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A Treatise of Human Nature Flashcards

David Hume · Public domain edition · 265 cards · 74 chapters

David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature argues that all knowledge of matters of fact rests on custom and experience rather than reason, and that the science of human nature is the foundation of other sciences. The deck covers his accounts of impressions and ideas, causation, necessary connection, belief, and the association of ideas.

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Chapter 1 · Question

According to Hume, from what does our idea of cause and effect derive?

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PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY.4 cards

According to Hume, from what does our idea of cause and effect derive?
Hume argues that the idea of cause and effect is not derived from reason but from experience and custom. We observe constant conjunction between objects, and habit leads the mind to infer one from the other. The necessary connection we feel is a sentiment of the mind, not a quality in the objects themselves.
Chapter 1
What distinguishes knowledge from probability in Hume's account?
Hume holds that knowledge arises from the comparison of ideas and yields certainty, as in mathematics, where relations are discovered by pure thought. Probability concerns matters of fact and rests on causal inference from experience, which never attains certainty. Probable reasoning thus depends on the custom-based transition from impression to idea.
Chapter 1
What role does belief play in Hume's theory of inference?
Hume argues belief is not a new idea added to a conception but a different manner of conceiving it — a livelier, more vivid and firm conception produced by custom. When an impression is present, the related idea is enlivened and becomes a belief. Belief thus consists in the force and vivacity of the idea.
Chapter 1
How does Hume explain the idea of necessary connection?
Hume argues that necessary connection is not observed in objects but arises from the mind's determination, produced by custom, to pass from a cause to its usual effect. This internal impression of determination is the source of the idea. The necessity we attribute to causes is thus a projection of our own feeling of transition.
Chapter 1

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES3 cards

According to Hume, what is the only solid foundation for the science of human nature?
Hume argues the science of man must be founded on experience and observation, just as experimental philosophy was applied to natural subjects. He insists we cannot go beyond experience, and any hypothesis claiming to reveal the ultimate original qualities of human nature should be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.
Chapter 2
How does Hume describe the relationship of all sciences to human nature?
Hume argues every science has a greater or lesser relation to human nature, and even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion depend on the science of man since they are judged by human powers and faculties. Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics are even more closely connected, so mastering human nature is the route to all of them.
Chapter 2
What common prejudice against metaphysics does Hume identify, and how does he respond?
Hume notes that many, including scholars, reject abstruse metaphysical reasoning because they have so often lost labor in such research. He responds that if truth is within human capacity, it must lie deep and abstruse, so hoping to reach it without pains is vain and presumptuous—only determined scepticism plus indolence justifies the aversion.
Chapter 2

PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION… (part 1)4 cards

How does Hume distinguish impressions from ideas?
Hume divides all perceptions into impressions and ideas by their degree of force and liveliness. Impressions are perceptions that enter with most force and violence, including sensations, passions and emotions at their first appearance. Ideas are the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. He says everyone readily perceives the difference between feeling and thinking, though in sleep, fever, madness or violent emotion the two may nearly approach each other.
Chapter 3
Does Hume claim all ideas and impressions exactly resemble each other?
Not universally. Hume limits the resemblance rule using the simple/complex distinction. Many complex ideas never had corresponding impressions, and many complex impressions are never exactly copied in ideas, as when he imagines a New Jerusalem of gold and rubies he never saw. But for simple perceptions he ventures that the rule holds without exception: every simple idea has a resembling simple impression, and vice versa.
Chapter 3
What general proposition does Hume establish about simple ideas and impressions?
Hume establishes that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions which correspond to them and which they exactly represent. He argues from constant conjunction plus the order of first appearance: simple impressions always precede their correspondent ideas, never the reverse. Presenting objects to a child conveys impressions; exciting ideas does not produce impressions. Where sensory faculties are obstructed, as in being born blind or deaf, both impressions and their correspondent ideas are lost.
Chapter 3
What exception does Hume allow to the priority of impressions over ideas?
Hume offers the missing shade of blue: a person acquainted with all colours except one shade, shown the full gradation with that shade absent, could presumably imagine the missing shade from his own fancy. This suggests simple ideas are not always derived from correspondent impressions. Hume calls the instance so particular and singular that it scarce merits altering the general maxim. He also notes secondary ideas, images of primary ideas, as a limitation rather than a true exception.
Chapter 3

PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION… (part 2)4 cards

According to Hume, what three relations unite simple ideas in the imagination?
Hume identifies resemblance, contiguity in space and time, and cause and effect as the principles of union or cohesion among simple ideas. He argues causation is the most extensive of the three, since it connects objects not only when one produces motion or action in another, but also when it merely has the power to do so, as in relations of interest, duty, and authority.
Chapter 4
How does Hume define the idea of substance?
Hume argues we have no idea of substance distinct from a collection of particular qualities. Since substance is neither a colour, sound, nor taste, it cannot come from sensation, and impressions of reflection are only passions and emotions. The idea of substance, like that of a mode, is a collection of simple ideas united by the imagination and given a name.
Chapter 4
What distinguishes a substance from a mode in Hume's account?
In a substance, the qualities are referred to an unknown something in which they supposedly inhere, or are at least closely connected by contiguity and causation. This lets new qualities join the complex idea without changing its name, as dissolubility in aqua regia was added to gold. In modes, the uniting principle is not the foundation, so new ideas require a new name.
Chapter 4
What does Hume argue about abstract or general ideas?
Hume endorses Berkeley's view that all general ideas are nothing but particular ideas annexed to a term, which gives them more extensive signification and makes them recall similar individuals. He calls this one of the greatest discoveries in the republic of letters and attempts to confirm it, arguing the mind cannot conceive quantity or quality without a precise notion of degrees.
Chapter 4

PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION… (part 3)1 cards

How does a particular idea become general, according to Hume?
The author argues a particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general term—a term that, through customary conjunction, relates to many other particular ideas and readily recalls them in the imagination. Thus ideas are particular in their nature but general in their representation; custom, not abstraction, does the work.
Chapter 5

PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.4 cards

Why does Hume reject the infinite divisibility of our ideas of space and time?
Hume argues the mind's capacity is limited and can never attain an adequate conception of infinity. Whatever is infinitely divisible must contain an infinite number of parts, so if the mind cannot conceive infinity, its ideas must terminate in simple, indivisible minima. He illustrates with a grain of sand and a distant ink spot, whose impression vanishes as a perfectly indivisible image.
Chapter 6
What argument from Malezieu does Hume cite against infinite divisibility?
Hume cites Mons. Malezieu: existence belongs only to unity, never to number except through the unites composing it. Since extension is always a number and never resolves into an indivisible unite, extension could never exist. Calling a quantity a 'unit' is a fictitious denomination, since the only true unity is perfectly indivisible.
Chapter 6
Why does Hume hold that time must be composed of indivisible moments?
Hume argues it is essential to time that each part succeeds another and no parts are co-existent. If division never ended, each moment would not be perfectly single, yielding an infinite number of co-existent moments—an arrant contradiction. He adds that infinite divisibility of space implies that of time through the nature of motion.
Chapter 6
How does Hume use the maxim that whatever the mind clearly conceives is possible?
Hume invokes the metaphysical maxim that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes possible existence. We have an idea of extension that, as conceived, is divisible into parts but not infinitely so, consisting of indivisible parts. Since this implies no contradiction, extension conforming to it is possible, so arguments against mathematical points are scholastic quibbles and demonstrations for infinite divisibility are sophistical.
Chapter 6

I.3 cards

What two extremes does Hume say the argument about infinite divisibility sets against each other?
Hume says the schools argue extension must be divisible in infinitum because the system of mathematical points is absurd, since a mathematical point is a non-entity and cannot form real existence by conjunction. He replies this would be decisive only if there were no medium between infinite divisibility of matter and the non-entity of mathematical points.
Chapter 7
What medium does Hume propose between infinite divisibility and the non-entity of points?
Hume proposes bestowing a colour or solidity on mathematical points. He argues that since both extremes are absurd, this medium must be true and real. He presents this as a demonstration of the truth and reality of the medium rather than as a proof of either extreme.
Chapter 7
Why does Hume reject the system of physical points?
Hume calls the system of physical points another medium but says it is too absurd to need refutation. He argues that a real extension, such as a physical point is supposed to be, can never exist without parts different from each other, and wherever objects are different they are distinguishable and separable by the imagination.
Chapter 7

II.3 cards

How does Hume redefine penetration to answer the objection about mathematical points?
Hume substitutes a juster idea of penetration: when two bodies with no internal void approach and unite so the resulting body is no more extended than either, this is really the annihilation of one body and preservation of the other, without our being able to distinguish which is preserved. Before approach we have the idea of two bodies; after, only one. The mind cannot preserve any notion of difference between two bodies of the same nature in the same place at the same time.
Chapter 8
Why does Hume think two differently coloured points can lie contiguous without penetration?
Hume asks whether anyone sees a necessity that a coloured or tangible point be annihilated on the approach of another. He argues the opposite is evident: from the union of two points results a compounded, divisible object distinguishable into two parts, each preserving its existence. Aiding the fancy with different colours, a blue and a red point may lie contiguous without penetration or annihilation; otherwise one must be annihilated or a new colour produced.
Chapter 8
What does Hume say chiefly causes the objections and makes them hard to answer?
Hume says the chief cause is the natural infirmity and unsteadiness of both imagination and senses when employed on such minute objects. He illustrates with a spot of ink: at a distance it is invisible, then visible at short intervals, then always visible, then gains force of colouring without augmenting bulk, and once truly extended the imagination still struggles to break it into component parts because conceiving such a minute object as a single point is uneasy.
Chapter 8

III. (part 1)4 cards

How does Hume use geometry's definitions of point, line, and surface against infinite divisibility?
Hume argues that a point is defined as having no length, breadth, or depth, a line as length without breadth or depth, and a surface as length and breadth without depth. He claims these definitions are unintelligible unless extension is composed of indivisible points or atoms, so geometry's definitions actually support his doctrine even though its demonstrations oppose it.
Chapter 9
What two answers does Hume consider to the argument from definitions, and why reject them?
First, that geometrical objects are mere ideas that never exist in nature; Hume rejects this as absurd, since whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived implies possible existence. Second, that we can consider length without breadth by abstraction without separation; Hume rejects this too, arguing that if ideas of points, lines, or surfaces were divisible, we could never conceive their terminations.
Chapter 9
Why does Hume say the standard of equality as equal numbers of points is just but useless?
Hume grants that defining equal lines by equal numbers of points is the readiest and justest answer for defenders of indivisible points. But he argues it is useless because the points are too minute and confounded for the mind to count, so no one can determine by numeration that an inch has fewer points than a foot.
Chapter 9
What does Hume conclude is the only useful notion of equality?
Hume agrees with philosophers who refuse any standard but presenting equal objects: the only useful notion of equality comes from the whole united appearance and comparison of particular objects. The eye or mind can often judge proportions at one view, though such judgments are sometimes fallible and corrected by juxtaposition or common measures. Any standard beyond our instruments is an imaginary fiction.
Chapter 9

III. (part 2)3 cards

What is Hume's stated original standard of a right line?
Hume asserts the original standard of a right line is nothing but a certain general appearance, not an exact enumeration of points in a fixed order. He adds that our senses and imagination lack firmness to determine when such an order is violated or preserved, and that right lines may be made to concur while still matching this standard, even when corrected by all practicable means.
Chapter 10
How does Hume argue against the idea of a vacuum from darkness?
Hume argues darkness is merely the negation of light, not a positive idea, and a sighted man in total darkness receives nothing beyond what a blind man has. Since blindness and darkness give no idea of extension, the dark distance between two luminous bodies cannot produce it either; the only perceptions are simple and indivisible, so they cannot yield extension.
Chapter 10
What does Hume say follows from the ideas of rest and annihilation in the chamber?
Hume asks what results from combining the possible ideas of rest and annihilation, supposing all air and subtle matter in a chamber vanish while walls remain. He rejects the common answer that walls then touch, defying metaphysicians to conceive opposite walls touching while at rest and keeping position. He concludes the resulting idea is not contact of parts but a vacuum.
Chapter 10

