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Kant's Critique of Judgement Flashcards

Immanuel Kant · Public domain edition · 180 cards · 47 chapters

Kant’s Critique of Judgement argues that judgement mediates between understanding and reason, grounding aesthetic and teleological experience. This deck covers its account of beauty, the sublime, genius, and the editor’s notes on the text’s history and reception.

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Chapter 1 · Question

In Kant's account, what role does Judgement play in the syllogistic triad of faculties?

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IX. (part 1)4 cards

In Kant's account, what role does Judgement play in the syllogistic triad of faculties?
Kant correlates the three propositions of the syllogism with three higher faculties: Understanding supplies the major premise through general concepts, Judgement applies the particular case under the general rule, and Reason draws the conclusion. The editor notes these correspond respectively to the Analytic of Concepts, the Analytic of Principles, and the Dialectic, though Kant did not grasp the full significance of this classification when he first wrote.
Chapter 1
According to the editor's introduction, why has the Critique of Judgement been comparatively neglected?
The editor suggests its comparative neglect may lie in its repulsive style. Kant was never careful of style and in later years grew more enthralled by technicalities and refined distinctions; Schopenhauer called these 'symmetrical architectonic amusements.' The editor adds that repetitions of the same thought in slightly varied language are frequent, and important new points are introduced without emphasis, so the book rarely attracts a wide circle of readers.
Chapter 1
What publication history of the Critique of Judgement does the editor give?
It was originally published at Berlin in 1790, a second edition was called for in 1793, and a French translation by Imhoff appeared in 1796. Other French versions are by Keratry and Weyland in 1823 and by Barni in 1846. The editor says he had Barni's version before him but did not find it of much service, and had not seen the older French translations.
Chapter 1
What advice does the editor quote from Schopenhauer about studying philosophy?
The editor quotes Schopenhauer: 'Above all, my truth-seeking young friends, beware of letting our professors tell you what is contained in the Critique of the Pure Reason.' The editor endorses this, insisting no one becomes a philosopher or acquires satisfactory knowledge of philosophy's history without personal and prolonged study of the ipsissima verba of the great masters, though translations remain an educational necessity for those lacking German.
Chapter 1

IX. (part 2)3 cards

What kind of universality does a pure judgement of beauty have, according to Kant?
The judgement about beauty gives universal satisfaction although it is based on no definite concept. Its universality is only subjective, but it is still there. The maxim 'Trahit sua quemque voluptas' does not apply to the pleasure of a pure judgement about beauty, since that pleasure is a priori and independent of charms of sense and emotions of mere feeling.
Chapter 2
How does Kant distinguish the Beautiful from the Sublime in terms of mental state and location?
In judgements about the Beautiful the mind is in restful contemplation, while the Sublime excites a mental movement. Nothing in nature is sublime; sublimity resides in the mind alone. Beauty is properly found only in beauty of form, whereas the idea of sublimity is excited rather by formless objects that exhibit a violation of purpose.
Chapter 2
What does Kant mean by genius, and how must it be kept in check?
Fine Art is the Art of Genius, 'that innate mental disposition through which Nature gives the rule to Art.' Art differs from Science by the absence of definite concepts in the artist's mind, so the great artist can rarely communicate his methods. Genius is the faculty of presenting aesthetical Ideas, intuitions to which no concept is adequate, but it requires to be kept in check by taste.
Chapter 2

IX. (part 3)4 cards

How does the text characterize the inference that other humans have minds like our own?
The text argues that we cannot demonstrate other minds; the inference is a venture of faith, not proof. It is highly probable and the simplest hypothesis that best accounts for the facts, extending by induction a force we know in ourselves. But in Kantian terms it is valid only for reflective, not determinant, Judgement.
Chapter 3
Why does Kant distinguish inferring finite minds from inferring a divine Mind?
Kant argues that comparing men with beasts or men with men stays within experience, since both are finite beings under space and time. But the power at the basis of Nature is above comprehension, and ascribing to it a mode of operation known only in finite beings exceeds our legitimate province. The author finds this answer not quite conclusive.
Chapter 3
What does the author say about the word 'infinite' when applied to wisdom or intelligence?
The author argues that 'infinite' properly refers only to the number of wise or knowing acts performed, not to a difference in kind. So we have no logical or common-sense warrant for supposing infinite intelligence is not similar in kind to finite intelligence. Thus Kant's criticism that the Design Argument infers an infinite mind is somewhat wide of the mark.
Chapter 3
How does Kant classify belief in God, and what role does the Moral Argument play?
Kant holds God's existence is a thing of faith, not a fact of knowledge: faith is Reason's moral attitude toward what theoretical cognition cannot attain. Physical Teleology proves an intelligent world-cause for reflective Judgement, while moral Teleology establishes it through a final purpose. Kant keeps the two proofs distinct and rejects combining them.
Chapter 3

IX. (part 4)4 cards

What role does Judgement play among the cognitive faculties in Kant's account?
The author argues that Judgement forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason in the order of our cognitive faculties. The Critique of Judgement asks whether Judgement has its own a priori principles, whether these are constitutive or merely regulative, and whether they give an a priori rule to the feeling of pleasure and pain as the mediating link between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire.
Chapter 4
Why does the Critique of pure Reason need to be completed by a Critique of Judgement?
The author argues a Critique of pure Reason would be incomplete if Judgement, which as a cognitive faculty also claims a priori principles, were not treated as a particular part of it. Its principles need not form a separate part between theoretical and practical philosophy, but the foundation of the faculty of principles independent of experience must be explored so the whole Metaphysic does not collapse.
Chapter 4
Why is finding a principle peculiar to Judgement so difficult?
The author argues the principle cannot be derived a priori from concepts, since these belong to the Understanding and Judgement only applies them. Judgement must furnish a concept of itself through which no thing is cognised but which serves as a rule; yet distinguishing whether a given case falls under the rule would require another Judgement. This perplexity appears mainly in aesthetical judgements concerning the Beautiful and Sublime.
Chapter 4
How does Kant distinguish the logical judging of nature from aesthetical judgement?
In logical judging of nature, Judgement derives from itself a principle of the reference of natural things to the unknowable supersensible, applied to cognition of world-beings; this opens prospects for practical Reason but has no immediate reference to pleasure and pain. The reference to feeling is precisely the puzzle in the principle of Judgement, and is why aesthetical judgement needs a special section.
Chapter 4

I. OF THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY4 cards

On what basis does Kant divide philosophy into theoretical and practical parts?
Kant divides philosophy according to the two kinds of concepts that supply objects to rational cognition: natural concepts and the concept of freedom. Natural concepts make theoretical cognition possible according to a priori principles; the concept of freedom yields practical fundamental propositions extending the determination of the will. Hence the theoretical part is Natural Philosophy and the practical part is Moral Philosophy, distinct in their principles.
Chapter 5
What error does Kant say has prevailed in dividing philosophy into theoretical and practical?
Kant argues that a gross misuse of these expressions has prevailed: what is practical according to natural concepts has been identified with what is practical according to the concept of freedom. Under the same titles 'theoretical' and 'practical' philosophy, a division was made by which in fact nothing was divided, since both parts might then have principles of the same kind.
Chapter 5
Why are technically practical rules not laws, and where do they belong?
Technically practical rules of art, skill, and prudence rest on natural concepts and concern only the possibility of things according to those concepts, including the will as a natural faculty. They are called precepts, not laws, because the will also stands under the concept of freedom, whose principles are laws. Such rules are only corollaries to theoretical Philosophy, not a special practical part.
Chapter 5
Which practical precepts constitute the special practical part of Philosophy?
Only morally practical precepts, based entirely on the concept of freedom to the complete exclusion of natural determining grounds of the will, constitute a special part of Philosophy. Like the rules nature obeys they are called laws, but they rest not on sensuous conditions but on a supersensible principle. They are laws without prior reference to purposes and designs.
Chapter 5

II. OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL4 cards

For Kant, what distinguishes a concept's 'territory' from its 'realm'?
The territory (territorium) is the part of a concept's field where knowledge is possible for us; the realm (ditio) is the part where the concept and its cognitive faculty are legislative. Empirical concepts thus have territory in nature but no realm, only a dwelling-place (domicilium), since their rules are empirical and contingent, not legislative.
Chapter 6
Which two realms make up our whole cognitive faculty, and how is each legislative?
Kant divides the cognitive faculty into the realm of natural concepts and the realm of the concept of freedom, since through both it is legislative a priori. Legislation through natural concepts is carried on by the Understanding and is theoretical; legislation through the concept of freedom is carried on by Reason and is merely practical. Philosophy is accordingly divided into theoretical and practical.
Chapter 6
Why do the two realms not limit each other in their legislation?
They do not limit each other in legislation, though they perpetually do so in the world of sense. Natural concepts represent objects in intuition as mere phenomena, not things in themselves; the concept of freedom represents its Object as a thing in itself, but not in intuition. Neither can give theoretical knowledge of its Object as a thing in itself.
Chapter 6
What role does the supersensible play, and why is a transition from nature to freedom needed?
The supersensible is an unbounded but inaccessible field where we have no territory or realm for theoretical cognition; we occupy it with Ideas but grant only practical reality. An immeasurable gulf separates the sensible realm of nature from the supersensible realm of freedom, yet the concept of freedom is meant to actualise its purposes in the world of sense, so nature must be thought as harmonising with them.
Chapter 6

III. OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AS A MEANS OF COMBINING…4 cards

How does Kant divide the higher cognitive faculties, and what sits between Understanding and Reason?
Kant places Judgement as a middle term between Understanding and Reason within the family of higher cognitive faculties. He suggests, by analogy, that Judgement may contain a special principle of its own, though merely subjective and a priori, rather than a special legislation. Even without a realm of objects, this principle may have a territory where no other principle is valid.
Chapter 7
What three faculties of the soul does Kant say cannot be further derived?
Kant reduces all faculties of the soul to three, which cannot be derived from any common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire. Understanding is legislative for knowledge, Reason for desire under the concept of freedom, and feeling of pleasure sits between knowledge and desire, just as Judgement sits between Understanding and Reason.
Chapter 7
Why does Kant say Philosophy divides into only two main parts despite three Critiques?
Kant holds that Philosophy divides only into theoretical and practical parts, justified because Understanding and Reason each have their own a priori legislation with nothing above them. Anything said about Judgement's special principles counts as belonging to the theoretical part. Yet the Critique of pure Reason consists of three parts — pure Understanding, pure Judgement, pure Reason — because it must decide the possibility of the system before undertaking it.
Chapter 7
What transition does Kant suppose Judgement brings about between the faculties?
Kant provisionally supposes Judgement contains an a priori principle, since pleasure or pain is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire. He suggests Judgement brings about a transition from the pure faculty of knowledge, the realm of natural concepts, to the realm of the concept of freedom — just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from Understanding to Reason.
Chapter 7

IV. OF JUDGEMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING _A PRIORI_4 cards

How does Kant distinguish determinant from reflective Judgement?
Kant defines Judgement generally as the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. When the universal (rule, principle, law) is given and Judgement merely subsumes the particular under it, the Judgement is determinant. When only the particular is given and the universal must be found, the Judgement is merely reflective.
Chapter 8
Why can't reflective Judgement borrow its principle from experience?
Kant argues reflective Judgement must ascend from particular empirical laws to a universal, and its function is to establish the unity of all empirical principles under higher ones, making their systematic subordination possible. Such a transcendental principle cannot be borrowed from experience; reflective Judgement can only give it as a law from and to itself, not derive it from outside nor prescribe it to nature.
Chapter 8
What is the principle that reflective Judgement gives to itself?
Kant states the principle is that particular empirical laws, insofar as they are left undetermined by universal laws grounded in our Understanding, must be considered in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an Understanding (not our own) had furnished them to our cognitive faculties, making possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature. This Idea serves only for reflecting, not for determining.
Chapter 8
What does Kant mean by the purposiveness of nature?
Kant defines purpose as the concept of an object insofar as it contains the ground of that object's actuality, and purposiveness as a thing's agreement with a constitution possible only according to purposes. The principle of Judgement regarding natural forms under empirical laws is the purposiveness of nature in its manifoldness: nature is represented as if an Understanding contained the ground of the unity of its empirical laws.
Chapter 8

V. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE IS A4 cards

What makes a principle transcendental rather than metaphysical for Kant?
A transcendental principle represents a priori the universal condition under which things can be objects of cognition in general, using only pure concepts. A metaphysical principle represents the a priori condition for further determining objects whose concept must be empirically given, such as the empirical concept of body as movable in space. Kant classifies the purposiveness of nature as transcendental, while practical purposiveness of a free will is metaphysical.
Chapter 9
How does Kant distinguish the maxims of Judgement from psychological descriptions of judging?
Kant argues the maxims (nature takes the shortest way, makes no leaps, has unity under few principles) state how we ought to judge, not what happens or how our cognitive powers actually operate. They carry logical objective necessity, which would not emerge if they were merely empirical. Treating their origin psychologically, he says, violates their sense; they are a transcendental principle requiring a Transcendental Deduction.
Chapter 9
Why must Judgement presuppose purposiveness for empirical laws?
Universal laws from the Categories connect things only as nature in general, not specifically. The particular empirical laws are, from our standpoint, contingent and infinitely various, yet without a unity of law there would be no thoroughgoing connection of empirical cognitions in a whole of experience. So Judgement must assume a priori that the contingent particular laws contain a unity thinkable but not fathomable by us.
Chapter 9
Is the purposiveness of nature a law given to nature or to Judgement itself?
Kant calls it a subjective principle or maxim: Judgement prescribes a law not to nature (autonomy) but to itself (heautonomy) for reflecting on nature. It is the law of the specification of nature regarding empirical laws, belonging to reflective rather than determinant Judgement. We neither prescribe a law to nature nor learn one by observation, though the principle may be confirmed by observation.
Chapter 9

VI. OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FEELING OF PLEASURE WITH THE…4 cards

Why does the harmony of nature's particular laws with our understanding produce pleasure?
Kant holds that the order of nature under its particular empirical laws is contingent as far as our insight goes, yet indispensable for our Understanding. When we discover that heterogeneous empirical laws can be combined under one principle, this harmony is felt as pleasure. The pleasure rests on an a priori ground—the principle of reflective Judgement—so it is valid for every man and refers only to the cognitive faculty, not to desire.
Chapter 10
How does the pleasure in nature's comprehensibility differ from practical purposiveness?
The pleasure is determined by an a priori ground and arises merely from the reference of the Object to the cognitive faculty. Kant stresses that the concept of purposiveness here has not the least reference to the faculty of desire, which is why it is quite distinguished from all practical purposiveness of nature. The harmony aims only at knowledge, not at any practical end or advantage.
Chapter 10
Why does the pleasure in nature's unity often go unnoticed?
Kant observes that we no longer find marked pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and its division into genera and species, though this pleasure was certainly present at one time. Because the commonest experience would be impossible without it, it is gradually confounded with mere cognition and no longer arrests particular attention. Pleasure is most marked when newly discovering that heterogeneous empirical laws combine under one principle.
Chapter 10
What attitude does Judgement take toward the extent of nature's purposiveness?
The presupposition is indeterminate as to how far nature's ideal purposiveness for our cognitive faculty extends. Kant says that if told a deeper knowledge of nature must lead to laws no human Understanding could reduce to a principle, we should at once acquiesce. Yet we more gladly listen to one who offers hope that nature will prove more simple and uniform in its principles the further our experience reaches.
Chapter 10

VII. OF THE AESTHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS…4 cards

What distinguishes the subjective from the logical element in a representation?
The subjective element decides the representation's reference to the subject and is its aesthetical character; the logical element serves or can be used for determining the object, i.e. for cognition. In sense-cognition of external things both references are present: space, though merely subjective, is an ingredient in cognising things as phenomena, and sensation is both subjective and the real material of representation.
Chapter 11
When is an object called purposive in the aesthetical sense?
An object is called purposive when its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of pleasure, and this representation is an aesthetical representation of purposiveness. Such purposiveness precedes cognition of the object and cannot be an ingredient in cognition. The question Kant then raises is whether such a representation of purposiveness exists at all.
Chapter 11
What grounds the pleasure in a judgement of taste, and what does it claim?
The pleasure rests on the undesigned harmony of Imagination and Understanding in reflective Judgement, a harmony that is the universal though subjective condition of empirical cognition. Because the ground lies in universally valid a priori conditions, the judgement claims agreement from everyone, even though the pleasure cannot be comprehended from concepts and the judgement remains empirical and singular.
Chapter 11
Why does the judgement of taste require a Critique despite being empirical?
Judgements of taste presuppose a principle a priori, though this principle is neither one of cognition for the Understanding nor of practice for the Will, and so is in no way determinant a priori. Since the pleasure depends on an empirical representation and we cannot determine a priori what is or is not according to taste, a Critique is still needed to examine their possibility.
Chapter 11

VIII. OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF…4 cards

How does Kant distinguish the two kinds of purposiveness representation?
Kant distinguishes subjective purposiveness, the harmony of an object's form with our cognitive faculties in apprehension prior to any concept, which rests on immediate pleasure in reflection; from objective purposiveness, the harmony of the form with the possibility of the thing according to a concept that precedes and grounds that form. The first involves feeling; the second only the Understanding judging under a given concept.
Chapter 12
What distinguishes natural beauty from natural purposes in Kant's account?
Kant treats natural beauty as the presentation of the concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, judged by Taste aesthetically through the feeling of pleasure. Natural purposes present the concept of real (objective) purposiveness, judged by Understanding and Reason logically according to concepts. This distinction grounds the division of the Critique of Judgement into the Critique of aesthetical and of teleological Judgement.
Chapter 12
Why does Kant say the aesthetical part is essential to the Critique of Judgement?
The author argues the aesthetical Judgement alone contains a principle the Judgement places a priori at the basis of its reflection on nature: the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature, according to its particular empirical laws, for our cognitive faculty. Without it the Understanding could not find itself in nature. By contrast, no reason a priori can be specified why there should be objective purposes of nature.
Chapter 12
How does Kant differentiate the aesthetical from the teleological Judgement as faculties?
Kant calls the aesthetical Judgement a special faculty for judging things according to a rule but not according to concepts, deciding by taste the harmony of a product's form with our cognitive faculties. The teleological Judgement is not a special faculty but reflective Judgement in general proceeding according to concepts, furnishing determinate conditions under which something like an organised body is judged by the Idea of a purpose of nature.
Chapter 12

