M. Hamlin Cannon · Public domain edition · 405 cards · 116 chapters
M. Hamlin Cannon’s Leyte: The Return to the Philippines argues that the Leyte landing’s strategic purpose and planning choices shaped the campaign’s course. The deck covers the preface, foreword, Allied strategic debates, and Joint Chiefs directives from 1943–1944.
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Chapter 1 · Question
What did the Leyte landing accomplish strategically, according to the preface?
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Chapter 1 · Answer
The author states that the landing on Leyte on 20 October 1944 fulfilled General Douglas MacArthur's long-cherished desire to return to the Philippines and avenge early war reverses. The campaign split the Japanese-held Philippine Archipelago into two parts with a strong American force between them, and completed severing the Japanese mainland from the stolen southern empire in the Netherlands Indies, source of oil.
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Section 13 cards
What did the Leyte landing accomplish strategically, according to the preface?
The author states that the landing on Leyte on 20 October 1944 fulfilled General Douglas MacArthur's long-cherished desire to return to the Philippines and avenge early war reverses. The campaign split the Japanese-held Philippine Archipelago into two parts with a strong American force between them, and completed severing the Japanese mainland from the stolen southern empire in the Netherlands Indies, source of oil.
Chapter 1
Why does the author caution about the maps in this volume?
The author explains that no reliable maps of Leyte were available when the volume was prepared. The maps are based on the highly inaccurate maps used by troops during the operation, and the relief shown has little in common with the terrain the troops actually faced. Both military and geographical information on the maps should therefore be regarded only as an approximation of the actual situation at the time of battle.
Chapter 1
What does the foreword say distinguished the Leyte Campaign from earlier Pacific operations?
Major General Orlando Ward's foreword states that with the Leyte Campaign the War in the Pacific entered a decisive stage. The period of limited offensives, bypassing, and island hopping was virtually over. American troops, in greater numbers than ever before assembled in the Pacific Theater and supported by correspondingly large naval and air forces, fought and overcame Japanese forces of greater magnitude than any previously met.
Chapter 1
Section 22 cards
How long did it take for the Leyte Campaign to begin after the 1942 surrender?
Nearly two and a half years elapsed between the May 1942 surrender message and the opening of the Leyte Campaign. The campaign began when naval guns in Leyte Gulf announced its start, and it was the first phase of the re-entry into the Philippines.
Chapter 2
What did the naval guns in Leyte Gulf announce to the world?
The sound of naval guns in Leyte Gulf announced the opening of the Leyte Campaign, which the chapter describes as the first phase of the re-entry into the Philippines. This occurred nearly two and a half years after U.S. control over Leyte ended in May 1942.
Chapter 2
Section 34 cards
What did the May 1943 Strategic Plan aim for, and what base was originally planned?
The Joint Chiefs approved a plan to secure Japan's unconditional surrender, possibly requiring invasion of the home islands. It called for a large supply base for a great aerial offensive; the original plan located this base in China, but the Mariana Islands were afterward substituted. The plan also called for acquiring successive island bases as steppingstones to shorten and secure the sea route.
Chapter 3
What two-phase plan did MacArthur issue on 15 June 1944 for entering the Philippines?
The first phase was a preliminary operation on 25 October into the Sarangani Bay area of southern Mindanao to establish land-based air forces augmenting carrier-based support. The major effort was an amphibious landing mounted from New Guinea to seize airfields and bases on Leyte on 15 November. The second operation was to follow quickly to exploit surprise.
Chapter 3
Why did MacArthur consider bypassing the Philippines unsound, and how did Marshall respond?
MacArthur called it unsound to attack Formosa directly with no land-based air support from 5,100 miles away, insisting Luzon be occupied first. He also cited national obligation to loyal Filipinos and prisoners and feared loss of prestige. Marshall cautioned him not to let personal feelings and Philippine politics override the great objective of ending the war, noting bypassing was not synonymous with abandonment.
Chapter 3
How did Nimitz and Halsey differ from King on bypassing the Philippines?
King, Chief of Naval Operations, wished to move directly to Formosa, bypassing the Philippines. Nimitz thought no decision should be made until further developments and judged the Leyte timing optimistic but advisable. Halsey felt it necessary and profitable to enter the archipelago, calling it 'the vulnerable belly of the Imperial dragon'; Carney said he wanted to make an England out of Luzon, not a London out of Manila.
Chapter 3
Section 43 cards
What did MacArthur argue was necessary before moving against Formosa?
At the Pearl Harbor conference, MacArthur argued at length that Luzon had to be taken before any move against Formosa. He had not been told strategy would be discussed. Nimitz did not enter the conversation. Leahy later said both commanders felt they needed no additional reinforcements or assistance for the scheduled operations, which Leahy considered most unusual.
Chapter 4
Why did MacArthur insist on an interval between Sarangani Bay and Leyte?
MacArthur gave three reasons: assault shipping used at Sarangani Bay would have time to turn around, reload, and be reused for Leyte; six combat air groups could be installed in the Sarangani Bay area to support Leyte; and the carriers would have time for two strikes before Leyte. Washington planners, however, believed there was already enough assault shipping without reusing the same craft.
Chapter 4
What missions did the Joint Chiefs assign on 8 September 1944?
MacArthur, after preliminary operations, was to take the Leyte-Surigao area on 20 December, with Nimitz furnishing fleet support and additional assault shipping. Both commanders were to coordinate plans and support each other, coordinate with Stilwell for maximum support from the China-Burma-India theater, and arrange supporting operations with Arnold of the Twentieth Air Force.
Chapter 4
Section 54 cards
What did Halsey recommend after his strikes on the Philippines?
Halsey told Nimitz that few serviceable Japanese planes remained, most oil supplies were destroyed, there was "no shipping left to sink," and the area was "wide open." He urged canceling the intermediate operations—Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani Bay on Mindanao—and seizing Leyte immediately and cheaply, with his fleet covering the landing until land-based aircraft could be established.
Chapter 5
What did MacArthur's chief of staff tell Marshall about the rescued pilot's report?
MacArthur was en route to Morotai under radio silence, so his chief of staff replied to Marshall. He said the rescued pilot's claim that there were no Japanese on Leyte was incorrect, but the intermediate operations could still be eliminated. The 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions with sufficient service troops were available, air strength and logistics were adequate, and the XXIV Corps could be used.
Chapter 5
What did the Joint Chiefs decide at Quebec, and what did they direct on 3 October?
Within an hour and a half of Marshall receiving MacArthur's reply at Quebec on 15 September, the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur and Nimitz to cancel the Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani operations, coordinate plans, and invade Leyte on 20 October. On 3 October they directed MacArthur to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944, the date originally set for entering Leyte.
Chapter 5
Why was Leyte Valley militarily important and what limited its use?
Leyte Valley, a fertile plain stretching from Leyte Gulf to Carigara Bay, held most of the population, principal cities, and airfields, and the main road net ran through it. But rice paddies disrupted drainage, roads were poor and too narrow for two-way military traffic, and the valley proved not well suited for development as a large air and logistical base.
Chapter 5
Section 63 cards
What did the chapter conclude about controlling Leyte island?
The chapter states control of Leyte depends on control of the Leyte and Ormoc Valleys and their adjacent hills and mountains. Control of high ground near Palo was essential before moving into Leyte Valley; high ground near Pinamopoan on Carigara Bay was needed to prevent infiltration from Ormoc Valley; and Ormoc Valley and Ormoc Bay required control of lowland near Ormoc city and the hills east of it.
Chapter 6
How did the Japanese administer Leyte during the occupation?
The Japanese governed through the old provincial administrative organization plus larger puppet bodies; in February 1944 José Laurel appointed a commissioner supervising Visayan local governments. The governor, formerly elected, was appointed by the president and had final say on provincial matters. A treasurer handled taxes and finances, and a law officer advised on administrative matters. Only the Kalibapi party was allowed, and officials had to belong.
Chapter 6
How did the guerrilla movement on Leyte begin and organize?
After the 1942 surrender, civilians and uns surrendered soldiers fled to the hills; some wanted to fight, others sought looting opportunities. Bands initially raided farms and storehouses, and bandit groups discredited them. Gradually strong leaders, generally ex-military, formed semi-military organizations and gave themselves 'bamboo commissions,' often higher than their former rank. Members took an oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth and the United States.
Chapter 6
Section 73 cards
How was the Leyte guerrilla conflict between Kangleon and Miranda resolved?
In August 1943 Kangleon sent a force against Miranda; a clash followed in which some men were killed. Miranda was routed, many of his followers joined Kangleon, and his power was broken. Kangleon then incorporated the island's other guerrillas into the 92d Division, unifying Leyte under his command.
Chapter 7
What did the Japanese offer guerrillas in late 1943, and what followed?
Japanese authorities tried to conciliate the guerrillas, offering freedom from punishment, jobs, and normal family life in return for surrender. Many guerrillas accepted amnesty and surrendered, including units under Maj. Marcos G. Soliman in January 1944. The Japanese then launched more frequent, intensive patrols, reinforced the garrison, and turned against civilians.
Chapter 7
How did Japanese and guerrilla accounts of casualties differ?
Kangleon reported only 10 guerrilla casualties in southern Leyte from 1 February to 12 June 1944, and Japanese losses of 434 killed and 205 wounded as of 18 May. The Japanese commander reported 561 engagements from January to August, 1,984 guerrillas killed, and far larger surrenders, with much smaller Japanese losses.
Chapter 7
Section 83 cards
What did MacArthur order Major Villamor to do in December 1942?
Major Jesus Antonio Villamor, who had escaped the Philippines and volunteered to return, received orders on 27 December 1942 to go back secretly by submarine with three other Filipino officers and two enlisted men. Their instructions were to build an intelligence and secret service network across the Philippines, develop communications with Australia and an escape route, organize subversive activities, propaganda, limited resistance and sabotage, and survey Japanese political, military and civil intentions and force dispositions.
Chapter 8
How did Villamor describe the training of his intelligence network members?
Villamor said he deliberately kept his net independent of earlier guerrilla intelligence nets, wanting something truly underground and secret. He took his time, spending as much as two months training each individual man. He stressed that once a man left, he would be on his own and must carry on regardless of what happened to Villamor or the rest of the net, and he assured each man that both GHQ and he would have faith in him.
Chapter 8
What were the monthly message totals from Kangleon's Leyte network?
From March 1944, when Kangleon's network was established, to October 1944, monthly messages received by General Headquarters from Leyte were: March, 6; April, 7; May, 7; June, 12; July, 13; August, 13; September, 17; and October, 26. The chapter notes Kangleon's network was not as active as most others operated by coastwatchers and guerrillas.
Chapter 8
Section 94 cards
What did Sixth Army believe about the number and status of Leyte's airfields?
