An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Flashcards
David Hume · Public domain edition · 76 cards · 21 chapters
Hume’s Enquiry argues that human knowledge rests on impressions and ideas, with causal reasoning grounded in custom rather than reason. The deck covers his distinction between easy and abstruse philosophy, the copy principle, and the three principles of association.
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Chapter 1 · Question
What two manners of treating moral philosophy does Hume distinguish?
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Chapter 1 · Answer
Hume distinguishes the easy and obvious philosophy, which considers man as born for action and shaped by taste and sentiment, painting virtue in amiable colours to engage the affections; and the accurate and abstruse philosophy, which treats man as a reasonable being, examining human nature by speculation to find the general principles behind our sentiments and moral distinctions.
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SECTION I.4 cards
What two manners of treating moral philosophy does Hume distinguish?
Hume distinguishes the easy and obvious philosophy, which considers man as born for action and shaped by taste and sentiment, painting virtue in amiable colours to engage the affections; and the accurate and abstruse philosophy, which treats man as a reasonable being, examining human nature by speculation to find the general principles behind our sentiments and moral distinctions.
Chapter 1
Why does Hume think the easy philosophy gains more durable fame?
Hume argues the easy philosophy wins lasting fame because it appeals to common sense: if its author errs, he can renew his appeal to natural sentiment and return to the right path. Abstruse reasoners, by contrast, compound one mistake into another and enjoy only momentary reputation. He cites Cicero flourishing while Aristotle decays, and Addison read when Locke is forgotten.
Chapter 1
What advantage does Hume claim accurate philosophy has for the easy kind?
Hume argues the abstract philosophy is subservient to the easy and humane: without it, the latter cannot attain exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or reasonings. Just as the anatomist's study of inward structure helps the painter depict a Venus, accurate knowledge of the understanding and passions is requisite for those who would describe life and manners successfully.
Chapter 1
What objection to metaphysics does Hume raise, and how does he answer it?
Hume notes the objection that abstract philosophy is obscure and a source of uncertainty and error, arising from vain efforts to penetrate inaccessible subjects or from popular superstition hiding in tangled brambles. He answers that this is no reason to desist; rather, philosophy must carry the war into superstition's secret recesses, since blind despair has no place in the sciences.
Chapter 1
SECTION II.4 cards
How does Hume divide the perceptions of the mind?
Hume divides all perceptions of the mind into two classes distinguished by their degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively he calls Thoughts or Ideas; the more lively ones he calls Impressions, a term he uses somewhat differently from common usage. Impressions include what we hear, see, feel, love, hate, desire, or will; ideas are the fainter perceptions we have when reflecting on those sensations.
Chapter 2
What does Hume claim about the creative power of thought?
Hume argues that although thought seems unbounded, it is really confined within narrow limits. Its creative power amounts to no more than compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing materials furnished by the senses and experience. A golden mountain joins the familiar ideas of gold and mountain; a virtuous horse joins virtue with the shape of a horse. All materials of thinking derive from outward or inward sentiment.
Chapter 2
What two arguments does Hume give that ideas copy impressions?
First, analyzing any idea, however compounded, always resolves it into simple ideas copied from a precedent feeling; even the idea of God arises from augmenting our own mental qualities. Second, where a sense is defective, the corresponding ideas are absent: a blind man has no notion of colours, a deaf man none of sounds, and a Laplander has no notion of the relish of wine.
Chapter 2
What exception does Hume raise to the copy principle, and how does he treat it?
Hume describes a man who has seen colours for thirty years but never encountered one particular shade of blue. Shown every other shade in gradual order, he would perceive a gap and, Hume believes, could supply the missing idea from imagination. This suggests simple ideas are not always derived from correspondent impressions, yet Hume calls the instance so singular it scarcely merits altering the general maxim.
Chapter 2
SECTION III.4 cards
What three principles of association among ideas does Hume identify?
