what does it not promise?

    Epictetus argues philosophy does not secure any external thing for a person, such as a brother's reconciliation, land, health, or reputation. If it did, it would be claiming something outside its province. Instead philosophy promises to maintain the governing part conformable to nature in every circumstance—specifically the governing part of the person in whom it resides.

    Chapter 5

  3. How does Epictetus advise responding to robbers and adulterers?

    Epictetus argues one should not destroy them but pity them, since they are mistaken and blinded about the most important things—not about black and white, but about good and bad. The greatest harm is deprivation of right will, so one should not be angered by another's badness. He adds that we are angry because we value the things taken, and only lose what we possess.

    Chapter 5

  4. What does Epictetus compare the growth of a person's mind to?

    Epictetus argues nothing great is produced suddenly, not even the grape or the fig. A fig must first flower, then bear fruit, then ripen, so one should not expect the fruit of a man's mind in a short time and easily. He uses this to answer a man asking how to remain conformable to nature even if his brother stays unreconciled.

    Chapter 5

Section 64 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what can a tyrant chain or take away, and what can he not?

    The tyrant can chain the leg and take away the neck—that is, control the body. He cannot chain or take away the will. Epictetus grounds this in the maxim "Know thyself" and urges practicing this on small things first, such as a headache, before proceeding to greater ones.

    Chapter 6

  2. What does Epictetus say actually disturbs and terrifies the multitude, if not the tyrant and his guards?

    It is not the tyrant or his guards, since what is by nature free cannot be disturbed by anything other than itself. It is a man's own opinions that disturb him. One who values his leg begs the tyrant to spare it; one who values his own will tells the tyrant to chain it if advantageous.

    Chapter 6

  3. According to the section on præcognitions, where does disagreement among people actually arise?

    Præcognitions—such as that Good is useful and to be pursued, or that Justice is beautiful—are common to all and do not contradict each other. Contradiction arises in adapting these præcognitions to particular cases. Epictetus cites disputes over eating pig's flesh and the quarrel of Agamemnon and Achilles over what is due.

    Chapter 6

  4. What does Epictetus say about a man who wishes to be admired as a great philosopher?

    Epictetus asks whom such a man wishes to be admired by, noting that these are the very people he calls mad. He argues that a man holding his proper station does not gape after things beyond it, and is satisfied if his desires, aversions, movements, purposes, and assents conform to nature.

    Chapter 6

Section 74 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what does education teach us to distinguish?

    Education is learning to adapt natural preconceptions to particular things conformably to nature, and then to distinguish that some things are in our power while others are not. In our power are will and all acts depending on the will; not in our power are the body, its parts, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and generally all with whom we live in society.

    Chapter 7

  2. What does Epictetus say happens when we place the good in external things?

    He argues that if good is placed in externals like health, possessions, or children, then when a man is damaged or fails to obtain good things he cannot be happy or maintain proper social behavior. Since one naturally looks after self-interest, this leads to taking from neighbors, and is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, and conspiracies.

    Chapter 7

  3. How does Epictetus describe difficulties and the role of a scout?

    He says circumstances show what men are, and God, like a trainer of wrestlers, matches you with a rough opponent so you may become an Olympic conqueror—not without sweat. A scout sent to Rome must not flee at every noise; Diogenes reported that death is no evil, reputation is the noise of madmen, and nakedness better than purple, proving it by his courage and tranquillity.

    Chapter 7

  4. What orders does Epictetus say Zeus has already given, and what happens when we seek what is not our own?

    Epictetus says Zeus has given directions: keep by every means what is your own and do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity and virtuous shame are your own, and no one but yourself can take them. When you seek what is not your own, you lose what is your own; he adds that setting admiration on the body or possessions makes you a slave.

    Chapter 7

Section 83 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what actually squeezes and puts us in straits?

    Epictetus argues that it is we ourselves who squeeze ourselves and put ourselves in straits—specifically, our opinions do the squeezing. He illustrates with the spectator who wants a Senator's seat: the trouble comes from his own desire, not the place. He adds that reviling a stone gains nothing, so a man who listens like a stone gives the reviler no foothold.

    Chapter 8

  2. In how many ways do appearances exist, according to Epictetus?

    Appearances come in four ways: things appear as they are; they are not and do not even appear to be; they are and do not appear to be; or they are not and yet appear to be. Forming a right judgment in all these cases is the office of an educated man. Epictetus says whatever troubles us needs a remedy, and against habit the aid is the contrary habit.

    Chapter 8

  3. Why does Epictetus say no one willingly assents to what is false?

    Epictetus argues the understanding naturally inclines to the true and withholds assent in uncertain matters, so anyone assenting to falsehood was deceived into thinking it true. He cites Plato's claim that every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth. Thus Medea knew her act was evil but passion overpowered her counsel; she was deceived about what was profitable, so we should pity rather than be angry.

    Chapter 8

Section 94 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what is the measure of every human act?

    Epictetus holds that the measure of every act is the appearance or opinion—whether a thing appears good or bad. Whoever remembers this will not be angry with, revile, blame, hate, or quarrel with any man, since the deceived person and the one who suffers are not two different people.

    Chapter 9

  2. Where does Epictetus locate the great good and evil in men?

    The author argues that great good and evil lie not in bodily destruction or burned houses but where humans differ from animals: in understanding, social community, fidelity, modesty, steadfastness, and intelligence. If these are preserved, the man is preserved; if modesty, fidelity, or intelligence is destroyed, the man perishes.

    Chapter 9

  3. How does Epictetus say the will obtains good, and what can threaten it?

    Epictetus says the good is a certain will, and externals are merely materials for it. The will obtains good if it does not over-value those materials, since right opinions make the will good and perverse opinions make it bad. God's law is to receive good from yourself; threats against body, property, or reputation do not concern the will, which only the will itself can conquer.

    Chapter 9

  4. How does Epictetus reinterpret Socrates' death and Achilles' ruin?

    Epictetus insists Socrates' body was dragged off and given hemlock by stronger men, but Socrates said Anytus and Melitus could kill him, not hurt him. The author argues Achilles was ruined not when Patroclus died but when he grew angry and wept for a girl, forgetting he came to Troy to fight. Ruin comes when right opinions are corrupted.

    Chapter 9

Section 104 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what did the thief really pay for the lamp?

    The thief was superior in wakefulness and so took the lamp, but Epictetus says the man bought the lamp at a price: for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. The point is that the loss of an external like a lamp is nothing compared with the corruption of the thief's own will.

    Chapter 10

  2. How does Epictetus define what is truly a master over a person?

    Epictetus argues that man is not the master of man; rather death is master, and life, pleasure, and pain. If a person comes without these things, even Caesar has no hold. But when Caesar comes with threats of these, one recognizes a master like a runaway slave. Release from these masters means freedom from fear.

    Chapter 10

  3. How can caution and confidence be consistent rather than contradictory?

    The author argues that since good and evil lie in the use of appearances, things independent of the will are neither good nor evil. So confidence should be employed toward things not in our power, and caution toward things that depend on the will. By being cautious about what is truly bad, one gains confidence about what is not.