Sixth Army believed Leyte held five operational airfields, three probably operational or under construction, seven nonoperational, and one seaplane base. The two most important operational airstrips were Tacloban, with forty-five hardstandings and able to accommodate bombers and fighters, and Dulag, with twenty hardstandings.
Chapter 9
Where did Sixth Army expect Japanese defenses to be concentrated on Leyte, and why?
Sixth Army concluded Tacloban, with its port and airfield, was the key to the Japanese defense, so a strong perimeter there was expected. Since the Japanese could not defend the whole east coast, forces were expected at road junctions and operational airfields, with mobile reserves in Leyte Valley and garrisons at Ormoc and Carigara.
Chapter 9
What were the three phases of the ground operation for Leyte?
Phase one covered overwater movement and minor amphibious operations to secure entrance into Leyte Gulf. Phase two, the main effort, was a major assault to capture the airfields and base sites in Leyte Valley and open San Juanico and Panaon Straits. Phase three secured remaining Japanese-held portions of the island and western southern Samar and opened Surigao Strait.
Chapter 9
How did the command arrangement work between Kinkaid and Krueger during the landing?
MacArthur was Supreme Commander, but during the amphibious movement and landing Admiral Kinkaid, as commander of the Naval Attack Force, commanded all amphibious operations. Army officers ashore continued under the Naval Attack Force commander until the next senior Army commander assumed control; after arriving ashore and notifying Kinkaid, General Krueger took control of the ground troops.
Chapter 9
Section 104 cards
How many ground troops were committed to the Leyte operation in total?
About 202,500 ground troops were committed. Roughly 174,000 were available for the initial assault phase, with about 51,500 in XXIV Corps and 53,000 in X Corps. The reserve 32d and 77th Divisions added about 14,500 and 14,000 troops respectively. Assault divisions were reinforced with tank battalions, amphibian truck and tractor battalions, joint assault signal companies, and attached service units.
Chapter 10
Which division was the only one in the Leyte force not yet combat tested?
Only the 96th Division was yet to be combat tested. The other divisions had prior campaigns: the 1st Cavalry Division in the Admiralty Islands, the 7th at Attu and Kwajalein, the 24th in the Hollandia campaign, the 32d in Papua and Aitape, and the 77th at Guam. Both X and XXIV Corps headquarters were also yet to be battle tested.
Chapter 10
What air support missions did General Kenney assign to the Allied Air Forces?
Kenney's airmen were to make aerial reconnaissance; with Third Fleet carrier aircraft, neutralize hostile naval and air forces within range of the Philippines from A minus 9 to cover naval movement and the landing; within capabilities and on Admiral Kinkaid's request, protect convoys and naval forces and provide direct landing support; and destroy Japanese shipping and installations in the Sulu and Arafura Seas and the East Indies.
Chapter 10
What naval gunfire tasks were set for 20 October, the landing day?
On 20 October naval gunfire support units were to cover the transports' approach to unloading areas and furnish counterbattery fire; thoroughly cover landing beach areas from the low-water line to about 400 yards inland; and closely support landings with rockets, 4.2-inch mortars, and gunfire of all calibers. After the landings they were to deliver fire on call and prevent the Japanese from reinforcing or evacuating the island.
Chapter 10
Section 114 cards
What tasks did Nimitz assign Halsey's Third Fleet for the Leyte operation?
Nimitz ordered Halsey's Third Fleet to destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine Area, protect air and sea communications along the Central Philippines axis, and, if opportunity arose, make destruction of major portions of the Japanese Fleet the primary task of all Central Pacific naval forces. Halsey and MacArthur were to coordinate their operations.
Chapter 11
How were requests for naval gunfire, air support, and artillery coordinated at each level?
From battalion to army, representatives of each support arm coordinated the use of their arms against targets in their zones. Requests were screened as they passed through echelons for approval. Field commanders felt this many-channel passage was time consuming and sometimes nullified immediate advantage, though requests were usually acted upon within an hour.
Chapter 11
What was the first phase of the Leyte operation, beginning 17 October?
Elements of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion were to land at dim half dawn under naval gunfire and seize the small islands guarding the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Harbor lights were placed on Homonhon and northern Dinagat to guide the convoy, and Suluan was added because valuable mine charts were believed there. Minesweepers and underwater demolition teams then cleared the gulf.
Chapter 11
Why were the X and XXIV Corps landing beaches so widely separated?
The large number of naval vessels needed room to land assault troops and maneuver. The road net connecting Dulag with the Burauen airfields also shaped the XXIV Corps beaches; this factor took precedence over possible strong enemy resistance from Catmon Hill. The result was that the two corps could not initially support each other.
Chapter 11
Section 134 cards
Where were the ten loaded liberty ships held in floating reserve for Leyte?
Eight were held at Hollandia and two in the Palaus. Of these, two carried aviation gasoline, two fuel oil and lubricants, two ammunition for the air forces, and four ammunition for the ground forces. Admiral Nimitz was to furnish two of the four ammunition ships for the ground forces.
Chapter 13
What did MacArthur charge the SWPA Services of Supply commander to provide Sixth Army?
General MacArthur charged the Commanding General, United States Army Services of Supply (SWPA), with providing the Sixth Army with all supplies needed for the operation, except air force technical supplies. Air force technical supplies followed separate arrangements, including thirty tons per LST arriving 20 October and forty tons per LST from A plus 1 through A plus 4.
Chapter 13
What was the Army garrison force under Maj. Gen. Woodruff originally scheduled for, and how was it used?
The garrison force was originally scheduled for Yap and was to go with the XXIV Corps. At Admiral Nimitz' suggestion it was designated to accompany the corps to Leyte instead, though SWPA had never used such an organization. It was hoped it would take over housekeeping and rear-area development, but General Krueger made little use of it.
Chapter 13
What shipping arrangement did POA and SWPA agree on 21 September for XXIV Corps ammunition?
They agreed that loaded ships from San Francisco would be sent periodically to the Leyte area to alleviate the shipping shortage. At least twenty-two cargo ships were expected to arrive from San Francisco during the operation. The change of target dates and the substitution of XXIV Corps for XIV Corps had reduced available amphibious shipping.
Chapter 13
Section 144 cards
What did the 96th Division's 9 October field order require of regimental headquarters?
The 96th Division issued its final field order for the Leyte operation on 9 October. It gave regimental headquarters less than forty-eight hours to complete final orders, plans, and maps and to distribute them to the headquarters of the assault battalions.
Chapter 14
How many combatant ships were assigned to the operation, and what types were they?
Of the vessels assigned, 157 were combatant ships: 6 old battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 18 escort carriers, 86 destroyers, 25 destroyer escorts, and 11 frigates. The 420 transport vessels included 5 command ships, 40 attack transports, 10 LSD's, 151 LST's, 79 LCI's, 21 LCT's, and 18 high-speed transports.
Chapter 14
What did the September carrier strikes achieve against Japanese air strength in the Philippines?
Carrier strikes from 9 to 14 September destroyed large numbers of Japanese aircraft on the ground and in the air, including about 135 on the ground and 81 in the air on 13 September. About 500 aircraft, roughly 57 percent of the 884 believed to be in the Philippines, were destroyed or rendered nonoperational. This was an important factor in speeding up the Leyte landing by two months.
Chapter 14
What was Halsey's 'Lure of the Streamlined Bait' and did it work?
Halsey had one task group guarding the crippled Canberra and Houston send messages in the clear begging for help, hoping the Japanese would think it was all that remained of the task force and attack, whereupon two retired task groups would engage them. The Japanese sent destroyers and cruisers, but their search planes found the two task forces off Formosa and the surface ships hastily withdrew.
Chapter 14
Section 154 cards
How did Japanese propaganda and the home front react to exaggerated air victory claims?
The chapter states that Japanese pilots made greatly exaggerated claims of success, and Imperial General Headquarters decided to order out the 2d Diversion Attack Force. The claims were accepted jubilantly in the home islands; the people believed the American Navy had been given a death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households. Tokyo radio claimed 57 enemy warships sunk or heavily damaged and predicted a two-month delay in the Philippine invasion.
Chapter 15
How did Admiral Halsey respond to Tokyo's claims that his ships were sunk?
Admiral Halsey reported that "all 3d Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy." The chapter also notes Halsey deployed the Third Fleet expecting the Japanese to rise to his bait, so except for the current Luzon strike the Third Fleet could furnish no more carrier support for the Leyte operation.
Chapter 15
What was the SHO Operations plan and what was SHO I?
In summer 1944 Imperial General Headquarters strengthened the Philippines, Ryukyus, Kuriles, and Japan itself as the "first line of sea defense." If the Allies landed in any of these areas, Japan would concentrate land, air, and sea forces to repel the landing. These were the SHO (Victory) Operations, and defense of the Philippines was designated SHO I.
Chapter 15
What was General Kuroda's proposed defense plan, and was it adopted?
General Kuroda, commanding the 14th Area Army, thought all available land forces should be concentrated in Luzon to counterattack any American landing there, though he believed the Americans could take the Philippines unless they made "some terrible mistake." The chapter says his plan was never considered. Imperial General Headquarters instead planned to employ ten divisions and five brigades across Luzon, the southern Philippines, China, and Formosa.
Chapter 15
Section 164 cards
What did General Kuroda argue about relying on air power to defend the Philippines?
Kuroda rejected the air-power emphasis, saying "you cannot fight with concept alone" and that words would not sink American ships. Comparing Japanese and American planes, he called Japanese air power negligible and insisted the land army must prepare and conduct its own decisive battle, noting air bases at Davao and Tacloban amounted to construction for the enemy's use.
Chapter 16
Why was General Kuroda replaced by General Yamashita in September 1944?
Imperial General Headquarters replaced Kuroda with Yamashita not only because Kuroda's concept of Philippine operations differed from his superiors', but because he was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander. Lt. Col. Yoshie's investigation substantiated reports that Kuroda devoted more time to golf, reading, and personal matters, that his control over staff and troops was weak, and that discipline was becoming lax.
Chapter 16
What were the two competing Japanese defensive concepts debated in mid-1944, and which was adopted?
The two concepts were "annihilation at the beachhead" and "resistance in depth." Proponents of resistance in depth thought beach defenses could not withstand naval bombardment; supporters of beachhead annihilation believed semipermanent fortifications could. After studying Pacific battle lessons and naval bombardment effects, Imperial General Headquarters adopted resistance in depth, and commanders regretfully abandoned beach defenses for interior fortifications.
Chapter 16
How did General Suzuki compromise between the two defensive concepts for the 35th Army?
At a mid-August 1944 meeting of 35th Army unit commanders, Suzuki stated that although the main battle was to be fought away from the beaches, some troops should remain to resist American landings, meaning "part of the troops must suffer premature losses." He also issued the Suzu Plan, assigning the 16th Division to Leyte and making most of the 30th Division mobile reserves.
Chapter 16
Section 174 cards
What was the principal assignment of the Japanese 4th Air Army?