III. (part 3)4 cards

According to Hume, what is the most fertile source of error in reasoning?
Hume states that of the three relations—resemblance, causation, and contiguity—resemblance is the most fertile source of error. Resembling ideas are related, and the mental actions used to consider them are so similar that we cannot distinguish them, so we confuse the ideas and take one for the other. He adds that causation and contiguity may also contribute to the same mistake.
Chapter 11
Why does Hume say people use words for ideas in reasoning?
Hume observes it is usual for men to use words for ideas and to talk instead of thinking in reasoning. This happens because words and ideas are commonly so closely connected that the mind easily mistakes them. He offers this as a proof drawn from metaphysicians' own discourses, since he considers arguments from poets and orators beneath metaphysical dignity.
Chapter 11
How does Hume answer the objection that his system explains only how objects affect the senses?
Hume pleads guilty, confessing his intention was never to penetrate the nature of bodies or explain the secret causes of their operations. He holds such an enterprise beyond human understanding, since we can know body only by external properties revealed to the senses. Knowing how objects affect the senses and their experienced connections suffices for the conduct of life and for his philosophy of perceptions.
Chapter 11
What is Hume's stated paradox about extension and the vacuum?
Hume concludes with a paradox: if you give the name 'vacuum' to invisible and intangible distance, or the capacity of becoming visible and tangible distance, then extension and matter are the same, and yet there is a vacuum. If you refuse that name, motion is possible in a plenum without impulse in infinitum, without circular return, and without penetration. Either way, we have no idea of real extension without filling it with sensible objects.
Chapter 11

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 1)2 cards

Why does Hume rank arithmetic and algebra above geometry in certainty?
Hume argues that arithmetic and algebra alone allow a chain of reasoning to any intricacy while preserving perfect exactness, because we possess a precise standard of equality for numbers: two numbers are equal when each unit of one answers to a unit of the other. Geometry's first principles are drawn from appearances, and we lack such a standard of equality in extension, so it can scarce be esteemed a perfect and infallible science.
Chapter 12
Of identity, time and place, and causation, which alone carries the mind beyond the senses?
Hume concludes that causation is the only one of the three relations that can be traced beyond our senses and inform us of existences we do not see or feel. Identity and relations of time and place cannot take the mind beyond what is immediately present; they are used in reasoning only so far as they affect or are affected by causation. Even judgments of identity rest on causal reasoning about whether a change could have occurred.
Chapter 12

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 2)4 cards

Why does Hume deny that every beginning of existence must have a cause?
Hume argues the proposition is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. Since cause and effect are distinct ideas, the imagination can conceive an object non-existent now and existent the next without any cause, implying no contradiction. He therefore concludes that belief in the necessity of a cause must arise from observation and experience, not from knowledge or scientific reasoning.
Chapter 13
How does Hume rebut the argument that an uncaused thing would produce itself?
Hume says the reasoning is unconclusive because it assumes what it denies: that there must be a cause, so the object itself must be it. But to say something comes into existence without a cause is not to say it is its own cause; excluding all external causes excludes the thing itself a fortiori. The argument begs the question it should prove.
Chapter 13
What does Hume say about the argument that 'nothing' cannot be a cause?
Hume treats this (attributed to Locke) as the same fallacy as the others. When we exclude all causes, we exclude them entirely and suppose neither nothing nor the object itself to be the cause. So no argument can be drawn from the absurdity of those suppositions to prove the absurdity of the exclusion. Whether everything must have a cause remains the very point in question.
Chapter 13
How does Hume distinguish memory from imagination?
Not by their simple ideas, since both borrow from impressions, and not reliably by the order of complex ideas, since past impressions cannot be recalled for comparison. The difference lies in memory's superior force and vivacity. A forgotten scene, revived by a lucky circumstance, appears in a new light and becomes an idea of memory, assented to without other alteration than that feeling.
Chapter 13

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 3)4 cards

According to Hume, what determines the mind's transition from an impression to the idea of a cause or effect?
Hume argues the transition is not determined by reason but by principles of association that unite ideas in the imagination. Reason, even aided by experience and observed constant conjunction, can never show the connexion of one object with another. The inference therefore depends solely on the union of ideas, established by resemblance, contiguity, and causation.
Chapter 14
Why can't there be demonstrative arguments proving that unexperienced instances resemble experienced ones?
Hume argues we can at least conceive a change in the course of nature, which proves such a change is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of anything is an undeniable argument for its possibility and refutes any pretended demonstration against it. So no demonstrative proof can establish that the future must resemble the past.
Chapter 14
What three general principles of association among ideas does Hume identify?
Hume reduces the principles of union among ideas to three: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. He allows these are neither infallible nor the sole causes of union, since attention can fix on one object and thought moves irregularly. Yet he asserts these are the only general principles that associate ideas.
Chapter 14
How does Hume distinguish belief from mere conception of an idea?
Hume argues belief adds no new ideas to those composing the idea of the object; thinking of God, thinking him existent, and believing him existent neither increases nor diminishes the idea. Since the difference lies not in the idea's parts, it must lie in the manner of conception. Belief is thus an idea related to or associated with a present impression.
Chapter 14

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 4)4 cards

According to Hume, how does belief differ from a fiction?
Hume argues belief is nothing but an idea that differs from a fiction not in the nature or order of its parts, but in the manner of its conception. An assented-to idea feels different—it has superior force, vivacity, solidity, firmness, or steadiness—which makes realities more present, gives them more influence on the passions, and renders them governing principles of action.
Chapter 15
How does Hume illustrate belief using two readers of the same book?
Hume asks us to imagine one person reading a book as a romance and another as a true history. Both receive the same ideas in the same order and put the same sense on the author's words. Yet the believer has a more lively conception, enters deeper into the persons' concerns, and even forms notions of their features, while the skeptic's conception stays faint and languid.
Chapter 15
What general maxim does Hume propose about present impressions and related ideas?
Hume proposes as a general maxim in the science of human nature that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to related ideas but communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. The mind's disposition, once enlivened, passes easily along related objects, so the related idea is conceived with the force acquired from the present impression.
Chapter 15
Which three relations does Hume say enliven ideas and produce belief?
Hume identifies resemblance, contiguity, and causation. A present impression with any of these relations communicates vivacity to a related idea. He cites a friend's picture (resemblance), proximity to home (contiguity), and relics of saints (causation) as experiments confirming that a present impression plus a relation in the fancy enlivens an idea and so produces belief.
Chapter 15

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 5)4 cards

How does Hume answer the objection that an idea, not an impression, can generate belief?
Hume answers that the present idea, considered not as a representation of an absent object but as a real perception of which we are intimately conscious, supplies the place of an impression. It can therefore bestow on whatever is related to it the same force and vivacity. On the same principles, he says, we need not be surprised at the remembrance of an idea, or the idea of an idea.
Chapter 16
Why does Hume hold that belief arises only from causation, not from resemblance or contiguity alone?
Hume argues that resemblance and contiguity, when single, have a very feeble and uncertain influence. Since nothing necessitates the mind to feign resembling or contiguous objects, such fictions rest on pure caprice, which is fluctuating and cannot operate with force or constancy. Causation, by contrast, presents objects that are fixed and unalterable, so thought passes from impression to idea without choice or hesitation.
Chapter 16
What example does Hume give of contiguity strengthening belief?
Hume remarks that among Mahometans as well as Christians, pilgrims who have seen Mecca or the Holy Land are ever after more faithful and zealous believers than those who have not had that advantage. A lively image of the Red Sea, the Desert, Jerusalem, and Galilee makes it hard to doubt the miraculous events related by Moses or the Evangelists, since the lively idea of places passes easily to the facts connected by contiguity.
Chapter 16
How does Hume argue against the claim that the communication of motion can be inferred from the ideas of body, motion, and impulse?
Hume argues that if such an inference could be drawn from the ideas alone, it would amount to a demonstration and imply the absolute impossibility of any contrary supposition. But we can clearly and consistently conceive a body resting on contact, returning in the same line, being annihilated, or moving circularly or elliptically. Since these suppositions are consistent and natural, the inference is not demonstrative; our preference for communication of motion rests on resemblance united to experience.
Chapter 16

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 6)4 cards

According to Hume, what does the inconsistency of certain religious believers reveal?
Hume argues that people who condemn acts like the Gunpowder-treason and the St. Bartholomew's massacre as barbarous, yet without scruple condemn others to eternal punishment, show they do not really believe what they affirm about a future state. He says the very inconsistency is the best proof, and adds that in religion men take pleasure in being terrified, so the most dismal preachers are most popular.
Chapter 17
How does Hume distinguish two ways custom operates on the mind?
Hume says custom works two ways: when two objects have always been conjoined in past experience, the appearance of one impression leads by easy transition to the idea of the other, conceived more strongly. Alternatively, a mere idea frequently appearing in the mind acquires facility and force by degrees, distinguishing itself from new and unusual ideas. These two kinds of custom agree only in this particular.
Chapter 17
What does Hume claim about education's influence on belief?
Hume argues that opinions accustomed from infancy take such deep root that reason and experience cannot eradicate them, and this habit sometimes prevails over custom from constant conjunction of causes and effects. He is persuaded that more than half of prevailing opinions are owing to education, which overbalances abstract reasoning or experience. Yet education is an artificial, not natural, cause, and its maxims are often contrary to reason.
Chapter 17
What is Hume's definition of belief and its effect on the passions?
Hume concludes belief is nothing but a more vivid and intense conception of any idea. Its effect is to raise a simple idea to equality with impressions and give it like influence on the passions, which it does by approaching impressions in force and vivacity. He adds that belief is almost absolutely requisite to exciting passions, and passions in turn favor belief, as when a coward readily assents to every account of danger.
Chapter 17

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 7)4 cards

How does Hume distinguish knowledge, proofs, and probabilities?
Hume proposes dividing human reason into three kinds: knowledge, the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas; proofs, arguments derived from cause and effect that are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty; and probability, evidence still attended with uncertainty. He notes that in common discourse we say arguments from causation exceed mere probability, as when we affirm the sun will rise tomorrow.
Chapter 18
What is chance in Hume's account, and why can no single chance exceed another?
Hume argues chance is nothing real in itself and is properly merely the negation of a cause. Its effect on the mind is to leave the imagination perfectly indifferent. Since total indifference is essential to chance, one chance cannot be superior to another except by being composed of a superior number of equal chances; otherwise something would determine the event, which would be a cause.
Chapter 18
Why does calculating chances require a mixture of causes?
Hume holds that chance and causation are directly contrary, yet we cannot conceive a combination of chances making one hazard superior without supposing a mixture of causes. Unless we allow causes that make dice fall, keep their form, and land on a side, no calculation about the laws of hazard is possible. Causes limit the events; chance leaves the particular outcome undetermined.
Chapter 18
How does a superior number of chances produce belief, according to Hume?
Hume argues this assent comes neither by demonstration nor by probability. The causes give the mind an impulse toward the effect; the indifferent sides divide that impulse equally among them; and sides bearing the same figure unite their divided impulses on one idea. Thus a die with four sides marked one way and two another makes us believe the four-side figure will lie uppermost, with doubt proportional to contrary chances.
Chapter 18

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 8)2 cards

How does Hume explain our judgment when past experiments are contrary?
Hume argues that when past experiments conflict, the habit of transferring past to future is full and perfect but presents no steady object, only disagreeing images in a certain order and proportion. The first impulse breaks into pieces, each image sharing equal force and vivacity. We judge the most common effect most likely, and each new experiment adds vivacity like a new stroke of the pencil without enlarging the figure.
Chapter 19
How does Hume argue that probability and its opposite possibility differ?
Hume argues every probability allows a contrary possibility, since otherwise it would be certainty. The component parts of possibility and probability are of the same nature, differing only in number, not kind. Belief is a compounded effect from concurring parts; the superior number prevails only by producing a stronger, more lively view of its object. The mind is determined to the superior side with the force remaining after subtracting the inferior.
Chapter 19

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 9)4 cards

According to Hume, how does the recency of an impression affect belief?
Hume argues that a lively or recent impression conveys greater force and vivacity to the related idea, so belief is stronger. A recent observation has more influence because the custom and transition are more entire. He illustrates with a drunkard who dreads a like accident after seeing a companion die, but whose former security returns as the memory decays.
Chapter 20
Why does a long chain of reasoning weaken conviction, according to Hume?
Hume holds that vivacity is derived from the original impression and decays in proportion to distance, losing something at each transition. So an immediate inference is more persuasive than a long chain, however infallible each link. He notes that sometimes distance matters more than contrary experiments, and that few can preserve evidence through many stages.
Chapter 20
How does Hume answer the objection that ancient history's evidence must decay?
Hume replies that although the links connecting an original fact to a present impression are innumerable, they are all of the same kind, depending on the fidelity of printers and copyists. Since there is no variation in the steps, the mind runs along them easily and forms only a confused general notion of each link, so the chain does not diminish the original vivacity.
Chapter 20
What does Hume say about prejudices formed from general rules?
Hume argues that prejudices such as 'an Irishman cannot have wit' arise from general rules we rashly form. They proceed from the same principles as causal judgments: custom operates with full force on exact instances and in an inferior degree on similar ones. He notes custom can influence the imagination in opposition to judgment, as when a man in an iron cage trembles at the precipice.
Chapter 20