    Chapter 10

  4. What mistake does Epictetus compare to deer fleeing the hunters' feathers?

    Deer flee the feathers in fright but turn into the nets and perish, confounding things to fear with things not to fear. Likewise people fear things independent of the will—death, exile, pain, infamy—while behaving confidently and rashly in things dependent on the will. Thus natural confidence becomes audacity and natural caution becomes cowardice.

    Chapter 10

Section 114 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what is evil about death?

    Epictetus states that death itself is not evil; only a shameful death is evil. He compares death to a tragic mask that frightens children through ignorance, but when turned and examined, it does not bite. The body must be separated from the spirit either now or later, so one should not be troubled if it happens now.

    Chapter 11

  2. How does Epictetus define freedom, and who alone is free?

    Epictetus argues freedom is the power of living as we choose. Since no one in error, fear, sorrow, or perturbation is free, only the educated are truly free. He rejects legislators who say only free persons may be educated, claiming instead that God allows none to be free except the educated.

    Chapter 11

  3. What does Epictetus say about preparing for a trial or court?

    Epictetus advises that if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature and keep what is in your own power, you have security and no troubles. But if you cling to externals like body, property, and reputation, you should prepare fully, even embracing the judge's knees or weeping. Socrates said he had prepared all his life by never acting unjustly.

    Chapter 11

  4. Why does Epictetus call asking for specific suggestions ridiculous?

    Epictetus compares it to an illiterate person asking what to write when a name is proposed: told to write Dion, he cannot adapt when Theon is named. Instead, one should practice so as to be prepared for whatever is required, holding the general precept rather than seeking case-by-case instructions.

    Chapter 11

Section 123 cards
  1. In Epictetus' analogy, what is the chief business of life, like playing dice?

    The counters and dice are indifferent; what is in my power is to use carefully and dexterously the cast that comes. Likewise in life the chief business is to distinguish and separate things: externals are not in my power, but will is. The good and bad are sought within, in what is my own; things not belonging to me are to be called neither good nor bad, profit nor damage.

    Chapter 12

  2. How does the voyage and shipwreck example illustrate doing one's part?

    As on a voyage, I can choose the master, the sailors, the day, and the opportunity; then a storm comes and my part is done—the business now belongs to the master. If the ship sinks, the only thing I can do is not be drowned full of fear, screaming, or blaming God, but know that what has been produced must also perish, since I am a man, a part of the whole, like an hour of the day.

    Chapter 12

  3. Why does Epictetus compare a man separated from others to a foot detached from the body?

    A foot is naturally clean, but taken as part of a body it must step in mud, tread on thorns, and sometimes be cut off for the whole body's good—otherwise it is no longer a foot. Likewise, considered as detached, it suits a man to be rich, healthy, and live to old age; but as a part of the whole, he should accept sickness, danger, want, and even premature death for the sake of that whole.

    Chapter 12

Section 133 cards
  1. Why does Epictetus say divination is unnecessary for deciding whether to help a friend?

    Epictetus argues that the diviner can only reveal external things like death, danger, or disease, not what is truly good or evil. Since one already has an inner diviner that distinguishes good from evil, and since duty may require dying for a friend, consulting entrails or birds is pointless. The author argues that frequent divination stems from cowardice and fear of outcomes.

    Chapter 13

  2. According to Epictetus, what actually drives people to consult diviners so often?

    The author argues that cowardice and dread of what will happen drive the frequent use of divination. This fear leads people to flatter diviners, asking whether they will inherit property and thanking them as if the diviner granted the inheritance. The result is that diviners play upon them, exploiting this fear of future outcomes.

    Chapter 13

  3. How does Epictetus contrast the statue of Phidias with God's creation of humans?

    Epictetus notes that a statue by Phidias, such as Athena or Zeus, is only marble, bronze, gold, or ivory, and once posed it stands fixed forever. God's works, by contrast, have motion, breathe, and possess the power to use and examine appearances. Since humans are the work of such an artist, Epictetus argues they should not dishonor themselves or their guardianship.

    Chapter 13

Section 144 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what distinguishes a man from wild beasts and sheep?

    Epictetus defines a man as a rational and mortal being. The rational faculty separates humans from wild beasts, while acting gluttonously, lewdly, or rashly lowers a person to the level of sheep. Acting contentiously, harmfully, passionately, or violently lowers one to wild beasts. In either case, the promise of man's nature is destroyed.

    Chapter 14

  2. How does Epictetus say a man is preserved or destroyed?

    Epictetus argues each person is preserved by corresponding acts, as a carpenter by carpentry and a grammarian by grammar. Modest actions preserve the modest man, while immodest actions destroy him; fidelity preserves the faithful, and the contrary destroys them. Conversely, shamelessness strengthens the shameless man and anger the angry man.

    Chapter 14

  3. Why do philosophers say learning alone is insufficient?

    Epictetus says philosophers advise adding study and then practice, because we are long accustomed to doing contrary things and holding opinions contrary to true ones. Without practicing right opinions, we become mere expositors of others' views. He compares stored doctrines to stored bread and wine: only what is eaten is digested into sinews, flesh, and blood.

    Chapter 14

  4. What duties does Epictetus derive from being a citizen of the world?

    Epictetus says a citizen of the world is a principal part of it, capable of comprehending the divine administration. The citizen's character promises to hold nothing as profitable to himself and to deliberate nothing as detached from the community, acting as hand or foot would. He adds that if the good man foreknew events, he would cooperate toward his own sickness, death, and mutilation.

    Chapter 14

Section 153 cards
  1. For Epictetus, what is the beginning of philosophy for one who enters it rightly?

    The author argues philosophy begins with a consciousness of one's own weakness and inability about necessary things. Unlike geometry or music, which we learn by instruction and so do not falsely think we know, we come into the world with innate notions of good and evil and therefore add self-conceit, assuming we adapt those preconceptions correctly when we may not.

    Chapter 15

  2. What does Epictetus identify as the actual starting point of philosophy regarding disagreement?

    He describes it as perceiving the disagreement of men with one another, inquiring into its cause, condemning and distrusting what merely 'seems,' investigating whether it 'seems' rightly, and discovering a rule—like a balance for weights or a carpenter's square for straight and crooked things—so one no longer measures by bare appearance.

    Chapter 15

  3. How does Epictetus analyze the desire to hurt someone who has hurt you?

    He asks first what harm is, recalling that good and evil lie in the will. If someone hurts himself by acting unjustly toward you, retaliating would mean hurting yourself by acting unjustly in return. People count harm only to body or property, not to the will, so they care about modesty and faithfulness only in school, in a few words.

    Chapter 15

Section 164 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what test must pleasure pass to count as good?

    Epictetus applies a rule: the good must be something secure in which we can confidently trust. Since pleasure is not secure, it fails the test and should be thrown out of the scale and driven away from the place of good things. He adds that if one balance is not enough, bring another: it is not fit to be elated over present pleasure.

    Chapter 16

  2. How does Epictetus say a guide should treat an illiterate man in argument?

    Just as a guide who finds a man out of the road leads him into the right way rather than ridiculing and abandoning him, so one should show the illiterate man the truth and he will follow. Until you show him the truth, do not ridicule him but feel your own incapacity. Epictetus praises Socrates for never being irritated or abusive in argument.