The 4th Air Army's principal assignment was to attack American transports and interdict American shipping, and, given the opportunity, to attack American combatant vessels. It was also to provide aerial support to the movement of reinforcements. In October it issued a plan to destroy American forces when they struck the Philippines, coordinating Army and Navy air units against carriers, air bases, and the landing force.
Chapter 17
How did Captain Ohmae characterize Army-Navy air force liaison?
Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Japanese Third Fleet, was highly critical of Army-Navy air force liaison. He said the Army and Navy always quarreled, that in theory they were supposed to cooperate and on the higher levels it would work, but that personalities were the trouble. The author presents this as Ohmae's assessment, not as established fact.
Chapter 17
What happened to Company D on Suluan Island, and did it get the mine charts?
Company D, under 1st Lt. Leslie M. Gray, landed unopposed at 0805 after the cruiser Denver shelled Suluan for twenty minutes. The men burned four buildings, including one with a Japanese radio, then took fire from a concealed position, losing one killed and one wounded. They reached the damaged, deserted lighthouse but failed to find the hoped-for enemy mine charts, and formed a perimeter for the night after surf wrecked the landing boats.
Chapter 17
What did mine sweeping establish about mines in Leyte Gulf by A Day?
By 19 October it was known the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but there were no mines within the gulf itself; the northern part of the main channel was still not considered safe. Sweeping had been completed in the southern half with 186 mines destroyed. By A Day, 227 mines had been destroyed and a passage about six miles wide cleared just north of Dinagat, through which all ships were directed to enter.
Chapter 17
Section 184 cards
What did the underwater demolition teams find near the proposed landing beaches?
On 18 and 19 October the underwater demolition teams reconnoitered the landing areas, accompanied by destroyers that bombarded the shores. The two days' reconnaissance disclosed no underwater obstacles or mines in the vicinity of the proposed landing beaches. The teams had been tasked to locate underwater obstructions and detonate mines, starting A minus 2 (18 October), with three teams covering northern beaches and four covering southern beaches.
Chapter 18
Why did the convoy enter Leyte Gulf without the mine sweepers?
The mine sweepers were to have escorted the convoy into the area, but since they would not be ready for about two hours, the entry was ordered to be made without them. Because the mine barrier in the entrance had not been completely cleared, ships entered somewhat south of the entrance's center, avoiding the main channel and keeping close to the northern point of Dinagat Island. Paravanes were attached and retained until arrival in transport areas, but no mines were encountered.
Chapter 18
How did Admiral Oldendorf respond to Filipinos approaching the mine sweepers?
As the mine sweepers neared land, boats containing Filipinos moved out to welcome the advance party of liberators, but the reception was not enthusiastic. Admiral Oldendorf, commanding the bombardment and fire support group, suspected that some might have come seeking information, so he detained them aboard their respective ships and directed that no further patriots be taken aboard ship.
Chapter 18
What did General Suzuki order once the American return was apparent?
By the afternoon of 19 October, when it had become apparent to the Japanese that the Americans had returned to the Philippine Islands, General Suzuki put his defense plan into effect. He ordered the 16th Division to annihilate the American force and, failing that, to interfere with American use of Leyte airfields. Mobile units including two battalions of the 30th Division were to speed to Leyte, and 35th Army headquarters was to move to Ormoc on 23 or 24 October.
Chapter 18
Section 194 cards
What missions did Sixth Army assign to secure airfields and straits on Leyte?
Sixth Army was ordered to seize beachheads in the Dulag and Tacloban areas, secure airfields for naval and air bases, and take objectives in the Panaon Strait area to permit safe naval passage through the strait to the Camotes Sea. Krueger assigned the 21st Infantry to control Panaon Strait, XXIV Corps to secure Dulag and its airstrip, and X Corps units to take Tacloban airdrome and Palo.
Chapter 19
What was the 2d Brigade's most important mission on A-Day?
The 2d Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Hugh F. Hoffman, was to advance northwest, capture the Tacloban airdrome, and seize the Cataisan Peninsula, reaching Cataisan Point by 1400. Col. William J. Bradley's 8th Cavalry Regiment was held afloat in division reserve, ready to reinforce either brigade. The 1st Brigade under Brig. Gen. William C. Chase instead reconnoitered hills west of Tacloban Valley.
Chapter 19
How did the 7th Cavalry's two squadrons execute their landings?
The 1st Squadron landed north of the 2d Squadron at the narrow neck connecting the Cataisan Peninsula, then moved north to secure the peninsula and airstrip. The 2d Squadron landed on the right flank of White Beach, captured San Jose and a bridge over the Burayan River, and seized a beachhead line 1,000 yards west of Highway 1. Both landed on schedule against slight opposition.
Chapter 19
What terrain obstacles slowed the 5th and 12th Cavalry after landing?
Beyond the narrow White Beach lay a deep swamp, often waist deep and in places up to the armpits, which the regiments had to cross to reach Highway 1. Men could not carry all their personal equipment and made three trips across certain areas. Both regiments reached Highway 1 by 1500 and pushed west toward the foothills, with the 5th Cavalry stopping a few hundred yards short of its objective.
Chapter 19
Section 204 cards
What terrain and fortifications defended the 24th Infantry Division's Red Beach sector?
Red Beach had no underwater obstacles, mines, or barbed wire, but shallow water prevented LST dry landings. Behind firm sand lay flat, marshy ground with palm trees and jungle growth. General Makino converted a small stream bed into a tank trap paralleling the beach for 1,500 yards, and well-camouflaged palm-log and earth pillboxes connected by tunnels dotted the area. Hill 522, commanding the beach, Palo, and Highway 2, was interlaced with tunnels, trenches, and pillboxes by the 33d Infantry Regiment.
Chapter 20
How did Japanese fire disrupt the 24th Division's landing waves?
The Japanese let the first five waves land, then opened strong artillery and mortar fire on later waves still 2,000 to 3,000 yards offshore. Several landing craft of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, were hit and four sunk, causing numerous casualties including Company C's commander. Four LST's were hit, one set afire; of the five remaining, two were driven away and three arrived much later, carrying off the artillery and most of the tanks.
Chapter 20
What did Colonel Newman do when his 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, landed off target?
The first elements of the 3d Battalion inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were pinned down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. Colonel Aubrey S. Newman arrived, saw the situation, and shouted, 'Get the hell off the beach. Get up and get moving. Follow me.' Urgently prompted, the men followed him into the wooded area. Company K then stormed five pillboxes along a stream with rifles, BAR's, and hand grenades.
Chapter 20
What actions earned Private First Class Frank B. Robinson recognition during the 19th Infantry's fight?
After Company I hit a group of pillboxes and knocked out several plus a 75-mm. gun, Pfc. Frank B. Robinson crawled behind a pillbox, dropped three grenades into it, and pulled the machine gun barrel out of line. When a flame thrower failed to ignite against another pillbox, he threw a bundle of lighted papers in front of it so the operator could fire through the blaze. By openly exposing himself to fire from a third pillbox, he enabled tanks to locate its position.
Chapter 20
Section 214 cards
What made Hill 522 a key objective on A Day, and how was it fortified?
Hill 522 rose from the river's edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing beaches, and dominated the route into the interior, making it a chief A Day objective. General Makino began fortifying it three months earlier, impressing nearly all of Palo's male population. By A Day the hill held five camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking, and logs covered with earth, with tunnels and seven-foot-deep communications trenches.
Chapter 21
How did the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, take Hill 522?
Scouts found a covered route on the hill's northern side, so at 1430 the battalion moved out in column. When Company A was pinned by fire from the five pillboxes, the rest moved north around it and attacked from the northeast, Company C on the right and Company B on the left. Company C reached the highest crest barely ahead of about two Japanese platoons, killing roughly fifty.
Chapter 21
What did the fight for Hill 522 cost the 1st Battalion?
During the action to secure Hill 522, fourteen men of the 1st Battalion were killed and ninety-five wounded, of whom thirty eventually rejoined their units. General Irving, who took command of the 24th Division ashore at 1420, later said that if Hill 522 had not been secured when it was, the Americans might have suffered a thousand casualties in the assault.
Chapter 21
What terrain and opposition faced the 96th Division near Dulag?
The 96th Division landed between the Calbasag River and San Jose, with Catmon Hill dominating the plain. The 383d Infantry advanced 1,200 yards inland against only intermittent mortar fire from the 9th Infantry Regiment near Catmon Hill, then hit an unsuspected swamp that bogged down the amphibian tanks. The 1st Battalion crossed the Labiranan River and dug in under fire at Labiranan Head's base.
Chapter 21
Section 224 cards
What limited the 96th Division's A-Day advance, according to the chapter?
The chapter states that all units of the 96th Division fell considerably short of the A-Day objective, and that the delay was due fully as much to the swampy and difficult terrain as it was to enemy resistance. During the day the division captured the barrio of San Jose, controlled both sides of the Labiranan River, and took Hill 120 overlooking the beach area.
Chapter 22
How did the 3d Battalion, 382d Infantry, capture Hill 120?
The battalion's amphibian tractors were held up by coconut-log tank barriers, forcing the troops to debark at the water's edge. Several hundred yards offshore it came under heavy fire from Hill 120, about 600 yards from the beach, which pinned it down. The battalion called for mortar support and naval gunfire; the barrage forced the Japanese out, and at 1040 the battalion advanced and captured the hill.
Chapter 22
What were the 7th Division's principal A-Day objectives?
The 7th Division landed between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers with the 32d Infantry on the right and the 184th on the left, the 17th Infantry in reserve. The principal A-Day objectives were the barrio of Dulag and its airstrip. The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, was to swing south and secure the Daguitan River crossing at Dao and the Talisay River crossing.
Chapter 22
How were the Japanese pillboxes facing Companies L and K of the 32d Infantry overcome?
The pillboxes, mutually supporting and armed with machine guns and antitank guns, were set at the ends of hedgerows and sometimes in open fields. Two tanks sent to Company K were knocked out, and the lead tank for Company L was hit by an antitank gun. With two tanks left, platoons hit the flanks at 1345 while the remaining troops assaulted; grenades finished the guns.
Chapter 22
Section 233 cards
What did the 184th Infantry accomplish on A Day, and what did it fail to secure?
The 184th Infantry landed on Yellow Beach at 1000 and pushed inland faster than anticipated. The 3d Battalion drove through Dulag to the Dulag-Burauen Highway, and the 1st Battalion reached the highway at 1210. The battalions made contact at 1530. At 1835 the regiment formed its night perimeter along the edge of the Dulag airstrip, although it had failed to secure the strip itself. It had no battle casualties, but three men were overcome by heat.
Chapter 23
What were the Sixth Army's casualties at the end of A Day?
At the end of A Day the Sixth Army had landed assault forces along the eastern coast of Leyte and controlled Panaon Strait. Its casualties were 49 men killed, 192 wounded, and 6 missing in action. A gap of nearly ten miles remained between the X and XXIV Corps. The Tacloban airstrip had been secured, and American forces were on the edge of the Dulag airstrip.
