Considerations on Representative Government Flashcards
John Stuart Mill · Public domain edition · 88 cards · 25 chapters
John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government argues that the best form of government is the one most conducive to progress and that representative institutions suit a people only under certain conditions. This deck covers Mill’s chapters on the criteria for good government, the Order/Progress distinction, and the fit between institutions and a people’s character.
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Chapter 1 · Question
What does Mill say about the novelty of the principles in this volume?
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Chapter 1 · Answer
Mill states that the principles are those he has been working up during the greater part of his life, and most practical suggestions were anticipated by others or himself. The novelty lies in bringing them together, exhibiting them in their connection, and in much of the support he offers. He adds that several opinions, if not new, are as little likely to meet general acceptance as if they were.
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Introduction4 cards
What does Mill say about the novelty of the principles in this volume?
Mill states that the principles are those he has been working up during the greater part of his life, and most practical suggestions were anticipated by others or himself. The novelty lies in bringing them together, exhibiting them in their connection, and in much of the support he offers. He adds that several opinions, if not new, are as little likely to meet general acceptance as if they were.
Chapter 1
What does Mill observe about Conservatives and Liberals in the recent Reform debates?
Mill argues that, judging from various indications and especially the recent debates on Reform of Parliament, both Conservatives and Liberals have lost confidence in the political creeds they nominally profess, while neither side has made progress in providing a better one. He holds that a better doctrine must be possible—not a compromise splitting the difference, but something wider than either.
Chapter 1
What kind of better doctrine does Mill say is needed, and why?
Mill argues the needed doctrine must not be a mere compromise splitting the difference between Liberal and Conservative, but something wider than either, which by its superior comprehensiveness could be adopted by either side without renouncing anything it truly values in its own creed. He offers his thoughts toward forming it because many obscurely feel the want of such a doctrine and few claim to have attained it.
Chapter 1
What is the subject of Chapter I, according to the table of contents?
The table of contents lists Chapter I as 'To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of Choice.' The remaining chapters cover the criterion of a good form of government, why the ideally best form is representative government, the social conditions under which it is inapplicable, the proper functions of representative bodies, their infirmities and dangers, true and false democracy, the extension of the suffrage, and related topics.
Chapter 1
Chapter I--To What Extent Forms of Government are a Matter…4 cards
What two conflicting theories of political institutions does Mill identify?
Mill contrasts viewing government as a practical art of invention and contrivance, like a steam plow or threshing machine, with viewing it as a spontaneous product that 'is not made, but grows,' a branch of natural history. He argues each side exaggerates out of opposition to the other, and neither is wholly right or wholly wrong.
Chapter 2
What three conditions must a people meet for a form of government to suit them?
Mill requires that the people be willing to accept the form, or at least not oppose it insurmountably; willing and able to do what keeps it standing; and willing and able to do what it requires to fulfill its purposes. 'Do' includes forbearances as well as acts, so self-restraint counts as a condition.
Chapter 2
According to Mill, when are representative institutions of little value?
Mill argues representative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue, when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested to vote, or vote without public grounds, selling their suffrages for money or voting at the beck of someone who controls them or whom they wish to propitiate.
Chapter 2
What mechanical obstacle limited popular government in the ancient world?
Mill says that in the ancient world there could be no regulated popular government beyond a single city-community, because the physical conditions for forming and propagating a public opinion did not exist except among those gathered to discuss public matters in the same agora. Surmounting this fully required the press, especially the newspaper press.
Chapter 2
Chapter II--The Criterion of a Good Form of Government. (part 1)4 cards
Why does Mill reject the Order/Progress classification for judging governments?
The author argues the distinction is unscientific and incorrect. In its widest sense, Order means preserving existing good and Progress means increasing it, but the same agencies produce both—only more is needed for Progress. Qualities like industry, integrity, and originality serve Permanence and Progress alike, so the two cannot ground a fundamental classification.
Chapter 3
According to Mill, why is Order not the true object of government?
The author argues Order, meaning obedience or peace through public authority, is only a necessary condition, not the purpose of government. A government must be obeyed in order to accomplish something else, and a society may submit to authority while the government's handling of matters still ranges from best to worst possible.
Chapter 3
How does Mill illustrate that Order and Progress share the same requisites?