    Chapter 16

  3. Why does the lute player feel no anxiety alone but trembles in the theatre?

    Alone he only wishes to sing well, which is in his power and where his skill gives confidence. In the theatre he also wishes to obtain applause, which is not in his power. Epictetus argues anxiety arises only about things outside the will; things independent of the will are neither good nor bad, and what depends on the will no one can take from us.

    Chapter 16

  4. Why was Zeno unanxious meeting Antigonus while Antigonus was anxious meeting Zeno?

    Antigonus had no power over anything Zeno admired, and Zeno did not care for the things Antigonus controlled. Antigonus wished to please Zeno, an external thing outside his power, so he was anxious. Epictetus notes no man skilled in an art wishes to please one who lacks that skill, and that a good man does not lament, weep, or tremble.

    Chapter 16

Section 174 cards
  1. How does Epictetus describe the work of a philosopher?

    The author argues the philosopher must adapt his wish to what is going on, so that nothing happens contrary to his wish and nothing he wishes fails to happen. The result is not failing in desire, not falling into what he would avoid, and passing through life without uneasiness, fear, or perturbation, while maintaining natural and acquired relations as son, father, brother, citizen, man, wife, neighbor, fellow-traveler, ruler, and ruled.

    Chapter 17

  2. What must philosophers first learn about God, according to Epictetus?

    The philosophers say we ought first to learn that there is a God and that he provides for all things, and that it is not possible to conceal from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts. Next we must learn the nature of the gods, for as they are discovered to be, whoever would please and obey them must try with all his power to be like them: faithful, free, beneficent, magnanimous.

    Chapter 17

  3. What error do people make about being firm in their determinations?

    Hearing that a man ought to be firm and the will is free, some suppose they should abide without deviation by everything they have determined. Epictetus replies that a determination must first be sound; firmness built on a rotten foundation falls the sooner the stronger the materials. He compares such obstinacy to the tone of a frenzied man, not a healthy body, and urges the man to seek the physician.

    Chapter 17

  4. What example shows the danger of persisting in a wrong resolution?

    A companion resolved for no reason to starve himself to death. Epictetus visited on the third day of abstinence and asked what induced the resolution, saying they would assist him if it were right but he should change his mind if unreasonable. The man was with difficulty persuaded. Epictetus concludes one should keep only right determinations, and that a wise fool is the most untractable friend.

    Chapter 17

Section 184 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, where are good, evil, and neither located?

    Epictetus locates good and evil in the will, while things independent of the will are neither good nor evil. He argues that people fail to practice these lessons outside the classroom, so they improve only in what they have studied. When money is offered, one should have rehearsed the answer that money is not a good thing, rather than only practicing against sophisms.

    Chapter 18

  2. Why does the rhetorician remain anxious despite writing and reciting well?

    The rhetorician is anxious because he has trained only in declamation, not in praise and blame. He never learned what praise and blame are, which kind to seek or shun, nor practiced that discipline. So he surpasses others only in what he studied and remains like the many elsewhere. The lute player likewise trembles on stage, knowing music but not the crowd or anxiety.

    Chapter 18

  3. What does Epictetus say is the first business of one who philosophizes?

    The first business is to throw away self-conceit, since it is impossible to begin learning what one thinks one already knows. People go to philosophers to learn theorems they do not think they know, but it is ridiculous to expect to learn one thing and gain another. Theopompus wrongly blames Plato for defining terms, since preconceptions must be analyzed before being applied to particulars.

    Chapter 18

  4. How does Epictetus use the physician example to explain preconceptions?

    Epictetus notes that everyone used words like healthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates, so we have a natural preconception of health. But we cannot adapt that preconception to particular cases without distinguishing and analyzing them. Hence one physician says abstain from food, another says give food, another says bleed, another says use cupping—because they cannot properly apply the preconception of health to particulars.

    Chapter 18

Section 194 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, how are habits and faculties maintained or increased?

    Epictetus states that every habit and faculty is maintained and increased by corresponding actions: walking by walking, running by running, reading by reading, writing by writing. Conversely, ceasing an activity weakens the capacity, as legs weaken after ten days of lying down. He concludes that if you would make anything a habit, do it; if not, avoid it and accustom yourself to something else instead.

    Chapter 19

  2. How does Epictetus describe the growth and cure of mental diseases like love of money?

    Epictetus says diseases of the mind grow as habits do. When desire for money arises and reason reveals its evil, the desire is stopped and the ruling faculty restored. But without a cure, the mind is inflamed quicker by the next appearance and becomes hardened, confirming the love of money. He compares this to a fever leaving traces, so repeated lashing produces sores rather than blisters.

    Chapter 19

  3. What practical method does Epictetus give for overcoming an angry temper?

    Epictetus advises not feeding the habit of anger: throw nothing on it that increases it. First keep quiet and count the days you have not been angry—he describes progressing from daily passion to every second, third, and fourth day. After thirty days of abstinence, the habit begins to weaken and is then completely destroyed. He adds that if you stay unvexed for two or three months, even amid provoking events, you are in a good way.

    Chapter 19

  4. What does Epictetus advise doing when a disturbing appearance first arises?

    Epictetus advises not being hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance. Instead, say to it: 'Appearances, wait for me a little; let me see who you are and what you are about; let me put you to the test.' Do not let it lead you on and paint lively pictures of what will follow, or it will carry you off. Rather, oppose it with some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out the base one.

    Chapter 19

Section 204 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, who alone has the power to love, and why?

    Epictetus argues that people earnestly pursue only what they consider good, and thus love what they pursue. Therefore only the wise, who can distinguish good from bad and things neither good nor bad, can truly love. Those unable to make this distinction cannot possess the power of loving, so to love is only in the power of the wise.

    Chapter 20

  2. What does Epictetus say every animal loves above all, and what follows from this?

    Epictetus states that every animal is attached to nothing so much as its own interests. Whatever appears an impediment to that interest—brother, father, child, beloved, or lover—it hates, spurns, and curses. He even cites Alexander burning the temples of Aesculapius when the gods seemed to obstruct him after a friend died.

    Chapter 20

  3. How does Epictetus say one should test whether people are truly friends?

    He says not to judge by shared parents, upbringing, or oaths, since a bad man's ruling principle is untrustworthy and shifts with appearances. Instead examine where they place their interest—in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not call them friends, trustworthy, or constant; if in the will and right use of appearances, confidently declare them friends.

    Chapter 20

  4. What does Epictetus say breaks apart friendships like that of Eriphyle and Amphiaraus?

    He says a necklace came between them, meaning the opinion about such things—the bestial principle that broke the friendship between husband and wife and prevented the woman from being a wife or mother. He urges anyone resolved to be a friend to cut out these opinions, hate them, and drive them from the soul.

    Chapter 20

Section 213 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, which faculty is most excellent, and why?

    Not the power of speaking but the faculty of the will when it is right. The will uses speech and all other faculties, small and great; it decides when to open or close the eyes and ears, what to believe, and what each thing is worth. When set right a man becomes good; when it fails, bad.

    Chapter 21

  2. What does Epictetus mean by the innkeeper analogy?

    A traveler pleased with a good inn should not stay there, since his purpose is to reach home and fulfill duties as citizen, kinsman, spouse, and parent. Likewise students captivated by expression, syllogisms, or sophisms linger in these as if among sirens, wasting away instead of using them to purge the will and correct the faculty that uses appearances.