IX. OF THE CONNEXION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UNDERSTANDING…4 cards

What separates the realm of the natural concept from that of the concept of freedom?
Kant says the two realms are entirely removed from mutual influence by the great gulf separating the supersensible from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines nothing for theoretical cognition of nature, and the natural concept determines nothing for the practical laws of freedom. So no bridge can be thrown from one realm to the other on those terms alone.
Chapter 13
What role does Judgement play between nature and freedom?
Judgement presupposes a priori, without reference to the practical, the condition of the possibility of the final purpose in nature. By the concept of a purposiveness of nature it furnishes the mediating concept between the concept of nature and that of freedom, making possible the transition from conformity to law to the final purpose.
Chapter 13
How do Understanding, Judgement, and Reason relate to the higher faculties of the soul?
The author assigns Understanding to the cognitive faculty with constitutive a priori principles; Judgement to the feeling of pleasure and pain, independent of concepts and sensations tied to desire; and Reason to the faculty of desire, practical without mediation of pleasure, determining the final purpose. Their a priori principles are conformity to law, purposiveness, and final purpose, applied to nature, art, and freedom respectively.
Chapter 13
What does Judgement make determinable, and what does Reason do with it?
Judgement, by its a priori principle for judging nature according to possible particular laws, makes the supersensible substrate—both in us and without us—determinable by the intellectual faculty. Reason, by its practical a priori law, determines it. Thus Judgement makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.
Chapter 13

PART I (part 1)4 cards

Why is the judgement of taste aesthetical rather than logical?
Kant argues the judgement of taste is not a judgement of cognition but aesthetical, because its determining ground can be no other than subjective. We refer the representation, by the Imagination perhaps with the Understanding, to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or pain, not to the Object for cognition. It adds nothing to cognition but compares the representation with the whole faculty of representations.
Chapter 14
What does Kant mean by calling taste satisfaction 'disinterested'?
Interest is satisfaction combined with the representation of an object's existence, tied to the faculty of desire. In judging beauty we do not ask whether anything depends on the thing's existence for ourselves or others, but how we judge it by mere observation. Kant argues any judgement of beauty in which the least interest mingles is partial and not a pure judgement of taste.
Chapter 14
How does the pleasant differ from the good?
The pleasant is what pleases the senses in sensation and always pleases immediately, arousing inclination; we say it gratifies. The good is what pleases by means of Reason through a mere concept, involving the concept of a purpose and thus an interest in the object's presence. Kant notes we call a spiced dish pleasant yet admit it is not good, since Reason considers its after results.
Chapter 14
What distinguishes the beautiful from both pleasant and good?
Kant argues the pleasant and good both refer to the faculty of desire and carry interest, while the judgement of taste is merely contemplative, indifferent as regards the being of the object. It is not based on concepts nor has concepts as its purpose. Thus we say what gratifies is pleasant, what merely pleases is beautiful, and what is esteemed or approved is good.
Chapter 14

PART I (part 2)4 cards

How does Kant distinguish the universality of judgments about the Pleasant from judgments of Taste?
Kant holds that judgments about the Pleasant have only comparative universality, resting on empirical rules that are general rather than universal. By contrast, the judgment of Taste about the beautiful claims universal validity for everyone, though it rests on no concept. He calls the first the taste of Sense, which makes merely private judgments, and the second the taste of Reflection, which makes judgments supposed to be generally valid.
Chapter 15
What kind of universality does Kant say an aesthetical judgment of Taste possesses?
Kant argues that the universality of a judgment of Taste is aesthetical, not logical: it involves no objective quantity but only subjective general validity, the reference of a representation to the feeling of pleasure and pain for every subject. In respect of logical quantity all judgments of taste are singular, since the object is referred immediately to one's own feeling without concepts, yet they extend to the whole sphere of judging persons.
Chapter 15
In the judgment of taste, does the feeling of pleasure precede or follow the judging of the object?
Kant answers that the pleasure cannot precede the judging, for then it would be mere pleasantness in sensation with only private validity. Instead, the universal communicability of the mental state—the free play of Imagination and Understanding in relation to cognition in general—must come first, and the pleasure in the object follows as its consequence. This subjective judging precedes the pleasure and grounds it.
Chapter 15
Why can no rule or reason force anyone to recognize something as beautiful?
Kant maintains that if we judge objects merely by concepts, all representation of beauty is lost. Hence there can be no rule by which anyone is forced to recognize something as beautiful, and we cannot press our judgment on others through reasons or fundamental propositions. The judgment of taste does not postulate but only imputes universal agreement, speaking with a universal voice that is an Idea, not a proof.
Chapter 15

PART I (part 3)4 cards

For Kant, what is the pleasure in an aesthetical judgement?
Kant holds that the pleasure in aesthetical judgement is contemplative and does not produce an interest in the object, unlike the practical moral judgement. It is the consciousness of the mere formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers when an object is given. This pleasure involves no definite cognition, yet it has causality: it maintains the state of representation, which is why we linger over the beautiful.
Chapter 16
What makes a judgement of taste pure, according to Kant?
A judgement of taste is pure only when charm and emotion have no influence on it, though they may be bound up with the satisfaction in the beautiful. Its determining ground must be merely the purposiveness of the form. Kant calls taste barbaric when it needs a mixture of charms and emotions for satisfaction, and worse when it makes these the measure of its assent. Every interest spoils taste and takes away its impartiality.
Chapter 16
How does Kant treat colours and tones in judgements of beauty?
Kant says most people call a mere colour, like the green of a grass plot, or a mere tone, like a violin's, beautiful in themselves, though these seem to rest on mere sensation and deserve only to be called pleasant. He argues such sensations count as beautiful only insofar as they are pure, a determination concerning their form, which alone admits of universal communicability. Composite colours lack this advantage because no standard exists for judging their purity.
Chapter 16
Why does Kant deny that beauty resolves into the concept of perfection?
Kant argues that objective purposiveness can only be cognised through a concept of a definite purpose, whether external utility or internal perfection. The judgement of taste rests on subjective grounds whose determining ground cannot be a concept, so no perfection of the object is thought in beauty. He therefore rejects the view that beautiful and good are the same concept, merely confused versus clear, insisting the aesthetical judgement is unique in kind.
Chapter 16

PART I (part 4)4 cards

According to Kant, why can there be no objective rule of taste based on concepts?
Kant argues every judgement of taste is aesthetical: the feeling of the subject, not a concept of the object, is its determining ground. Seeking a principle of taste that supplies a universal criterion of the beautiful through definite concepts is therefore fruitless, impossible, and self-contradictory. The empirical criterion is instead the universal communicability of sensation without concepts, confirmed by the agreement of many times and peoples.
Chapter 17
What is the difference between the normal Idea and the Ideal of beauty?
The normal Idea is an individual intuition of the Imagination representing the standard for judging man as a member of an animal species; it is the indispensable condition of beauty, i.e. mere correctness, and pleases only negatively. The Ideal, found only in the human figure, consists in the expression of the moral; judging it requires pure Ideas of Reason united with great imaginative power, and such a judgement is not a mere judgement of taste.
Chapter 17
How does Kant illustrate the formation of the normal Idea using a thousand men?
Kant offers a psychological explanation: the Imagination can let many images of the same kind glide into one another and form an average serving as a common measure. If one wishes to judge the normal size of full-grown men, the Imagination allows perhaps a thousand images to fall on one another, and the average size is cognisable where most are combined, equally removed from the extremes of greatest and smallest stature.
Chapter 17
What kind of necessity does Kant attribute to the judgement of taste?
Kant holds the necessity is exemplary: a necessity of the assent of all to a judgement regarded as an example of a universal rule that cannot be stated. It is not theoretical objective necessity, nor practical necessity, nor inferred from the universality of experience. The judgement requires everyone's agreement, and its 'ought' is pronounced with all data required for judging, yet only conditioned, resting on the Idea of a common sense.
Chapter 17

PART I (part 5)4 cards

Why does Kant say regular figures please us in cognition but not in pure taste?
Kant holds that regularity is the indispensable condition for grasping an object in a single representation and determining its manifold form, so it satisfies a purpose of cognition. But this approval is merely of a problem solved, not the free and indefinite play of Imagination and Understanding that constitutes beauty. Pure taste, he argues, combines satisfaction with the mere consideration of the object, without reference to use or purpose.
Chapter 18
Why does Kant claim stiff regularity is repugnant to taste?
The author argues that all stiff regularity approximating mathematical regularity is repugnant to taste, because contemplation of it does not last but produces weariness when it has no express cognition or practical purpose in view. By contrast, what Imagination can play with in an unstudied yet purposive manner is always new. He cites Marsden's pepper-garden remark but counters that a day there would show regularity burdens the Imagination.
Chapter 18
How do the Beautiful and the Sublime differ in form and satisfaction?
Kant states the Beautiful in nature is connected with the form of an object that has boundaries, while the Sublime is found in a formless object insofar as boundlessness is represented, though its totality is present to thought. Satisfaction in the Beautiful is bound up with quality and directly furthers life; satisfaction in the Sublime is indirect, arising from a momentary checking and stronger outflow of vital powers, so it is emotion rather than play, and deserves to be called negative pleasure.
Chapter 18
Why does Kant say no object of nature should be called sublime?
Kant argues we express ourselves incorrectly if we call any object of nature sublime, though many objects can correctly be called beautiful. No sensible form can contain the sublime properly so-called; it concerns only Ideas of Reason, which are aroused by the inadequacy of any sensible presentation. The wide ocean agitated by storm cannot be called sublime, since its aspect is horrible and the mind must already be filled with manifold Ideas.
Chapter 18