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 10)4 cards

According to Hume, what gives us the idea of necessity between cause and effect?
Hume argues that after frequent repetition, when one object appears the mind is determined by custom to consider its usual attendant in a stronger light. It is this impression or determination of the mind, not any third relation discovered in the objects themselves, that affords the idea of necessity.
Chapter 21
What two obvious principles does Hume use to reject the popular explanation of power?
Hume rejects the view that we reason from new productions in matter to a power capable of producing them, citing two principles: first, that reason alone can never give rise to any original idea; second, that reason, as distinguished from experience, can never make us conclude a cause or productive quality is absolutely requisite to every beginning of existence.
Chapter 21
What conditions does Hume list that diminish the evidence of a probable judgment?
Hume says evidence diminishes when we have not observed enough instances to produce a strong habit; when instances are contrary to each other; when resemblance is not exact; when the present impression is faint or obscure; when experience is partly obliterated from memory; when the connexion depends on a long chain of objects; or when the inference comes from general rules yet is not conformable to them.
Chapter 21
How does Hume describe the mind's decision when it weighs contrary experiments?
Hume says the mind is first divided within itself, inclining to either side in proportion to the number of experiments seen and remembered. The contest is decided in favor of the side with the superior number, but still with a diminution of force in the evidence corresponding to the number of opposite experiments.
Chapter 21

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 11)2 cards

According to Hume, where does the idea of necessity exist?
Hume argues that necessity exists in the mind, not in objects. It is nothing but the internal impression or determination of thought to pass from causes to effects, according to their experienced union. He compares it to the necessity in mathematics, which lies in the act of understanding. The efficacy of causes belongs entirely to the soul considering the union of objects, not to the causes themselves.
Chapter 22
How does Hume answer the objection that causes operate independent of the mind?
Hume replies that the objection assumes we have a clear idea of power or efficacy in objects, which he denies. He compares the objector to a blind man finding absurdities in claims about colors. If we have no idea of power in objects, proving efficacy is necessary accomplishes little. He allows there may be unknown qualities we could call power, but we cannot clearly conceive them.
Chapter 22

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. (part 12)4 cards

According to Hume, what two elements constitute physical necessity?
Hume holds that physical necessity consists of the constant conjunction of objects together with the determination of the mind to pass from one object to another. Removing either element yields chance, and he insists there is no medium between chance and absolute necessity. Weakening the conjunction or determination does not change the nature of the necessity, since bodies show varying degrees of constancy without producing a different species of relation.
Chapter 23
What are Hume's first three rules for judging causes and effects?
Hume lists: (1) cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time; (2) the cause must be prior to the effect; (3) there must be a constant union betwixt cause and effect, which chiefly constitutes the relation. He derives these rules from experience, noting that since anything may produce anything by the mere survey, general rules are needed to identify real causation.
Chapter 23
Why does Hume use animal reasoning as a test of theories of the mind?
Hume argues beasts are endowed with thought and reason as well as men, since their actions resemble ours in adapting means to ends. He proposes this as a touchstone: any hypothesis explaining a mental operation common to men and beasts must apply to both. He claims false systems fail because they presuppose a subtility of thought exceeding animals, children, and common people.
Chapter 23
How does Hume explain a dog's inference from a present impression?
Hume asserts animal inference works like human inference: a present impression in memory or senses grounds the judgment, and the inference is built on experience of past conjunctions. A dog infers anger from his master's tone and foresees punishment; vary the experience and he varies his conclusion. Since beasts perceive no real connexion, custom alone makes experience operate on them.
Chapter 23

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 2)4 cards

According to Hume, from which faculty does the belief in continued and distinct existence of body arise?
Hume concludes that the opinion of a continued and distinct existence never arises from the senses, since they cannot operate beyond the extent in which they really operate, and reason cannot assure us of it either. The belief must therefore be entirely owing to the imagination, which he then makes the subject of his enquiry.
Chapter 25
What two qualities of impressions lead us to attribute continued existence to objects?
Hume identifies constancy and coherence. Constancy: mountains, houses, and trees appear in the same order and return unchanged after we shut our eyes. Coherence: bodies change position and qualities but preserve a regular dependence on each other, as when fire alters during an absence, which founds a kind of reasoning from causation.
Chapter 25
Why does Hume reject involuntariness and force as the basis for attributing real existence to impressions?
He argues pains, pleasures, passions, and affections are equally involuntary and often operate with greater violence than impressions of figure, colour, and sound, yet we never suppose them to exist beyond our perception. The moderate heat of a fire is thought to exist in the fire, but the pain it causes on near approach is not.
Chapter 25
How do the porter and the letter illustrate coherence in Hume's argument?
Hearing a door and seeing a porter, or receiving a letter from a friend two hundred leagues away, contradicts past experience unless the door still exists and the stairs were not annihilated by his absence. The supposition that objects continue, at first arbitrary and hypothetical, gains force as the only way to reconcile these phenomena with experience.
Chapter 25

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 3)2 cards

How does Hume explain our ascription of identity to interrupted, resembling perceptions?
Hume argues that resemblance is the most efficacious relation: it associates both ideas and the mind's dispositions, so we readily confound ideas placing the mind in similar dispositions. A succession of resembling perceptions produces the same smooth, uninterrupted passage of imagination as viewing one invariable object, so we mistake the succession for identity and ascribe perfect identity to interrupted perceptions.
Chapter 26
Whose opinions does Hume claim to account for in explaining belief in body?
Hume states he accounts for the opinions and belief of the vulgar regarding the existence of body, so he conforms to their manner of thinking and speaking. He supposes at first a single existence called indifferently object or perception, meaning what a common man means by a hat, shoe, or stone, warning he will return later to a more philosophical way of speaking.
Chapter 26

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 4)4 cards

What experiment does Hume cite to show perceptions depend on our organs?
Hume cites pressing one eye with a finger, which makes objects appear double and displaces half of them from their natural position. Since we do not attribute continued existence to both perceptions, and both are of the same nature, we perceive that all perceptions depend on our organs and the disposition of nerves and animal spirits. He adds the seeming increase and diminution of objects by distance and changes from sickness as confirmation.
Chapter 27
Why does Hume say the double-existence hypothesis has no primary recommendation to reason?
Hume argues the only existences we are certain of are perceptions, immediately present by consciousness. The only inference from one existence to another is cause and effect, derived from past experience of constant conjunction. But only perceptions are ever present to the mind, so we can observe causation between perceptions, never between perceptions and objects. Hence reason can never conclude from perceptions to external objects.
Chapter 27
How does the philosophical system of double existence arise, according to Hume?
Hume argues it is the "monstrous offspring" of two contrary principles. Imagination tells us resembling perceptions continue uninterrupted; reflection tells us they are interrupted and dependent. Unable to reconcile these, the mind feigns a double existence, ascribing interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects. It arises from the mind's intermediate situation, not from any direct recommendation of reason or fancy.
Chapter 27
What happens to philosophers when they leave their closets?
Hume observes that philosophers, immediately upon leaving their closets, mingle with the rest of mankind in the "exploded opinions" that our perceptions are our only objects and continue identically and uninterruptedly through their interrupted appearances. This shows the philosophical system's similarity to the vulgar one: it lets reason be humoured briefly, then easily abandoned upon the least inattention, returning to natural notions.
Chapter 27

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 5)4 cards

According to Hume, why does the imagination feign an unknown substance?
Hume argues that when we compare an object after considerable change, the thought's progress is broken and we get the idea of diversity. To reconcile this with our notion of identity, the imagination feigns something unknown and invisible supposed to continue the same through variations, which it calls substance or original first matter.
Chapter 28
How does Hume explain the fiction of 'accidents' inhering in a substance?
Hume argues that because we never discover sensible qualities without also fancying a substance, the same habit that makes us infer causal connexion makes us infer every quality's dependence on an unknown substance. But each quality is distinct and may exist apart, even from that unintelligible chimera of substance.
Chapter 28
What three opinions does Hume rank by degrees of reason and knowledge?
Hume distinguishes the vulgar, a false philosophy, and the true. He argues the true philosophy approaches nearer the vulgar than to mistaken knowledge: the vulgar imagine a perceived connexion, false philosophers see no known connexion yet keep seeking power in causes, while true philosophy concludes we have no idea of power separate from the mind.
Chapter 28
Why does Hume call 'faculty' and 'occult quality' a consolation for philosophers?
Hume argues that frequent use of insignificant terms makes us fancy they have a secret meaning, as with significant terms. So philosophers say a puzzling phenomenon arises from a faculty or occult quality, ending all dispute. This illusion brings them the same indifference the vulgar reach by stupidity and true philosophers by moderate scepticism.
Chapter 28

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 6)3 cards

Why does Hume argue solidity is not represented by a simple impression of touch?
Hume compares a hand pressing a stone with two stones pressing each other: the former includes a felt sensation absent in the latter. To make the cases alike one must remove part of the impression, but a simple impression cannot be partly removed, so the whole must go. He adds that solidity supposes two bodies with contiguity and impulse, a compound object no simple impression can represent.
Chapter 29
Why does Hume reject the dispute over the soul's materiality or immateriality?
Hume asks what philosophers mean by substance and inhesion, finding no satisfactory answer. Every idea derives from an impression, but no impression can resemble a substance. The definition 'something which may exist by itself' applies to every perception, since perceptions are distinct, separable, and need nothing to support them. Having no idea of substance or inhesion, Hume condemns the question itself.
Chapter 29
What does Hume's maxim that an object may exist and yet be nowhere mean?
Hume holds that most beings exist without place: an object is nowhere when its parts form no figure or quantity and it bears no contiguity or distance to other bodies. This applies to all perceptions except those of sight and feeling. A moral reflection cannot sit left or right of a passion, nor can a smell be square; such objects are incompatible with place.
Chapter 29

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 7)4 cards

What maxim does Hume establish about reasoning from objects versus impressions?
Hume argues that any conclusion we form concerning objects will certainly apply to impressions, but not conversely. Since every idea derives from an impression, whatever relation we discover among objects must extend to impressions; however, conclusions drawn from impressions may not always apply to objects, because an object could differ in that particular.
Chapter 30
Why does Hume claim Spinoza's hypothesis resembles the immateriality of the soul doctrine?
Hume argues both systems posit a simple, uncompounded, indivisible substance underlying modifications. He contends the objections raised against Spinoza—that a mode must be identical with its substance, that extension cannot inhere in something indivisible—apply equally to the theologians' simple soul substance. The author argues the two hypotheses share the same unintelligibility, so scorn for one and veneration for the other is unjustified.
Chapter 30
How does Hume refute the argument that matter cannot cause thought?
Hume argues we are never aware of any connexion between causes and effects, only constant conjunction from experience. Since no real objects are contrary, anything may produce anything considered a priori. If the position of bodies cannot cause thought for lacking apparent connexion, the same reasoning would deny it can cause motion—which contradicts evident experience.
Chapter 30
What does Hume say about calling perception an 'action' of the soul rather than a modification?
Hume argues the term 'action' adds nothing. Perceptions are really different, separable, and distinguishable from each other and from anything imaginable, so they cannot be the action or abstract mode of a substance. He adds that if 'action' helps the theologians' cause, atheists could equally claim all natural objects are actions of one simple universal substance.
Chapter 30

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 8)4 cards

Why does Hume deny that the idea of self derives from any impression?
Hume argues the idea of self cannot come from an impression because self is supposed to be constant and invariable, yet no impression is constant: pain, pleasure, grief, joy, passions and sensations succeed each other and never all exist at once. Since every real idea must arise from some impression, and none yields the idea of self, he concludes there is no such idea.
Chapter 31
What does Hume discover when he introspects most intimately into himself?
Hume reports that whenever he enters most intimately into what he calls himself, he always stumbles on some particular perception—heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. He never catches himself without a perception, nor observes anything but the perception. During sound sleep, when perceptions are removed, he is insensible of himself and may truly be said not to exist.
Chapter 31
What causes us to ascribe identity to successive perceptions?
The author argues the propensity arises from a confusion: the imagination's action in considering an uninterrupted object resembles its action in reflecting on a succession of related objects, since relation makes the transition smooth. We mistake this resemblance for identity, then feign a soul, self, or substance to disguise the variation and justify the absurdity.
Chapter 31
How does Hume illustrate identity through the oak and the ship?
Hume notes a ship whose parts are changed by frequent repairs is still considered the same because the parts share a common end. Likewise animals and vegetables have parts with mutual dependence and reciprocal cause and effect; though in a few years they endure total change, we still attribute identity while form, size and substance alter. An oak growing from a small plant is still the same oak, though no particle or figure remains.
Chapter 31