    Chapter 21

  3. What does Epictetus say about the art of hearing?

    Asked by a man he had ignored, Epictetus argues there is an art of speaking and also of hearing: some are benefited and some damaged by what they hear, just as looking at a statue requires art. He adds that anyone intending to hear philosophers needs some practice in hearing.

    Chapter 21

Section 224 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what three topics must a person practice to become wise and good?

    Epictetus names three: first, desires and aversions, so one neither fails to get what one desires nor falls into what one avoids; second, movements toward and away from objects, acting with order and reason; third, freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, concerning assents. He says the first topic, dealing with the affects, is the chief and most urgent.

    Chapter 22

  2. Why does Epictetus say the third topic is above our power as commonly pursued?

    He says the third topic concerns security of the other two, so no unexamined appearance surprises us even in sleep or intoxication. But present philosophers neglect the first two topics—affects and duties—and busy themselves with sophistical arguments, hypotheses, and lying. Epictetus argues this is backwards, since the affects must be mastered first.

    Chapter 22

  3. What makes a man beautiful, according to Epictetus's argument to the young rhetorician?

    Epictetus argues by analogy: a dog is beautiful through the excellence of a dog, a horse through that of a horse. So a man is beautiful through possessing human excellence—being just, moderate, and temperate. He tells the youth that if he neglects these, he must be ugly no matter how much he contrives to appear beautiful.

    Chapter 22

  4. What does Epictetus say to the man who asks to be persuaded that logic is necessary?

    Epictetus replies that he must use a demonstrative form of speech to prove it. When the man agrees, Epictetus asks how he will know whether the argument cheats him. The man falls silent, and Epictetus concludes that the man himself admits logic is necessary, since without it he cannot even determine whether logic is necessary.

    Chapter 22

Section 234 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what is the proper material or business of the wise and good man?

    Epictetus says the material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty, just as the body is material for the physician and land for the husbandman. His business is to use appearances conformably to nature: assenting to truth, dissenting from falsehood, suspending judgment on the uncertain, desiring good, avoiding evil, and treating what is neither as indifferent.

    Chapter 23

  2. What daily exercise does Epictetus recommend for testing impressions?

    He advises that from morning to night you examine each person and thing you encounter and apply the rule: is this dependent on the will or independent? A handsome person, a death, a proconsul's office—all are independent, so you 'take it away' and cast it off as nothing to you. Practicing this daily, he says, something would actually be done.

    Chapter 23

  3. What does Epictetus claim weeping, bad fortune, sedition, and accusation really are?

    He argues they are all opinions, and nothing more—opinions about things independent of the will, treated as if they were good or bad. If a person transfers these opinions to things dependent on the will, Epictetus promises he will be firm and constant whatever happens around him. He compares the soul to water and appearances to a ray of light.

    Chapter 23

  4. Why does Epictetus say the ancients progressed more than his contemporaries?

    Asked how it is that reason is more cultivated now yet progress was greater before, he answers that progress follows whatever reason is cultivated for. Now it is cultivated for resolving syllogisms, and progress is made in that; formerly it was cultivated to keep the governing faculty conformable to nature, and progress was made there. He warns against mixing different things and expecting progress in one while laboring at another.

    Chapter 23

Section 244 cards
  1. In Epictetus's dialogue, what three things relate to man?

    Epictetus says that scarcely any man denies there are three things which relate to man: soul, body, and things external. He uses this threefold division to press the Epicurean administrator to say which of these is best, so that the philosophers' answer can guide the conduct of ordinary people.

    Chapter 24

  2. How does Epictetus argue the Epicurean's position collapses?

    Epictetus argues that if the pleasure of the soul depends on the soul, then the substance of the good is already found; but good cannot be one thing and what we rationally delight in another. Since the Epicurean will not accept this, Epictetus concludes the soul's pleasure must rest on bodily pleasure, making bodily things the substance of the good—a result he presents as inconsistent with Epicurus's own doctrines.

    Chapter 24

  3. What three kinds of duties does Epictetus distinguish using toreutic art?

    Using the analogy of toreutic (metal-engraving) art, Epictetus distinguishes duties directed toward a thing's existence, duties toward its existence in a particular kind, and the chief or leading things themselves. He applies this to man: we should not value the material, the poor flesh, but the leading things—public business, marriage, children, honoring God, caring for parents, and right desires and aversions.

    Chapter 24

  4. How does Epictetus train against appearances, using the dead son example?

    Epictetus says we should exercise daily against appearances as against sophistical questions. When a person's son dies, answer: it is not within the power of the will, not an evil. A father disinherits a son, Caesar condemns a man—both beyond the will, not evils. But the man's affliction depends on the will and is an evil; bearing the condemnation bravely is within the will and is a good.

    Chapter 24

Section 254 cards
  1. For what purpose does Epictetus say philosophers have theorems?

    Epictetus says philosophers have theorems so that whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may remain conformable to nature. He calls this the greatest thing, not a small one, and asks whether it can be seized in passing. The point is preparation against events, not abstract speculation.

    Chapter 25

  2. What does Epictetus say is the cause of every man's acting?

    Epictetus states that to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. He illustrates with the man going to Rome: his opinion is the reason he desired office and travels in winter with danger and expense. If opinions are causes and a man has bad opinions, the effect is bad.

    Chapter 25

  3. How does Epictetus describe a genuine meeting with a philosopher?

    Epictetus says a man meets with a philosopher as a man when he learns the philosopher's opinions and shows his own in turn. They examine one another: if one has a bad opinion, it is taken away; if the other has one, it is shown. A passing visit while hiring a vessel is not this.

    Chapter 25

  4. What attitude does Epictetus recommend when fever or sickness comes?

    Epictetus says we should have ready opinions suited to each occasion, including fever, and not lose them when illness begins. He compares giving up philosophy under sickness to a pancratist quitting after blows. A physician may stop you drinking or eating, but cannot stop you bearing thirst or hunger well.

    Chapter 25

Section 264 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what does it mean to bear a fever well?

    To bear a fever well is not to blame God or man, not to be afflicted at what happens, to expect death well and nobly, and to do what must be done. One should neither be frightened when the physician speaks nor overjoyed at good news, since illness merely brings one near the severance of soul and body. The author argues the philosopher's task is to keep the ruling power conformable to nature in every condition, including fever.

    Chapter 26

  2. Why does Epictetus reject showy exercises like walking on a rope or embracing statues?

    Epictetus argues exercises should not consist in means contrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, since philosophers who do so differ not at all from jugglers. Difficulty and danger alone do not make something suitable for practice; only what conduces to the proposed goal does. That goal is to live with desire and aversion free from restraint, neither disappointed in desire nor falling into what one would avoid.

    Chapter 26

  3. How does Epictetus define solitude, and what does he say a solitary person should do?

    Solitude is a certain condition of a helpless man; being alone does not make one solitary, nor does being among crowds prevent it. We feel solitary when we lose someone faithful and helpful, not merely when no humans are present. Epictetus says a man ought to be prepared to be sufficient for himself and his own companion, as Zeus dwells with himself, observing the divine administration and improving what needs improvement by reason.