The author argues an effective police represses crime and secures person and property, which also drives greater production, represses criminal dispositions, frees faculties for improvement, and fosters fellowship—all Progress. Likewise, a good system of taxation and finance preserves national wealth while encouraging industry, liberty, and moral education.
Chapter 3
Why does Mill say the best government is most conducive to Progress?
The author argues Progress includes Order, but Order does not include Progress; Progress is a greater degree of what Order is a lesser degree of. Apparent conflicts, like wealth growing while virtue declines, only show wealth differs from virtue, not that Progress differs from Permanence. Progress of any kind includes Permanence in that same kind.
Chapter 3
Chapter II--The Criterion of a Good Form of Government. (part 2)4 cards
What two elements make up Mill's twofold criterion of good government?
Mill divides the merit of political institutions into two parts: the degree to which they promote the general mental advancement of the community (intellect, virtue, and practical activity), and the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing so it operates effectively on public affairs. Government is judged by its action on men and its action on things.
Chapter 4
According to Mill, what is the first question to ask about any political institutions?
The first question is how far institutions tend to foster in community members the desirable qualities—moral, intellectual, and active, following Bentham's classification. Mill argues the most important excellence a government can possess is promoting the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves, since all possibility of goodness in practical government operations depends on these qualities in the people.
Chapter 4
How does Mill's judicial example illustrate the machinery-versus-power distinction?
Mill says the goodness of justice administration is a compound of the worth of tribunal members and the worth of public opinion controlling them. But the difference between good and bad judicature lies in contrivances—selecting virtuous judges, salutary procedure, publicity, press liberty, evidence rules, court access, crime detection—which are not the power but the machinery bringing power to bear. Machinery has no action itself, yet without it power is wasted.
Chapter 4
Why does Mill argue a despotic constitution suits savage independence?
Mill argues a people in savage independence, each living for himself and exempt from external control, cannot progress until they learn to obey. The indispensable virtue in a government over such people is that it make itself obeyed, requiring a nearly or quite despotic constitution. A popular constitution depending on voluntary surrender of individual freedom would fail to enforce this first lesson.
Chapter 4
Chapter II--The Criterion of a Good Form of Government. (part 3)4 cards
How does Mill use the Hebrew Prophets to illustrate progress?
The author argues the Prophets acted as a countervailing power to kings and priests, keeping alive the antagonism of influences he calls the only real security for continued progress. Because the canon of inspiration was never complete, eminent figures could denounce abuses and offer higher interpretations of the national religion. Mill cites M. Salvador's comparison of the Prophets to the modern liberty of the press.
Chapter 5
What does Mill say about reading the Bible as a single book?
Mill says whoever can divest himself of the habit of reading the Bible as if it were one book—a habit he claims was until lately equally inveterate in Christians and unbelievers—sees a vast interval between the morality of the Pentateuch and historical books and that of the prophecies. He describes that distance as as wide as between the prophecies and the Gospels.
Chapter 5
How does Mill rank the Jews and Greeks among ancient peoples?
Mill states that conditions favorable to progress could not easily exist, and accordingly the Jews, instead of being stationary like other Asiatics, were next to the Greeks the most progressive people of antiquity. Jointly with the Greeks, he says, they have been the starting-point and main propelling agency of modern cultivation.
Chapter 5
What method does Mill propose for judging forms of government?
Mill argues one must construct an ideal of the form of government most eligible in itself—one that, given the necessary conditions, would favor all forms and degrees of improvement, not just one. Then one must identify the mental conditions needed for it to realize its tendencies and the defects that unfit a people, yielding a theorem of when it may wisely be introduced. He concludes the ideally best form is some variety of the Representative System.
Chapter 5
Chapter III--That the ideally best Form of Government is…4 cards
Why does Mill reject the idea of a good despot as the best government?
The author argues that a good despot, even granting ideal virtue and ability, would require superhuman, all-seeing knowledge to supervise every branch of administration. More fundamentally, absolute power implies a mentally passive people with no voice in their own destiny, stunting both their intelligence and moral capacities, since the prospect of practical use is the main incitement to mental exertion.
Chapter 6
How does despotism harm the moral capacities of the people, according to Mill?
The author argues that where the sphere of action is artificially circumscribed, sentiments are narrowed and dwarfed in proportion, because the food of feeling is action. If a person has nothing to do for his country, he will not care for it. Religion may remain, but it narrows into a private personal affair consistent with selfish egoism rather than a social concern.