PART I (part 6)2 cards

Why does Savary say one must avoid both extremes at the Pyramids?
Kant cites Savary's account of Egypt: one must keep from going too near the Pyramids as much as from going too far. Too far away, the parts are obscurely represented and produce no effect on aesthetical judgement. Too near, the eye cannot complete apprehension from bottom to apex before the first tiers are forgotten, so comprehension is never complete.
Chapter 19
What is the difference between monstrous and colossal for Kant?
An object is monstrous if by its size it destroys the purpose constituting its concept. The mere presentation of a concept is called colossal when it is almost too great for any presentation, bordering on the relatively monstrous, because the intuition is almost too great for our faculty of apprehension. A pure judgement on the sublime must have no purpose of the Object as its determining ground.
Chapter 19

PART I (part 7)4 cards

For Kant, where does sublimity actually reside?
Kant argues sublimity does not reside in anything of nature but only in our mind, insofar as we become conscious of being superior to nature within and therefore to nature without us. Objects that excite this feeling, such as nature's might calling forth our forces, are called sublime only improperly. The feeling presupposes the Idea of sublimity already present in ourselves.
Chapter 20
What condition must nature meet to be judged dynamically sublime?
Nature must be represented as exciting fear, though not every fearful object is judged sublime. We can regard an object as fearful without being afraid of it, by merely thinking a case in which we would wish to resist and all resistance would be vain. Kant notes that he who actually fears can form no judgement about the sublime in nature.
Chapter 20
Why does the sublime please us only through a pain?
The Imagination is pained by its inadequacy for Reason's Idea of the absolute whole, yet this very unpurposiveness is represented as purposive. The aesthetical judgement is subjectively purposive for Reason as the source of Ideas, so pleasure accompanies the reception of an object as sublime only through the medium of a pain.
Chapter 20
How does Kant distinguish religion from superstition?
Kant argues religion is essentially distinguished from superstition: superstition establishes fear and apprehension of an all-powerful Being without high esteem, producing only seeking of favour and flattery. True religion consists in a good life. Only one conscious of an upright disposition pleasing to God can recognise sublimity in that Being, since a mood of calm, free judgement is needed.
Chapter 20

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For a pure aesthetical judgement of the sublime, how must we regard the starry heaven or ocean?
We must not base the judgement on teleological concepts, such as worlds inhabited by rational beings or the ocean as a kingdom of creatures or source of vapours. Instead we regard the starry heaven merely as a distant all-embracing vault, and the ocean as poets do—a clear mirror or a threatening abyss. Only then can a pure aesthetical judgement ascribe sublimity to them.
Chapter 21
How does the satisfaction in the sublime differ from that in the beautiful?
The author argues satisfaction in the sublime of nature is negative, while that in the beautiful is positive. In the sublime, the Imagination feels it deprives itself of its freedom yet is purposively determined by a law other than its empirical employment. It feels the sacrifice or deprivation and at the same time the cause to which it is subjected, gaining an extension and might greater than it sacrifices.
Chapter 21
Why is enthusiasm aesthetically sublime yet not approved by Reason?
The author argues enthusiasm, the Idea of the Good conjoined with affection, is aesthetically sublime because it is a tension of forces produced by Ideas that impels the mind more powerfully than sensible representations. Yet every affection is blind, either in choosing its purpose or in accomplishing it, making free deliberation about fundamental propositions impossible; thus it cannot deserve Reason's approval.
Chapter 21
What is the author's view of tender emotions that rise to affections, and of false humility?
The author argues tender emotions, if they rise to the height of affections, are worthless, and the propensity to them is sentimentality. A sympathetic grief admitting no consolation, or grief over imaginary evils, shows a weak soul. Likewise a cringing, abject religious discourse and false humility that places pleasing the Supreme Being in self-depreciation are incompatible with a frame of mind counted beautiful, still less sublime.
Chapter 21

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Why does Kant say judgements about the Sublime in nature need no separate Deduction?
Kant argues the Sublime in nature is improperly so called; the word properly applies only to a state of mind or its foundation in human nature. A formless, unpurposive object merely gives the occasion for becoming conscious of that state, so the object is employed as subjectively purposive but not judged as such in itself. Hence the Exposition of judgements on the Sublime was at the same time their Deduction.
Chapter 22
What does Kant mean by saying taste claims autonomy rather than heteronomy?
Kant holds that every judgement proving the subject's taste must be pronounced a priori by the subject himself, without groping empirically among others' judgements. Making others' judgements the determining grounds of one's own would be heteronomy. He illustrates with a young poet who, though the public has false taste, conforms only out of desire for applause, not because he now judges differently.
Chapter 22
How does Kant reconcile classical models with the autonomy of taste?
Kant argues recommending the ancients as models does not contradict autonomy, any more than old mathematicians prove Reason is imitative. Following, which involves something precedent, is the right expression for the influence of exemplary authors: we draw from the same sources as our predecessor and learn only the way to avail ourselves of them, rather than mechanically imitating.
Chapter 22

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How does Kant distinguish a judgement of taste from a logical judgement?
Kant says the logical judgement subsumes a representation under the concept of the Object, while the judgement of taste subsumes it under no concept. Otherwise its necessary universal agreement could be enforced by proofs. Yet taste resembles the logical judgement in claiming universality and necessity, though only a subjective necessity, not one according to concepts of the Object.
Chapter 23
On what does a pure judgement of taste rest, according to Kant?
Since no concept of the Object underlies it, the judgement can only consist in subsuming the Imagination under the conditions the Understanding requires to pass from intuition to concepts. It rests on a mere feeling of the reciprocal activity of the Imagination in its freedom and the Understanding in its conformity to law, a subjective purposiveness furthering the cognitive faculties in free play.
Chapter 23
What does a judgement of taste properly assert a priori about an object?
Not the pleasure itself, which is empirical and only inwardly perceived, but the universal validity of that pleasure, represented a priori as a rule valid for everyone. Hence all judgements of taste are singular, combining the predicate of satisfaction with a given individual empirical representation. To say 'I find it beautiful' is to attribute the satisfaction necessarily to every one.
Chapter 23
Why is the Deduction of judgements of taste easy, and what does it not establish?
It need not justify the objective reality of any concept, since Beauty is not a concept of the Object and taste is not cognitive. It only maintains that we may presuppose universally in every man those subjective conditions of the Judgement we find in ourselves, and rightly subsume the given Object under them. Whether nature is a priori a complex of objects of taste belongs to Teleology and remains doubtful.
Chapter 23

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According to Kant, why does the Beautiful interest us empirically only in society?
Kant argues that taste is empirically interested only in society: a man alone on a desert island would adorn neither hut nor person, nor seek or plant flowers. Only in society does one wish to be a refined man and to communicate pleasure to others. This empirical interest, Kant says, is of no importance for the a priori judgement of taste.
Chapter 24
What distinguishes the immediate interest in natural beauty from interest in artistic beauty?
Kant maintains that immediate interest in the Beauty of Nature marks a good soul, while interest in Beautiful Art proves no moral disposition. If we discover artificial flowers or carved birds are fake, the immediate interest vanishes. Natural beauty interests us because nature has produced it; art either deceives us into taking it for nature or interests only mediately through its purpose.
Chapter 24
How does Kant connect interest in natural beauty with moral feeling?
Kant argues that interest in natural beauty is akin to the moral, and one who takes it can do so only if he has already established interest in the morally good. Reason wants its Ideas to have objective reality, so it takes interest in nature showing agreement with our disinterested satisfaction. This immediate interest is not common but belongs to those already cultivated toward the good.
Chapter 24
What does Kant say about colors and tones as charms in natural beauty?
Kant refers charms in beautiful Nature to modifications of light (colours) or sound (tones), the only sensations implying both sensible feeling and reflection on form. They involve a kind of language by which nature seems to speak: white lilies suggest innocence, the seven colours suggest ideas from sublimity to tenderness, and birdsong proclaims gladness—though this is our interpretation, whether nature intends it or not.
Chapter 24

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For Kant, what distinguishes beautiful art from mere agreeable entertainment like table games?
The author argues that agreeable arts, such as entertaining storytelling, jest, table arrangement, and games that merely make time pass, aim only at momentary enjoyment and involve no permanent material for reflection. Beautiful art, by contrast, is a mode of representation purposive for itself; though devoid of definite purpose, it furthers the culture of mental powers in reference to social communication, and its pleasure rests on reflection rather than sensation.
Chapter 25
According to Kant, how must a product of beautiful art appear despite being art?
The author argues that in a product of beautiful art we must be conscious it is art and not nature, yet its purposiveness must seem free from the constraint of arbitrary rules, as if it were nature. The purposiveness must be designed but must not seem designed: the artist punctiliously observes the rules, but no trace of the rule or the form of the schools should obtrude and fetter the mental powers.
Chapter 25
What four properties does Kant ascribe to genius as the talent that gives the rule to art?
The author argues genius is the innate mental disposition through which nature gives the rule to art. Its properties: (1) originality, since it produces what no definite rule can give and is not learnable; (2) its products must be exemplary models, not springing from imitation, serving as standards for others; (3) it cannot describe scientifically how it produces its works, nor teach precepts enabling others to make the like; (4) nature prescribes rules through genius to art only, and only to beautiful art, not to science.
Chapter 25
How does Kant distinguish the discoverer in science from the genius in fine art?
The author argues that even great scientific achievement, such as Newton's, can be learned, since Newton could make all his steps intuitively plain and definite to everyone; the greatest discoverer differs only in degree from his laborious imitator. But one cannot learn to write spirited poetry, because a Homer or Wieland cannot show how his ideas come together, not knowing it himself. Genius thus differs specifically from the imitator, though art, unlike science, stands still at a boundary.
Chapter 25