    Chapter 26

  4. What two principles does Epictetus say we ought to keep in readiness?

    Epictetus says we should have two principles ready: that except the will nothing is good nor bad, and that we ought not to lead events but to follow them. So when a brother behaves badly, one should not wish events otherwise but conduct oneself toward him as one ought, since one's own conduct is one's business while the brother's belongs to another. No man can prevent the former; the latter can be hindered.

    Chapter 26

Section 274 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what two things must be rooted out of men, and how is arrogance removed?

    Epictetus says arrogance (the opinion that you want nothing) and distrust (the opinion that you cannot be happy amid many circumstances) must be rooted out. Arrogance is removed by confutation, a practice he credits Socrates with first practising. He adds that to know the thing is not impossible, one should inquire and seek, which he calls a form of philosophizing.

    Chapter 27

  2. What does Epictetus say one must consider before undertaking an act, using the Olympic contest as example?

    Epictetus says that in every act you must consider what precedes and what follows before proceeding. For the Olympic contest this means strict diet, fixed compulsory exercise in heat and cold, abstaining from cold water and wine, submitting to a trainer, and enduring sand, dislocations, sprains, dust, and whippings, and sometimes still being conquered. Only after reckoning all this should one enter the contest.

    Chapter 27

  3. How does Epictetus argue against pride based on ancestry or office, using the horse analogy?

    Epictetus imagines claims like 'my father is of consular rank' or 'I have been a tribune.' He answers with a horse analogy: if horses boasted of a swift father or abundant barley and fine neck ornaments, one would simply say 'let us run' to test superiority. He asks whether man has no equivalent—modesty, fidelity, justice—and says show yourself superior in these to be superior as a man.

    Chapter 27

  4. What does Epictetus teach about entering familiar intercourse with ordinary people, using the charcoal image?

    Epictetus warns that frequent social intercourse means either becoming like others or changing them to your own fashion. He compares it to placing quenched charcoal next to burning charcoal: either the quenched quenches the other or the burning lights the quenched. Since the danger is great, one must cautiously enter such intimacies, remembering that no one can keep company with a soot-covered man without partaking of the soot.

    Chapter 27

Section 284 cards
  1. Why does Epictetus advise the student to avoid associating with common persons?

    He warns that until good sentiments are firmly fixed, daily contact with ordinary people will melt away whatever you inscribe on your mind, like wax in the sun. He therefore advises withdrawing from the sun while sentiments remain waxen, and notes that philosophers advise leaving one's native country because ancient habits distract and prevent a new habit from beginning.

    Chapter 28

  2. How does Epictetus answer the complaint that the unjust man has the advantage?

    He says the unjust man is superior only in money, flattery, shamelessness, and watchfulness. The author argues one should check whether he is superior in faithfulness and modesty, and remember the law of nature that the superior has the advantage in that in which he is superior, so you will never be vexed.

    Chapter 28

  3. What does Epictetus say must be removed to be happy, regarding poverty?

    He argues that we must not get rid of poverty but of the opinion about poverty, and then we shall be happy. Likewise, when a wife treats you badly or a father gives you nothing, that bare fact is not itself an evil; calling it an evil is something added externally and falsely.

    Chapter 28

  4. What does Epictetus say a Cynic must use as protection instead of walls and concealment?

    He says other men use walls, houses, and darkness to conceal what they do, but the Cynic must use modesty as his protection, since he must not wish to hide anything. If he does hide something, he has lost the character of a Cynic, a man who lives under the open sky and is free.

    Chapter 28

Section 294 cards
  1. What role does Epictetus assign to the true Cynic?

    The author argues the true Cynic is a messenger sent from Zeus to men about good and bad things, and a spy of what is truly good and evil for humans, like Diogenes carried off to Philip. His duty is to examine carefully, report truly, and not be terrified or perturbed by appearances into naming non-enemies as enemies.

    Chapter 29

  2. Where does Epictetus say happiness is not found, and who are his examples?

    The author argues happiness is not in the body (Myro, Ophellius), possessions (Croesus and the rich, whose lives are full of lamentation), power (twice and thrice consuls, who are not happy), royal power (Nero, Sardanapalus), or even Agamemnon's kingship. He urges men to seek good within, in the ruling faculty.

    Chapter 29

  3. Why does Epictetus call Agamemnon an unhappy king?

    The author argues Agamemnon laments though rich in gold and copper, because the part of him that desires, avoids, and moves toward things has been neglected and corrupted. He does not know the nature of good and evil, what is his own and what belongs to others, and grieves over others' losses while his ruling faculty alone is uncared for.

    Chapter 29

  4. What does Epictetus say is free and not in the power of others?

    The author argues the body is a slave to fever, gout, a tyrant, fire, and iron, but no one can compel assent to what appears false or prevent assent to what appears true. Likewise desire, aversion, movement, preparation, and purpose involve something unhindered and free; men should work out and care for good here.

    Chapter 29

Section 304 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, whose sorrow is in our power to stop, and how?

    Epictetus distinguishes another person's sorrow from one's own: another's sorrow is another's, while my sorrow is my own. He says he will stop his own sorrow by every means because it is in his power, but will try to stop another's sorrow only as far as he can, not by every means—since attempting it by every means means fighting against God and opposing Zeus's administration of the universe.

    Chapter 30

  2. What does Epictetus say about desiring to live long yet never seeing loved ones die?

    He asks how one can desire to live to old age and simultaneously not see the death of anyone one loves, since in a long time many varied things must happen: fever overpowers one, a robber another, a tyrant a third. Such is the condition of things around us—cold, heat, unsuitable living, journeys, voyages, winds—which destroy one man, banish another, and send another to an embassy or army.

    Chapter 30

  3. What metaphor does Epictetus use for human life and each person's role?

    Epictetus calls human life a warfare: one man keeps watch, another goes out as a spy, a third fights, and it is not possible—nor better—that all be in one place. He compares neglecting the general's commands to a sailor who refuses to climb the mast or run to the ship's head; such a useless impediment would be pitched overboard. A good man acts for the sake of doing right, not appearance.

    Chapter 30

  4. How does Epictetus advise treating loved ones, and what image illustrates it?

    He advises that when kissing a child, brother, or friend, you not give full license to the appearance or let pleasure go as far as it chooses, but check and curb it—like those who stand behind men in triumphs reminding them they are mortal. Remind yourself that what you love is mortal and not your own, given for the present like a fig or grapes at the appointed season; wishing for it otherwise is wishing for a fig in winter.

    Chapter 30

Section 314 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what should a man say to prepare for misfortunes like a son's death?

    He should say "I knew that I begot a son who is mortal," and likewise that he is mortal, may leave or be ejected from his home, and may be led to prison. Reflecting first that the event is not unexpected relieves the mind when something contrary to one's wish occurs.

    Chapter 31

  2. How does Epictetus advise handling painful appearances and thoughts about other places?

    He says when an appearance pains you, contend against it with reason and conquer it before it gains strength or leads you to consequences. If in Gyara, do not imagine life at Rome's pleasures; fix your mind on how a courageous man should live in Gyara. If in Rome, think only of life in Rome.