Chapter 6
What happens when a despot permits free public opinion to form?
Mill argues such improvement begins new difficulties: public opinion independent of the monarch must be either with him or against him. If adverse opinions are in the majority, the monarch must either defer to the nation, becoming a constitutional king, or suppress opposition, creating permanent antagonism ending in his succumbing or being replaced. The despotism becomes chiefly nominal, with citizens legally slaves of an indulgent master.
Chapter 6
Why does Mill say a good despotism is worse than a bad one in advanced countries?
The author argues a good despotism is more noxious than a bad one in a civilized country because it is far more relaxing and enervating to the thoughts, feelings, and energies of the people. He cites the despotism of Augustus preparing the Romans for Tiberius, suggesting character was first prostrated before worse rule followed.
Chapter 6
Chapter IV--Under what Social Conditions Representative…4 cards
What three fundamental conditions must a people meet for representative government to subsist?
Mill states representative government must be permanently viable, requiring three conditions: the people must be willing to receive it; willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation; and willing and able to fulfill the duties and functions it imposes on them. These conditions, first enumerated in his opening chapter, determine whether the polity can endure at all.
Chapter 7
Why does Mill say a people's indifference to representative institutions is as fatal as opposition?
Mill argues indifference and inability to understand representative processes are as fatal as outright aversion, and often harder to cure, since it is easier to redirect an active feeling than to create one in a passive people. Because the executive holds immediate power and public hopes and fears attach to it, institutions not backed by effective popular feeling are easily set aside or overthrown by any leader willing to risk a coup.
Chapter 7
Why does Mill consider despotic central authority beneficial for peoples still learning obedience or lacking national unity?
Mill argues some peoples need lessons representative government would impede. Turbulent tribes not yet obedient are brought to civilized society through warfare and the despotic authority of military command. Similarly, peoples with an inveterate spirit of locality may coalesce into one people only through prior subjection to a common central authority; he cites French history from Hugh Capet onward, and says nothing short of despotic rule could emancipate Russian serfs.
Chapter 7
How does Mill say a despotic central power can help a passive people escape local tyranny?
Mill argues a people extremely passive and submissive to tyranny would, given representative institutions, elect their tyrants as representatives and make the yoke heavier. Instead, a central authority that rivals and eventually masters local despots can aid gradual emergence: French history from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis XIV shows the king, being single, became the object of hope for the locally oppressed, encouraging serfs to emancipate themselves and form communities under him alone.
Chapter 7
Chapter V--Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies.2 cards
According to Mill, what distinguishes controlling government business from doing it?
The author argues there is a radical distinction between controlling the business of government and actually doing it. A body may control everything but cannot possibly do everything, and its control is often more perfect the less it personally attempts. He compares this to an army commander, who could not direct movements effectually if he himself fought in the ranks.
Chapter 8
What does Mill say about Parliament's power over taxation and expenditure?
Mill notes that although the House of Commons alone votes supplies and sanctions appropriation, the constitutional maxim is that money can be granted only on the proposition of the crown. Parliament is not permitted to originate taxation or expenditure directly; it gives consent, and its sole power is refusal. Moderation and care in detail are expected from the responsible executive.
Chapter 8
Chapter VI--Of the Infirmities and Dangers to which…4 cards
What two negative defects can a form of government have, according to Mill?
Mill says a government is negatively defective if it fails to concentrate enough power in the authorities to fulfill the necessary offices of government, or if it fails to sufficiently develop the active capacities and social feelings of individual citizens through exercise. He treats the first as tied to a rude state of society rather than to a particular form of political union.
Chapter 9
What does Mill identify as the two positive evils of representative government?
Mill reduces the positive evils and dangers of representative government, as of every other form, to two heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; second, the danger of that body being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community.
Chapter 9
Which governments have historically shown sustained governing ability, and why?
Mill argues the governments remarkable for sustained mental ability have generally been aristocracies, but only aristocracies of public functionaries. Their ruling bodies were narrow enough that each influential member made public business an active profession and life's principal occupation. He cites Rome and Venice, noting Rome's Senate was composed of those who had held or sought high office under severe responsibility.
Chapter 9
What is the characteristic disease of bureaucratic government, and what does Mill say cures it?