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What does Kant call aesthetical attributes, and what example does he give?
Kant calls aesthetical attributes forms that do not present a given concept itself but express its consequences and relations to other concepts, giving the Imagination scope for more thought than words can capture. His example: Jupiter's eagle with lightning in its claws is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven, and the peacock of its magnificent queen. They enliven the mind by opening an illimitable field of kindred representations.
Chapter 26
According to Kant, what two mental powers constitute genius?
Kant states that the mental powers whose union constitutes genius are Imagination and Understanding. In cognition the Imagination submits to the Understanding's constraint; aesthetically it is free to furnish undeveloped material that quickens the cognitive powers. Genius consists in the happy relation, which no science can teach and no industry learn, by which Ideas are found for a given concept and expression is found for those Ideas.
Chapter 26
How does Kant define genius in his summary?
Kant defines genius as the exemplary originality of the natural gifts of a subject in the free employment of his cognitive faculties. It is a talent for Art, not Science; it presupposes a definite concept of the product and a relation between Imagination and Understanding; it shows itself in expressing aesthetical Ideas; and its free accord of faculties cannot be produced by following rules. Its product is an example to be followed, not imitated.
Chapter 26
In combining Taste with Genius, which does Kant say is more important for beautiful art?
Kant argues that Taste (Judgement) is the indispensable condition, more important than Genius, for judging art as beautiful. Abundant originality in lawless freedom produces only nonsense; Taste disciplines Genius, clips its wings, and gives it guidance. If something must be sacrificed in a conflict, it should be on the side of genius, not the Understanding. Beautiful art requires Imagination, Understanding, Spirit, and Taste.
Chapter 26

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According to Kant, what is the essential thing in all beautiful art?
The author argues that in all beautiful art the essential thing is the form, which is purposive as regards our observation and judgement, so that the pleasure is at the same time cultivation and disposes the spirit to Ideas. The matter of sensation (charm or emotion) is not essential; it has only to do with enjoyment and leaves nothing behind in the Idea.
Chapter 27
Why does Kant rank poetry first among the beautiful arts?
The author argues poetry holds the first rank because it owes its origin almost entirely to genius and is least guided by precept or example. It expands the mind by setting the Imagination at liberty, strengthens the mind by making it feel its free and spontaneous faculty of judging nature as a phenomenon, and plays with illusion without deceiving, since it declares its exercise to be mere play.
Chapter 27
Why does Kant condemn rhetoric as the art of persuasion?
The author argues rhetoric as ars oratoria, the art of deceiving by a beautiful show, is a Dialectic that borrows from poetry only enough to win minds before they have judged and to deprive them of their freedom. He says it cannot be recommended for law courts or pulpit, since it is unworthy of important business to let wit, imagination, or the art of talking people over appear.
Chapter 27
Why does Kant give music a low rank among the beautiful arts?
The author argues that if beautiful arts are valued by the culture they supply to the mind, Music has the lowest place, because it merely plays with sensations and is rather enjoyment than culture. Its impressions are transitory, and it has a certain want of urbanity since it obtrudes itself on others nearby, unlike arts appealing to the eyes.
Chapter 27

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According to Kant, what causes the gratification we feel when a jest's illusion is dissolved?
Kant argues the jest must momentarily deceive; when the illusion vanishes, the mind oscillates between tension and relaxation. This sudden slackening produces a mental movement and a harmonising inner bodily movement—an alternating tension of the intestines communicated to the diaphragm, with the lungs expelling air at rapid intervals. This bodily movement, beneficial to health, is the proper cause of gratification, not what precedes it in the mind.
Chapter 28
How does Kant distinguish naiveté from open-hearted simplicity?
Kant says naiveté is the breaking out of humanity's originally natural sincerity against the art of dissimulation that has become second nature; we laugh at simplicity that cannot dissemble yet delight in it. It must not be confounded with open-hearted simplicity, which does not spoil nature solely because it does not understand the art of social intercourse. An art that is to be naive is a contradiction, but representing naiveté in a fictitious personage is possible.
Chapter 28
What is the antinomy of taste as Kant states it in thesis and antithesis?
The thesis holds that the judgement of taste is not based on concepts, for otherwise it would admit of controversy and be determinable by proofs. The antithesis holds that the judgement of taste is based on concepts, for otherwise, despite its diversity, we could not quarrel about it or claim the necessary assent of others. Kant notes a missing middle proposition: there may be a quarrel about taste, though no controversy.
Chapter 28
How does Kant resolve the antinomy of taste?
Kant resolves it by showing the concept involved is taken in two senses. The judgement of taste must refer to some concept to claim universal validity, but not one provable from concepts. The relevant concept is the pure rational concept of the supersensible, which underlies both object and subject as phenomenon; it is in itself undeterminable and useless for knowledge. Thus the two propositions do not truly contradict, and the judgement is valid for everyone as a singular judgement.
Chapter 28

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How does Kant define genius in this chapter?
Kant explains genius as the faculty of aesthetical Ideas. Since reducing a representation of the Imagination to concepts is the same as expounding it, an aesthetical Idea is an inexponible representation of the Imagination in its free play. In products of genius it is nature in the subject, not a premeditated purpose, that gives the rule to beautiful art.
Chapter 29
Why does Kant claim there are exactly three kinds of antinomies of pure Reason?
Kant grounds the three antinomies in the three cognitive faculties: Understanding, Judgement, and Reason, each of which as a superior cognitive faculty must have a priori principles. Reason inexorably requires the unconditioned for the given conditioned, which can never be found if the sensible is treated as belonging to things in themselves rather than as phenomenon with a supersensible substrate.
Chapter 29
What two options does Kant give for avoiding the antinomy of the judgement of taste?
Kant says there are only two ways. Either deny any a priori principle underlies the judgement of taste, treating its claim to necessary universal agreement as vain fancy and its correctness as contingent agreement of similar organisation, as with the palate. Or treat the judgement of taste as a disguised judgement of Reason upon perfection and purpose, only called aesthetical through confusion, making it teleological at bottom. Kant says neither expedient satisfies.
Chapter 29
What is the difference between the realism and idealism of aesthetical purposiveness?
Both fall under rationalism of the principle of taste, since the judgement is not cognitive and beauty is not a characteristic of the Object in itself. Realism assumes a subjective purposiveness that is an actual designed purpose of nature or art harmonising with our Judgement; idealism assumes a purposive harmony with the needs of Judgement that shows itself without purpose, spontaneously and contingently.
Chapter 29

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What does Kant claim the Beautiful is a symbol of, and what does this give pleasure with?
Kant states the Beautiful is the symbol of the morally Good, and it is only in this respect—a reference natural to every man and postulated in others as a duty—that it gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of everyone else. Through this the mind is made conscious of an ennoblement above mere sensibility to pleasure from sense.
Chapter 30
How does Kant distinguish the beautiful from the morally good regarding interest?
Kant argues the beautiful pleases apart from any interest, whereas the morally good is necessarily bound up with an interest—though not one preceding the judgement upon the satisfaction, but one first produced by it. The beautiful also pleases immediately, but only in reflective intuition, not, like morality, in its concept.
Chapter 30
According to Kant, what is the true propaedeutic for founding taste?
Kant argues the true propaedeutic for the foundation of taste is the development of moral Ideas and the culture of the moral feeling, since only when sensibility is brought into agreement with this can genuine taste assume a definite invariable form. He holds taste is at bottom a faculty for judging the sensible illustration of moral Ideas.
Chapter 30
Why is there no science or method of teaching for beautiful art, per the Appendix?
Kant argues there neither is nor can be a science of the Beautiful, and the judgement of taste is not determinable by principles. For beautiful art there is only a manner (modus), not a method of teaching (methodus); the master shows what to do and how, while universal rules serve mainly for remembrance rather than prescription.
Chapter 30

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For what does Kant say we have no a priori ground in the idea of nature?
Kant argues we have no ground in the universal Idea of nature, as the complex of objects of sense, for assuming that natural things serve one another as means to purposes, or that their possibility is only intelligible through this causality. Subjective purposiveness in nature's particular laws, relative to our cognitive faculties, may be assumed on transcendental principles; objective purposiveness may not.
Chapter 31
How should the teleological judgement be brought to bear on nature investigation, and to which judgement does it belong?
Kant says the teleological act of judgement is rightly brought to bear on nature investigation only problematically, to bring nature under principles of observation and inquiry according to the analogy with the causality of purpose, without any pretence of explaining it thereby. It therefore belongs to the reflective, not the determinant, judgement.
Chapter 31
What distinguishes the objective purposiveness of geometrical figures from real purposiveness found in external things?
Kant says geometrical purposiveness is objective and intellectual but merely formal: it expresses a figure's suitability for producing many intended figures, yet does not make the object's concept possible, and needs no purpose. By contrast, order and regularity in external complexes of things, like a garden's trees and walks, must be given empirically and, as real purposiveness, depends on the concept of a purpose.
Chapter 31
How does Kant distinguish wonder from admiration?
Kant defines wonder as a shock of the mind arising from the incompatibility of a representation, and the rule given by its means, with principles already lying at its basis, provoking doubt whether we have rightly seen or judged. Admiration is wonder that ever recurs despite the disappearance of this doubt; it is a natural effect of observed purposiveness in things as phenomena.
Chapter 31