Chapter 23
Why did the Americans meet only delaying forces during the Leyte landings?
Most of the 16th Division had withdrawn during the naval and air bombardment that preceded the landing. The immediate invasion after this pounding let the Americans secure most of the coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup and return. As a consequence, the only Japanese encountered were those left behind to fight a delaying action. The meeting with the enemy in force was yet to come.
Chapter 23
Section 244 cards
Why was unloading at the XXIV Corps beach congested on A Day?
Supplies were rushed ashore with little regard for the order needed, and beach parties brought cargo in faster than shore parties could handle it. Many boats were improperly loaded with mixed cargo and shipped water, forcing them ashore. Shore parties also lacked workers—only fifty or sixty of 250 men were actual laborers—and lacked mechanical equipment and transportation. Over eighty loaded boats once waited over five hours.
Chapter 24
What was the 7th Division's 'drugstore system' at Dulag?
DUKWs carried supplies directly from specially loaded LSTs anchored off the beaches to the division's front-line consumers, delivering critical supplies within an hour of a request while other cargo was put ashore without interruption. The 7th Division abandoned the system six hours after the first assault wave, once enough supplies were ashore to fill requisitions directly from dumps.
Chapter 24
Why did Japanese commanders agree to fight the decisive battle at Leyte?
Pilots erroneously reported the Formosa naval battle as a great victory, claiming only remnants of the American Navy remained, which ended the defeatist mood of summer 1944. Earlier, Imperial General Headquarters and the 14th Area Army wanted the decisive battle on Luzon, while the Southern Army argued that losing other areas, especially the Visayan Islands, would make a Luzon battle impossible. The false victory report let all commands agree the moment was opportune.
Chapter 24
How did American air defenses respond to the 24 October Japanese air assault?
The Americans anticipated heavier air activity and increased fighters over Leyte to 36 on call from 0545 till dark, plus 16 more ready on request; 28 went to attack force commanders and 8 patrolled the beachhead for General Krueger. Of an estimated 150 to 200 enemy planes, mostly twin-engined bombers, 66 were definitely shot down and 18 probably. Three American aircraft crash-landed.
Chapter 24
Section 254 cards
What was the Japanese SHO (Victory) Operations plan and its first objective?
On 26 July the chief of the naval general staff told Admiral Toyoda that future "urgent operations" would be called SHO (Victory) Operations. There were four SHO Operations, and the first covered defense of the Philippine Archipelago. Admiral Toyoda described it as essentially Japan's last chance to remain in the war.
Chapter 25
Why did Admiral Toyoda commit the whole fleet to the Leyte Gulf gamble?
Toyoda argued that without the Combined Fleet the land-based forces in the Philippines had no chance, so he sent the entire fleet, accepting the risk of losing it all. He reasoned that losing the Philippines would cut the southern shipping lane, leaving the fleet unable to obtain fuel or ammunition either in Japanese or southern waters.
Chapter 25
What was the Japanese naval plan for the Battle of Leyte Gulf?
Because their carrier force was weak, the Japanese built the plan on fleet gunnery and land-based air. Battleships and cruisers from a southern base would approach Leyte from the south and destroy Allied assault shipping, a decoy force would lure the U.S. carrier task force away, and shore-based air would hit American carriers. Little attention was paid to getting the gunnery force out.
Chapter 25
What did American submarines Dace and Darter accomplish on 23 October?
Off the western coast of Palawan, the submarines Dace and Darter encountered the 1st Diversion Attack Force and sank two heavy cruisers, the Atago and Maya. The Atago was Kurita's flagship, forcing him to transfer hurriedly to another vessel. The submarines also seriously damaged another heavy cruiser.
Chapter 25
Section 263 cards
Why did Halsey take the Third Fleet north, and what did that leave open?
Halsey's airmen sighted the Japanese Main Body and reported it in the afternoon. Not knowing it was mainly empty carriers, and believing the 1st Diversion Attack Force had been severely damaged, Halsey withdrew his battleships and carriers and steamed north, leaving San Bernardino Strait wide open. Kurita's force then passed through unmolested at midnight.
Chapter 26
Why did Kurita break off the engagement off Samar, according to his own account?
After the war Kurita justified the withdrawal by saying his conclusion from Japanese gunfire and anti-aircraft fire during the day led him to believe in his uselessness and ineffectual position if he proceeded into Leyte Gulf under even heavier aircraft attack. He therefore concluded to go north and join Admiral Ozawa for coordinated action against the northern Task Forces.
Chapter 26
How do the Sixth Army and Halsey differ on the consequences had the Japanese plan succeeded?
The Sixth Army said a Japanese victory would likely have been calamitous, isolating troops on Leyte and letting the fleet destroy vital shipping, aircraft, and supplies, with incalculable effects on the Leyte Operation and the liberation of the Philippines. Halsey disagreed, arguing Kurita was limited to a hit-and-run attack in restricted waters against cruisers present, and could have caused only minor damage.
Chapter 26
Section 274 cards
What did the 35th Army plan for the 26th Division and 68th Independent Mixed Brigade depending on the naval battle's outcome?
On 22 October the 14th Area Army asked how these units would be used if Japan decisively won the pending naval battle. The 35th Army replied that if the Japanese Navy were victorious, the units were to prevent further American landings at Leyte Gulf; if the Navy were unsuccessful, the troops were to be landed at Carigara Bay.
Chapter 27
What were the Fifth Air Force's priorities after taking over support of the Sixth Army on 27 October?
The Fifth Air Force took over support of the Sixth Army on 27 October, but with airstrips unserviceable only the 308th Bombardment Wing could be sent in, and carrier aircraft continued to help. It preferred attacking Japanese convoys before they reached Leyte, plus large troop movements and supply areas. Army Air Forces doctrine ranked close support third, and with insufficient aircraft, close support suffered.
Chapter 27
What happened when B-24s of the 307th Bombardment Group attacked Japanese warships in the Sulu Sea on 26 October?
Part of the Japanese naval task force—three battleships, five cruisers, and four destroyers—had withdrawn from Leyte and was sighted in the Sulu Sea. Twenty-eight B-24s made two battleships, one Kongo class and one Yamato class, their principal targets. Three planes were shot down as the Japanese skillfully maneuvered, and none of the vessels was sunk. Elsewhere, B-24s of the 5th Bombardment Squadron sank an enemy light cruiser.
Chapter 27
What difficulties did the 7th Fighter Squadron face on Leyte around 29 October?
On 29 October the road between the strip and camp collapsed under army traffic, forcing men to rise at three or four in the morning, cross to the strip by barge, and endure pre-dawn raids. A 50-knot gale arrived; pilots secured planes with tent ropes to jeeps, trucks, and tractors, and a small typhoon blew away three or four tents. The next day a squadron pilot was shot down by friendly antiaircraft.
Chapter 27
Section 284 cards
What was the TA Operation and how long did it run?
The TA Operation was the Japanese program for reinforcing Leyte. It continued from 23 October through 11 December, sending nine convoys to the port of Ormoc on the west coast. The numerical weakness of U.S. land-based aircraft let the Japanese land many thousands of troops and tons of supplies, though the operation was 'literally gruesome' to the Japanese because American aircraft struck their transports and escorts repeatedly.
Chapter 28
What did General Nishimura claim about vessels sent to Ormoc?
After the war, General Nishimura, formerly on the staff of the 14th Area Army, made the amazing statement that nearly 80 percent of the vessels sent to Ormoc were sunk en route. Most went down close enough to Leyte's shore for troops to swim ashore, but the lost equipment could not be replaced. It is estimated the Japanese still landed more than 45,000 troops and over 10,000 tons of matériel.
Chapter 28
What did SHO ICHI GO commit Japan to on Leyte?
After news of the American landings, General Yamashita activated SHO ICHI GO (Victory Operation Number One) on 21 October. He made clear the Japanese Army, cooperating with the total Air Force and Navy, would make a major effort on Leyte and destroy the American forces there. The 35th Army was to concentrate on Leyte, reinforced by the 1st and 26th Divisions, the 68th Brigade, and an artillery unit from the 14th Area Army.
Chapter 28
What did Japanese planners originally intend for Leyte's defense?
In preliminary planning the Japanese considered Leyte's defense only a delaying action: defenders would inflict as many casualties as possible and deny the Americans the Leyte airfields, while the decisive battle for the Philippines would be fought on Luzon. As late as 10 October, Manila ordered the 35th Army to prepare to dispatch as large a force to Luzon as possible.
Chapter 28
Section 294 cards
How did the 16th Division fortify Catmon Hill against the Americans?
The 16th Division used caves on Catmon Hill as shelters, artillery positions, and supply dumps. It built well-concealed coconut log pillboxes and observation posts at numerous vantage points, some with good fields of fire and spider holes covering the roads. A spider hole was about five feet deep, sometimes camouflaged with a removable cover, and large enough to hold a man and his weapon.
Chapter 29
What did the prelanding naval bombardment do to the 22d Field Artillery Regiment?
The American prelanding naval bombardment destroyed a number of field pieces of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment, which was deployed along the first line of defense. The gunfire also disrupted the regiment's radio service and temporarily broke its direct communication with the 35th Army and the 14th Area Army headquarters.
Chapter 29
What mission did General Krueger assign to the 96th and 7th Divisions?
Krueger assigned the XXIV Corps to seize southern Leyte Valley. The 96th Division was to seize Catmon Hill and its surrounding area plus the Dagami-Tanauan road. The 7th Division was to advance along the Dulag-Burauen road, seize the airfields there, and then move north to Dagami.
Chapter 29
Why did Captain Young's troops abandon Labiranan Head after securing it?
At 1600 Captain Young reported Labiranan Head secured, but friendly naval gunfire then shelled his troops. The gunfire was not stopped because known Japanese positions were nearby and it was believed more important to knock them out than to hold that one position. Young evacuated the head and withdrew; his troops swam the Labiranan River and formed a night perimeter on the south bank.
Chapter 29
Section 304 cards
Why did General Bradley refuse Colonel May's request to attack Catmon Hill on 22 October?
Bradley had decided to bypass the strongly entrenched Japanese on Catmon Hill temporarily. His plan called for the 2d and 3d Battalions, 383d Infantry, to envelop the hill from the south and then move north to make contact with the 24th Division at Tanauan. When Colonel May asked permission to attack the hill from the south, Bradley refused and ordered him to continue the enveloping movement begun on 21 October.
Chapter 30
What supply difficulties did the 383d Infantry face during its inland advance, and how were they partly eased?
Few supplies came forward because battalion vehicles bogged down after only 200 yards. Troops hand-carried weapons and communications equipment, while civilians with about eight carabaos helped carry supplies. Ammunition got priority over rations and water, which were nearly exhausted. The men made free use of coconuts for food and drink, and later received small quantities by Filipino and carabao trains and by airdrop from Navy planes.