Mill says the disease afflicting bureaucratic governments is routine: fixed maxims, mechanical repetition, and a tendency to become a pedantocracy, where the spirit of the corps bears down individual genius. He argues only a popular government could let a man of original genius like Sir Rowland Hill prevail over the Post-office, since popular government installed him there and forced the body to obey.
Chapter 9
Chapter VII--Of True and False Democracy; Representation of…4 cards
What two dangers does Mill say threaten representative democracy?
Mill identifies two dangers: a low grade of intelligence in the representative body and in the popular opinion controlling it, and class legislation by the numerical majority, since the majority are all of one class. He then asks how democracy might be organized to abate these evils without losing its characteristic benefits.
Chapter 10
How does Mill distinguish true democracy from democracy as commonly practiced?
Mill argues the pure idea of democracy is government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented. What commonly passes for democracy is government of the whole people by a mere majority exclusively represented — a government of privilege for the numerical majority. The latter results from how votes are taken, disfranchising minorities.
Chapter 10
Why does Mill say majority-only representation fails even the majority's own object?
Mill argues that with single-member contests decided by small margins, a parliament may represent only a bare majority, and its measures may pass by a bare majority of that. The prevailing opinion could thus suit only a minority of the nation. Any minority left out gives power not to the majority but to a minority elsewhere in the scale.
Chapter 10
What schemes does Mill discuss for representing minorities, and what does he say of Hare's plan?
Mill mentions Lord John Russell's proposal that some constituencies return three members with each elector voting for only two, the plan of one vote per elector, and James Garth Marshall's scheme letting electors give all three votes to one candidate. He calls these makeshifts, since minorities under a third or spread across constituencies stay unrepresented. He praises Thomas Hare's scheme as nearly perfect in carrying out the principle.
Chapter 10
Chapter VIII--Of the Extension of the Suffrage. (part 1)4 cards
Why does Mill reject limiting the suffrage to prevent class government?
Mill argues that excluding any portion of citizens from the vote sacrifices a foremost benefit of free government: the education of intelligence and sentiment that reaches the lowest ranks when people take part in acts affecting their country's great interests. He calls it a personal injustice to withhold a voice from those compelled to pay, fight, and obey, and insists no arrangement is permanently satisfactory in which any class is peremptorily excluded.
Chapter 11
What three elementary acquirements does Mill say should be required for the suffrage?
Mill regards it as wholly inadmissible that anyone participate in the suffrage without being able to read, write, and perform the common operations of arithmetic. He argues universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement, and proposes a test where the registrant copies a sentence from an English book and performs a sum in the rule of three, with fixed rules and publicity to ensure honest application.
Chapter 11
Why does Mill want the taxing assembly elected only by taxpayers?
Mill argues that those who pay no taxes, disposing by vote of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economize, violating the principle that control should accompany interest in its beneficial exercise. He notes this produced onerous local taxation in great towns of the United States borne by the wealthier classes. To reconcile this with universality, he wants visible direct taxation to descend to the poorest.
Chapter 11
What does Mill claim happens politically to those denied the vote?
Mill argues political discussion flies over the heads of those with no votes and no prospect of obtaining them; appeals are addressed to others, so they have little inducement to form opinions. Such a person will be either a permanent malcontent or feel that society's general affairs do not concern him, like an audience member compared with the jury. He likens this to an average middle-class woman's political knowledge compared with her husband's or brothers'.
Chapter 11
Chapter VIII--Of the Extension of the Suffrage. (part 2)4 cards
Why does Mill reject property as the basis for plural voting?
Mill argues that property is an imperfect test of intelligence: accident plays a larger role than merit in how men rise in the world, and instruction cannot guarantee a corresponding rise in station. He therefore calls this foundation of electoral privilege supremely odious, and warns that tying plurality of votes to a pecuniary qualification would compromise the principle and make its permanent maintenance impracticable.
Chapter 12
What practical tests of mental superiority does Mill propose for awarding multiple votes?
In the absence of national education or trustworthy general examinations, Mill uses occupation as an approximate test: employers over laborers, foremen over ordinary laborers, skilled over unskilled trades, and bankers, merchants, or manufacturers over tradesmen. He requires successful performance of the function, not mere nominal undertaking, and perseverance for some length of time, say three years. Members of liberal professions and university graduates could be admitted at once to plurality.
Chapter 12
What absolute limit does Mill place on the plurality of votes?