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For Kant, what two conditions make a thing a natural purpose?
Kant requires first that its parts be possible only through their reference to the whole, and second that its parts combine as reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form. Only then can the Idea of the whole determine the parts as a ground of cognition, not as an external cause, making the product an organised and self-organising being.
Chapter 32
How does Kant distinguish a watch from an organised being?
In a watch each part is an instrument for moving the others, but no wheel produces another wheel, and a watch cannot replace lost parts or repair itself. An organised being, by contrast, possesses formative power that it communicates to materials lacking it, so its parts are organs reciprocally producing each other.
Chapter 32
Why does Kant call beauty an analogon of art but deny this for internal natural perfection?
Beauty is ascribed to objects only in reference to reflection on their external aspect, so it resembles art. Internal natural perfection belongs to things possible only as natural purposes, organised beings, and Kant says it is not analogous to any physical faculty known to us, nor even thinkable by any exactly fitting analogy.
Chapter 32
What does Kant's hexagon-in-the-sand example illustrate?
A regular hexagon traced on sand would be attributed to Reason, since the chance of such a concept arising from sand, sea, wind, or beasts is infinitely small. Kant says it would be judged a purpose, but a product of art, not a natural purpose, since a trace of a human is evident.
Chapter 32

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Why does Kant say a blade of grass shows nature's purposiveness but not a categorical purpose?
Kant argues that the internal form of a blade of grass can only be judged possible according to the rule of purposes, showing it is organized matter and thus a natural purpose. But external purposive references, like grass for oxen and oxen for men, rest on ever more distant conditions and never reach an unconditioned final purpose, so no categorical purpose is established.
Chapter 33
What status does Kant assign to the principle that nothing in nature is vain?
Kant holds this principle belongs to Reason only as a subjective maxim for reflective Judgement: it is regulative, not constitutive, and not a principle for determinant Judgement. It justifies extending natural science according to final causes without prejudice to mechanical causality, and it does not decide whether anything is a designed purpose of nature.
Chapter 33
How does Kant distinguish domestic from foreign principles of a science?
Principles internal to a science are domestic (principia domestica); those based on concepts belonging outside it are foreign (peregrina). Sciences using foreign principles borrow auxiliary propositions (lemmata) from another science. Kant insists every science be treated architectonically as a whole in itself, not as a wing of another building.
Chapter 33
Why does Kant say Teleology is usually a propaedeutic to Theology rather than part of natural science?
Kant explains that we see into a thing completely only so far as we can make it according to our concepts. Organisation, as inner purpose of nature, infinitely surpasses our art, and external purposive arrangements like wind and rain cannot be presented by Physic as necessary. Teleology thus serves as a transition to Theology rather than a proper part of theoretical natural science.
Chapter 33

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For reflective Judgement, what maxim does Kant say is correct regarding organized beings?
Kant holds that for reflective Judgement it is a correct fundamental proposition that the connexion of things according to final causes requires thinking a causality distinct from mechanism, namely an intelligent world-cause acting by purposes. But this is only a maxim, an Idea used as a guide to reflection, not a constitutive claim about reality.
Chapter 34
How does Kant distinguish reflective from determinant Judgement on purposiveness?
The reflective Judgement treats the concept of purposive causality as a mere Idea and maxim, leaving mechanical explanation open and staying within the world of Sense. The determinant Judgement would make it an objective principle prescribed by Reason, moving beyond the world of Sense into the transcendent and perhaps into error. Kant says the apparent antinomy rests on confusing these two.
Chapter 34
What two sorts of systems about the Technic of nature does Kant identify?
Kant divides systems concerning nature's productive power according to purposes into Idealism and Realism of natural purposes. Idealism says all purposiveness is undesigned, split into the casuality of Epicurus and Democritus and the fatality of Spinoza. Realism says some purposiveness is designed, split into Hylozoism, which grounds purposes in the life of matter, and Theism, which grounds them in an intelligent original Being.
Chapter 34
Why does Kant say Spinozism fails to explain natural purposes?
Kant argues Spinoza reduces purposiveness to the unity of an all-embracing substrate in which things inhere as accidents. But such ontological unity is not a unity of purpose, which requires reference to a cause possessing Understanding that produces effects by design. Spinoza also removes the contingence needed for any unity of purpose, so he cannot establish even the idealism of purposiveness he intends.
Chapter 34

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What does teleology prove about an intelligent original Being, according to Kant?
Kant argues teleology does not objectively prove that an intelligent Being exists. It only proves that, given the constitution of our cognitive faculties, we cannot conceive the possibility of such a world except by thinking a designedly-working supreme cause. The proposition "There is a God" is thus not objectively valid but only subjectively necessary for the reflective Judgement.
Chapter 35
Why is the concept of design a necessary maxim for reflective Judgement?
Kant holds we are indispensably obliged to ascribe design to nature when investigating organised products through continuous observation, making it an absolutely necessary maxim for the empirical use of Reason. For organised beings, the thought of them is impossible without combining it with designed production. For nature as a whole, however, the maxim is useful but not indispensable, since nature as a whole is not given as organised.
Chapter 35
What does Kant say about the hope for a Newton of a blade of grass?
Kant states boldly that it is absurd for men to attempt, or to hope, that another Newton will arise who could make comprehensible the production of a blade of grass by natural laws ordered by no design. He insists we must absolutely deny this insight to men. Yet he also warns it would be presumptuous to claim that no hidden mechanical ground could exist.
Chapter 35
Why does Kant say the possible/actual distinction is only subjectively valid?
Kant argues the distinction between possibility and actuality rests on the subject and the nature of our cognitive faculties, requiring two distinct elements: Understanding for concepts and sensible intuition for objects. An intuitive Understanding would know only actual objects, with no room for mere possibility. Thus the distinction has merely subjective validity for the human Understanding, not for things in general.
Chapter 35

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Why does Kant say we must think of an intuitive Understanding (intellectus archetypus)?
Kant argues that because our discursive Understanding moves from analytical-universal concepts to particular intuitions, the accord of natural laws with our Judgement appears contingent. To think this accord as possible, we must think an intuitive Understanding that proceeds from the synthetical-universal (intuition of a whole) to the particular. This Idea contains no contradiction and serves only as a contrast to our ectypal Understanding.
Chapter 36
What does Kant conclude about explaining organized bodies by mere mechanism?
Kant argues that no human Reason, nor any finite Reason like ours, can hope to understand the production of even a blade of grass by mere mechanical causes. We may try all known and yet-to-be-discovered mechanical laws and hope for progress, but the call for a quite different ground of production—causality by purposes—can never be dispensed with.
Chapter 36
How do mechanism and teleology relate as principles for the determinant Judgement?
Kant holds that in the same natural thing both principles cannot be connected as constitutive grounds of explanation, one derived from the other. If I regard a maggot as a product of mere mechanism, I cannot derive it from causality by purposes, and conversely. One method excludes the other; their compatibility must rest on a supersensible ground we cannot determinately know.
Chapter 36
What role does Kant assign teleology as a maxim of Reason?
Kant argues teleology is a necessary maxim of Reason and a heuristic principle for investigating the particular laws of nature, even though it does not make their mode of origination more comprehensible. Yet Reason must proceed cautiously, treating regular figures as mechanically possible where it can, while not excluding the teleological principle where purposiveness shows itself undeniably.
Chapter 36

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To what does Teleology belong as a science, according to Kant?
The author argues that Teleology, as science, belongs to no Doctrine but only to Criticism—specifically the criticism of Judgement. It does not belong to Theology as a part, though it may be used therein, nor to Natural Science, which needs determinant rather than merely reflective principles. Its Methodology has at least a negative influence on theoretical Natural Science and on its relation to Theology as propaedeutic.
Chapter 37
Why can mechanism alone never explain organized beings for us?
Kant holds that the privilege of aiming at mechanical explanation is unlimited, but the faculty of attaining it is bounded by the constitution of our Understanding. Explaining natural purposes mechanically would require a non-sensuous intuition and determinate knowledge of the intelligible substrate of nature, which surpasses our faculties. So judgement on such products must always be subordinated to a teleological principle.
Chapter 37
What faint hope does comparative anatomy give the naturalist?
The agreement of many animal genera in a common schema—bones and other parts—suggests a common original type, allowing a faint hope that the mechanism of nature may accomplish something here. This analogy strengthens suspicion of an actual relationship through gradual approximation from man down to polyps, mosses, lichens, and crude matter, as if derived from matter by mechanical laws.
Chapter 37
How does Kant answer Hume's objection about a purposive Understanding?
Hume objects that one may ask how such an Understanding, with manifold faculties purposively united, is possible. Kant replies the objection is without weight: the real difficulty concerns the unity of the ground combining elements external to one another. If that ground is a simple substance with Understanding, the teleological question is answered; if sought in matter as an aggregate, the unity is wanting.
Chapter 37