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 9)4 cards

According to Hume, what is the true idea of the human mind?
Hume argues the human mind is best understood as a system of different perceptions or existences linked by cause and effect, mutually producing, destroying, influencing, and modifying each other. He compares the soul to a republic or commonwealth whose members are united by reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and which propagates itself through incessant changes of its parts.
Chapter 32
What role does memory play in personal identity, and can identity extend beyond memory?
Hume argues memory is chiefly the source of personal identity because it alone acquaints us with the continuance of the succession of perceptions. Without memory we would have no notion of causation, hence no chain constituting the self. But once causation is acquired from memory, we can extend the chain beyond memory to forgotten times and actions, so memory discovers rather than produces identity.
Chapter 32
Why does Hume call disputes about personal identity grammatical rather than philosophical?
Hume argues identity depends on relations of ideas, which produce identity through an easy transition of the imagination. Since these relations and the easiness of transition can diminish by insensible degrees, there is no just standard for deciding when they acquire or lose the title of identity. Thus all disputes about the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except where the relation of parts gives rise to a fiction of union.
Chapter 32
What dilemma does Hume face regarding the imagination's suggestions?
Hume argues that assenting to every trivial suggestion of fancy leads to errors and absurdities, since these suggestions often contradict each other. But rejecting all such suggestions and adhering to the understanding is equally dangerous, for the understanding, acting alone by its most general principles, entirely subverts itself. He concludes memory, senses, and understanding are all founded on the imagination.
Chapter 32

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. (part 10)3 cards

Why does Hume recommend philosophy over superstition?
Hume argues philosophy should be preferred to superstition of every kind because superstition arises naturally from popular opinions, seizes strongly on the mind, and can disturb conduct. Just philosophy yields mild, moderate sentiments; false philosophy produces opinions that are cold speculation and seldom interrupt natural propensities. He concludes errors in religion are dangerous, while errors in philosophy are only ridiculous.
Chapter 33
What does Hume call a 'true sceptic'?
Hume says the careless student of philosophy is more truly sceptical than one who, inclined to philosophy, is overwhelmed by doubts and rejects it entirely. A true sceptic is diffident of his philosophical doubts as well as his philosophical convictions, and never refuses an innocent satisfaction on account of either. He also yields to the propensity to be positive in particular points.
Chapter 33
Which philosophers does Hume cite as an extreme case?
Hume cites the Cynics as an extraordinary instance of philosophers who, from purely philosophical reasonings, ran into as great extravagancies of conduct as any Monk or Dervise. He uses them to show philosophy can occasionally disturb life, though generally its errors are only ridiculous, unlike the dangerous errors of religion.
Chapter 33

PART I OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY3 cards

How does Hume divide impressions into original and secondary?
Hume divides impressions into original (of sensation) and secondary (reflective). Original impressions arise in the soul without any antecedent perception, from the body's constitution, animal spirits, or objects acting on external organs; they include sense impressions and bodily pains and pleasures. Secondary impressions proceed from these original ones, either immediately or via their ideas, and include the passions and resembling emotions.
Chapter 34
What two parts does Hume distinguish within a cause of pride?
Hume splits the cause into the quality that operates on the passion and the subject in which it inheres. In being vain of a beautiful house, the beauty is the quality and the house as one's property or contrivance is the subject. Both are essential: beauty unrelated to us produces no pride, and relation alone without beauty has as little influence.
Chapter 34
Why does Hume deny that each cause of pride has its own original principle?
Hume argues the causes of pride are natural but not original. Their number is vast, and many are products of art, industry, caprice, and fortune, like houses, furniture, and clothes. It is absurd that nature foresaw each new artifact with a distinct principle; instead, some common circumstance or circumstances must explain their efficacy.
Chapter 34

I.4 cards

Why does joy arise from a slighter relation to self than pride does?
Hume argues that a relation is needed for joy only to bring the object near enough to give satisfaction. Pride requires the relation to do a double task: approach the object and also produce a transition from one passion to another. Having a double task, the relation must have double force and energy.
Chapter 35
What happens when an agreeable object relates closely to another person rather than ourselves?
Hume notes that where agreeable objects bear no very close relation to ourselves, they commonly bear one to some other person. This latter relation not only excels the former but even diminishes it, and sometimes destroys it. He refers forward to Part II, Section 4 for the fuller account of this effect.
Chapter 35
How does Hume illustrate joy versus vanity using a feast?
A guest present at a feast may feel joy, since the senses are regarded with delicacies of every kind. But only the master of the feast gains, besides the same joy, the additional passion of self-applause and vanity. Hume concedes men sometimes boast of an entertainment they merely attended, converting small pleasure into pride, but holds joy generally arises from a more inconsiderable relation than vanity.
Chapter 35
What limitation does Hume place on his general position about related objects and pride?
Hume limits his general position that everything related to us which produces pleasure or pain produces likewise pride or humility. He states that not only is a relation required, but a close one, and closer than is required to joy. This is the first limitation he makes to that general position.
Chapter 35

II.3 cards

What is the second limitation on the object that excites pride?
The agreeable or disagreeable object must be not only closely related but also peculiar to ourselves, or at least shared with only a few persons. Hume observes that things long accustomed lose value, and we judge objects more by comparison than intrinsic merit, so goods common to all mankind give little satisfaction.
Chapter 36
Why does this limitation affect pride more than joy?
Hume argues pride has two objects to contemplate: the cause producing pleasure and self, the real object of the passion. Joy needs only the pleasurable object, with some relation to self. Since pride directs our view to two objects, when neither has singularity the passion is more weakened, and two disadvantageous comparisons destroy it entirely.
Chapter 36
What example does Hume give of a good that gives joy but not pride?
Health, when it returns after a long absence, affords very sensible satisfaction but is seldom regarded as a subject of vanity, because it is shared with such vast numbers. Hume uses this to show that frequency and familiarity operate on both passions, but have a much greater influence on vanity than on joy.
Chapter 36

IV.3 cards

Why does an inconstant cause produce little pride, according to Hume?
Hume argues that what is casual and inconstant gives little joy and less pride. We foresee its change through imagination, which leaves us dissatisfied with the thing itself, and we compare it to ourselves, whose existence is more durable, making its inconstancy appear still greater. It seems ridiculous to infer excellence in ourselves from an object of much shorter duration.
Chapter 37
Why does this limitation affect pride more strongly than joy?
Hume explains that the idea of self is not so essential to joy as it is to pride. Because pride depends more essentially on the idea of self, comparing a short-lived object to our own more durable existence undercuts pride more sharply. Joy, less tied to self, is less diminished by the inconstancy of its cause.
Chapter 37
How does comparing an object to ourselves affect our estimate of its inconstancy?
Hume argues that we compare the inconstant object to ourselves, whose existence is more durable. By this comparison its inconstancy appears still greater. It then seems ridiculous to infer an excellency in ourselves from an object of so much shorter duration that attends us during so small a part of our existence.
Chapter 37

V. (part 1)4 cards

According to Hume, how do general rules affect pride and humility?
Hume argues that general rules strongly influence pride and humility, as they do all passions. We form notions of ranks of men suited to their power and riches, and we do not change these notions for peculiarities of health or temper that may deprive persons of enjoyment of their possessions. Custom, he says, carries us beyond just bounds in passions as in reasonings.
Chapter 38
What thought experiment does Hume use to show custom's role in passions?
Hume asks us to imagine a full-grown person of our nature suddenly transported into our world. Such a person would be embarrassed by every object and would not readily find what degree of love, hatred, pride, or humility to attribute to it, since passions vary by inconsiderable principles. Custom and practice bring these principles to light and settle the just value of everything.
Chapter 38
What is Hume's closing reflection from the five limitations?
Hume reflects that the proudest persons, who in the world's eye have most reason for pride, are not always the happiest; nor are the most humble always the most miserable, as the system might at first suggest. An evil may be real though its cause has no relation to us, without being peculiar, without showing itself to others, without being constant, and without falling under general rules.
Chapter 38
How does Hume argue vice and virtue cause pride and humility?
Hume sets aside whether moral distinctions are natural or arise from interest and education. On either hypothesis, vice and virtue produce real pain and pleasure, and that sensation is what matters for his system. He defines pride as the agreeable impression arising when the view of our virtue, beauty, riches, or power makes us satisfied with ourselves, and humility as the opposite impression.
Chapter 38

V. (part 2)4 cards

Why does Hume say resemblance seldom grounds pride or humility?
Hume argues resemblance rarely founds pride or humility because if we resemble someone in a valuable quality, we possess that quality ourselves and prefer to survey it directly in ourselves rather than by reflection in another. A likeness may occasionally stir vanity by suggesting a better idea of ourselves, but the view fixes there, making that the passion's ultimate cause.
Chapter 39
What two relations must cooperate to produce pride, according to Hume?
Hume argues pride requires a double relation: a relation of ideas conveying the mind from the object to self, and a relation of impressions carrying a related pleasant feeling into the passion. Association of ideas alone produces no emotion, so the idea-transition must second a transition of affections. Changes in the object's relation proportionally change the pride felt.
Chapter 39
Why are people vain of their country, climate, or native soil?
Hume explains that the beauty of one's country plainly produces pleasure, which is related to pride, while the country is related to self, the object of pride. This double relation of impressions and ideas lets the mind transition from one to the other. Similarly, climate, soil, wines, fruits, and language are first agreeable to the senses, then become objects of pride through that transition.
Chapter 39
Why do some travelers depreciate their own country?
Hume observes that some affect to depreciate their own country compared with places they have traveled. At home, the strong relation to their nation is shared with so many that it is in a manner lost; whereas their distant relation to a foreign country, formed by having seen and lived in it, is augmented by how few have done the same. So they admire abroad above home.
Chapter 39

V. (part 3)4 cards

For Hume, what does the essence of riches consist in?
Hume argues the essence of riches lies in the power of procuring the pleasures and conveniences of life, and the essence of that power lies in the probability of its exercise, which makes us anticipate the real existence of pleasure by true or false reasoning. This anticipation is itself a considerable pleasure, and since its cause is property related to us, it produces pride through a double relation of impressions and ideas.
Chapter 40
Why does a miser delight in money he never spends?
Hume observes the miser enjoys riches for forty years without employing them and cannot by reasoning conclude the pleasures are nearer than if deprived of everything. Yet he imagines them to approach whenever external obstacles and powerful motives of interest and danger are removed. Hume attributes this to an illusion of the fancy, akin to the false sensation of liberty, which makes the enjoyment seem nearer and gives lively satisfaction.
Chapter 40
What is sympathy, and how does an idea of another's passion become the passion itself?
Hume argues sympathy is the propensity to receive by communication others' inclinations and sentiments. We first know an affection by its external signs, forming an idea, which is converted into an impression with enough force and vivacity to become the very passion. This conversion is aided by the impression of ourselves and the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, which enliven the idea.
Chapter 40
Why does power over rational creatures give more pride than power over statues?
Hume argues the vanity of power and shame of slavery are much augmented by considering the persons over whom authority is exercised. Even moving statues obeying our will would give pleasure and pride, but not so much as authority over sensible rational creatures, whose condition compared to our own makes it seem more agreeable and honourable. Comparison always augments esteem, and here the contrast is obvious and natural to the imagination.
Chapter 40

V. (part 4)2 cards

How does Hume answer objections to praise-pleasure arising from communication of sentiments?
Hume holds that the pleasure we receive from praise arises from a communication of sentiments, and argues that objections, taken in a proper light, confirm it. Popular fame pleases even a man who despises the vulgar because multitude gives weight and authority. Plagiaries delight in undeserved praise through castle-building, rendering fictions firm by sympathy. Proud men are most shocked by contempt because of the opposition between their natural passion and that received by sympathy.
Chapter 41
What method does Hume use to study pride and humility in animals?
Hume proposes applying the anatomists' method—joining observations on human bodies to those on beasts—to the anatomy of the mind. He first shows passions correspond in men and animals, then compares their causes. He observes marks of pride in swans, turkeys, and peacocks, and vanity in nightingales, horses, hounds, bulls, and cocks. Since animals lack sense of virtue, vice, blood relations, and property, their pride lies solely in the body—beauty, strength, swiftness, or other useful or agreeable qualities.
Chapter 41