Mill insists the plurality must never be carried so far that those privileged by it, or the class to which they mainly belong, outweigh by means of it all the rest of the community. The distinction in favor of education is right in itself and protects the educated from class legislation by the uneducated, but it must stop short of enabling them to practice class legislation on their own account.
Chapter 12
Why does Mill consider equal voting only relatively good rather than good in itself?
Mill argues equal voting recognizes a wrong standard and exercises a bad influence on the voter's mind, since it declares ignorance entitled to as much political power as knowledge. He holds that institutions shape national character through their spirit more than their direct provisions, and cites American institutions imprinting the creed that any one man is as good as any other as connected with unfavorable points in American character.
Chapter 12
Chapter VIII--Of the Extension of the Suffrage. (part 3)4 cards
For Mill, what happens when women's indirect political influence is not converted to direct suffrage?
The author argues that a woman's indirect agency, exercised through personal or family ties, acts as a disturbing force on the political conscience of the man. He claims this indirect agency can only be prevented from being politically mischievous by being exchanged for direct suffrage—that is, by giving women the vote rather than leaving them to influence men privately.
Chapter 13
What does Mill call especially irrational about property-based suffrage excluding women?
Where suffrage depends on property, Mill finds it flagrantly contradictory that a woman who meets every guarantee required of a male elector—independent circumstances, position as householder and head of family, payment of taxes—is still barred. He argues this sets aside the very principle of property-based representation and creates an exceptionally personal disqualification solely to exclude her.
Chapter 13
Which examples does Mill cite to expose the unreason of excluding women from suffrage?
Mill notes that in the country where this exclusion is done, a woman now reigns, and the most glorious ruler that country ever had was a woman. He presents this as completing the picture of unreason and scarcely disguised injustice, arguing that the accident of sex, like the accident of skin, should not justify depriving a person of equal protection and just privileges of a citizen.
Chapter 13
Whose opinions does Mill invoke in favor of women's suffrage, and what does he hope?
Mill cites Bentham, Mr. Samuel Bailey, Mr. Hare, and many other powerful political thinkers of his age and country. He hopes their opinion will reach all minds not made obdurate by selfishness or inveterate prejudice, and that before another generation passes, the accident of sex—no more than the accident of skin—will not justify denying anyone the equal protection and just privileges of a citizen.
Chapter 13
Chapter IX--Should there be Two Stages of Election?4 cards
What was the likely purpose of double-stage elections, according to Mill?
Mill says the contrivance was probably intended as a slight impediment to the full sweep of popular feeling, giving ultimate power to the Many but forcing them to exercise it through a comparatively few electors. These electors, being a select body, were expected to exceed their constituents in intellect and character, making the choice more careful and enlightened and conducted under a greater sense of responsibility.
Chapter 14
Why does Mill argue indirect election fails to develop public spirit?
Mill argues the theory requires voters to choose only choosers, not the member, which defeats a principal use of giving them a vote: developing public spirit and political intelligence. He also says the supposition is inconsistent, since a voter indifferent to the final result cannot reasonably be expected to care about the process leading to it.
Chapter 14
How does Mill claim indirect election actually operates in practice?
Mill argues voters will not merely name worthy electors but will choose known partisans pledged to a candidate, so the two modes coincide in result. He cites the U.S. presidential election: citizens vote for electors pledged to a candidate, voting for the Breckinridge or Lincoln ticket rather than preferring the elector himself.
Chapter 14
When does Mill say indirect election works well, and why?
Mill says it works when electors have other important functions, precluding selection solely as delegates. He cites the U.S. Senate, chosen by State Legislatures representing states equally, two members each regardless of size. Mill calls these elections eminently successful, the best in the United States, producing distinguished senators, but says such conditions are hardly obtainable outside a federal government.
Chapter 14
Chapter X--Of the Mode of Voting.4 cards
Why does Mill say secret voting is wrong in political elections?
Mill argues the ballot's spirit teaches electors that the suffrage is their private property rather than a public trust. If the public is entitled to their vote, it is entitled to know it. Secret voting, he contends, removes all sense of shame or responsibility and lets voters follow personal or class interest unchecked.
Chapter 15
How does Mill distinguish club voting from parliamentary elections?
Mill says a club member is genuinely under no obligation to consider others' wishes; his vote merely declares willingness to associate, so his own inclination may decide, and the ballot avoids quarrels without leading to lying. In parliamentary elections, by contrast, the voter is morally bound to consider the public interest, and social superiors may dictate votes.