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According to Kant, what alone can be the ultimate purpose of nature for the human race?
Kant argues that culture alone can be the ultimate purpose we ascribe to nature regarding the human race, not earthly happiness. Happiness is a mere Idea of a state that humans project in shifting ways and can never attain, since human nature does not rest content with any possession or enjoyment. Culture, meaning the aptitude for setting purposes in general and using nature as a means, is what nature can actually produce in us.
Chapter 38
What two kinds of culture does Kant distinguish, and which is adequate to nature's ultimate purpose?
Kant distinguishes the culture of skill from the culture of training (discipline). The culture of skill is the chief subjective condition for aptitude in furthering purposes generally, but it is not adequate for furthering the will in choosing purposes. The culture of training is negative: it frees the will from the despotism of desires. Kant argues that skill alone cannot suffice; the discipline that liberates the will is also required.
Chapter 38
Why does Kant deny that man, as a natural being, can be the final purpose of creation?
Kant argues we can prove a priori that no natural being could be the final purpose of creation. Nature treats man as one animal genus among many, subjecting him to the same mechanism: plague, hunger, floods, frost, and predators spare him no more than other animals. His own natural dispositions drive him into self-torments and wars. He is thus only a link in the chain of natural purposes, a means for maintaining purposiveness in the rest.
Chapter 38
How does Kant resolve the apparent conflict between mechanical and teleological explanations of nature?
Kant holds that mechanical and teleological principles are merely principles of the reflective Judgement, not determinations of how organisms originate in themselves. We are invited by Reason to attempt mechanical explanation as far as possible, though we know our Understanding can never fully attain it. The compatibility of both ways of representing nature may lie in a supersensible principle, with final causes being a subjective condition of our Reason.
Chapter 38

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What distinction does Kant draw between physico-theology and moral theology?
Kant defines physico-theology as Reason's attempt to infer the Supreme Cause and its properties from purposes of nature, which can only be known empirically. Moral (ethico-)theology infers that Cause from the moral purpose of rational beings, which can be known a priori. He states the former naturally precedes the latter, since purposes of nature must first be given before we seek a final purpose.
Chapter 39
Why can physico-theology never establish a final purpose of creation?
Kant argues physico-theology, however far pursued, cannot disclose a final purpose because it does not even extend to that question. The purposive references it finds are always conditioned within nature, so it cannot ask why nature itself exists, whose ground must lie outside nature. It can justify an intelligent World Cause only as a subjective concept suited to our cognitive constitution, not determine it further theoretically or practically.
Chapter 39
What does Kant say about supplementing physical teleology's deficient concept of the Deity?
Kant says if we arbitrarily add perfections beyond what empirical grounds support, physico-theology may seem to support a Theology, but no justification exists in the theoretical use of Reason, which ascribes only properties with empirical data of possibility. On closer examination, an Idea of a Supreme Being resting on the practical use of Reason lies in us a priori, impelling us to supplement the defective representation — not something worked out or proved theoretically.
Chapter 39
How does Kant characterize Spinozism and the Idealism of final causes?
Kant describes a system where all things are mere determinations of one Substance, producing nothing according to purposes, yet relating purposively through the unity of that subject. This Idealism of final causes, he says, becomes Pantheism on the side of world beings and Spinozism on the side of the Subject as Original Being. It does not resolve but explains away the question of the first ground of nature's purposiveness, reducing that concept to a misinterpretation of an ontological concept.
Chapter 39

PART II (part 10)1 cards

What is the highest good in the world possible through freedom, per Kant?
Kant holds that the moral law obliges us to strive for the highest good: happiness under the objective condition of harmony with morality, i.e., worthiness to be happy. Since natural causes cannot connect these two requirements, we must assume a moral World-Cause, a God, to render the final purpose consistent with the moral law.
Chapter 40

PART II (part 11)4 cards

What does Kant say the final purpose of creation is, and what alone can the concept serve?
Kant holds that a final purpose is a concept of our practical Reason, not inferable from any data of experience for theoretically judging nature. Its only possible use is for practical Reason according to moral laws. The final purpose of creation is that constitution of the world which harmonises with the final purpose of our pure practical Reason, in so far as it is to be practical.
Chapter 41
How does moral Teleology lead to God, and what does Kant deny it achieves theoretically?
Kant argues moral Teleology establishes the Idea of God by the concept of a final purpose that it is forced to ascribe to creation practically. But this holds only for the reflective, not the determinant, Judgement. The Idea gains practical reality while all means of establishing it theoretically, for explaining nature or determining the supreme Cause, are entirely wanting for speculative cognition.
Chapter 41
What two cautions does Kant give about the properties we ascribe to the highest Being?
Kant says we can think these properties only according to analogy, since experience shows us nothing similar. And in this way we only think the supreme Being; we cannot thereby cognise Him or ascribe anything theoretically to Him. The concept may be transcendent for speculative Reason and may conceal an anthropomorphism, but its design is to determine ourselves and our will, not the nature of that Being.
Chapter 41
What does limiting Reason to practical employment prevent regarding Theology and Religion?
Kant claims this limitation prevents Theology from rising into Theosophy, with transcendent concepts that confound Reason, or sinking into Demonology, an anthropomorphic representation of the highest Being. It also prevents Religion from turning into Theurgy, a fanatical belief in feeling and influencing supersensible beings, or into Idolatry, a superstitious belief that the Supreme Being can be pleased by means other than a moral sentiment.
Chapter 41

PART II (part 12)4 cards

According to Kant, why can no theoretical proof establish God's existence?
Kant argues that no theoretical proof of the original Being as a Godhead, or of the soul as immortal, is possible for human Reason—not even the least degree of belief. The reason: we have no material for determining supersensible Ideas except things in the world of sense, which is absolutely inadequate for such an Object. Without determination, only the concept of a non-sensible something remains, yielding no knowledge of its inner constitution.
Chapter 42
What three kinds of cognisable things does Kant distinguish in §91?
Kant distinguishes things of opinion (opinabile), things of fact (scibile), and things of faith (mere credibile). Things of opinion are objects of possible empirical cognition that we cannot attain due to the low degree of our faculties, like the ether or rational inhabitants of other planets. Things of fact have provable objective reality, including the Idea of freedom. Things of faith are objects of pure Reason needed for practical use, namely the highest good, God, and immortality.
Chapter 42
Why is the Idea of freedom uniquely a thing of fact?
Kant says the Idea of freedom, though it admits no presentation in intuition and no theoretical proof of its possibility, comes under things of fact. Its reality as a particular kind of causality—theoretically transcendent—can be exhibited through practical laws of pure Reason and, conformably to these, in actual actions and thus in experience. It is the only Idea of pure Reason whose object is a thing of fact, reckoned among the scibilia.
Chapter 42
What are things of faith, and why is historical testimony not one?
Things of faith are objects that must be thought a priori for the use of pure practical Reason conforming to duty but are transcendent for theoretical use. The highest good, with God and immortality as its conditions, are the only things of faith. Kant notes that what we learn by testimony from others' experience is believed but is not a thing of faith, since it was someone's actual experience—a thing of fact—and knowledge of it is possible.
Chapter 42

PART II (part 13)4 cards

Which of the three pure rational Ideas proves its objective reality in nature, and how?
Kant states that of God, freedom, and immortality, freedom is the only supersensible concept that proves its objective reality in nature, through the causality thought in it and the effects it can produce there. This renders possible the connection of the other two with nature and of all three with Religion, though only from a practical point of view.
Chapter 43
Why does the physico-teleological proof fail to reach Theology, according to Kant?
Kant argues it cannot supply a determinate concept of the original Being sufficient for Theology, because it does not and cannot give such a concept. It only leads the mind to an intelligent Author of the world; the concept must be derived from another quarter or its gap filled by arbitrary addition.
Chapter 43
What merit does Kant grant the physico-teleological proof, and what actually produces conviction?
Kant grants it only the merit of leading the mind, through purposes in considering the world, to an intelligent Author. He argues it is really the moral ground of proof, dwelling in every man and influencing him secretly, that produces conviction; the physico-teleological proof merely arrests Reason's attention and makes it more susceptible to the moral proof.
Chapter 43
Would the moral proof of God's existence lose force without physical Teleology?
Kant argues no: the moral proof would preserve all its force even if the world showed no material, or only doubtful material, for physical Teleology. Reason would still find in the concept of freedom and moral Ideas a practically sufficient ground for postulating the original Being as Deity and nature as a final purpose.
Chapter 43

PART II (part 14)4 cards

Why does Kant say the category of causality cannot cognise God as first mover?
Kant argues that predicates like causality only find their object in the world of sense. Starting from them we can reach the being that grounds the world, but not determine its concept as a supersensible being, since that excludes all such predicates. So by 'first mover' we only represent something containing the ground of the world's motions, leaving the concept empty.
Chapter 44
What is the difference between thinking and cognising a supersensible Being for Kant?
Kant holds that the great purposiveness of the world compels us to think a supreme cause whose causality is that of an Understanding, but we are not entitled to ascribe this to it. Thinking God as an intelligence is unavoidable in a certain aspect of Reason's employment, yet ascribing Understanding to Him and claiming to cognise Him thereby is not permissible.
Chapter 44
Under what condition is an Ethical Theology possible, and why is a Theological Ethic impossible?
Kant argues an Ethical Theology is possible because we may think God's causality by analogy with an Understanding when it concerns a morally necessary effect unattainable by a sensible being, giving reality only in a practical (moral) reference. A Theological Ethic is impossible because laws Reason does not itself give, and whose observance it does not bring about as pure practical faculty, cannot be moral.
Chapter 44
What role does physico-teleological Theology play for Kant?
Kant argues a physical (properly physico-teleological) Theology can serve at least as a propaedeutic to Theology proper, giving occasion for the Idea of a final purpose nature cannot present through observation of natural purposes. It makes felt the need of a Theology determining God's concept for the highest practical use of Reason, but cannot develop it or base it satisfactorily on its proofs.
Chapter 44