Hume says there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas: Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect. He notes no philosopher before him had attempted to enumerate or class all such principles, a subject he considers worthy of curiosity.
Chapter 3
How does Hume illustrate each of the three principles?
A picture naturally leads thoughts to the original (resemblance); mention of one apartment in a building introduces enquiry about the others (contiguity); and thinking of a wound makes us reflect on the pain that follows it (cause or effect).
Chapter 3
Does Hume claim his enumeration of association principles is provably complete?
No. Hume admits that proving the enumeration complete may be difficult to satisfy the reader or even himself. He says all we can do is run over instances, examine the binding principle carefully, and generalize as far as possible; more instances and care yield more assurance, not certainty.
Chapter 3
How does Hume handle contrast or contrariety as a possible fourth principle?
In a note, Hume concedes contrast or contrariety is also a connexion among ideas, but suggests it may be considered a mixture of causation and resemblance: where two objects are contrary, one destroys the other, so it is the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of annihilation implies the idea of the object's former existence.
Chapter 3
PART II.4 cards
According to Hume, what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?
Hume argues that conclusions from experience are not founded on reasoning or any process of the understanding. Even after we have experience of cause and effect, the inference from past to future is a step of the mind that cannot be justified by argument. He offers only a negative answer, claiming no reasoning supports extending past experience to future objects.
Chapter 5
Why can't the resemblance of past to future be proved by demonstrative arguments?
Hume argues it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object seemingly like those experienced may have different or contrary effects. We can clearly conceive snow-like bodies tasting of salt or fire, or trees flourishing in winter. Whatever is intelligible and distinctly conceivable implies no contradiction, so no demonstrative or a priori argument can prove it false.
Chapter 5
Why does Hume say proving the future resembles the past by probable arguments is circular?
All arguments concerning existence are founded on cause and effect, knowledge of which derives from experience, and all experimental conclusions suppose the future will conform to the past. To prove that supposition by probable arguments is to take for granted the very point in question. Hume concludes all arguments from experience are founded on similarity, not reason.
Chapter 5
How does Hume use the eggs example against reasoning from experience?
Hume notes nothing is so like as eggs, yet no one expects the same taste in all of them. If conclusions from experience were formed by reason, they would be as perfect after one instance as after many. But firm reliance comes only after long uniform experiments, and Hume cannot find or imagine any reasoning that draws a different conclusion from one instance than from a hundred.
Chapter 5
PART I.4 cards
According to Hume, what principle determines us to infer cause from constant conjunction?
Hume argues that Custom or Habit is the principle: when repetition of an act produces a propensity to renew it without reasoning, we call that propensity custom. After constant conjunction of two objects—heat and flame, weight and solidity—we are determined by custom alone to expect one from the other. Reason cannot explain why a thousand instances yield an inference that one instance cannot.
Chapter 6
What does Hume say a person new to the world could infer without experience?
Hume asks us to suppose a person with the strongest reason brought suddenly into the world. He would observe a succession of objects but could not reach the idea of cause and effect, since particular powers never appear to the senses. One event preceding another may be arbitrary and casual. Without more experience he could be assured of nothing beyond what was present to memory and senses.
Chapter 6
Why does Hume say sceptical philosophy faces public hatred despite being harmless?
The author argues the Academic or Sceptical philosophy mingles with no disorderly passion, so it is harmless and innocent. But by flattering no irregular passion it gains few partizans, and by opposing many vices and follies it raises abundance of enemies who stigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious. The very circumstance rendering it innocent exposes it to public hatred.
Chapter 6
Must all reasoning about matters of fact terminate in something present to memory or senses?
Hume argues yes: though conclusions from experience reach distant places and remote ages, some fact must always be present to the senses or memory from which we first proceed. Otherwise reasonings are merely hypothetical, a chain with nothing to support it. Since you cannot proceed in infinitum, you must terminate in such a fact or admit belief is entirely without foundation.
Chapter 6
PART II.4 cards
For Hume, what distinguishes belief from fiction?