    Chapter 31

  3. Why does Epictetus say God sends him poverty, illness, Gyara, and prison?

    Not from hatred or neglect—God neglects nothing, even the smallest things—but to exercise him and use him as a witness to others, showing that fear is groundless and the good lies not in externals but in oneself. As a soldier and citizen appointed to this service, he directs his thoughts to God's commands.

    Chapter 31

  4. What does Epictetus say about falling off one's purpose and fearing want?

    He urges reviewing what you secured and failed, and recovering failures, since the combat is for good fortune and happiness itself and can be renewed at once, not after four years like Olympia—though one should not grow to enjoy renouncing. On fear of want, he notes even fugitive slaves contrive to survive, and want leads to death, as fever or a falling stone does.

    Chapter 31

Section 324 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what alone makes a person free from hindrance and his own master?

    Epictetus argues that wealth, consulship, provincial government, and royal power do not make a person free. Instead, just as knowledge of the art of writing frees a writer from hindrance and knowledge of lute-playing frees a lutenist, it is the science of life that makes a person free. He concludes that whoever desires things dependent on others cannot be free or unimpeded.

    Chapter 32

  2. Why does Epictetus say no bad man is free?

    Epictetus argues that no one chooses to live in error, sorrow, fear, envy, or to fail in desires and fall into what he would avoid. Since every bad person experiences these things, none of the bad obtains what he wishes. Therefore, the author concludes, no bad man lives as he wishes and none of the bad is free.

    Chapter 32

  3. What does Epictetus say is shameful and what is not?

    Epictetus argues that what is shameful must be one's own act and blamable, since only what a person causes deserves blame. Things that come by accident or from others—a headache, a fever, poor parents who leave property to others—are not shameful to you. He asks whether it is in your power to improve your father, and whether you should be ashamed at not obtaining what was never given.

    Chapter 32

  4. How does Epictetus say to identify a slave, regardless of rank?

    Epictetus says not to inquire about a person's ancestors or whether he was bought or sold. If you hear him say 'Master' from the heart, or lament 'Wretch that I am, how much I suffer,' or see him complaining and unhappy, call him a slave even if the twelve fasces precede him as consul or he wears a praetexta. Only if he does none of this should you examine his opinions before calling him free.

    Chapter 32

Section 334 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what alone can no man force you to do?

    No man can make you assent to what is false, so in matters of assent you are free from hindrance. By contrast, threats of death or bonds can compel you to desire to move toward something. Epictetus argues that if you despise death and bonds, the threatener loses his power over you, since despising death is your own act.

    Chapter 33

  2. What distinction does Epictetus say the student must practice to become fearless?

    The student must distinguish what belongs to another from what is his own, things subject to hindrance from those not subject to it, and what is in his power from what is not. He should fix desire on what concerns himself and turn it from what does not. Then he fears no one, since no man can take away or impede what is truly his own.

    Chapter 33

  3. How does Epictetus describe the world as a festival, and what should a person do when dismissed?

    Epictetus says God introduced you as subject to death, to observe his administration and join the spectacle for a short time. When he leads you out, you should go with adoration and thanks, making room for others who must be born. He argues that clinging to life, wife, and children, which belong to the giver, shows ingratitude and insatiability.

    Chapter 33

  4. Why does Epictetus say Diogenes was free, and what made him able to speak to kings?

    Diogenes was free not because of free-born parents but because he himself had cast off all the handles of slavery; nothing could be laid hold of to enslave him. He would let go of property, leg, or body rather than follow anyone for them. He could speak to the King of Persia and Archidamus because he did not consider his poor body his own, wanted nothing, and made law everything.

    Chapter 33

Section 344 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, how is true freedom acquired?

    Epictetus argues that freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. He says that those who obtain what they eagerly sought find the same feverish feeling, tossing to and fro, and satiety as before, and desire for things not present.

    Chapter 34

  2. What rule does Epictetus give about former intimates and friends?

    He says you must attend before all else to never be so closely connected with any former intimate or friend as to come down to the same acts as he does; if you do not observe this rule, you will ruin yourself. If the thought arises that you will seem disobliging, remember nothing is done without cost, and choose between being equally loved as your former self or being superior.

    Chapter 34

  3. What does Epictetus say about exchanging external things for what is worth more?

    He advises keeping ready the thought, when you lose anything external, of what you acquire in its place; if it is worth more, never say you have had a loss—as with a horse for an ass, an ox for a sheep, a good action for money, tranquillity for idle talk, or modesty for lewd talk. Remembering this, you maintain your character; forgetting it, you waste your pains, since a small deviation from reason overturns everything.

    Chapter 34

  4. Why does Epictetus say the desire for tranquillity and leisure also enslaves?

    Epictetus argues that not only desire of power and riches but even desire of tranquillity, leisure, travel, and learning makes us mean and subject to others, since whatever external thing we value places us in subjection. A book is external and independent of the will like salutations and power; a tranquil and happy life has nothing so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle.

    Chapter 34

Section 354 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what is the sole purpose for which we should read and write?

    Epictetus says we should read and write so that we may use in our actions, in a way conformable to nature, the appearances presented to us. He criticizes those who stop at learning what is said, expounding it to others, and resolving syllogisms, because their study ends there and so the impediment lies there. The author argues reading should be referred to right action, desire, aversion, and duty.

    Chapter 35

  2. What daily accounting does Epictetus recommend instead of counting verses read or pages written?

    Instead of reckoning how many verses one has read or written, Epictetus recommends reviewing one's actions: that today one employed action as the philosophers teach, did not misuse desire, used avoidance only regarding things within the power of the will, was not afraid of someone, was not prevailed upon by entreaties, and exercised patience, abstinence, and co-operation. For these things one should thank God.

    Chapter 35

  3. Why does Epictetus refuse to call a man industrious merely because he reads and writes all night?

    Epictetus says he cannot call a man industrious on hearing only that he reads and writes, even all night, because industry depends on the purpose to which labor is referred. If done for reputation, the man is a lover of reputation; for money, a lover of money; for learning, a lover of learning. Only one who refers labor to keeping his ruling power conformable to nature is industrious.

    Chapter 35

  4. How does Socrates serve as the example of the wise man who avoids quarrels?

    Epictetus points to Socrates, who avoided fights himself and would not allow others to quarrel, settling many disputes in Xenophon's Symposium and enduring Thrasymachus, Polus, Callicles, his wife, and his son who tried to confute him. Socrates remembered that no man controls another's ruling principle, so he wished only for what was his own: to remain conformable to nature while others act as they choose.

    Chapter 35

Section 364 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what alone makes a man's soul impregnable?

    Epictetus argues that nothing but a man's own opinions makes his soul impregnable. He compares this to a strong city whose walls, food, and resources let its people mock besiegers. All other things—body, possessions, honor—are perishable and easily assaulted, so anyone attached to them must be disturbed, fear, lament, and fall into what he would avoid.

    Chapter 36

  2. What does Epictetus say actually hurts or overturns a person?

    Epictetus argues that no man hurts or benefits another; rather, a man's opinions about each thing are what hurt and overturn him. He calls this the real source of fighting, civil discord, and war. He cites Eteocles and Polynices, whose enmity came from their opinions about royal power and exile—one as the greatest good, the other as the extreme of evils.