Chapter 15
When does Mill consider the ballot justified?
Mill holds the ballot may be the smaller evil when voters are coerced by powerful individuals whose interest opposes the public. He cites the declining Roman republic, where the ballot was irresistible, and Athens, where it was a valuable instrument of order. He argues the strongest case is when the mischievous power of the Few over the Many is increasing.
Chapter 15
Why does Mill think the ballot's case has weakened in modern England?
Mill argues coercion by landlords, employers, and customers has declined, so bad voting now stems more from the voter's own selfish or class interests. The ballot would free him to indulge those without shame. He notes bribery's growth shows electors now vote to please themselves, making publicity, not secrecy, the needed restraint.
Chapter 15
Chapter XI--Of the Duration of Parliaments.4 cards
What two opposing principles must a term of Parliament balance?
The member must not have so long a tenure that he forgets his responsibility, takes duties easily, seeks personal advantage, or neglects public conferences with constituents. Yet he needs a term long enough to be judged by his whole course of action rather than a single act, and to have latitude for independent opinion. Mill says no universal rule can fix the boundary between these principles.
Chapter 16
When democracy is weak, why does Mill favor frequent re-election?
Where democratic power is weak or passive, and the representative enters a courtly or aristocratic atmosphere that deflects him from the popular course, frequent return to constituents is indispensable to keeping his temper and character right. In such circumstances even three years is almost too long, and any longer term is absolutely inadmissible.
Chapter 16
When democracy is ascendant, what term does Mill suggest and why?
Where democracy is the ascendant and still increasing power, needing moderation rather than encouragement, and where publicity and a newspaper press keep every act known and judged, less than five years would hardly prevent timid subserviency. Mill notes this change explains why annual Parliaments, once prominent among advanced reformers, are now seldom heard of.
Chapter 16
Why does Mill reject gradual, partial renewal of the House?
Partial renewal gives no means of promptly getting rid of a majority whose course offends the nation, and new members added drop by drop would more likely assume than modify the qualities of the mass. Mill also argues a periodical general muster is needed to gauge the national mind and establish the relative strength of parties, which partial renewal cannot do conclusively.
Chapter 16
Chapter XII--Ought Pledges to be Required from Members of…1 cards
What practical difficulties does Mill raise against electors simply deferring to a wiser representative?
Mill notes electors must judge representatives by their own opinions, since tests of ability mostly measure expression, not worth. The ablest candidate may hold opposite convictions, and may only pursue a wrong course more effectively. Electors may also need their moral position represented, and poorer electors choosing among rich candidates may reasonably demand pledges as emancipation from class interests.
Chapter 17
Chapter XIII--Of a Second Chamber.2 cards
Why does Mill doubt an aristocratic Second Chamber can check democracy?
Mill argues a Second Chamber's efficacy depends entirely on social support outside the House. An aristocratic House is only powerful in an aristocratic society; once conventional rank and riches no longer overawe democracy, a House of Lords becomes insignificant. He says the real moderating power must act through the democratic House, not stand apart as an antagonist body.
Chapter 18
What composition does Mill recommend for a wisely conservative Second Chamber?
Mill proposes a Chamber of Statesmen modeled on the Roman Senate, representing personal merit tested by public service rather than class. It would include former cabinet ministers, judges, military commanders thanked by Parliament, governors, and senior civil servants. Such a body, drawn from the people's own natural leaders, could moderate without being dismissed as obstructive.
Chapter 18
Chapter XIV--Of the Executive in a Representative…4 cards
According to Mill, why should executive functions be assigned to individuals rather than boards?
Mill argues every executive function should be the appointed duty of a given individual, so it is clear who did what and who is to blame. Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible, and boards deliberating in secret make responsibility 'a mere name.' He quotes Bentham: 'Boards are screens.' Boards are admissible only when giving full discretionary power to a single minister would be worse.
Chapter 19
How does Mill distinguish two modes of shared responsibility?
Mill says responsibility is enfeebled when the concurrence of more than one functionary is required for the same act: each still bears real responsibility, as an accomplice does, but the penalties of opinion are diminished by being shared. Responsibility is absolutely destroyed when the act is only that of a majority on a closed-door board, since nobody can know how each member voted.
Chapter 19
What role does Mill assign to professional advisers and councils for a minister?