Hume argues belief is not a separate idea the mind can attach at will, since we cannot choose to believe in a centaur. Instead, belief is a sentiment or feeling annexed to a conception, arising from nature and custom rather than the will. It is a more vivid, lively, firm conception than imagination alone produces.
Chapter 7
What causes the vivid conception that constitutes belief?
Hume holds that when an object is present to memory or senses, custom carries the imagination to its usual conjoined object, and that conception carries a feeling distinct from reverie. He illustrates with a moving billiard ball: we can conceive it stopping, but the idea of motion transferring feels different.
Chapter 7
How do resemblance and contiguity enliven ideas?
Hume argues a present impression plus a relation enlivens the correlative idea. A friend's portrait enlivens our idea of him through resemblance, but only if it resembles him and is present. Similarly, distance weakens ideas: near home we are more touched than far away, though both objects are then mere ideas.
Chapter 7
How does Hume use relics and a friend's son as evidence?
Hume argues causation works like resemblance and contiguity: superstition's relics enliven devotion because they were once touched by the saint, making them imperfect effects linked by a short chain. Likewise a dead friend's son instantly revives past intimacies more vividly. In all cases, belief in the correlative object is presupposed.
Chapter 7
SECTION VI.4 cards
How does Hume classify arguments, correcting Locke's division?
Hume says Locke divided all arguments into demonstrative and probable, which would make even 'all men must die' merely probable. To conform to common use, Hume argues we should divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities—where proofs are arguments from experience leaving no room for doubt or opposition.
Chapter 8
Why does Hume say chance has no real existence yet still influences belief?
Hume holds there is no such thing as Chance in the world; rather, our ignorance of the real cause of an event has the same influence on the understanding and produces a like species of belief or opinion. Probability arises from superiority of chances, and as that superiority increases, belief or assent proportionably increases.
Chapter 8
How does the mind form belief from a die with more sides favoring one outcome?
The mind considers each side equally probable, since chance renders particular events equal. But finding more sides concur in one event, the mind meets that event more often when revolving the possibilities. This concurrence of several views imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination, giving it force and vigour and begetting the reliance that constitutes belief.
Chapter 8
How does Hume treat probability of causes compared with chance?
Hume says the case is the same with probability of causes as with chance. Some causes are uniform, like fire burning; others are irregular, like rhubarb not always purging. Custom leads us to transfer the past to the future, and where effects differ we assign each a weight in proportion to its observed frequency, with the most usual effect getting preference.
Chapter 8
PART I.4 cards
According to Hume, what is the chief obstacle to progress in moral and metaphysical sciences?
The author argues the chief obstacle is the obscurity of ideas and ambiguity of terms. Moral ideas, unlike geometric ones, easily escape reflection and cannot be steadily recalled, so similar objects are mistaken for the same and conclusions drift wide of the premises. By contrast, the principal difficulty in mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought required.
Chapter 9
What does Hume say all our ideas are copies of?
Hume asserts it will not admit of much dispute that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions; we cannot think of anything we have not antecedently felt through external or internal senses. Complex ideas may be known by definition, but to clarify simple ideas one must produce the original impressions, which are strong, sensible, and free of ambiguity.
Chapter 9
In a single instance of cause and effect, what do we discover about power?
Hume argues that in any single instance we never discover power or necessary connexion binding effect to cause. With billiard balls we see only that motion actually follows impulse; the outward senses reveal succession, not energy. No sensible quality of body points to its effect, and the power actuating the universe stays entirely concealed.
Chapter 9
Why does Hume reject deriving the idea of power from the will's command over the body?
Hume argues we are not conscious of any power in volition. The soul-body union is mysterious; we cannot move all organs alike, and a palsy victim feels the same 'power' over a limb he cannot move. Anatomy shows the will directly moves unknown nerves and spirits, not the limb, so the effect is not known and the power cannot be felt.
Chapter 9
PART II.4 cards
For Hume, what single circumstance distinguishes many uniform instances from one instance?