Chapter 30
How did the Japanese 16th Division organize its defense of Leyte on 22 October?
At 2300 on 22 October General Makino issued an order organizing his troops into Northern and Southern Leyte Defense Forces. The Southern Force was to protect the Dulag-Burauen road and the Burauen airfields, in the 7th Division's zone. The Northern Force was to hold Catmon Hill, high ground south of Tanauan and south of Palo, with elements near Tabontabon and Kansamada. The division reserve and command post were near Dagami.
Chapter 30
What happened when the 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, was attacked while setting up its night perimeter on 23 October?
After reaching high ground on the north bank of the Guinarona River, 600 yards west of Pikas, the battalion was attacked by about 100 Japanese as it established its night perimeter. The Americans had positioned their machine guns and mortars just fifteen minutes earlier, so they could fire immediately and repulse the attack. The 3d Battalion closed in at 1900, and each battalion set up its own perimeter.
Chapter 30
Section 313 cards
How did the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, overcome the enemy position beyond Hindang on 24 October?
After driving through Hindang with Companies A and G abreast, the 1st Battalion met a strong enemy position about 200 yards beyond the town on Company A's left flank. A platoon of the Cannon Company and some light tanks got forward; tanks and flame throwers flushed the Japanese into the open, where waiting American riflemen fired on them. By 1600 the strong point was secured.
Chapter 31
What happened when Company K attacked Tabontabon on 25 October?
Company K moved out at 0645 and took covered positions by 0730. Scheduled artillery fire at 0800 failed because of unexplained communication difficulties, but each platoon still sent a squad in. They met intense rifle and mortar fire: the Japanese had reinforced the barrio overnight with a battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment. The commander said he could take the town with another rifle company but not without heavy casualties, so he was ordered to withdraw at 1155.
Chapter 31
What were the 96th Division's casualties and Japanese losses in the first six days?
During the first six days of the operation, the 96th Division lost 5 officers and 89 enlisted men killed, 17 officers and 416 enlisted men wounded, and 13 enlisted men missing in action. In the same period the division killed an estimated 531 Japanese and took one prisoner.
Chapter 31
Section 324 cards
What did the 382d Infantry accomplish at Tabontabon by 28 October?
After three days of fighting, the 382d Infantry captured Tabontabon, the Japanese supply center, killing approximately 350 Japanese in the area. The 2d Battalion's own losses were thirty-four killed and eighty wounded. On 28 October the 2d Battalion knocked out resistance northeast of the town, then moved north toward the Kiling road junction, leaving Company G to clear the area outside the town.
Chapter 32
How did Colonel Dill lead the 382d Infantry across the Guinarona River on 27 October?
As Companies I and K of the 3d Battalion began wading the Guinarona River, Colonel Dill, the regimental commander, called to the men to follow him and dashed across the bridge, which was swept by enemy rifle fire. The 3d Battalion followed him over the bridge to the southeast corner of the barrio, where troops met opposition from 9th Infantry soldiers hidden in tall cogon grass.
Chapter 32
What happened to Colonel McCray during the San Vicente Hill reconnaissance on 26 October?
During the 383d Infantry's reconnaissance in force, the 2d Battalion commander, Lt. Col. James O. McCray, moved to the command post and began dragging wounded men to cover while ordering all weapons except artillery to fire on the hill. He was killed about twenty yards from the command post. Captain Thomas was overcome by heat, and Lt. O'Neill briefly took over before Thomas resumed command of the withdrawal.
Chapter 32
How was artillery used to support the 381st Infantry's attack on Catmon Hill?
Catmon Hill had been under naval and artillery fire since A Day, 20 October. Starting at 2100 on 27 October, several field artillery battalions delivered harassing fires until 1030 the next day. Then all artillery units fired successive concentrations from the bottom of the hill upward in fifty-yard bounds. After the 381st attacked at 1200 on 28 October, artillery fired concentrations in front of the advancing troops.
Chapter 32
Section 334 cards
What was Colonel Halloran's plan for capturing Catmon Hill on 28 October?
Col. Michael E. Halloran, commander of the 381st Infantry, planned for the 1st Battalion to make an enveloping movement from the northeast while the 2d Battalion pushed west along the main ridge. The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, would support by fire from Labiranan Head. After a thirty-minute artillery preparation, the 381st Infantry (less the 3d Battalion) attacked at 1200.
Chapter 33
When did the main Japanese force leave Catmon Hill, and why did it matter?
The main body of Japanese troops, the 9th Infantry Regiment, had withdrawn from Catmon Hill on 26 October, unknown to the Americans, and rejoined the 16th Division in the Dagami area. The Americans therefore pounded and assaulted a hill whose principal defenders had already gone, though entrenched positions still gave the 1st Battalion a bloody nose.
Chapter 33
What did the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, encounter on the road toward Kiling?
Moving southwest from Tanauan, the battalion came under fire from 75-mm. guns, mortars, and machine guns about two miles along the road. Two hours were needed for Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, and two flame-thrower tanks to reduce the resistance. Seven pillboxes and three 75-mm. guns were destroyed and a command post captured.
Chapter 33
How was Lt. Col. Jesse W. Mecham's body recovered after he was mortally wounded?
During the 1st Battalion's fight near Kiling on 29 October, Lt. Col. Jesse W. Mecham was mortally wounded. His last order was that the troops should not risk their lives to get his body out. That night Maj. Joseph R. Lewis, who had assumed command, led a small party forward and recovered the body.
Chapter 33
Section 344 cards
What did the 96th Division accomplish in its Leyte beachhead zone?
The 96th Division secured the XXIV Corps beachhead area, seized the Catmon Hill mass dominating the landing beaches, cleaned out the inland swamps, and took Tabontabon's communications center and supply dump plus most of the Tanauan-Dagami road. Since landing it killed an estimated 2,769 Japanese and took 6 prisoners, at a cost of 13 officers and 132 enlisted killed, 30 officers and 534 enlisted wounded, and 2 officers and 88 enlisted missing.
Chapter 34
What did General Hodge order the 7th Division to do?
General Hodge ordered the 7th Division to capture the Dulag airfield, then drive west along the Dulag-Burauen road to seize Burauen and its airfields, and afterward turn north along the Burauen-Dagami road to capture Dagami. The 32d Infantry was to protect the division's north flank and maintain contact with the 96th Division, while the 184th Infantry's main effort was securing the airstrip.
Chapter 34
How did the 7th Division repel the Japanese tank attacks on the night of 20 October?
Three tanks from the 7th Independent Tank Company sprayed Company G, 184th Infantry, with machine gun fire but fired high, causing no casualties, and escaped despite rifle, bazooka, and mortar fire. An hour later one returning tank was knocked out by a rifle grenade, killing its crew. Pfc. George W. Tilk stopped one medium tank with a bazooka, and the other two were destroyed on their return, one by the battalion supply detail and one by Pfc. Johnnie Johnson.
Chapter 34
What defenses did the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, face at the bypassed strong point?
The strong point held one 75-mm. gun and one antitank gun emplaced in bunkers and four machine guns in pillboxes, all surrounded by an elaborate system of trenches and foxholes and occupied by about two platoons of riflemen. Companies A and B advanced behind five medium tanks and one M8 self-propelled 75-mm. howitzer; Japanese fire hit Company A in the open field and Company B beyond the hedgerow, and Company B halted until the positions could be neutralized.
Chapter 34
Section 354 cards
What did Pfc. Grammatico do when the howitzer was hit and ablaze?
After the howitzer took a direct hit, caught fire, and its ammunition exploded, the crew abandoned the burning vehicle. Pfc. Fedele A. Grammatico crawled up under enemy fire, removed the intact machine guns, and brought them safely back behind the lines. The tanks had also been hit by the Japanese antitank gun, but none suffered serious damage.
Chapter 35
Why did the 184th Infantry halt its advance on 22 October?
The 184th Infantry advanced faster than the 32d Infantry, opening a gap between the regiments. It was ordered to move forward an additional 2,800 yards and then hold its position until the 32d Infantry could close the gap. It maintained contact with the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, through patrols.
Chapter 35
Why could Company G not use tanks or artillery against the pillboxes?
Company G's 3d Platoon was ambushed by machine guns firing from two pillboxes under native shacks and suffered ten casualties. Swamps prohibited tanks, mutually supported pillboxes prevented envelopment, and the nearness of friendly troops made artillery dangerous. All of Company G was held up, and the 3d Platoon hugged the ground until darkness allowed it to withdraw.
Chapter 35
What was General Arnold's 'flying wedge' plan for 23 October?
The author describes Arnold's plan: the 17th Infantry, less the 3d Battalion but with the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry attached, would pass through the 184th and 32d at 0830, attack west astride the Dulag-Burauen road, and capture the San Pablo airfield. The 32d and 184th would follow 1,000 yards behind, handling bypassed enemy units. Arnold hoped to seize the Burauen-area airfields before the Japanese fortified them.
Chapter 35
Section 362 cards
How did the Japanese defend Burauen town against the 17th Infantry on 24 October?
There was no organized resistance in the town, but elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment were dug in under buildings in spider holes, armed with satchel charges, bamboo Bangalore torpedoes, and antitank mines. Some jumped out to hold explosive charges against American tanks at the cost of their own lives. Despite the difficulty of flushing them out, the 17th Infantry secured the town by 1400.
Chapter 36
What happened to the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, at Buri on 24 October?
After meeting no resistance initially, the battalion hit well-camouflaged positions about 1,000 yards northwest of San Pablo airfield around 1400. Company A overran the emplacements, but Company C was pinned by heavy machine gun fire, opening a gap. Major Mathias was wounded, Major Foulston took command, and Company C made a confused withdrawal before a holding force stopped the enemy. Colonel Finn then ordered the battalion back to San Pablo airstrip.
Chapter 36
Section 374 cards
How did Colonel Finn help the 3d Battalion locate the Buri airstrip?
Finn requested an artillery liaison plane to drop a flare over the southwest edge of the airfield so the 3d Battalion could confirm its direction of advance. After the flare was dropped, the battalion resumed its attack and reached the edge of the airstrip at 1700. It immediately went into a defensive position, and at 1715 repulsed a sharp enemy assault with machine gun and rifle fire.
Chapter 37
What defenses faced the 2d Battalion at the northern edge of Buri airfield?
The 2d Battalion probed bunkers at the edge of heavy woods on the northern fringe of the Buri airfield. The defenses consisted of three bunkers connected by an elaborate system of trenches and spider holes. Both flanks of the battalion received machine gun fire, which grew heavier whenever it attempted an enveloping movement. Under cover of American heavy machine gun fire, the battalion withdrew its wounded, formed a night perimeter, and waited for heavier supporting weapons.