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED (part 1)3 cards

For Hume, what is the immediate object of love and hatred?
Hume holds the object of love and hatred is always some other thinking person, external to us, of whose thoughts and sensations we are not conscious. Self is the object of pride and humility instead. He notes that what we call self-love is not properly the same tender emotion excited by a friend or mistress, and that we feel no hatred except from injuries of others.
Chapter 42
Why does Hume say the object alone cannot cause love or hatred?
Because love and hatred are directly contrary in sensation yet share the same object. If that object were also their cause, it would produce both opposite passions equally, and they would destroy each other from the first moment, so neither would appear. Therefore some cause distinct from the object is required, and Hume finds the causes highly diversified.
Chapter 42
In the travelling-companion experiment, what happens with only a relation of impressions?
Hume supposes travelling with a companion through a country strange to both. Beautiful prospects, agreeable roads and commodious inns may put him in good humour with himself and his fellow-traveller. But since the country relates to neither of them, it cannot be the immediate cause of pride or love; such emotions are overflowings of an elevated or humane disposition rather than an established passion.
Chapter 42

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED (part 2)4 cards

Why does pride not transfer into love as easily as love into pride?
Hume argues the imagination moves easily from an obscure idea of another person to the lively idea of oneself, but with difficulty from the lively self back to another. Since the passions depend on this transition of the imagination, pride or humility is not transfused into love or hatred as readily as the reverse.
Chapter 43
How does Hume reconcile sympathy with the difficulty of leaving the self?
Hume says the contradiction vanishes because in sympathy the self is not the object of any passion and nothing fixes attention on it. But when self is the object of pride or humility, it is unnatural to quit its consideration until the passion is exhausted, after which the double relations can no longer operate.
Chapter 43
What does Hume's seventh experiment show about love and hatred?
Hume argues that when we love or hate a person, the passion seldom stays within its first bounds but extends to contiguous objects, including friends and relations. We bear kindness to one brother for another's sake, or hate a whole family after quarreling with one member, since identity of impressions plus relation of ideas produces transition.
Chapter 43
Why do passions descend more easily than they ascend?
Hume observes we more readily love the son for the father, the servant for the master, and hate a family when quarreling with its head. The imagination passes more easily from lesser to greater, but passions find it easier to move from a strong passion to a weak one, and since passions are the more powerful principle, they prevail over the imagination.
Chapter 43

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED (part 3)4 cards

For Hume, when do a person's disagreeable qualities produce hatred without any intention?
When the quality is constant and inherent in the person's character, it causes love or hatred independent of intention. Hume's example is someone disagreeable by deformity or folly, who becomes the object of aversion even though he has no intention of displeasing us. By contrast, a fleeting action needs forethought and design to connect it to the person.
Chapter 44
Why does Hume say an intention is required for actions to excite love or hatred?
Hume gives two reasons. First, intention reveals durable qualities that remain after the action, strengthening the relation of ideas between action and person. Second, intention is often needed to produce a relation of impressions: the principal part of an injury is the contempt it shows, and a good office pleases chiefly as proof of esteem. Removing design diminishes but does not entirely remove the passions.
Chapter 44
Why do we love relations and acquaintances, according to Hume?
Hume argues that whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner through the easy transition from ourselves to the related object, and custom or acquaintance likewise strengthens conception. This force and liveliness of conception is agreeable and produces affection. Hence we love blood relations, countrymen, neighbours, those of the same trade or name, and even mere acquaintances, preferring them to more meritorious strangers.
Chapter 44
What curious phenomena about parents' second marriages does Hume note?
Hume observes that children regard their relation to their mother as greatly weakened by her second marriage, and no longer see her with the same eye as in widowhood. This happens even without inconvenience or an inferior husband, merely because she has become part of another family. The same occurs with a father's second marriage, but in a much lesser degree.
Chapter 44

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED (part 4)3 cards

According to Hume, what ultimately explains our esteem for the rich and powerful?
Hume argues that the agreeable idea of the pleasures riches afford resolves largely into sympathy with the possessor, and that the expectation of advantage fails as an explanation. He concludes nothing remains to give esteem for power and riches, and contempt for meanness and poverty, except sympathy, by which we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness.
Chapter 45
How does Hume use an avaricious man to support sympathy over the agreeable-idea principle?
An avaricious man is respected for his money though he scarcely possesses a power—hardly a probability or possibility of employing it for life's pleasures. To himself alone the power seems perfect and entire. So we must receive his sentiments by sympathy before we can form a strong idea of these enjoyments or esteem him on account of them.
Chapter 45
How does Hume explain the beauty of utility, such as a convenient house or fertile field?
Hume argues the chief beauty of a building lies in conveniences like apartment layout and lost space in stairs and passages, and that a field's fertility surpasses ornament or situation. Our own interest is not concerned, so such beauty must delight by communication—we sympathize with the proprietor and feel the satisfaction the objects naturally occasion in him.
Chapter 45

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED (part 5)4 cards

How does Hume explain pity as a secondary affection?
Hume derives pity from sympathy: all humans resemble us, so their interests and passions strike us vividly, and a lively idea is easily converted into an impression. Sorrow and affliction have a stronger, more lasting influence than pleasure. Pity depends greatly on contiguity and even sight of the object, which Hume takes as proof it derives from the imagination.
Chapter 46
What does Hume mean by a 'pity reverst' in malice and envy?
Hume argues we judge objects by comparison rather than intrinsic worth. Observing others' misery gives a livelier idea of our own happiness, producing delight; their happiness makes our misery vivid, producing uneasiness. So malice and envy are a kind of reversed pity, contrary sensations arising in the beholder from those felt by the person considered.
Chapter 46
How can sympathy strengthen from a weak or absent original passion?
Hume notes sympathy sometimes gains strength from the weakness of its original. We rejoice more for someone's prosperity the less he seems to feel it, and lament a patient man more. The imagination follows the general rule connecting misfortune with sorrow, overlooking the exception, so we feel the passion as if he really had it—as when we blush for the foolish conduct of someone unaware of his folly.
Chapter 46
Why do objects appear greater or less through comparison?
Hume holds that every object is attended by an emotion proportioned to it, and that we adhere to general rules. A great object succeeding a small one makes a great emotion succeed a small one, which grows beyond its ordinary proportion; since a certain emotion usually attends a certain magnitude, we imagine the object itself has enlarged. Comparison changes the emotion without changing the object.
Chapter 46

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED (part 6)3 cards

Why do parties in a civil war prefer a foreign enemy to fellow citizens?
Hume argues that superiority joined with other relations (name, language, contiguity) makes comparison more natural and therefore more grievous. The mind seeks repose by separating the ideas, and when it cannot break the association, it feels a stronger desire to remove the superiority. Hence men call in a foreign enemy, whose superiority carries no relation and so has less influence on the imagination.
Chapter 47
How does Hume reconcile pity producing love rather than hatred?
Pity is an uneasiness, so by the double relation of impressions it should produce hatred. Hume answers that a transition requires a double relation, and that the character of a passion depends not on the momentary sensation but on its whole bent or tendency. Pity is a desire for another's happiness and aversion to his misery, which parallels benevolence; malice parallels anger. Thus pity connects with love and malice with hatred.
Chapter 47
Why does Hume say we love a partner and hate a rival regardless of their fortune?
Hume argues this cannot come from the double relations of impressions and ideas, since a rival's loss pleases me while a partner's loss pains me, and the connexion of cause and effect is the same in both. The explanation is a parallel direction of affections from interest: concern for my own interest gives pleasure in a partner's pleasure and pain in a rival's, the same contrariety as comparison and malice.
Chapter 47

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED (part 7)4 cards

For Hume, what three impressions combine to form love between the sexes?
Hume says this affection in its most natural state derives from the conjunction of three distinct impressions: the pleasing sensation arising from beauty, the bodily appetite for generation, and a generous kindness or good-will. He argues these become nearly inseparable through two relations—resemblance of sensation and a parallel direction of desires—so that any one of them, once aroused, tends to draw the others along with it.
Chapter 48
Why does Hume think beauty excites the bodily appetite for generation?
Hume explains it by two relations: resemblance of sensation, since the appetite at a moderate degree is pleasant and connected with agreeable emotions like joy, mirth, vanity, and kindness, while sorrow, melancholy, poverty, and humility destroy it; and a parallel direction of desires, illustrated by hunger, where whatever inclines us to approach the meat increases appetite, as beauty does, while deformity does the reverse.
Chapter 48
According to Hume, what distinguishes respect from contempt in terms of passion mixture?
Hume holds both arise from comparison with ourselves: others' good qualities produce love directly and humility by comparison, mixing into respect; bad qualities produce hatred and pride, mixing into contempt. Because the mind leans far more to pride than humility, contempt carries a much stronger tincture of pride than respect carries of humility, so we are more elevated by one below us than mortified by one above us.
Chapter 48
Why do some qualities produce pure love rather than respect, on Hume's account?
Hume argues an object yields humility by comparison only insofar as it would have produced pride if placed in ourselves. Qualities like good nature, good humour, facility, generosity, and beauty are peculiarly fitted to produce love in others but have little tendency to excite pride in ourselves, so the comparison generates only slight humility, too weak to convert the love into respect—hence pure love.
Chapter 48

PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS (part 1)4 cards

How does Hume define the will?
Hume defines the will as nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind. He says this impression, like pride, humility, love, and hatred, cannot be defined and needs no further description, so he sets aside the definitions and distinctions philosophers use to perplex the question.
Chapter 49
What two particulars does Hume say are essential to necessity?
Hume holds that constant union and the inference of the mind are the two particulars essential to necessity. Since we never discover the ultimate connexion of objects by senses or reason, necessity arises only from constant union, and the necessity entering the idea of cause and effect is nothing but a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant. Wherever both are found, necessity must be acknowledged.
Chapter 49
What evidence does Hume give that human actions have a constant union with motives?
Hume appeals to the uniform regular operation of natural principles across sexes, ages, governments, conditions, and education: like causes produce like effects. He compares the differing products of Guienne and Champagne to the differing sentiments of the two sexes, and notes that different stations of life arise necessarily from uniform principles of human nature, since men cannot live without society or associate without government.
Chapter 49
How does Hume answer the objection that human actions are too capricious to be necessary?
Hume replies that we must judge human actions by the same maxims as external objects. Where phenomena are constantly conjoined, the imagination passes from one to the other; below that there are inferior degrees of evidence, and the mind balances contrary experiments rather than destroying all reasoning. Even equal contrary experiments do not remove necessity, since the contrariety is ascribed to concealed causes and imperfect knowledge, not to the things themselves.
Chapter 49

PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS (part 2)3 cards

How does Hume define necessity, and to what does he apply it?
Hume defines necessity two ways, matching his two definitions of cause: as the constant union and conjunction of like objects, or as the inference of the mind from one to the other. He argues this necessity has always been tacitly allowed to belong to the human will, since we draw inferences about actions from experienced unions of like actions with like motives and circumstances.
Chapter 50
What two claims does Hume set out to prove against reason's supremacy?
Hume aims to show first that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, and second that reason can never oppose passion in directing the will. He frames this against the widespread philosophical view that virtue consists in conforming to reason and subduing passion, a view he calls the foundation of most ancient and modern moral philosophy.
Chapter 50
In what two senses can a passion be called unreasonable?
Hume says an affection can be called unreasonable only in two senses: when a passion like hope or fear is founded on the supposition of objects that do not really exist, and when, in acting on a passion, we choose means insufficient for the end and deceive ourselves about causes and effects. Otherwise passions, being original existences, cannot contradict truth or reason.
Chapter 50

PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS (part 3)4 cards

For Hume, what distinguishes a calm passion from a violent one?
Hume holds that both calm and violent passions pursue good and avoid evil, and both increase or diminish with the good or evil. The difference is proximity: the same good, when near, causes a violent passion, while when remote it produces only a calm one.
Chapter 51
How does Hume explain why opposition or uncertainty strengthens a passion?
Hume argues that opposition of passions produces a new emotion and more disorder than concurrence of equal affections. This new emotion is easily converted into the predominant passion and increases its violence. The same follows for external obstacles, and uncertainty works likewise: the mind's agitation and quick turns transfuse themselves into the predominant passion.
Chapter 51
What are custom's two original effects on the mind, according to Hume?
Hume says custom has two original effects: it bestows a facility in performing an action or conceiving an object, and afterwards a tendency or inclination toward it. From these he accounts for its other effects, including why custom increases active habits but diminishes passive ones, since facility renders passive motions faint while active spirits are supported and bent more strongly to action.
Chapter 51
Why does Hume reject Rollin's admiration of the Athenians' rejection of Themistocles' plan?
Rollin finds it extraordinary that a whole people, interested in the proposal's public advantage, unanimously rejected it merely because it was unjust. Hume sees nothing so extraordinary: philosophers decide general maxims without their passions or imaginations being engaged, and the Athenians knew the advantage only under the general notion of advantage, without particular ideas, so it had less influence on their imaginations and was a weaker temptation.
Chapter 51

PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS (part 4)4 cards

Why does Hume say distance in time weakens passion more than equal distance in space?
Hume argues that time, unlike space, is always broken and divided in the imagination, so every part of a temporal succession must appear single and alone. This interrupts the thought more than an equal spatial distance, weakening the idea and therefore the passions, which he holds depend greatly on the imagination.
Chapter 52
Why does Hume claim distance in the past affects passion more than equal distance in the future?
Hume argues the fancy naturally follows time forward: from the present we pass easily to what follows, but moving backward to the past opposes the natural succession. Since easy progression strengthens conception and difficult progression weakens it, a small past distance interrupts conception more than a much greater future distance.
Chapter 52
Why does great distance increase esteem for an object, according to Hume?
Hume argues that contemplating greatness—wide plains, the ocean, eternity—enlarges the soul and gives pleasure. When a distant object is presented, we reflect on the interposed distance and conceive something magnificent; by association the admiration for the distance diffuses onto the object. Hence a great traveller or a Greek medal is valued even nearby.
Chapter 52
Why does Hume say distance in time increases veneration more than distance in space?
Hume argues opposition that does not discourage invigorates the soul, and the mind seeks it. Time is harder to traverse than space because succession is broken while extension seems united to the senses. With a great removal, this difficulty elevates rather than weakens the mind, producing a more vigorous and sublime disposition toward the distant object.
Chapter 52

PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS (part 5)4 cards

For Hume, what causes probability in the mind?
Hume holds that probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes. The mind cannot fix on either side but is tossed between opposite views, alternately considering an object existent and then non-existent. Because it cannot rest on either side, all certainty and established opinion are destroyed, leaving the imagination or understanding in a state of fluctuation.
Chapter 53
How do hope and fear arise from grief and joy, according to Hume?
Hume argues that when an object of desire or aversion is uncertain, the mind turns to each side and feels momentary joy or sorrow. Since passions decay slowly like a struck string, these emotions mingle rather than replace each other. The predominant passion tints the mixture: joy mixed with sorrow yields hope, and sorrow mixed with joy yields fear.
Chapter 53
What three outcomes does Hume give for contrary passions?
Hume distinguishes three cases. When contrary passions arise from entirely different objects, they occur alternately, since the ideas lack relation. When they come from different parts of the same object, they mingle and mutually destroy each other, leaving tranquility. When they derive from contrary chances concerning one object's existence, they subsist together and unite to produce a third passion, such as hope or fear.
Chapter 53
Why does surprise tend to turn into fear, per Hume?
Hume rejects the obvious conclusion that human nature is simply pusillanimous. Instead, the suddenness and strangeness of an appearance excite a commotion in the mind, producing violent curiosity that becomes uneasy and resembles fear in its fluctuation. This image of fear naturally converts into fear itself, since the mind judges more from its present disposition than from the object's nature.
Chapter 53

PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS (part 6)3 cards

Why does a wealthy non-avaricious man enjoy shooting game birds but not crows?
The author argues the utility or importance of the object causes no real passion by itself; it is only requisite to support the imagination. The man considers game birds fit for the table and crows entirely useless, so the idea of utility fixes his attention. The same person who overlooks a ten times greater profit elsewhere is pleased to bring home half a dozen woodcocks after hours of hunting.
Chapter 54
How does Hume explain the pleasure of gaming?
Hume argues the pleasure of gaming arises neither from interest alone, since many leave a sure gain for the entertainment, nor from the game alone, since the same persons have no satisfaction playing for nothing. It proceeds from both united, though separately they have no effect, like two clear liquids producing an opaque coloured mixture. Interest engages attention, and difficulty, variety, and sudden reverses of fortune then interest us further.
Chapter 54
Why do people feel curiosity about neighbours' affairs, per Hume?
Hume derives this curiosity from a different principle than love of knowledge: belief enlivens and infixes an idea, preventing hesitation. The vivacity of the idea interests the fancy and produces pleasure like a moderate passion, while certainty prevents uneasiness by fixing one idea and keeping it from wavering. Sudden violent change is unpleasant, so doubt, which transports thought between ideas, occasions pain.
Chapter 54

PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL (part 1)4 cards

According to Hume, why can moral distinctions not be derived from reason?
The author argues morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions, while reason alone is "utterly impotent" and can never influence passion or action. Since an active principle cannot be founded on an inactive one, and reason is perfectly inert, the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason.
Chapter 55
What two kinds of judgment can accompany actions and influence conduct, per Hume?
Reason influences conduct only by exciting a passion through informing us of an object's existence, or by discovering cause-effect connections that afford means to exert a passion. These judgments may be false, but such errors are commonly innocent, extend only to mistakes of fact, and are involuntary rather than criminal.
Chapter 55
Why does Hume say mistakes of fact are not the source of immorality?
The author argues errors about an object's pleasantness or about proper means to an end are involuntary and draw no guilt; one is "more to be lamented than blamed." If morality rested on such truth or falsehood, it would apply equally to an apple or a kingdom, and since agreement admits no degrees, all virtues and vices would be equal.
Chapter 55
How does Hume refute Wollaston's claim that falsehood is the foundation of all guilt?
Hume notes false conclusions from actions arise only through obscurity in natural principles and uncertain cause-effect connections. Since the same uncertainty occurs in natural objects and produces like errors, Wollaston's hypothesis would imply even inanimate objects could be vicious and immoral — which Hume presents as absurd.
Chapter 55

PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL (part 2)4 cards

Why does Hume argue morality cannot consist in relations discoverable by reason?
Hume argues the four demonstrable relations—resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number—apply equally to inanimate matter. Since morality belongs only to actions of the mind, any relation grounding it must hold between internal actions and external objects, not between objects alone. He claims no such relation can be shown, so morality lies not in relations nor in their discovery.
Chapter 56
How does Hume's oak-and-elm example attack the idea that reason discovers vice?
Hume supposes an oak's seed produces a sapling that eventually overtops and destroys the parent tree. He asks whether any relation found in parricide is missing here: cause of existence, destruction of benefactor. A will does not create different relations, only a different cause. Since the same relations occur without any notion of immorality, that notion cannot arise from discovering relations.
Chapter 56
What does Hume conclude when examining a vicious act like wilful murder?
Hume says that examining the act in all lights reveals only passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts—no matter of fact called vice. Vice escapes you until you turn reflection inward and find a sentiment of disapprobation arising in yourself. So vice and virtue resemble sounds, colours, heat and cold: perceptions in the mind, not qualities in objects. The author argues this advances speculative science.
Chapter 56
What is Hume's is-ought observation about systems of morality?
Hume remarks that moral authors reason with 'is' and 'is not' propositions, then suddenly switch to 'ought' and 'ought not.' He says this change is imperceptible but of the last consequence, since the new relation needs explanation and a reason must be given for how it can be deduced from entirely different relations. He argues this attention would subvert the vulgar systems of morality.
Chapter 56

PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL (part 3)4 cards

Why does Hume say 'natural vs unnatural' cannot mark the boundary of vice and virtue?
The author argues the word nature is ambiguous. Against miracles, both vice and virtue are equally natural; against the rare and unusual, virtue may even be the most unnatural, since heroic virtue is as unusual as brutal barbarity; against artifice, both are equally artificial. So in no sense does natural/unnatural divide vice from virtue.
Chapter 57
In what sense does Hume call moral sentiments natural, and why?
Hume says if 'natural' means opposed to the rare and unusual, moral sentiments certainly qualify: no nation and no single person was ever utterly deprived of them, and no one never showed any approbation or dislike of manners. They are so rooted in our constitution that only disease or madness could extirpate them.
Chapter 57
What does Hume conclude distinguishes virtue from vice?
Hume returns to his first position: virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment, or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation. He calls this decision commodious because it reduces us to the simple question of why a survey of something gives satisfaction or uneasiness, without positing incomprehensible relations and qualities.
Chapter 57
How does Hume treat the question of whether the sense of virtue is natural or artificial?
Hume declines to give a precise answer at present, saying the question depends on which sense of 'natural' is meant. He suggests it may later appear that our sense of some virtues is artificial and of others natural, and that an exact detail of each particular vice and virtue is the proper place to discuss it.
Chapter 57

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 1)4 cards

According to Hume, what must precede regard for an action's virtue?
Hume argues that all virtuous actions derive merit from virtuous motives and are considered as signs of those motives. The first virtuous motive can never be regard for the virtue of the action itself, since the action must already be virtuous before we can regard it as such; to claim otherwise is to reason in a circle. Some natural motive must therefore be antecedent to that regard.
Chapter 58
What maxim does Hume call undoubted regarding virtuous actions?
Hume states as an undoubted maxim that no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality. He illustrates with a father's natural affection: were affection not a duty, care of children could not be a duty, so a motive distinct from duty is presupposed.
Chapter 58
Why does Hume reject private interest as the motive to justice?
Hume argues that self-love, acting at liberty, is the source of all injustice and violence rather than honest action; a person cannot correct those vices without restraining that appetite. So concern for private interest or reputation cannot be the legitimate motive to justice, since wherever that concern ceases, honesty would have no place.
Chapter 58
Why does Hume reject public interest as the original motive to justice?
Hume gives three considerations: public interest is not naturally attached to justice but only after an artificial convention; a secret loan shows duty persists though the public is uninterested; and experience shows people do not look so far as public interest in paying debts or refraining from theft. He also denies any general love of mankind independent of personal qualities.
Chapter 58

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 2)4 cards

According to Hume, what is the remedy for the partiality of our affections?
Hume argues the remedy is not derived from nature but from artifice: nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular in the affections. Men, sensible of society's advantages, establish by convention the stability of possession of external goods, restraining the partial and contradictory motions of the passions.
Chapter 59
Why does Hume say the convention for stability of possession is not a promise?
Hume argues the convention is only a general sense of common interest, mutually expressed and known, producing a resolution and behavior. It needs no promise, since promises themselves arise from human conventions. He compares it to two men rowing a boat by agreement without promises, or languages and money gradually established by convention.
Chapter 59
What does Hume claim about the origin of property, right, and obligation?
Hume argues that after the convention of abstaining from others' possessions is entered into, the ideas of justice and injustice arise, and with them property, right, and obligation. Property is nothing but goods whose constant possession is established by the laws of justice; the relation is moral, not natural, and the same artifice gives rise to both justice and property.
Chapter 59
Which passion does Hume identify as the chief obstacle to society, and how is it restrained?
Hume argues the insatiable, perpetual, universal avidity for acquiring goods for ourselves and our nearest friends is directly destructive of society. No other passion can control it; only the interested affection itself, by an alteration of its direction, restrains it, since the passion is better satisfied by restraint and by preserving society than by liberty and universal licence.
Chapter 59

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 3)4 cards

For Hume, why are the rules of justice artificial rather than natural?
The author argues the rules of justice are artificial because they seek their end obliquely and indirectly; the interest giving rise to them cannot be pursued by natural, inartificial passions. Without such rules, people following self-interest would fall into injustice and violence. Justice arises by convention—a sense of common interest—where each performs a just act expecting others to do likewise.
Chapter 60
How does Hume reconcile single just acts harming interest with the whole scheme being useful?
Hume concedes a single act of justice may be contrary to both public and private interest—restoring a fortune to a miser benefits no one. Yet the whole plan or scheme is requisite to society and individual well-being. The momentary ill is compensated by steady prosecution of the rule, since without justice society dissolves into a savage and solitary condition.
Chapter 60
What is the source of the moral approbation that attends justice, according to Hume?
Self-interest is the original motive establishing justice, but sympathy with public interest is the source of moral approbation. When injustice is distant and doesn't affect us, it still displeases because we consider it pernicious to society; we partake of others' uneasiness by sympathy. Politicians and education may forward this sentiment but cannot be its sole cause.
Chapter 60
Why can't property be assigned by judging each person's fitness for particular goods?
Hume argues such fitness is common to several at once and breeds endless controversy, since men are partial and passionate in judging it. A loose, uncertain rule would be incompatible with peace. Justice ignores fitness and proceeds by general rules extending to the whole society, inflexible by spite or favour; the first expedient is that each continue enjoying what he presently possesses.
Chapter 60