The instances are otherwise exactly alike; the only difference is that after repetition the mind is carried by habit, on the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant. This customary transition of the imagination is the sentiment from which the idea of power or necessary connexion is formed.
Chapter 10
How does Hume define cause in his two definitions?
First, an object followed by another where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second, or where if the first had not been, the second never had existed. Second, an object followed by another whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other. Both are drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause.
Chapter 10
What does Hume conclude about the words force, power, and energy in common use?
Their frequent use in conversation and philosophy proves no acquaintance with any connecting principle between cause and effect. The words have loose meanings and confused ideas. Animals feel a nisus when moving bodies and a sensation from blows, and we transfer these merely animal feelings to inanimate objects.
Chapter 10
What does Hume say about the idea of power in his footnote?
The idea of power is relative, like that of cause, referring to an effect constantly conjoined. We call power the unknown circumstance fixing the degree of an effect, and all philosophers allow the effect measures the power. If we had an idea of power in itself, the dispute over force and velocity could be settled by direct mensuration.
Chapter 10
PART I.3 cards
Why does Hume think long-undecided controversies usually persist?
Hume argues that if a dispute about common life and experience stays undecided for long, the likely cause is ambiguous expressions: disputants attach different ideas to the same terms and so never grapple with each other. He adds the exception that questions entirely beyond human capacity may also remain fruitless.
Chapter 11
What evidence does Hume give for uniformity in human actions?
Hume points to the acknowledged uniformity of human actions across nations and ages: the same motives produce the same actions, and passions like ambition, avarice, and generosity drive all human enterprises. He says history's chief use is discovering these constant principles, and that a traveler reporting men wholly unlike any known would be detected as a liar.
Chapter 11
How does Hume explain apparent irregularities in human conduct?
Hume grants that some actions seem unconnected to known motives, but argues this no more disproves uniformity than irregular natural events do. Philosophers recognize that contrary effects betray contrary causes, often hidden by minuteness or remoteness, just as a watch may stop from a grain of dust rather than any failure in the spring's force.
Chapter 11
PART II.4 cards
Why does Hume reject arguments that refute a philosophy by its dangerous consequences?
Hume says refuting a hypothesis by claiming its dangerous consequences for religion and morality is the most common yet most blameable method of reasoning. An opinion leading to absurdities is certainly false, but an opinion is not false merely because it is dangerous. Such topics serve only to make an antagonist odious, not to discover truth. He submits his own doctrines of necessity and liberty to this kind of examination.
Chapter 12
How does Hume argue that necessity is essential to morality and punishment?
Hume argues all laws rest on rewards and punishments, which presuppose motives have a regular, uniform influence on the mind—a cause, and thus necessity. Only a person with thought and consciousness is a proper object of hatred or vengeance, and actions matter only through their relation to a durable character. Without necessity, actions prove nothing about character, so a man would be as pure after the most horrid crime as at birth.
Chapter 12
What is the first objection in section 78, and how does Hume answer it?
The objection: if voluntary actions are chained by necessity to the Deity, human actions either have no moral turpitude, since they come from a good cause, or the Creator shares the guilt. Hume answers the first part by noting some philosophers hold the whole system is ordered with perfect benevolence, so apparent ills serve greater good. But he finds such remote reflections weak against immediate sentiment, as preaching general laws to a man with gout does not ease his pain.
Chapter 12
What does Hume concede about the second objection, and what does he recommend?
Hume admits the second objection—how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all human actions without authoring sin—admits no easy or satisfactory answer. Reconciling contingency with prescience, or absolute decrees with divine innocence, exceeds the power of philosophy. He recommends that philosophy, sensible of its temerity, leave these sublime mysteries and return with modesty to its proper province, the examination of common life.
Chapter 12
SECTION IX.4 cards
According to Hume, what principle guides animals in inferring effects from causes?