Chapter 37
What did the 32d Infantry find on 27 October when it attacked the Buri airstrip?
The attack was moved an hour earlier, to 0700, hoping to catch the Japanese off guard. The troops encountered little opposition and secured bunker after bunker, since the 20th Infantry Regiment had spent its strength. They found enemy dead in every bunker, trench, foxhole, and bush, along with wreckage of 75's, machine guns, grenade launchers, and rifles. More than 400 Japanese dead were found in the 1st Battalion's sector, and by 1130 the Buri airstrip was secured.
Chapter 37
What choice did Lt. Col. Pachler face on the night of 24 October, and what did he decide?
Pachler could either bypass the Japanese on the ridge, using the tactical surprise from his rapid advance, and dash along the Burauen-Dagami road while disregarding flank losses, or destroy the enemy on the ridge before advancing to Dagami. The first option risked fire from the 32d Infantry, pushing west, falling on the 17th Infantry before the Buri airfield was secured. After prolonged discussion, Pachler decided to destroy the ridge forces first.
Chapter 37
Section 384 cards
What did the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, face on the wooded ridge, and how was it resolved?
Advancing from the heavily wooded eastern finger of the ridge, the battalion had to meet and destroy the enemy with bayonets and grenades. Progress was slow until a Cannon Company platoon and a platoon of medium tanks made a wide encircling move through the Bayug airstrip and brought fire on the Japanese. By 1300 the enemy threat was removed and the battalion swung north to join the other two battalions.
Chapter 38
How did the 17th Infantry handle the damaged bridges during its 27 October advance?
Aerial photographs showed all bridges blown, so a platoon of the 13th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 3d Battalion. At each damaged bridge, the lead infantry company crossed the stream and stood guard while engineers quickly repaired the span, after which the rest of the regiment moved forward. The advance continued 2,500 yards, opposed only by small groups of Japanese.
Chapter 38
What did Japanese prisoners tell the 17th Infantry about the Dagami sector defenses?
Prisoners reported that besides elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment, the sector held the 2d Battalion, 33d Infantry Regiment (about 200 men), plus scattered elements of the 16th Engineer Regiment and the 9th Infantry Regiment. The Japanese held positions in depth about 1,000 yards south of Dagami: mutually supporting log-and-sandbag pillboxes on higher ground delivering interlocking machine gun fire, approachable only across open rice paddies.
Chapter 38
What happened to Company F after crossing the swamp toward Dagami on 28 October?
Company F and three tanks crossed the creek, and the tanks continued north. Wading the waist-deep swamp under intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire, the company passed a large tank trap and found a line of pillboxes to its front and left. Its commander went back for more tanks but found none available because they could not cross the weakened bridge; he then ordered Company F to retire to the tank trap, reorganize, and evacuate the wounded.
Chapter 38
Section 394 cards
How did the 17th Infantry finally neutralize the Japanese in the Dagami cemetery?
After small arms failed against enemy firing from open graves and stone crypts used as foxholes, the Americans brought forward flame throwers. Company K reorganized at the path and advanced shoulder to shoulder preceded by a battery of six flame throwers, burning out the defenders. A Japanese officer's saber charge wounded one man before he was brought down. The regiment completed the action about 1900 and formed its night perimeter.
Chapter 39
Why was the 2d Battalion withdrawn into regimental reserve on 29 October?
The regimental commander decided the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the fighting on 28 October and suffered numerous casualties. At 0800 on 29 October the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, passed through it, making the 2d Battalion the regimental reserve. Company B, reinforced by a platoon of M8s, attacked the flank and rear of the enemy's left line of pillboxes.
Chapter 39
What did Company B accomplish against the left-flank pillbox line on 29 October?
Under cover of heavy artillery from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, reinforced by a Cannon Company platoon, fought the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, hitting flanks and rear with rifle and machine gun fire plus time-burst fire from self-propelled howitzers. The author states this completely demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted.
Chapter 39
What was the 17th Infantry's mission, and when was it completed?
The regiment's mission was securing Dagami and effecting junction with X Corps and the 96th Division. By 1040 on 30 October Dagami was securely in American hands. The 19th Infantry across the Binahaan River was reached by airdrop message from the artillery spotter plane, and patrols reached the 382d Infantry of the 96th Division on the east. The regiment then spent two days mopping up and patrolling.
Chapter 39
Section 404 cards
What was the initial mission of the 7th Infantry Division on Leyte?
The 7th Infantry Division was to land between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, advance rapidly inland along the Dulag-Burauen road, seize hostile airstrips in its zone, secure the Burauen-Dagami road, and protect the XXIV Corps' left (south) flank. The chapter states this mission had been accomplished.
Chapter 40
What casualties had the 7th Division suffered by 1 November?
By 1 November, 32 officers and 290 enlisted men had been killed; 48 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 777 enlisted men were wounded; 15 officers and 223 enlisted men were injured; and 21 enlisted men were missing. The division had also killed an estimated 4,211 Japanese and taken 19 prisoners since landing.
Chapter 40
How did the 7th Cavalry capture Tacloban on 21 October?
At 0800 the 7th Cavalry advanced with the 1st Squadron on the right and 2d on the left astride the highway, despite swampy terrain. The 1st Squadron entered Tacloban by 1400 and searched house-to-house, while the 2d was held up by about 200 entrenched Japanese until the Antitank Platoon and Weapons Troop, with Pfc. Grove silencing a bunker, secured the hill by 1800.
Chapter 40
Why did the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, seize Filipino carriers?
The squadron needed carriers for its move up the Diit River and across unmapped mountains to Santa Cruz but had trouble securing them. It drove a truck through the streets and seized every able-bodied Filipino in sight; these 'volunteers' got the squadron to its bivouac, then, described as 'indignant carriers,' dissolved into the jungle.
Chapter 40
Section 414 cards
What happened when Japanese troops in Caibaan signaled surrender with a white flag?
After an exchange of fire, about half a company of Japanese waved a white flag. The Americans positioned heavy machine guns and signaled the Japanese to disrobe to prevent concealed grenades or weapons. The Japanese then opened fire, wounding five men; American automatic weapons returned fire, killing thirteen, and the rest withdrew over the hill.
Chapter 41
What slowed the 5th Cavalry's advance more than the Japanese did?
The author states that difficult terrain, rather than the Japanese, slowed the advance. Tall cogon grass cut off every breeze, and troops struggled up steep slopes and sharp ridges under a hot sun while burdened with equipment and ammunition. By 22 October the 1st Squadron, on the move a day and a half with rations and water gone, was still at the base of the hill.
Chapter 41
What did MacArthur's proclamation at Tacloban announce and call on Filipinos to do?
At a ceremony in front of the Tacloban municipal building, MacArthur broadcast an address announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head; Lt. Gen. Sutherland read the official proclamation. The proclamation declares 'I have returned' and calls on Filipinos to rally, rise and strike at every favorable opportunity as battle lines advance.
Chapter 41
What missions did General Hoffman assign for seizing San Juanico Strait?
The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry under Maj. Smith would sail to seize Babatngon, sealing the strait's western entrance. Reinforced Troop C, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry under Maj. King would seize the Guintiguian–La Paz ferry crossing, while the rest of the squadron under Lt. Col. Shore drove north along the highway to juncture with C Troop at Guintiguian.
Chapter 41
Section 422 cards
What did Private Moon do during the Japanese attack at Pawing?
When the Japanese attacked along Highway 1 at 0100 on 21 October, Moon was the only unwounded survivor of the first two positions. Though wounded, he held back the enemy for over four hours with his submachine gun, called back mortar range corrections that knocked out an enemy light machine gun, and at dawn killed eighteen Japanese in a bayonet charge before being killed by machine gun fire while throwing a grenade.
Chapter 42
What were the 1st Cavalry Division's casualties and enemy losses by 27 October?
By the end of 27 October the division had seized Tacloban and controlled San Juanico Strait. Its casualties were 4 officers and 36 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 185 enlisted men wounded, and 8 enlisted men missing. During the same period it reported killing 739 of the enemy and taking prisoner 7 Japanese, 1 Formosan, and 1 Chinese. The author notes opposition was much lighter than expected.
Chapter 42
Section 433 cards
How was the Japanese resistance on the hill broken before Company F captured the ridge?
Navy dive bombers bombed and strafed the hill for ten minutes at 1410, after the 63d Field Artillery Battalion marked the limits with smoke at 1345. The Japanese power to resist was broken, and Company F, with Colonel Newman, then captured the entire ridge by 1515 without a single casualty.
Chapter 43
Why did the 2d Battalion hurry across the Palo bridge on 21 October?
As the battalion moved south along the highway between the road junction and the bridge, it came under artillery fire from an undetermined source. The troops wanted to move as rapidly as possible from that vicinity and double timed across the bridge, entering Palo at 1500 without further opposition.
Chapter 43
What happened during Colonel Suzuki's raid on Palo on the night of 23 October?
Suzuki led a raiding detachment using Filipino civilians in front to trick outpost guards into thinking they were guerrillas. They captured two machine guns and a 37-mm. gun, penetrated to the town square, and broke into an evacuation hospital where they killed some wounded. The raid was broken up; sixty Japanese including Suzuki were killed, at a cost of fourteen American dead and twenty wounded.
Chapter 43
Section 444 cards
Why did the 1st Cavalry Brigade get detached and reassigned before the attack on Hills B and C?
General Sibert detached the 1st Brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division and placed it under X Corps control because the 24th Division had encountered considerably stronger opposition than the 1st Cavalry Division. The 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry stayed on high ground west of Tacloban, the 1st Squadron moved into Pawing to relieve the 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 12th Cavalry assembled near Marasbaras in X Corps reserve.
Chapter 44
What happened to Company B during its first day attacking Hill Nan on 23 October?
Company B advanced up Hill Nan in a skirmish line. Near the crest, a machine gun 200 yards to its front opened fire while Japanese in dug-in positions on the reverse slope threw grenades over the crest. The company was halted and reached the crest three times that afternoon, only to be driven back each time. It repulsed several counterattacks, but the machine gun was not silenced.
Chapter 44
How did the 2d Battalion finally take Hill B on 25 October?
Companies G and E attacked abreast, moved down the slope, crossed the road, and climbed the hill without opposition. At the crest they met heavy fire from well-constructed emplacements, some six feet deep and five feet wide. The 11th and 52d Field Artillery Battalions fired in front of Hill B and silenced the enemy fire. Company E was forced back, but Company G held on.
Chapter 44
What did the 2d Battalion discover when it reached the true crest of the ridge at midnight?
The battalion lost its way in the dark and at midnight reached the true crest of the ridge, where the enemy had an observation post surrounded by prepared positions. All were empty. The Japanese habitually went to the villages for the night and returned in the morning to man their posts, so the night movement literally caught them napping away from their defenses. The battalion set up a defensive perimeter for the night.