Mill holds that a department head is a mere politician lacking professional knowledge, so professional advisers must be provided. Sometimes one competent adviser and clerks suffice; often, especially in military and naval affairs, the minister should habitually consult a council of able, experienced professionals. Councils should be consultative: the ultimate decision rests undividedly with the minister, who remains individually responsible.
Chapter 19
Why does Mill oppose appointing executive functionaries by popular election?
Mill argues the entire business of government is skilled employment, and the qualifications required are special and professional, not properly judged except by those sharing or experienced in them. Finding the fittest persons is laborious and demands delicate, conscientious discernment. He would impose appointment on the direct responsibility of the minister, and the appointing functionary should alone have power to remove subordinates.
Chapter 19
Chapter XV--Of Local Representative Bodies.3 cards
Why does Mill think local bodies are the chief instrument of public education?
Mill argues local administrative institutions are the chief instrument of the "public education of the citizens." Unlike national politics, where citizens mostly read, discuss, and vote, local bodies let many citizens in turn be elected and hold executive office, so they must act for public interests, not merely think by proxy. These functions also draw political education down to lower social ranks, since higher ranks generally do not seek them.
Chapter 20
Why does Mill criticize the Quarter Sessions as a local body?
Mill calls the Quarter Sessions, composed solely of justices of the peace, the most aristocratic institution remaining in England, more so than the House of Lords, since it grants public money and disposes of important interests alone, without a popular assembly. Its members hold office virtually by right of their acres, appointment by the crown serving mainly to exclude the discreditable or politically inconvenient. He finds it at variance with representative government.
Chapter 20
How should local constituencies and elective bodies be organized, per Mill?
Mill argues community of local interest, inappropriate as an exclusive rule for Parliament, is the only just rule for local constituencies, since local representation exists so those sharing a peculiar common interest may manage it themselves. Every town, regardless of size, should have one municipal council, not several per town. Each locality should also have a single elective body controlling all local business, since control, unlike execution, need not be subdivided by department.
Chapter 20
Chapter XVI--Of Nationality, as connected with…3 cards
What does Mill call the strongest cause of national feeling?
Mill identifies identity of political antecedents as the strongest cause: possession of a national history and the consequent community of recollections, collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret connected with the same past incidents. Race, language, religion, and geography also contribute, but he insists none of these causes is either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by itself, citing Switzerland and Sicily as counterexamples.
Chapter 21
Why does Mill say free institutions are nearly impossible with multiple nationalities?
Mill argues that among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary for representative government cannot exist. Different sections have different leaders, books, and newspapers; each fears the other nationalities more than the state; and the army's sympathy with the people, the last-resort security against despotism, is absent. Such armies become mere executors of orders.
Chapter 21
When does Mill say absorption of a smaller nationality is beneficial?
Mill argues absorption benefits the smaller nationality when it was originally inferior and more backward, and when it is admitted on equal terms to the privileges of the larger nation's citizenship. But if the smaller nationality is more advanced and is overcome by brute strength, that is a sheer mischief. If the larger and more improved nationality governs with tolerable justice and without exclusive privileges, amalgamation gradually follows.
Chapter 21
Chapter XVII--Of Federal Representative Governments.4 cards
What conditions make a federation advisable according to Mill?
Mill lists three conditions: sufficient mutual sympathy among populations (of race, language, religion, and especially political institutions); separate states not strong enough to rely on their own individual strength for defense; and no very marked inequality of strength among member states. He argues the essential point on inequality is that no single state should be able to rival many of the others combined.
Chapter 22
What two modes of organizing a federal union does Mill distinguish?
Mill distinguishes federations where federal authorities represent governments only and bind governments as such, from those where federal law binds individual citizens directly. He argues only the latter produces effective federal government. The former is a mere alliance, enforced only by requisitions backed by war, and is more likely to cause internal wars than prevent them.
Chapter 22
Why does Mill consider a supreme court essential to a perfect federation?
Because citizens owe obedience to two governments, the limits of each authority must be clearly defined and disputes decided by an umpire independent of both. Mill argues there must be a Supreme Court with final appeal, before which states and federal functionaries can be sued for exceeding powers. He notes this makes the court supreme over both state and federal governments, able to declare laws invalid.
Chapter 22
What does Mill say about federations among monarchical states?