    Chapter 36

  3. How does Epictetus use the metaphor of a coin's stamp to judge a person?

    Epictetus compares examining a person to checking a coin for its stamp: a sestertius stamped by Trajan is accepted, one stamped by Nero is thrown away as counterfeit. Likewise, if a man's opinions show gentleness, a sociable disposition, and tolerance, accept him as citizen, neighbor, and companion. If he is passionate, resentful, and fault-finding, he lacks the stamp of a man.

    Chapter 36

  4. How does Epictetus advise responding to someone who insults or strikes you?

    Epictetus advises gratitude for what the offender did not do: thank him for not striking you, for not wounding you, for not killing you. Since such a man never learned that injustice harms the doer, he simply follows what seems in his interest. You are not a utensil to be broken but a free power of will; if you consider what is proper to a man, you examine your own faculties rather than retaliating like a wolf.

    Chapter 36

Section 373 cards
  1. Why does Epictetus say being pitied is not up to the person pitied?

    Epictetus argues that whether others pity you concerns those who pity you, not you; you can stop it only by showing you do not require pity. He notes people pity poverty, lack of office, disease and death, not faults. Convincing the many that none of these is evil is impracticable; only convincing yourself is in your power.

    Chapter 37

  2. According to Epictetus, what makes a tyrant and his guards formidable?

    Epictetus argues the guards' swords are formidable only to someone who wishes to live or fears death. A child is unafraid because he does not understand; a man seeking death by the tyrant's hand is unafraid because he wants what makes the guards feared. One who neither clings to life nor property, valuing only his own opinions, has nothing a tyrant can threaten.

    Chapter 37

  3. What does Epictetus say remains in a person's power under poverty, power, exile, or death?

    Epictetus argues that opinions alone are truly one's own and cannot be taken away. He says wherever he goes it will be well with him, not because of the place but because of the opinions he carries. On death, he urges speaking of it plainly as the body resolving into its elements, not as a tragedy, and claims no man has power over him.

    Chapter 37

Section 384 cards
  1. Why does Epictetus not force his way into Caesar's chamber?

    He says he does not choose to enter unless someone allows him, being content with what happens and believing God's choice is better than his own. He knows nothing good is distributed inside to those who force their way in, so there is no shutting out for him—only for those who would force their way in.

    Chapter 38

  2. How does Epictetus use dried figs and nuts to explain provincial offices?

    He compares a man scattering dried figs and nuts to Caesar distributing provinces, money, praetorships, and consulships. Children scramble and fight for such things; men regard them as small matters. Epictetus says if a fig lands in your lap, take and eat it, but it is not worth stooping, being turned over, or flattering the chamber's occupants.

    Chapter 38

  3. What does Epictetus say to the person anxious about desire and avoidance?

    He first praises him for discarding what others fuss over and attending to his own affairs. Then he advises: desire nothing in the power of others and avoid nothing outside your power, or you must necessarily fail in desires and fall into what you would avoid. Everything that happens can be treated according to nature, and no one can hinder that.

    Chapter 38

  4. What does Epictetus wish to be doing when death finds him?

    He wishes to be found doing something manly, beneficent, and suited to the general interest; failing that, correcting himself, cultivating the faculty that uses appearances, laboring at tranquillity, and rendering life's relations their due. If death surprises him there, it is enough to stretch out his hands to God and give thanks, having used what was given.

    Chapter 38

Section 394 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what makes the soul impure and what purifies it?

    Epictetus holds that the soul's impurity consists in its own bad judgments or opinions; the soul's acts are movement toward or from things, desire, aversion, preparation, purpose, and assent. Purification is planting proper opinions in the soul, and the soul that has proper opinions is pure, since the soul alone in its own acts is free from perturbation and pollution.

    Chapter 39

  2. Why does Epictetus prefer a young philosophy student with carefully trimmed hair over a dirty one?

    The author argues that a neat young man shows a notion of beauty and a desire for what is becoming, and where he supposes beauty to be, there he strives for it; one need only redirect him to the rational faculty. A filthy, unkempt man has busied himself with nothing resembling beauty, so there is no handle by which to lead him, like telling a hog not to roll in mud.

    Chapter 39

  3. What does Epictetus say happens when you let your attention lapse even briefly?

    He warns that you should not imagine you can recover attention whenever you choose; the fault committed today worsens all that follows. First, a habit of not attending is formed, then a habit of deferring attention, and by deferring you continually drive away happiness of life, proper behavior, and living conformably to nature. Once the mind is let loose, it cannot be recalled to propriety, modesty, or moderation.

    Chapter 39

  4. What rules does Epictetus say we should keep ready before acting?

    We should do nothing without them and keep the soul directed to this mark: pursue nothing external or in the power of others, but pursue things in the power of the will, and other things as permitted, doing as he who has the power appointed. We should remember who we are and our name, directing duties toward our several relations: the season for singing or play, in whose presence, the consequences, and how to maintain our own character while complying.

    Chapter 39

Section 404 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, is it possible to be completely free from faults?

    No, complete faultlessness is not possible. What is possible is to direct your efforts incessantly toward being faultless. Epictetus says we must be content if by never remitting this attention we escape at least a few errors. He warns that saying "Tomorrow I will begin to attend" means saying "Today I will be shameless, mean, passionate, and envious."

    Chapter 40

  2. Why does Epictetus warn against readily telling others your own affairs?

    He notes we feel it unfair to hear a neighbor's affairs without sharing ours, and fear seeming uncandid if silent. But he warns this trust is unsafe: a soldier in common dress who speaks ill of Caesar may be bait, and you are carried off in chains for agreeing. Hearing someone's secrets does not obligate you to reveal your own.

    Chapter 40

  3. What does Epictetus mean by the cask with a hole in it?

    He compares trusting secrets to depositing wine in a cask. If your cask leaks, you cannot demand that a watertight cask also trust you with its wine; there is no equality. Likewise, someone who has dishonored his faculty of will and chases money or office is not owed another's secrets. Show yourself faithful and steady first.

    Chapter 40

  4. In the Encheiridion, which things does Epictetus say are in our power?

    In our power are opinion, movement toward a thing, desire, aversion, turning from a thing, and in a word whatever are our acts. Not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices, and whatever are not our own acts. Things in our power are free and unhindered; things not in our power are weak, slavish, and in the power of others.

    Chapter 40

Section 414 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what actually disturbs people when things happen?

    Epictetus states that men are disturbed not by the things which happen but by their opinions about those things. He illustrates with death, arguing it is nothing terrible, since it would then have seemed so to Socrates; rather, the opinion that death is terrible is the terrible thing. He advises blaming oneself—one's own opinions—rather than others when impeded or grieved.

    Chapter 41

  2. What does Epictetus say about desire and aversion regarding things not in our power?

    Epictetus says desire contains a hope of obtaining what you desire, and aversion a hope of not falling into what you avoid; failing desire makes one unfortunate, falling into what one avoids makes one unhappy. He advises taking aversion away from things not in our power and transferring it to things contrary to nature within our power, and destroying desire completely for the present.

    Chapter 41

  3. How does Epictetus advise reacting when you kiss your child or wife?

    Epictetus advises adding the true nature of each thing to your notion of it, beginning from the smallest. If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel you love, so you are not disturbed when it breaks. Likewise, when kissing your child or wife, say it is a human being you are kissing, so that when the wife or child dies you will not be disturbed.