Chapter 44
Section 454 cards
Why did General Krueger release the 21st Infantry for the Panaon Strait landings?
Krueger expected stronger Japanese resistance in the 1st Cavalry Division's zone than in the 24th Division's, so he thought it safe to release the 21st Infantry for the Panaon Strait landings. When events proved otherwise, part of the 1st Cavalry Division was shifted into the 24th Division's zone, freeing the 24th from rear-area duties so it could advance into Leyte Valley.
Chapter 45
What Japanese plan did the rapid American advance prevent after the Tacloban airfield seizure?
The Japanese planned to fall back into the mountains if the Americans seized the Tacloban airfield, taking munitions for one and a half units of fire for a division and food for 20,000 men for six months. The rapid American advance prevented execution of this plan. After 25 October the remaining 33d Infantry Regiment elements withdrew to a position about three and three-fourths miles northeast of Jaro.
Chapter 45
How did the 2d Battalion cross the Mainit River and take the bridge?
Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion pushed north 500 yards through heavy brush and forded the river unobserved in driving rain. Company F led the charge, overran three mortar positions, and was halted by machine gun fire until its 60-mm. mortar knocked the gun out. Company E relieved Company F, and by 1500 the bridge was in American hands; the Japanese never detonated their demolition charge.
Chapter 45
What unusual fortification stopped the 3d Battalion's attack on Pastrana?
The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry attacked Pastrana on 26 October after Colonel Chapman rescinded his earlier order to stay out of the town. Companies I and K were stopped by a star-shaped fort with a tin roof, banked with earth and covered in grass, resembling three or four native shacks. Pillboxes flanked it, backed by trenches. A 1630 attack failed with heavy casualties, and troops dug in within 100 yards.
Chapter 45
Section 464 cards
What prevented Battery C, 11th Field Artillery, from continuing its fire on the fortification?
After expending forty-two rounds, Battery C reported that the muddy ground "caused [the] guns to go out of action." The chapter presents this as the battery's own explanation for ceasing fire at 1750, after which other batteries and battalions took over harassing and interdicting fire around Pastrana through the night.
Chapter 46
How did the night-long shelling of Pastrana affect operations on 27 October?
The pounding was so effective that on the morning of 27 October Company K, 3d Battalion, could move around the town and set up a roadblock at a demolished bridge a few hundred yards southwest. The 3d Battalion, assisted by Colonel Zierath's 1st Battalion, then mopped up in the town and patrolled west and south.
Chapter 46
What happened to Troop C, 7th Cavalry, at Carigara on 28 October?
Troop C, under 1st Lt. Tower W. Greenbowe, moved by water to Barugo and overland, entering eastern Carigara unopposed before receiving fire near the main intersection. Well deployed, the troop returned fire until late afternoon, then withdrew to Barugo with its dead and wounded. The enemy was estimated at 75 casualties; Greenbowe's force had 3 killed, 9 wounded, and 1 missing.
Chapter 46
Why did General Suzuki abandon Jaro as the 35th Army's assembly point?
The American advance was so rapid that General Suzuki lacked time to put his plan into effect, forcing him to use the Carigara area as the new rendezvous for his troops. The chapter also notes that, through skirmishes and patrols, General Makino could not establish contact between the 16th Division elements at Dagami and those at Jaro.
Chapter 46
Section 473 cards
What did the Japanese 35th Army plan on 29 October call for?
The plans provided for calling up the 102d Division from Panay and the 1st and 26th Divisions from Luzon. These were to land at Ormoc and proceed in three columns north along Highway 2 through Ormoc Valley to Carigara Bay, then advance eastward to destroy American forces between Tacloban and Tanauan. The 68th Brigade was expected to land near Carigara, and the 30th Division at Albuera to drive to Burauen.
Chapter 47
What happened to Colonel Newman during the 30 October advance toward Carigara?
When the advance stalled, Colonel Newman came forward and declared, "I'll get the men going okay." Upon hearing the regimental commander would lead them, the men moved forward, but Japanese artillery and mortar fire opened, and Newman was hit in the stomach. Though badly wounded, he sent a runner ordering Colonel Postlethwait to fire on the Japanese position and said, "Leave me here and get mortar fire on that enemy position."
Chapter 47
How did the 2d Battalion overcome the enemy pillbox near the Yapan River on 31 October?
Company E was halted by fire from an enemy pillbox on a knoll. A self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer was brought up, and its fire completely disorganized the Japanese and forced them to desert their position. When the howitzer exhausted its ammunition, another was brought up to replace it, but by then enemy artillery was registering on the spot and the second was disabled before it could fire a shot.
Chapter 47
Section 484 cards
How did the Americans deceive themselves about Japanese strength at Carigara?
By 31 October the Americans detected unusual Japanese activity and estimated 2,000 to 3,000 defenders in and around Carigara. In fact, General Suzuki withdrew his troops during 1 November and the following night, establishing strong positions southwest of the town near Limon. The chapter states the enemy used clever deception as to his strength and intentions, completely deluding the Americans into believing his major force was still in Carigara.
Chapter 48
What artillery plan did General Sibert arrange for the Carigara assault?
Sibert felt no means should be left untried. Corps and division artillery were to fire a heavy 15-minute preparation from 0745 to 0800 on the 24th Division front to a depth of 1,000 yards. From 0800 to 0840, concentrations advanced at 100 yards every four minutes. From 0845 to 0900 all available artillery except one light battalion fired in front of the 1st Cavalry Division, after which each division supported its own.
Chapter 48
What delayed the cavalry attack on Carigara on 2 November?
American artillery fire that morning accidentally landed in the 7th Cavalry's sector, delaying the attack until 0935. The bridge over the Canomontag River had been destroyed by the enemy and the river was not fordable, so only two native canoes were available for crossing. The crossing consumed much time, but by 1130 the troops had completed it, and since no resistance was met, the town was entered at 1200.
Chapter 48
What did the capture of Carigara accomplish in Krueger's plan?
With Carigara taken, the second phase of General Krueger's plan for liberating Leyte was complete. Panaon and San Juanico Straits had been seized, and Sixth Army elements were at Baybay on Ormoc Bay and at Carigara near the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley, poised for a coordinated drive on the last important Japanese stronghold. Yet the chapter notes continued Japanese reinforcement and delays in the Leyte Valley base construction as grave concerns.
Chapter 48
Section 494 cards
What logistical problems did the engineers face on Leyte?
The engineers encountered poor soil, heavy rain, and weak roads that could not support heavy equipment. Roads broke down under traffic, vehicles sank to their axles, and the Tacloban airstrip was described as an "unadulterated bog." The author argues these combined conditions protracted the campaign and slowed the schedule for future Pacific operations.
Chapter 49
Why was airfield construction on Leyte so delayed?
General Casey cited poor soil conditions, enemy air raids, and rain as the chief causes. The Japanese had placed little surfacing on runways, so an eight-inch sand and gravel base with steel mat was needed for bombers. Labor crews were diverted to road building, and crash landings during the Leyte Gulf battle further disrupted work.
Chapter 49
How did the Sixth Army try to manage the road crisis?
The transportation officer restricted roads to highest-priority vehicles, minimized civilian transport, and forbade heavy trucks for personnel when lighter transport existed. Supplies were issued at night to avoid congestion, traffic censuses guided corrective measures, drainage was stressed, and Filipino pick-and-shovel crews were used. Despite this, roads remained a major hindrance at the end of November.
Chapter 49
What did General Krueger believe should have been emphasized in planning?
Krueger thought greater emphasis should have been placed on terrain appreciation when selecting landing beaches, exits, base sites, airdrome locations, and headquarters. He argued terrain information should have been analyzed by competent personnel so tactical and development plans fit the ground, and that target dates and phase lines should have been flexible enough to accommodate poor terrain.
Chapter 49
Section 504 cards
How did engineers solve the coral shortage for the Tacloban airstrip?
They used the dredge Raymond, brought forward to dredge the navigational channel, to pump coral from the channel bottom onto the runways. Its 2,800-horsepower pumps could move solid matter a mile through pipes across the bay and raise dredged material up to 300 feet above sea level. The engineers found this pipeline the quickest way to transport material to the strip, though mechanical difficulties sometimes developed.
Chapter 50
Why did the Fifth Air Force's inability to move to Leyte matter strategically?
Because the main part of the Fifth Air Force could not displace forward to Leyte, the Japanese were able to reinforce their Leyte garrison, prolonging the campaign. General Krueger said that if adequate airdromes had been available as scheduled, ample air forces could have stopped all Japanese reinforcements, but terrific rains flooded all level areas, making this impossible. He blamed himself, not the Allied Air Force.
Chapter 50
What priority did hospitals receive, and what construction problems did they face?
By 20 November Krueger's hospital program was far behind schedule: of eight planned hospitals, only one was 34 percent complete and one just 5 percent. Lack of engineer battalions prevented doing justice to requirements. Krueger gave hospitals first priority on structural materials and portable buildings, and no lumber, including ship dunnage, could be used for officers' or enlisted quarters until hospitals were finished.
Chapter 50
What caused supply congestion on Leyte, and how were unloading priorities handled?
LSTs shelled near Hill 522 and Palo were redirected to the Cataisan Peninsula, where many discharged on the Tacloban airfield, scattering supplies across the proposed runway and dispersal areas. Congestion also came from Air Forces shipping service troops and equipment unusable until airfields opened. A priorities committee set discharge order; on 27 November it ranked rations, ammunition, landing mats, and aviation gasoline, and Krueger ordered disciplinary action against personnel ignoring priorities.
Chapter 50
Section 514 cards
How were casualties evacuated in the first days of the Leyte campaign?
For the first few days, medical units evacuated all casualties to naval vessels in the harbor, which then sailed for a rear area base. It frequently happened that a man with a minor wound, illness, or nonbattle injury was well and fit for duty by the time the vessel reached the rear area.
Chapter 51
What was the time lag in evacuation to clearing stations in the 96th Division sector?
Because of swamps and steep hills in the 96th Division sector, the time lag from forward aid station to clearing station varied from one hour to thirty hours. In the 24th Division zone, clearing stations stayed mobile, and only rarely was a casualty more than four hours reaching the clearing station.
Chapter 51
What did the Sixth Army survey of 519 battle deaths find about wound causes?
Of 519 patients who died from battle injuries, 1 died of bayonet wounds, 2 of blast concussion, 249 of gunshot wounds, 170 of fragment wounds, and 97 of unclassified injuries, many believed inflicted by bomb or shell fragments. Gunshot wounds included 66 in the abdomen, 67 in the chest, and 49 in the head.
Chapter 51
How did the 96th and 24th Divisions differ on using Filipinos as litter bearers?
Attempts to use Filipinos as litter bearers in the 96th Division were, for some unexplained reason, not successful. The 24th Division, unlike the 96th, found Filipinos to be excellent litter bearers and recommended their use whenever possible, since they were willing workers who conserved the efficiency of a combat unit by replacing combat soldiers.