Hume argues that animals do not infer effects from causes through reasoning or argument, since such arguments are too abstruse for their imperfect understandings. Instead, custom alone leads animals, from any object striking their senses, to infer its usual attendant and to conceive the other in the manner called belief. He says the same principle governs children, ordinary people, and philosophers in active life.
Chapter 13
What evidence does Hume give that animals learn from experience?
Hume cites the difference between young and old animals: an old horse knows the proper height it can leap, and an old greyhound trusts the fatiguing chase to younger dogs while positioning to meet the hare in her doubles. He also notes animals can be taught actions contrary to instinct through rewards and punishments, and a dog fears the raised whip or answers its name through experience.
Chapter 13
How does Hume explain why humans surpass animals in reasoning?
In the footnote, Hume attributes differences in understanding to custom and to varying degrees of attention, memory, and observation; to comprehending complex systems of causes; to carrying chains of consequences further; to avoiding confusion of ideas; to separating relevant circumstances; to forming general maxims carefully; to suggesting analogies; to freedom from prejudice and passion; and to benefiting from books and conversation.
Chapter 13
What does Hume conclude about instinct versus experimental reasoning?
Hume argues that although animals derive much knowledge from observation, many parts come from the original hand of nature as instincts, which improve little with practice. He then claims that experimental reasoning itself, shared with beasts and on which all conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power acting unknown to ourselves. The instinct differs, but it is still instinct.
Chapter 13
PART I.3 cards
What does Tillotson's argument against the real presence conclude about evidence?
Tillotson argues that the authority of scripture and tradition rests on the apostles' testimony, so our evidence for Christianity is weaker than the evidence of our senses. Since a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger, it would be contrary to just reasoning to assent to the real presence, which contradicts sense. Hume praises this as a decisive argument that silences bigotry and superstition.
Chapter 14
How does Hume say a wise man proportions belief to evidence?
Hume states that a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. Where experience is infallible, he expects the event with full assurance and treats past experience as proof. Otherwise he weighs opposite experiments, inclines to the side with more, and his judgement amounts only to probability. All probability supposes opposing observations, and we deduct the smaller number from the greater.
Chapter 14
How does Hume define a miracle and what proof stands against it?
Hume defines a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature, or a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or interposition of an invisible agent. Since firm, unalterable experience establishes the laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience. There must be uniform experience against every miraculous event, so proof stands against proof.
Chapter 14
PART II.4 cards
What four circumstances does Hume say are required for full assurance in human testimony?
Hume lists sufficient numbers of men of unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning to guard against delusion; undoubted integrity beyond suspicion of deceit; credit and reputation such that they have much to lose if detected in falsehood; and facts performed so publicly in so celebrated a part of the world that detection would be unavoidable. He claims no miracle in history meets all these conditions.
Chapter 15
Why does Hume say humans more readily believe utterly absurd and miraculous claims?
Hume observes that while we normally prefer what past experience shows to be most usual, with utterly absurd and miraculous claims the mind instead more readily admits them. The passion of surprise and wonder is an agreeable emotion that inclines us toward belief, and even those who cannot believe directly enjoy the pleasure second-hand by exciting others' admiration.
Chapter 15
What third presumption does Hume raise against supernatural relations?
Hume argues miracles are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations, or among civilized peoples who received them from ignorant ancestors and transmitted them with inviolable sanction. In early histories, prodigies, omens, and oracles obscure natural events, but these grow thinner nearer enlightened ages, showing the propensity to the marvellous is checked by learning but never extirpated.
Chapter 15
How does Hume use conflicting miracles across religions as a fourth reason?
Hume argues that in religion whatever is different is contrary, so the religions of Rome, Turkey, Siam, and China cannot all rest on solid foundation. Every miracle establishing one system indirectly overthrows every other, making prodigies of different religions contrary facts and their evidences opposite to each other. He compares this to a judge whose two witnesses are destroyed by two others placing the accused far away.
Chapter 15
SECTION XI.2 cards
What rule does Epicurus invoke for inferring a cause from an effect?