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 4)4 cards

According to Hume, what makes possession difficult to define precisely?
Hume argues that possession is a species of cause-and-effect relation: we possess what we can use, alter, or destroy at pleasure. But since the power of using an object grows more or less certain by insensible degrees, it is often impossible to say when possession begins or ends. His example: a wild boar in our snares counts as possessed if escape is impossible—yet impossibility, improbability, and probability cannot be precisely separated.
Chapter 61
Why does Hume say a hunter chasing a hare has a stronger claim than someone reaching for an apple?
Hume observes our judgments of possession shift with the subject. A person who has hunted a hare to exhaustion would see another's seizure as injustice, yet has no complaint if a swifter person takes an apple hanging within reach. The difference, Hume argues, is that immobility is not natural to the hare but the effect of industry, forming a strong relation with the hunter that the apple case lacks.
Chapter 61
What does Hume conclude about the dispute over the two Greek colonies and the deserted city?
Two colonies sent messengers who raced to the empty city; one, losing, threw his spear into the gates first. Hume finds the dispute impossible to decide because the whole question hangs on the fancy, which has no precise standard. He notes the messengers' relation to their colonies is feeble, that gates were chosen only as the most obvious part, and that neither touch nor spear-thrust is properly possession—leaving the decision to wiser heads.
Chapter 61
How does Hume explain property by accession, and what objection does he raise against his own account?
Accession gives us property in things intimately connected to what we already own and inferior to it—garden fruits, cattle's offspring, slaves' work—because the imagination easily passes between related ideas. Hume raises an objection: if easy transition of ideas explains accession, a small object should pull in a great one, yet the empire of Great Britain draws the Orkneys, not vice versa. He answers by citing the imagination's agility in shifting views.
Chapter 61

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 5)4 cards

According to Hume, what is the proper role of municipal laws in property disputes?
Hume argues that when the principles of human nature leave ownership undetermined—because the competing considerations are equally balanced—municipal laws step in to fix what nature left open. He cites the civil law rules that the superficies yields to the soil, writing to paper, and canvas to picture, noting these decisions do not agree with one another and reveal the contrariety of the underlying principles.
Chapter 62
How did Sabinus and Proculus disagree about a cup made from another's metal?
Sabinus held that the substance or matter is the foundation of all qualities, being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore superior to the casual and dependent form—so the cup belongs to the metal's owner. Proculus countered that form is the most obvious and remarkable part, and that bodies are denominated by their species from it. Hume adds Proculus might have noted matter is too fluctuating to trace.
Chapter 62
Why does Hume think a promise is unintelligible before human conventions?
Hume argues the mental act expressed by a promise is neither resolving, desiring, nor willing the performance, since a promise regards the future and the will influences only present actions. It must therefore be willing the obligation itself. But morality depends on sentiments, which we cannot change by a single act of will, so willing a new obligation is absurd. Thus a promise is naturally unintelligible.
Chapter 62
Why is delivery of a sensible object required in transferring property, per Hume?
Hume argues property, taken as something real apart from morality or sentiment, is insensible and even inconceivable, so we cannot distinctly conceive its translation. Since a present impression enlivens an idea, we transfer the sensible object itself to aid the imagination. This explains symbolical delivery—keys for a granary, stone and earth for a manor—which Hume compares to Roman Catholic superstitious practices.
Chapter 62

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 6)4 cards

According to Hume, what is the first obligation to perform promises?
Hume argues that interest is the first obligation to perform promises. People perceive that mutual advantage follows from keeping agreements, so each performs their part expecting others to do the same. A sentiment of morals later concurs with interest and becomes a new obligation, arising from public interest, education, and the artifices of politicians.
Chapter 63
Why does Hume say promises impose no natural obligation?
Hume argues promises are human conventions, not natural acts of the mind. He claims there is no separate act of 'willing an obligation,' so the moral binding force must come from convention and public interest. The obligation is artificial, invented for the convenience of society, not something real arising from any action of mind or body.
Chapter 63
How does Hume use the case of force invalidating contracts?
Hume argues that if force can void a contract, this proves promises have no natural obligation and are artificial contrivances for society's advantage. He notes force is not essentially different from other motives of hope or fear. A wounded man promising a surgeon payment is bound, though the case differs little from promising a robber.
Chapter 63
What is Hume's first argument that justice is artificial, not natural?
Hume examines the vulgar definition of justice as a constant will of giving each their due, which assumes property exists prior to justice. He argues property is not a sensible quality but a relation depending on moral sentiments. Since property depends on justice rather than the reverse, justice must be artificial and of human invention.
Chapter 63

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 7)4 cards

Why does Hume say the laws of justice cannot derive from natural motives?
Hume argues that the mind does not restrain itself by general universal rules but acts on particular present motives and inclinations, allowing many exceptions. Since the laws of justice are universal and perfectly inflexible, they cannot be the immediate offspring of any natural motive. They must instead be artificially invented for a certain purpose, contrary to the common principles of human nature.
Chapter 64
What two foundations does Hume assign to the distinction between justice and injustice?
Hume says the distinction has two foundations: interest, when men observe they cannot live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and morality, when this interest is observed and men take pleasure in actions tending to society's peace and uneasiness at the contrary. The voluntary convention of men makes the first interest take place, so the laws of justice are artificial; the moral sense follows naturally and is augmented by politicians and parents.
Chapter 64
According to Hume, why do people prefer present advantages over remote ones?
Hume argues men are mightily governed by the imagination and proportion affections more to the light under which an object appears than to its real value. What is contiguous in space or time strikes with a strong lively idea and prevails over distant objects, even when we judge the latter superior. Thus men often act against their known interest, preferring trivial present advantage to maintaining social order.
Chapter 64
How does Hume explain the origin of civil government?
Hume argues men cannot cure their narrowness of soul that prefers present to remote, nor change their natures. All they can do is change their situation, making observance of justice the immediate interest of a few indifferent persons and its violation remote. These are civil magistrates, kings, ministers, and rulers, who have immediate interest in executing justice and constrain others to like regularity. Here is the origin of civil government.
Chapter 64

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 8)4 cards

According to Hume, which comes first: justice or government?
Hume argues justice is antecedent to government. The three fundamental laws—stability of possession, its translation by consent, and performance of promises—impose obligation before allegiance to magistrates is ever thought of. Small uncultivated societies may exist without government, but no society can exist without justice. Government is invented later to constrain men to observe these laws of nature.
Chapter 65
How does Hume describe the first obligation to obey government?
Hume says allegiance is at first grafted onto the obligation of promises: men assemble, choose magistrates, and promise obedience. But he maintains this duty quickly takes root of itself and acquires an original authority independent of all contracts. The promise is only the original sanction at the start, not the permanent foundation of political obligation.
Chapter 65
Why does Hume reject resolving allegiance entirely into promise?
Hume argues the interests behind promises and allegiance are distinct: obedience preserves order and concord in society, while promise-keeping begets trust in common offices of life. Both interests are general, avowed, and of the last consequence. Since each has its own separate interest and moral sanction, neither can be founded on the other; each has a peculiar authority.
Chapter 65
What authority does Hume appeal to for his claim about submission?
Hume appeals to the universal consent of mankind, arguing the opinions of men on this matter carry peculiar authority. Since moral good and evil are founded on sentiment, and each person feels their own pleasure or pain, there is just so much vice or virtue as everyone places in it. No one, unless led astray by too strict adherence to a philosophical system, has ascribed civil obligation to a promise.
Chapter 65

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 9)4 cards

For Hume, what is the original motive and sanction of obedience to government?
Hume argues that the original motive to obedience is interest—specifically the security and protection enjoyed in political society, which people cannot attain when perfectly free and independent. Since interest is the immediate sanction of government, the obligation can last no longer than the interest; when a magistrate's oppression becomes perfectly intolerable, the cause ceases and the natural obligation to submit ceases with it.
Chapter 66
How does Hume distinguish the natural and moral obligations of allegiance when tyranny occurs?
Hume holds that the natural obligation of interest ceases when government no longer serves security. The moral obligation, however, does not automatically cease, because people carry general rules beyond the reasons that founded them. Still, he argues we may resist violent supreme power without crime, since human nature's imperfections make exceptions necessary; mankind generally approves resistance to flagrant tyranny, as with Dionysius, Nero, and Philip the second.
Chapter 66
What does Hume say about the ordinary rule of submission versus resistance?
Hume argues that although resistance to supreme power may sometimes be justifiable in sound politics and morality, in the ordinary course of affairs it is pernicious and criminal, tending toward anarchy and the subversion of government. The common rule requires submission, and only in cases of grievous tyranny and oppression may the exception take place; we should weigh the advantages of authority against the disadvantages.
Chapter 66
According to Hume, what gives long possession authority as a foundation of the right of magistracy?
Hume argues that long possession in a form of government or succession of princes gives authority to established governments, since nearly every regime originates in usurpation and doubtful title. Time alone solidifies right by custom, which directs the general instinct of loyalty toward particular rulers. Interest supplies the general instinct, but custom gives the particular direction; a century is scarce enough to establish a new government.
Chapter 66

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 10)4 cards

According to Hume, why can't convenience alone explain succession by blood?
Hume argues that while public interest requires a fixed rule of succession, it does not dictate which rule. If the relation of blood had no effect independent of public interest, it would never be adopted without positive law, and so many different nations could not have converged on the same rule.
Chapter 67
What are fundamental laws, and can their limits be determined?
Fundamental laws are rules supposed to be unalterable by the sovereign's will, such as the Salic law in France. Hume says how far they extend is not determined in any government and never can be, because there is an insensible gradation from the most material to the most trivial laws, making it impossible to set bounds to legislative power.
Chapter 67
When is resistance to supreme power lawful, and can philosophy fix rules for it?
Hume holds that in cases of enormous tyranny and oppression it is lawful to take arms even against supreme power, since government is a human invention for mutual advantage and ceases to obligate when it loses that tendency. But he insists neither laws nor philosophy can establish particular rules to determine when resistance is lawful.
Chapter 67
How does time and custom affect a usurper's title, per Hume?
Hume observes that princes seem to acquire right from their successors as well as ancestors: a king deemed a usurper in his lifetime is later regarded as lawful once his family settles on the throne. He cites Julius Caesar as first Roman emperor, while Sylla and Marius, with really the same titles, are treated as tyrants.
Chapter 67

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (part 11)4 cards

Why does Hume say the two sexes have vastly different duties regarding chastity?
Hume derives it from a "trivial and anatomical observation": in generation the principle passes from man to woman, so a man may easily be mistaken about paternity while a woman cannot. Since men labor for children only if persuaded they are their own, some security is needed. Legal proof of a wife's infidelity is hard, so the world attaches peculiar shame to female infidelity and praise to chastity.
Chapter 68
Why does reputation, not legal punishment, restrain female infidelity according to Hume?
Hume argues public punishments require legal proof, which is difficult in this subject. The only available restraint is punishment of bad fame or reputation, which strongly influences the mind and is inflicted by the world on surmises and conjectures that no court would accept. So a peculiar degree of shame is attached to female infidelity beyond what its injustice alone would produce.
Chapter 68
How does Hume explain modesty extending to women past child-bearing?
Hume says such maxims plainly refer to generation, yet once a general rule is established, men extend it beyond the principles from which it arose. Bachelors are shocked by lewdness in women, and women past child-bearing keep no privilege. Men impose different laws on males because the exception there is obvious, but with women's ages the general rule carries beyond the original principle.
Chapter 68
How do men's chastity obligations compare to women's, per Hume?
Hume says that according to the general notions of the world, men's obligations bear nearly the same proportion to women's as the law of nations does to the law of nature. It is contrary to civil society's interest that men have entire liberty in venereal enjoyment, but that interest is weaker than for women, so the moral obligation is proportionably weaker, as the practice of all nations shows.
Chapter 68