    Chapter 41

  4. What does Epictetus say about disease and lameness as impediments?

    Epictetus says disease is an impediment to the body but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses; lameness is an impediment to the leg but not to the will. He advises adding this reflection on the occasion of everything that happens, for you will find it an impediment to something else, but not to yourself.

    Chapter 41

Section 424 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what must you accept to improve?

    Epictetus says that to improve, you must submit to being considered senseless and foolish with respect to externals, and wish to be thought to know nothing. If you seem important to some, distrust yourself. He argues it is not easy both to keep your will conformable to nature and to secure external things; caring about one means neglecting the other.

    Chapter 42

  2. How does Epictetus describe life at a banquet?

    He advises behaving at life as at a banquet: if something is carried round and opposite you, stretch out your hand and take a portion with decency; if it passes by, do not detain it; if not yet come, do not send desire forward but wait. Apply this to children, wife, offices, and wealth. Taking nothing and despising it makes you a partner with the gods in power, as Diogenes and Heracleitus were.

    Chapter 42

  3. What does Epictetus say about being an actor in a play?

    Epictetus says to remember you are an actor in a play, of whatever kind the author chooses: short or long, poor man, lame man, magistrate, or private person. Your duty is to act well the part given to you; selecting the part belongs to another.

    Chapter 42

  4. How should you respond when someone weeps in sorrow?

    Epictetus advises not letting the appearance hurry you away as if the person were suffering in external things. Distinguish in your mind that it is not the event that afflicts him—since it does not afflict another—but his opinion about it. In words, show sympathy and even lament with him, but take care not to lament internally.

    Chapter 42

Section 432 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, why should you not resent not being invited to a man's feast?

    Epictetus argues the host sells the supper for a price—praise or flattery and personal attention. If you refuse to pay that price, you should not expect the supper; you instead keep the obolus you did not give, plus the benefit of not flattering him. To want both the thing and no price is, he says, insatiable and silly.

    Chapter 43

  2. How does Epictetus define duties, and what does he say about a bad father?

    He says duties are universally measured by relations. If a man is a father, the precept is to care for him, yield to him, and submit when he reproaches or strikes. Asked whether one is made akin to a good father, he answers no—but to a father. Likewise with a wronging brother: maintain your own position and consider what you must do, not what he does.

    Chapter 43

Section 444 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, what is the chief thing in piety toward the gods?

    Epictetus says the chief thing is to have right opinions about the gods: to think they exist and administer the All well and justly. One must fix oneself in obeying and yielding to them in everything that happens, following voluntarily as accomplished by the wisest intelligence. This prevents blaming the gods or accusing them of neglect.

    Chapter 44

  2. Why does Epictetus say people revile the gods and each other?

    He argues it happens because people place good and evil in things not in their power. Every animal naturally flees what appears harmful and its cause, so one who thinks he is harmed cannot be pleased with the cause. Thus a son reviles a father, Polynices and Eteocles became enemies over royal power, and farmers, sailors, merchants, and the bereaved revile the gods.

    Chapter 44

  3. How should one approach divination, according to Epictetus?

    Come remembering you do not know the outcome but are inquiring of the diviner. Bring neither desire nor aversion, since if the matter is not in our power it is neither good nor bad. Determine that whatever results is indifferent and you can use it well, then come with confidence. Do not consult divination about whether to share a friend's or country's danger; reason prevails there.

    Chapter 44

  4. What rule does Epictetus give for responding to someone who reports that a person speaks ill of you?

    Do not make any defense against what has been told to you. Instead reply that the man did not know the rest of your faults, for otherwise he would not have mentioned only these. This is part of Epictetus's broader advice to prescribe a character for yourself, keep silence as the general rule, and speak only what is necessary and in few words.

    Chapter 44

Section 453 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, how should you prepare before meeting a superior person?

    Epictetus advises placing before yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances, and you will then have no difficulty making proper use of the occasion. He also warns that when visiting the powerful you should expect to be excluded, that the door may not open, and that the man will not care about you—and if duty requires the visit, bear it without calling it not worth the trouble.

    Chapter 45

  2. What does Epictetus say about speaking of your own acts and dangers in company?

    He warns against speaking much and excessively about your own acts or dangers. What is pleasant for you to recount is not pleasant for others to hear. He also cautions against provoking laughter, calling it a slippery path toward vulgar habits that diminishes the respect of neighbors, and against approaching obscene talk—rebuking the speaker if there is opportunity, or otherwise showing displeasure through silence, blushing, and countenance.

    Chapter 45

  3. How does Epictetus advise handling an impression of pleasure?

    Guard against being carried away by it; let the thing wait and allow yourself a delay. Then consider both times: the enjoyment of the pleasure and the later repentance and self-reproach. Set against these how you will rejoice and commend yourself if you abstain. If it seems seasonable to act, take care that the charm and attraction do not conquer you, but weigh how much better it is to be conscious of having gained the victory.

    Chapter 45

Section 464 cards
  1. According to Epictetus, how should a philosopher behave among the uninstructed?

    Epictetus advises not calling yourself a philosopher or speaking much about theorems among the uninstructed; instead do what follows from them. At a banquet, don't explain how to eat—eat as you ought. He cites Socrates, who avoided ostentation and readily let himself be overlooked. He warns that speaking prematurely risks vomiting up undigested ideas; like sheep producing wool and milk, show acts, not theorems.

    Chapter 46

  2. What does Epictetus say are the signs of one making progress?

    Epictetus lists: censuring no one, praising no one, blaming no one, accusing no one; saying nothing about oneself as if knowing something; blaming oneself when hindered; ridiculing a praiser inwardly and not defending against a critic; moving cautiously like the weak; removing desire and transferring aversion only to things within our power contrary to nature; caring not if thought foolish; and watching oneself as an enemy in ambush.

    Chapter 46

  3. How does Epictetus rank the three parts of philosophy, and what error do students make?

    Epictetus says the first and most necessary part is the use of theorems, such as that we must not lie. The second is demonstrations, e.g., how it is proved we ought not to lie. The third explains demonstration, consequence, contradiction, truth, and falsehood. The third is necessary for the second, and the second for the first, but the first is most necessary. He argues we do the contrary, spending our time on the third and neglecting the first—so we lie while having the proof ready.

    Chapter 46

  4. What does Epictetus say about being proud of understanding Chrysippus?

    Epictetus says if a man is proud of explaining Chrysippus, reflect that if Chrysippus had not written obscurely, he'd have nothing to be proud of. What one should wish is to understand nature and follow it; the interpreter is a means, and understanding the text is not yet grounds for pride. The remaining task is to use the precepts—that alone is worth pride. Otherwise one becomes a grammarian instead of a philosopher, explaining Chrysippus instead of Homer, and should blush when unable to show acts consistent with his words.

    Chapter 46

Source and licence

Text used: Project Gutenberg eBook #10661 (Public domain in the United States). Generated from the full text; cards paraphrase the source.

Version: Public domain edition. Retrieved 2026-10-27. Cards reviewed 2026-10-27.

These cards paraphrase the text for study. They are not a substitute for reading the book, and they do not reproduce long passages.

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