He argues that when inferring a cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other and ascribe to the cause only qualities exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A ten-ounce body proves the counterweight exceeds ten ounces, never a hundred. Any further qualities are conjecture; and we cannot return from the cause to infer new effects beyond those by which it is known.
Chapter 16
What follows, according to the argument, about the gods' attributes from the order of the universe?
Allowing the gods to be authors of the universe's order, it follows only that they possess the precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence appearing in their workmanship — nothing further. Supposing greater attributes, or grander displays in other regions or ages, is mere hypothesis. One may not mount from the universe to Jupiter and then descend to infer new effects.
Chapter 16
PART I.4 cards
What two species of scepticism does Hume distinguish, and how do they differ?
Hume distinguishes scepticism antecedent to philosophy, which recommends universal doubt of our opinions and faculties as a preservative against error, from scepticism consequent to science and enquiry, which arises after men supposedly discover the fallaciousness of their mental faculties or their unfitness to reach fixed determinations on speculative subjects. He argues the Cartesian antecedent doubt, if attainable, would be incurable, though in moderated form it is a reasonable preparative to philosophy.
Chapter 17
Why does Hume say the Cartesian doubt cannot be cured by reasoning?
Hume argues there is no original principle with a prerogative above other self-evident principles, and even if there were, we could not advance beyond it except by using the very faculties we are supposed to distrust. Therefore the Cartesian doubt, were any human creature able to attain it (which Hume says plainly is not possible), would be entirely incurable, and no reasoning could bring us to assurance on any subject.
Chapter 17
What is the primary opinion of all men about the senses, and how does philosophy destroy it?
Hume says a natural instinct leads men to repose faith in their senses and to suppose the very images presented by the senses are external objects existing independent of perception; even animals share this belief. The slightest philosophy destroys it by teaching that nothing is present to the mind but an image or perception, so the senses are only inlets conveying images, as when a table seems to diminish with distance though the real table does not.
Chapter 17
Why can experience not prove that our perceptions are caused by resembling external objects?
Hume argues that whether sense perceptions are produced by external resembling objects is a question of fact, to be settled by experience, but experience here is and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but perceptions and cannot reach any experience of their connexion with objects, so the supposition of such a connexion is without foundation in reasoning. He adds that appealing to the supreme Being's veracity makes an unexpected circuit.
Chapter 17
PART II.4 cards
What is the chief objection to abstract reasonings like geometry, per Hume?
The chief objection comes from the ideas of space and time. When scrutinized by profound sciences, they yield principles full of absurdity and contradiction—such as the infinite divisibility of extension. Hume notes these absurd conclusions are supported by chains of reasoning as convincing as geometric proofs, leaving reason dazzled and confounded between light and profound darkness.
Chapter 18
How does Hume propose resolving the contradictions of infinite divisibility?
In a footnote, Hume suggests it may be possible to avoid these absurdities by denying abstract or general ideas proper. All general ideas, he argues, are really particular ideas attached to a general term that recalls resembling particulars. On this view, mathematical ideas of quantity are particular, suggested by sense and imagination, and thus cannot be infinitely divisible.
Chapter 18
What is Hume's chief objection to excessive or Pyrrhonian scepticism?
Hume argues no durable good can result from excessive scepticism while it retains full force. A Pyrrhonian cannot expect constant influence on the mind, and if his principles universally prevailed, all discourse and action would cease. But nature is too strong for principle: the first trivial event in life dispels such doubts, leaving the sceptic like everyone else.
Chapter 18
According to Hume, what defeats popular sceptical objections to moral evidence?
Hume says popular objections—from human weakness, contradictory opinions across ages, and variations in sickness and health—are weak. Since we reason every moment about fact and existence in common life and cannot subsist without it, such objections cannot destroy that evidence. Action, employment, and the occupations of common life are the great subverters of Pyrrhonism.