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES (part 1)4 cards

For Hume, what makes an action virtuous or vicious?
Hume argues that an action is virtuous or vicious only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend on durable principles of the mind extending over the whole conduct and entering into personal character. Actions not proceeding from a constant principle have no influence on love, hatred, pride, or humility, and are therefore never considered in morality.
Chapter 69
How does Hume explain sympathy between minds?
Hume argues all minds are similar in feelings and operations, so no affection exists that others are not somewhat susceptible to. Like equally wound strings, affections pass from person to person. We perceive only causes or effects of another's passion, never the passion directly, and from these we infer it, which gives rise to sympathy.
Chapter 69
Why does Hume say usefulness contributes to beauty?
Hume argues an object with a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor is always regarded as beautiful, while one tending to produce pain is deformed. The conveniency of a house, fertility of a field, strength of a horse, and swift-sailing of a vessel form their principal beauty. Such beauty pleases by sympathy with the possessor's pleasure.
Chapter 69
How do natural virtues differ from justice, per Hume?
Hume argues the good from natural virtues arises from every single act and is the object of some natural passion, as when humanity motivates relieving the distressed. A single act of justice may often be contrary to the public good; only the concurrence of mankind in a general scheme is advantageous. Both are approved through sympathy with society's interests.
Chapter 69

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES (part 2)4 cards

Why does Hume say virtue in rags is still virtue?
Hume argues that a character naturally beneficial to society is esteemed virtuous even when accidents prevent it from operating, as in a dungeon or desert. He compares this to a well-contrived house that pleases though no one will dwell in it, and to fertile soil in an uninhabited country: the imagination passes easily from cause to effect, and general rules create a species of probability that influences the imagination.
Chapter 70
How does Hume reconcile extensive sympathy with limited generosity?
Hume holds that sympathy may give us pain and disapprobation at an object tending to give another uneasiness, though we would not sacrifice our own interest for his satisfaction. A house may displease us as ill-contrived for the owner, yet we refuse a shilling to rebuild it. Sentiments must touch the heart to control our passions, but need only extend to the imagination to influence our taste.
Chapter 70
What two kinds of qualities does Hume find in panegyrics of great men?
Hume says most qualities attributed to great men divide into those that make them perform their part in society, and those that render them serviceable to themselves and promote their own interest. Prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, enterprise and dexterity are celebrated alongside generosity and humanity. Indolence alone gets indulgence, yet is still allowed to be a fault, and a very great one if extreme.
Chapter 70
What is Hume's opinion on the causes of moral sentiments?
Hume argues moral good and evil are distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason, and that these sentiments arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind and of particular persons. He holds both causes are intermixed in our moral judgments, as in decisions about external beauty, though reflections on tendencies have by far the greatest influence and determine all the great lines of our duty.
Chapter 70

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES (part 3)4 cards

According to Hume, what happens when an idea of another's distress becomes too lively?
Hume argues there is a medium: if the idea is too faint it has no influence by comparison, but if too strong it operates entirely by sympathy, which is contrary to comparison. Sympathy, being the conversion of an idea into an impression, demands greater force and vivacity in the idea than comparison requires.
Chapter 71
Why does Hume say pride is universally blamed and condemned?
Hume argues pride is vicious because it causes uneasiness in all men, presenting them constantly with a disagreeable comparison. Since everyone is proud to some degree, the proud cannot endure the proud. Those with ill-grounded conceit must keep making comparisons to support their vanity, so pride is condemned by all mankind for its natural tendency to cause uneasiness in others.
Chapter 71
What two circumstances give pride or self-esteem its merit, according to Hume?
Hume states the merit of pride derives from its utility and its agreeableness to ourselves: it capacitates us for business and gives immediate satisfaction. When it exceeds just bounds it loses the first advantage and becomes prejudicial, which is why extravagant pride and ambition are condemned, though such passion still conveys an elevated sensation to the person actuated by it.
Chapter 71
How does Hume distinguish well-grounded self-esteem from over-weaning conceit in conduct?
Hume argues a value for ourselves where we truly have valuable qualities is laudable, and a due degree of pride is useful, making us sensible of our merit. But good-breeding and decency require we avoid all signs and expressions of that passion, since everyone over-values themselves; even men of sense and merit must show reserve and the appearance of modesty.
Chapter 71

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES (part 4)4 cards

Why does Hume say benevolence gives direction to other qualities like courage and ambition?
Hume argues that a propensity to the tender passions makes a person agreeable and useful in all parts of life and gives a just direction to their other qualities. Courage and ambition, when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber. Judgment and capacity are likewise indifferent in themselves to society's interests and tend to good or ill according as these other passions direct them.
Chapter 72
According to Hume, are all angry passions vicious?
No. Hume holds that anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitutions, and the want of them may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility. In low degrees we excuse and even applaud them as natural. Only when they rise to cruelty do they form the most detested of all vices, turning our pity for sufferers into stronger hatred of the guilty.
Chapter 72
What is Hume's ultimate test of merit and virtue?
Hume states it is a most certain rule that if there is no relation of life in which I could not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allowed to be perfect. If he is as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue.
Chapter 72
Why does Hume think excluding natural abilities from virtues is merely a dispute of words?
Hume argues natural abilities and moral virtues are both equally mental qualities, both produce pleasure, and both tend to procure love and esteem. Men are as jealous of their character regarding sense and knowledge as honour and courage. Though we refuse natural abilities the title of virtue, they give new lustre to other virtues and entitle a person to good-will.
Chapter 72

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES (part 5)4 cards

For what three causes does Hume say we approve of the rich and fortunate?
Hume lists three causes: the immediate pleasure from viewing a rich man's fine clothes, equipage, gardens, or houses; the hoped-for advantage from his generosity and liberality; and the pleasure and advantage he himself reaps from his possessions, which produces an agreeable sympathy in us. Hume argues the third principle is preferable, since our esteem extends beyond any prospect of personal advantage.
Chapter 73
Why does Hume say we esteem men of extraordinary parts and abilities?
Hume argues that the good and ill of multitudes are connected with the actions of such people, so whatever they undertake is important and commands our attention. This occupation or agitation of the mind is commonly agreeable and amusing. Anyone who can excite these sentiments soon acquires our esteem, unless other circumstances of his character render him odious and disagreeable.
Chapter 73
How does Hume explain the esteem shown to 'good women's men' by women with no design on them?
Hume calls this a singular instance meriting attention. The ability of such a person to give enjoyment is the real source of the love and esteem he meets among females, even though the women who love and esteem him have no prospect of receiving that enjoyment themselves. They can only be affected by sympathy with one who has a commerce of love with him.
Chapter 73
Why does Hume hold that the rules of justice are stedfast despite being artificial?
Hume argues that although justice is artificial, the sense of its morality is natural. The interest on which justice is founded is the greatest imaginable and extends to all times and places; it cannot be served by any other invention and is obvious on the first formation of society. These causes render the rules of justice as immutable as human nature.
Chapter 73

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES (part 6)4 cards

According to Hume, does belief involve a distinct impression separate from the idea?
Hume argues no: belief only modifies the idea or conception, rendering it different to the feeling without producing any distinct impression. He notes that no distinct impression attends every distinct idea of matter of fact, and that the firm conception can be fully explained by association with a present impression, leaving nothing to produce a separate impression.
Chapter 74
What two principles does Hume confess he cannot render consistent?
Hume states he cannot reconcile two principles: that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. He pleads the privilege of a sceptic, calling the difficulty too hard for his understanding, though he does not pronounce it absolutely insuperable.
Chapter 74
How does Hume argue against the idea of a simple, individual self?
Hume argues every idea derives from preceding impressions, but we have no impression of self or substance as something simple and individual, so we have no idea of them in that sense. Since all perceptions are distinct, distinguishable, and separable, the self is merely a composition of particular perceptions, not a simple substance.
Chapter 74
What two errors does Hume confess in his earlier reasoning?
Hume confesses two lesser errors found by mature reflection. First, he wrongly said distance between bodies is known by angles made by rays of light, though these angles are not known to the mind. Second, he wrongly said two ideas of the same object differ only by degrees of force and vivacity; he now thinks they differ by feeling.
Chapter 74

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All questions and answers

According to Hume, from what does our idea of cause and effect derive?

What distinguishes knowledge from probability in Hume's account?

What role does belief play in Hume's theory of inference?

How does Hume explain the idea of necessary connection?

According to Hume, what is the only solid foundation for the science of human nature?

How does Hume describe the relationship of all sciences to human nature?

What common prejudice against metaphysics does Hume identify, and how does he respond?

How does Hume distinguish impressions from ideas?

Does Hume claim all ideas and impressions exactly resemble each other?

What general proposition does Hume establish about simple ideas and impressions?

What exception does Hume allow to the priority of impressions over ideas?

According to Hume, what three relations unite simple ideas in the imagination?

How does Hume define the idea of substance?

What distinguishes a substance from a mode in Hume's account?

What does Hume argue about abstract or general ideas?

How does a particular idea become general, according to Hume?

Why does Hume reject the infinite divisibility of our ideas of space and time?

What argument from Malezieu does Hume cite against infinite divisibility?

Why does Hume hold that time must be composed of indivisible moments?

How does Hume use the maxim that whatever the mind clearly conceives is possible?

What two extremes does Hume say the argument about infinite divisibility sets against each other?

What medium does Hume propose between infinite divisibility and the non-entity of points?

Why does Hume reject the system of physical points?

How does Hume redefine penetration to answer the objection about mathematical points?

Why does Hume think two differently coloured points can lie contiguous without penetration?

What does Hume say chiefly causes the objections and makes them hard to answer?

How does Hume use geometry's definitions of point, line, and surface against infinite divisibility?

What two answers does Hume consider to the argument from definitions, and why reject them?

Why does Hume say the standard of equality as equal numbers of points is just but useless?

What does Hume conclude is the only useful notion of equality?

What is Hume's stated original standard of a right line?

How does Hume argue against the idea of a vacuum from darkness?

What does Hume say follows from the ideas of rest and annihilation in the chamber?

According to Hume, what is the most fertile source of error in reasoning?

Why does Hume say people use words for ideas in reasoning?

How does Hume answer the objection that his system explains only how objects affect the senses?

What is Hume's stated paradox about extension and the vacuum?

Why does Hume rank arithmetic and algebra above geometry in certainty?

Of identity, time and place, and causation, which alone carries the mind beyond the senses?

Why does Hume deny that every beginning of existence must have a cause?

How does Hume rebut the argument that an uncaused thing would produce itself?

What does Hume say about the argument that 'nothing' cannot be a cause?

How does Hume distinguish memory from imagination?

According to Hume, what determines the mind's transition from an impression to the idea of a cause or effect?

Why can't there be demonstrative arguments proving that unexperienced instances resemble experienced ones?

What three general principles of association among ideas does Hume identify?

How does Hume distinguish belief from mere conception of an idea?

According to Hume, how does belief differ from a fiction?

How does Hume illustrate belief using two readers of the same book?

What general maxim does Hume propose about present impressions and related ideas?

Which three relations does Hume say enliven ideas and produce belief?

How does Hume answer the objection that an idea, not an impression, can generate belief?

Why does Hume hold that belief arises only from causation, not from resemblance or contiguity alone?

What example does Hume give of contiguity strengthening belief?

How does Hume argue against the claim that the communication of motion can be inferred from the ideas of body, motion, and impulse?

According to Hume, what does the inconsistency of certain religious believers reveal?

How does Hume distinguish two ways custom operates on the mind?

What does Hume claim about education's influence on belief?

What is Hume's definition of belief and its effect on the passions?

How does Hume distinguish knowledge, proofs, and probabilities?

What is chance in Hume's account, and why can no single chance exceed another?

Why does calculating chances require a mixture of causes?

How does a superior number of chances produce belief, according to Hume?

How does Hume explain our judgment when past experiments are contrary?

How does Hume argue that probability and its opposite possibility differ?

According to Hume, how does the recency of an impression affect belief?

Why does a long chain of reasoning weaken conviction, according to Hume?

How does Hume answer the objection that ancient history's evidence must decay?

What does Hume say about prejudices formed from general rules?

According to Hume, what gives us the idea of necessity between cause and effect?

What two obvious principles does Hume use to reject the popular explanation of power?

What conditions does Hume list that diminish the evidence of a probable judgment?

How does Hume describe the mind's decision when it weighs contrary experiments?

According to Hume, where does the idea of necessity exist?

How does Hume answer the objection that causes operate independent of the mind?

According to Hume, what two elements constitute physical necessity?

What are Hume's first three rules for judging causes and effects?

Why does Hume use animal reasoning as a test of theories of the mind?

How does Hume explain a dog's inference from a present impression?