I. From Thales to Plato. [_In the Press._ (part 1)4 cards

What does Kant's footnote say about the threefold division in pure philosophy?
Kant argues that an a priori division must be either analytical, which is always twofold by the law of contradiction, or synthetical. If synthetical and derived from a priori concepts, it must be trichotomy: (1) a condition, (2) a conditioned, and (3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition.
Chapter 45
How does Kant define taste in the footnote on the definition of taste?
Kant defines taste as the faculty of judging of the beautiful. He adds that the analysis of judgements of taste must show what is required to call an object beautiful, and that he sought the moments of reflection according to the logical functions of judgement, since a judgement of taste always involves a reference to the Understanding. He treats quality first.
Chapter 45
What does Kant say about an obligation to enjoyment?
Kant states that an obligation to enjoyment is a manifest absurdity. Therefore an obligation to actions that have merely enjoyment as their aim can only be pretended, however spiritually it is conceived or decked out, even if it is a mystical or so-called heavenly enjoyment.
Chapter 45
What does Kant's footnote say about regular countenances and caricature?
Kant says a perfectly regular countenance, such as a painter might want as a model, ordinarily tells us nothing, since it contains nothing characteristic and expresses the Idea of the race rather than specific traits of a person. Exaggerating a characteristic so as to violate the normal Idea is called caricature. Experience shows regular countenances commonly indicate a mediocre man.
Chapter 45

I. From Thales to Plato. [_In the Press._ (part 2)4 cards

What three stages did Kant say dinner-table talk should pass through?
Kant was accustomed to say that talk at a dinner table should always pass through three stages: narrative, discussion, and jest. The note adds that he was punctilious in this, as in all else, and is said to have directed the conversation at his own table accordingly, citing Wallace's Kant.
Chapter 46
What inscription on the Temple of Isis does Kant call perhaps the most sublime ever said?
Kant says perhaps nothing more sublime was ever said and no sublimer thought expressed than the inscription on the Temple of Isis (Mother Nature): 'I am all that is and that was and that shall be, and no mortal hath lifted my veil.' Segner used this Idea in a vignette prefixed to his Natural Philosophy to inspire holy awe in the pupil.
Chapter 46
How does Kant distinguish the orator's art from readiness and accuracy in speaking?
Kant admits a beautiful poem gives him pure gratification, while the best discourse leaves an unpleasant feeling of disapprobation toward a treacherous art that moves men like machines to a judgement losing all weight on reflection. Readiness and accuracy in speaking constitute Rhetoric and belong to beautiful art; but the art of the orator (ars oratoria), exploiting men's weaknesses for one's own designs, is worthy of no respect.
Chapter 46
What does Kant mean by calling a hypothesis of descent a 'daring venture of reason'?
Kant says such a hypothesis may be called a daring venture of reason, and few acute naturalists have not sometimes entertained it. It is not absurd like generatio aequivoca (an organised being from crude unorganised matter); it would remain generatio univoca, deriving one organic being from another specifically different one. A priori there is no contradiction, but experience gives no example: all known generation is generatio homonyma, and heteronyma is nowhere found.
Chapter 46

I. From Thales to Plato. [_In the Press._ (part 3)3 cards

According to Kant, when is religion in a practical sense always idolatry?
The author argues that religion is always idolatry in a practical sense when it conceives the Supreme Being with properties according to which something besides morality can be a fit condition for what man does being in accordance with His Will. However pure and free from sensible images the concept may be theoretically, practically it is still represented as an idol, anthropomorphically, in regard to the character of His Will.
Chapter 47
How does Kant distinguish concluding by analogy about beasts from concluding about God?
Kant holds we may rightly conclude according to analogy that beasts act in accordance with representations, since there is a par ratio: the same ground for reckoning them in the same genus with man. But we cannot conclude by analogy to properties in the Supreme World-Cause, because the paritas rationis fails—the Supreme Being shares no generic concept with world-beings save Thing in general.
Chapter 47
Why does Kant say the final purpose is not the ground of duty?
Kant argues the final purpose the moral law enjoins us to further is not the ground of duty, since this lies in the moral law itself, which as a formal practical principle leads categorically, independently of objects of desire and any purpose. The formal characteristic of actions—their subordination under universal validity—alone constitutes inner moral worth and is in our power.
Chapter 47

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All questions and answers

In Kant's account, what role does Judgement play in the syllogistic triad of faculties?

According to the editor's introduction, why has the Critique of Judgement been comparatively neglected?

What publication history of the Critique of Judgement does the editor give?

What advice does the editor quote from Schopenhauer about studying philosophy?

What kind of universality does a pure judgement of beauty have, according to Kant?

How does Kant distinguish the Beautiful from the Sublime in terms of mental state and location?

What does Kant mean by genius, and how must it be kept in check?

How does the text characterize the inference that other humans have minds like our own?

Why does Kant distinguish inferring finite minds from inferring a divine Mind?

What does the author say about the word 'infinite' when applied to wisdom or intelligence?

How does Kant classify belief in God, and what role does the Moral Argument play?

What role does Judgement play among the cognitive faculties in Kant's account?

Why does the Critique of pure Reason need to be completed by a Critique of Judgement?

Why is finding a principle peculiar to Judgement so difficult?

How does Kant distinguish the logical judging of nature from aesthetical judgement?

On what basis does Kant divide philosophy into theoretical and practical parts?

What error does Kant say has prevailed in dividing philosophy into theoretical and practical?

Why are technically practical rules not laws, and where do they belong?

Which practical precepts constitute the special practical part of Philosophy?

For Kant, what distinguishes a concept's 'territory' from its 'realm'?

Which two realms make up our whole cognitive faculty, and how is each legislative?

Why do the two realms not limit each other in their legislation?

What role does the supersensible play, and why is a transition from nature to freedom needed?

How does Kant divide the higher cognitive faculties, and what sits between Understanding and Reason?

What three faculties of the soul does Kant say cannot be further derived?

Why does Kant say Philosophy divides into only two main parts despite three Critiques?

What transition does Kant suppose Judgement brings about between the faculties?

How does Kant distinguish determinant from reflective Judgement?

Why can't reflective Judgement borrow its principle from experience?

What is the principle that reflective Judgement gives to itself?

What does Kant mean by the purposiveness of nature?

What makes a principle transcendental rather than metaphysical for Kant?

How does Kant distinguish the maxims of Judgement from psychological descriptions of judging?

Why must Judgement presuppose purposiveness for empirical laws?

Is the purposiveness of nature a law given to nature or to Judgement itself?

Why does the harmony of nature's particular laws with our understanding produce pleasure?

How does the pleasure in nature's comprehensibility differ from practical purposiveness?

Why does the pleasure in nature's unity often go unnoticed?

What attitude does Judgement take toward the extent of nature's purposiveness?

What distinguishes the subjective from the logical element in a representation?

When is an object called purposive in the aesthetical sense?

What grounds the pleasure in a judgement of taste, and what does it claim?

Why does the judgement of taste require a Critique despite being empirical?

How does Kant distinguish the two kinds of purposiveness representation?

What distinguishes natural beauty from natural purposes in Kant's account?

Why does Kant say the aesthetical part is essential to the Critique of Judgement?

How does Kant differentiate the aesthetical from the teleological Judgement as faculties?

What separates the realm of the natural concept from that of the concept of freedom?

What role does Judgement play between nature and freedom?

How do Understanding, Judgement, and Reason relate to the higher faculties of the soul?

What does Judgement make determinable, and what does Reason do with it?

Why is the judgement of taste aesthetical rather than logical?

What does Kant mean by calling taste satisfaction 'disinterested'?

How does the pleasant differ from the good?

What distinguishes the beautiful from both pleasant and good?

How does Kant distinguish the universality of judgments about the Pleasant from judgments of Taste?

What kind of universality does Kant say an aesthetical judgment of Taste possesses?

In the judgment of taste, does the feeling of pleasure precede or follow the judging of the object?

Why can no rule or reason force anyone to recognize something as beautiful?

For Kant, what is the pleasure in an aesthetical judgement?

What makes a judgement of taste pure, according to Kant?

How does Kant treat colours and tones in judgements of beauty?

Why does Kant deny that beauty resolves into the concept of perfection?

According to Kant, why can there be no objective rule of taste based on concepts?

What is the difference between the normal Idea and the Ideal of beauty?

How does Kant illustrate the formation of the normal Idea using a thousand men?

What kind of necessity does Kant attribute to the judgement of taste?

Why does Kant say regular figures please us in cognition but not in pure taste?

Why does Kant claim stiff regularity is repugnant to taste?

How do the Beautiful and the Sublime differ in form and satisfaction?

Why does Kant say no object of nature should be called sublime?

Why does Savary say one must avoid both extremes at the Pyramids?

What is the difference between monstrous and colossal for Kant?

For Kant, where does sublimity actually reside?

What condition must nature meet to be judged dynamically sublime?

Why does the sublime please us only through a pain?

How does Kant distinguish religion from superstition?

For a pure aesthetical judgement of the sublime, how must we regard the starry heaven or ocean?

How does the satisfaction in the sublime differ from that in the beautiful?