Chapter 18
PART III.4 cards
According to Hume, what two kinds of mitigated scepticism are durable and useful?
The author argues that mitigated or academical scepticism is useful in two forms: first, it corrects dogmatism by inspiring modesty and reserve, showing the infirmities of human understanding; second, it limits enquiries to subjects suited to our narrow capacity, confining judgement to common life and daily experience rather than distant, sublime topics.
Chapter 19
What does Hume say are the only proper objects of abstract science or demonstration?
The author argues that quantity and number alone are the objects of demonstration, since their parts are entirely similar and their relations intricate. All attempts to extend demonstrative knowledge beyond these bounds he calls mere sophistry and illusion. Other ideas are distinct, so scrutiny only observes their diversity, corrected by juster definitions.
Chapter 19
Why does Hume hold that matters of fact cannot be demonstrated?
The author argues that whatever is may not be, and no negation of a fact involves a contradiction. The non-existence of any being is as clear an idea as its existence, so a false factual proposition remains perfectly conceivable. In contrast, a false proposition in the demonstrative sciences is confused and unintelligible.
Chapter 19
How does Hume classify moral reasoning, theology, and morals and criticism?
The author argues moral reasoning concerns particular or general facts, founded on experience; theology partly reasons about facts but rests best on faith and revelation. Morals and criticism he treats as objects of taste and sentiment, since beauty is felt rather than perceived, though reasoning may fix a standard by regarding general human tastes.
Chapter 19
C.4 cards
According to Hume, what is the only proper object of demonstration?
Hume holds that no demonstration is possible except in the case of ideas of quantity or number. Because the parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations can be traced by thought alone. Mathematics therefore surpasses moral and metaphysical sciences in the clearness of its ideas, though it is not without its own difficulty.
Chapter 20
How does Hume define the liberty required for morality?
Hume defines hypothetical liberty as a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will, and says it can be ascribed to everyone who is not a prisoner. Liberty opposed to necessity, rather than merely to constraint, amounts to chance. He argues both necessity and liberty are essential to morality and to punishment.
Chapter 20
What is Hume's rule for inferring God's attributes from nature's design?
Hume argues the sole argument for a divine existence is from marks of design in nature. We must not infer greater power, wisdom, or benevolence in the cause than is needed to produce the observed effects, nor argue from an inferred cause to new unobserved effects. Doing so, he says, is a gross sophism.
Chapter 20
Under what condition is testimony sufficient to establish a miracle?
Hume argues no testimony suffices to establish a miracle unless its falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it establishes. Since a miracle requires uniform experience against it, the proof against it is as complete as possible. He concludes no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less a proof.
Chapter 20
D. In _Religion_ (v. _Miracles_, _Providence_).4 cards
According to Hume, what are the materials of thinking supplied by sensation?
Hume holds that outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of thinking, but these must be corrected by reason (p. 117). This reflects his empiricist claim that the senses furnish the raw content of thought, while reason's role is corrective rather than generative.
Chapter 21
What does Hume say about the will's power over the body?
Hume argues the will's influence over the organs of the body can never give us the idea of power, because we are not conscious of any power in the will—only of a sequence of motions following upon willing (p. 52). The same applies to the will's power over the mind in raising new ideas (p. 53).
Chapter 21
Why can the power of God not be used to explain motion, per Hume?
Hume states that the power of God cannot be used to explain motion (p. 57). This fits his broader critique: we have no impression of power from the will, so invoking divine power to account for motion adds nothing explanatory.
Chapter 21
What is the Tillotson argument mentioned in the index?
The index lists the Tillotson argument against real presence (p. 86). It is cited as an argument against the doctrine of transubstantiation in the Eucharist, appearing among Hume's references relevant to religion, miracles, and providence.
Chapter 21
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Text used: Project Gutenberg eBook #9662 (Public domain in the United States). Generated from the full text; cards paraphrase the source.
Version: Public domain edition. Retrieved 2026-10-25. Cards reviewed 2026-10-25.
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