Mill argues the more imperfect federation binding only governments is the only kind seemingly possible among monarchical states. A hereditary king, not removable or responsible to anyone, is unlikely to renounce a separate army or accept another power's direct authority over his subjects. For an effectual confederation of kingdoms, Mill says they likely must share the same king, as England and Scotland did between the union of crowns and Parliaments.
Chapter 22
Chapter XVIII--Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free… (part 1)4 cards
How does Mill classify dependencies of a free state?
Mill divides outlying dependencies into two classes: those of similar civilization to the ruling country, capable of and ripe for representative government (such as British possessions in America and Australia), and those like India, still at a great distance from that state. Small posts like Gibraltar or Aden are excluded from discussion since they are held only as naval or military positions.
Chapter 23
What new era in colonial policy began with Lord Durham's Report?
Mill argues a new era began with Lord Durham's Report, which he calls an imperishable memorial of Durham's courage, patriotism, and enlightened liberality, and of the intellect and practical sagacity of its joint authors, Mr. Wakefield and Charles Buller. It established the principle that colonies of European race possess the fullest measure of internal self-government, equally with the parent country.
Chapter 23
Why does Mill reject colonial representation in a federal body?
Mill says the suggestions are worthy of praise in motive but inconsistent with rational principles of government. Countries separated by half the globe lack the natural conditions for one government or federation: they do not discuss in the same arena, know each other's objects, or trust each other's principles. He asks how an Englishman would like his destinies to depend on an assembly one third British American and another third South African and Australian.
Chapter 23
What does Mill call the one sufficient expedient for colonial inequality?
Mill says the one indispensable and sufficient expedient, meeting both justice and policy, is to open the service of government in all its departments and every part of the empire on perfectly equal terms to colonial inhabitants. He cites the Channel Islands, which show no disloyalty while every office or dignity in the crown's gift is open to natives of Guernsey or Jersey, and notes Sir William Molesworth began this by appointing Canadian Mr. Hinckes to a West Indian government.
Chapter 23
Chapter XVIII--Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free… (part 2)3 cards
Why does Mill say government of one people by another cannot truly exist?
Mill argues that while self-government has meaning and reality, governing one people by another does not and cannot exist. A dominant people may treat another as a preserve or human-cattle farm for profit, but if the good of the governed is government's proper business, it is impossible for a people to attend to it directly. At most they can commission some of their best men to look after it, though their own country's opinion is neither a guide nor a competent judge.
Chapter 24
Why does Mill oppose Bible teaching in Indian government schools?
Mill argues that from the European view, optional Bible teaching seems fair and consistent with religious freedom, but Asiatics see it differently. No Asiatic believes a government deploys official machinery without being bent on an object, or pursues it by halves. Parents would suspect improper means were used to convert their children, or at least make them outcasts from Hindooism. If teaching had any effect, it would compromise the schools' utility, existence, and perhaps the government's safety.
Chapter 24
What is Mill's proposed mode for governing a distant dependency?
Mill argues a free country attempting to govern a distant dependency of dissimilar people through a branch of its own executive will almost inevitably fail. The only mode with any chance of tolerable success is governing through a delegated body of comparatively permanent character, with only inspection and a negative voice reserved to the changeable administration. He regrets the abolition of such an intermediate body for India and predicts severe penalty for both India and England.
Chapter 24
Chapter XVIII--Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free… (part 3)2 cards
What security for impartial patronage existed under the crown and East India Company's mixed government?
The governor general and governors were appointed, in fact though not formally, by the crown rather than by the intermediate body. A crown officer likely had no personal or political connections in the local service, while the delegated body, many of whom had served in India, did. This guaranty for impartiality would be much impaired if civil servants came largely from the class supplying viceroys and governors.
Chapter 25
What does Mill say the East India Company's government contributed to political theory?
The author argues it was the destiny of the East India Company's government to suggest the true theory of governing a semi-barbarous dependency by a civilized country, and then to perish. He warns it would be a singular fortune if this speculative result were the only remaining fruit of English ascendancy in India.
Chapter 25
Source and licence
Text used: Project Gutenberg eBook #5669 (Public domain in the United States). Generated from the full text; cards paraphrase the source.
Version: Public domain edition. Retrieved 2026-10-30. Cards reviewed 2026-10-30.
These cards paraphrase the text for study. They are not a substitute for reading the book, and they do not reproduce long passages.
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