Chapter 51
Section 524 cards
What problem did the 24th Division's medical supply system face in practice?
The 24th Division drew about thirty tons of medical supplies, mobile-loading twenty tons on five 2 1/2-ton trucks and bulk-loading the rest, with each unit carrying a five-day supply. In practice the system proved unsatisfactory: rapid advances and lack of transportation made supply acute, so resupply was coordinated with evacuation, with ambulances carrying supplies forward on return trips.
Chapter 52
How did MacArthur's civil affairs policy treat suspected collaborationists?
By arrangement with MacArthur, the Philippine Commonwealth was generally to determine the guilt or innocence of suspected collaborationists, though U.S. Army commanders retained complete authority to deal with suspects if necessary. During combat, General Krueger was responsible for civil administration and relief, and MacArthur was to delegate authority to Commonwealth representatives as promptly as possible.
Chapter 52
What currency policies did MacArthur establish for liberated areas?
MacArthur introduced new Philippine Treasury certificates called 'Victory Pesos,' exchanged at two for an American dollar. All prewar currency and officially determined bona fide emergency currency were accepted at face value; all other Philippine or enemy currency was worthless. Wage rates for Filipino labor were set, with ceiling prices consistent with the approved wage scale.
Chapter 52
How did the Army handle refugees in the Palo sector?
By nightfall on A Day, fifty to seventy-five civilians arrived; the Army fed them and quartered them in beach houses, later adding dwellings, latrines, and wire enclosures. As 1,500 to 2,000 crowded in, General Sibert moved them to Palo, though it was not yet cleared of Japanese. The Army fed them from captured rice, appointed civilian police, and instituted sanitation measures.
Chapter 52
Section 534 cards
What did the Army do with roughly 1,500 refugees found near the XXIV Corps beaches?
A naval civil affairs unit arrived ashore at 0700 on 21 October and found the allocated civilian compound was a swamp. The Army assembled the approximately 1,500 refugees scattered around the landing beaches and moved them to a new site at Dulag, a town already reduced to smoldering rubble by a three-day naval bombardment. The Army then recruited laborers to clean the area.
Chapter 53
Why did civilians resist moving to the new site two miles from Dulag on 23 October?
The refugee population had grown from about 10,000 on 22 October to roughly 30,000 by 23 October, when General Hodge's ordered relocation site was found. The mass migration was most difficult, and civilians could not be persuaded to move until civil affairs officers sent food and water to the new site. The selected area, a coconut grove and beach about 1,000 by 600 yards, was deemed satisfactory except for its inadequate size and infringement on military installations.
Chapter 53
What items in the Sixth Army general store did Filipinos refuse to buy or use?
The general store opened by 26 October selling necessities such as clothing, rice, biscuits, salmon, and candles, with prices fixed at prewar levels. According to the chapter, the people would not buy or use the 4,000 rat traps or the rolls of toilet paper furnished, nor would they buy or use canned or powdered milk. Some articles were ill adapted to Filipino use or customs.
Chapter 53
How did the Sixth Army recruit Filipino labor, and what obstacle did American generosity create?
Gifts of supplies by American soldiers diminished laborers' incentive to work, so the Sixth Army issued an order prohibiting such gifts. From 21 October the Army contacted political and labor leaders, telling them daily how many laborers were needed; the leaders cooperated, and enlisting local leaders, especially parish priests, produced good results. General Krueger said the priests lent willing assistance and gave reliable, impartial information. Up to 8,000 Filipinos worked as supply carriers and on roads and trails, paid at Commonwealth wage scales.
Chapter 53
Section 543 cards
What did the 34th Infantry accomplish at Capoocan and Pinamopoan on 3 November?
At 0700 the 34th Infantry moved west from Balaud in a column of battalions, with the 1st Battalion under Colonel Clifford leading. The 1st Battalion entered Capoocan at 0755 and secured it within ten minutes. After an advance of about 1,000 yards toward Pinamopoan, Company B met about 100 entrenched Japanese. After artillery blasted the ridge, Company B attacked and Company C enveloped the south flank, destroying the pocket of resistance.
Chapter 54
How did Sergeant Charles E. Mower earn the Medal of Honor?
When the leader of Company A's advance squad was killed, Sergeant Mower assumed command. Severely wounded as he started across the stream, he directed his squad from his exposed position in midstream in destroying two enemy machine guns and numerous riflemen. He was killed when the Japanese turned their fire on him, and he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
Chapter 54
What was General Suzuki's plan after the Battle of Leyte Gulf?
The 102d Division from Panay and the 1st and 26th Divisions from Luzon were to land at Ormoc and move north along Highway 2 through Ormoc Valley. They were to diverge in three columns, capture the Carigara-Jaro road, then advance east to destroy American forces between Tacloban and Tanauan. The 68th Brigade would land in the north as 35th Army reserve, and the 30th Division would land at Albuera.
Chapter 54
Section 554 cards
Why did Seventh Fleet officers doubt a Japanese amphibious assault through Carigara Bay?
Ranking Seventh Fleet officers thought such an assault unlikely for three stated reasons: the Japanese had never made an assault landing against defended beaches; they lacked equipment for a sustained amphibious assault; and they would land under the combined fire of X Corps artillery positioned well behind the beaches. The author notes the escort carriers, weakened by the Battle of Leyte Gulf, could not support the area and Third Fleet help might not arrive in time.
Chapter 55
Why did Krueger order Sibert to defend Carigara before continuing south?
Although Krueger realized the high ground in the Limon area was key to operations farther south, he decided the threat to Carigara could not be ignored. Lacking sufficient forces to drive south and simultaneously prepare Carigara's defense, on 4 November he directed Sibert to protect the Carigara area from seaborne attack before the advance south continued. X Corps was also to explore trails from Daro toward Ormoc for emplacing 155-mm. guns.
Chapter 55
How did the 21st Infantry's two companies fare on Breakneck Ridge on 5–6 November?
Company K secured the northern approaches to OP Hill and rescued the observation party; Company I took Corkscrew Ridge against stiff resistance. Both were far ahead of the rest of the regiment, so ammunition had to be carried up by hand after hidden riflemen punctured vehicle tires. They repulsed three night counterattacks of about fifty men each, but next morning mortar and artillery fire forced them to withdraw and rejoin the 3d Battalion near Colasion.
Chapter 55
What made Breakneck Ridge such a strong Japanese defensive position?
Breakneck Ridge was a hill mass with many spurs, about 7,200 yards of Highway 2 between Pinamopoan and Limon. The 1st Division had fortified it using thickly wooded pockets as natural forts, plus elaborate trenches and spider holes, many on reverse slopes protected from direct fire. Fire lanes cut through shoulder-high cogon grass exposed even crawling soldiers, and constant rain made hills slippery while screening enemy movement by day and night.
Chapter 55
Section 564 cards
What happened to Colonel Weber at noon on 7 November?
General Sibert, dissatisfied with the 21st Infantry's progress and feeling Weber was not aggressive enough, visited Weber's command post with his G-2, Col. William J. Verbeck. Dispensing with usual command channels and in the presence of General Irving, Sibert relieved Weber and made Verbeck commanding officer of the 21st Infantry. Weber was retained in the regiment as its executive officer.
Chapter 56
What did the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, use to clear enemy from spider holes and caves?
During the 8 November attack in the typhoon, the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, effectively used flame throwers to drive enemy troops out of spider holes and caves. Although shelled by sporadic artillery fire, the battalion continued to advance, while strong elements of the 57th Infantry hotly contested the American assault.
Chapter 56
How did the 8 November typhoon affect military operations on Leyte?
The typhoon swept over the entire island from the west. Valtin describes horizontal sheets of rain, flattened palms, crashing trees, and a black sky. The trickle of supplies was at a standstill, planes were grounded, ships sought refuge, trails were obliterated, and artillery sounded dim and hollow. In the midst of the storm, the infantry attacked.
Chapter 56
What important discovery followed Company G's capture of the ridge on 8 November?
Company G, 19th Infantry, drove the enemy off the ridge that had halted its advance the previous afternoon. The fleeing Japanese abandoned much equipment, most of it new. More importantly, a significant field order of the 1st Division was found on the body of a Japanese officer.
Chapter 56
Section 574 cards
What did the 24th Infantry Division operations report conclude about Hill 1525?
The report states that it 'began to dawn on all concerned' that Hill 1525, as shown on the map, was not a single hill mass but a long ridge of many knolls and hilltops. This realization came after the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, reached what it believed were the western slopes and found no contact with friend or foe.
Chapter 57
What happened to the Japanese 26th Division convoy arriving at Ormoc on 9 November?
The 26th Division arrived at Ormoc in three large transports with a destroyer escort, but the troops landed without their equipment and ammunition. Fifth Air Force aircraft bombed the convoy and forced it to depart before unloading was complete, and some Japanese vessels were destroyed by American aircraft during the return.
Chapter 57
What grand offensive did the captured Japanese order describe?
The plan envisaged a mid-November offensive: the 41st Infantry Regiment and the 169th and 171st Independent Infantry Battalions were to secure a line northwest of Jaro to south of Pinamopoan and protect the 1st Division's movement. Once the 1st Division arrived, a coordinated attack would seize Carigara and the Mt. Mamban area, opening a drive into Leyte Valley.
Chapter 57
How did General Krueger respond to the captured Japanese plan?
Krueger realized Suzuki apparently wished to make northern Leyte's mountains the battleground, so he disposed forces to meet the threat. X Corps would continue south down Highway 2 while guarding exits from Ormoc Valley; XXIV Corps would send a reinforced regiment northwest of Dagami to block infiltration and hold a regiment in Sixth Army Reserve.
Chapter 57
Section 584 cards
What did the 21st Infantry accomplish on Breakneck Ridge by mid-November?
By 14 November General Irving believed the 21st Infantry had eliminated nearly all resistance on Breakneck Ridge, controlling the ridge proper, though adjacent spurs like Corkscrew Ridge remained with the Japanese 57th Infantry. On 16 November the 128th Infantry of the 32d Division relieved the 21st, which had lost 630 men killed, wounded, and missing plus 135 from other causes, while killing 1,779 Japanese.
Chapter 58
Why did Yamashita urge discontinuing the Leyte operation?
General Yamashita argued Leyte should be abandoned because reinforcements were unlikely to reach the Philippines, manpower needed for Luzon's defense would be drained uselessly, the naval battle of Leyte Gulf and the Formosa air battle were disappointing, shipping and escort shortages hampered troop transport, and land operations were not going favorably. Field Marshal Terauchi overruled him and insisted the reinforcement program continue.
Chapter 58
What replacement problems did General Krueger face during the Leyte Campaign?
Krueger's request for 10 percent overstrength was disapproved, though he received 5,000 untrained replacements before embarkation. He had asked for 18,800 replacements during the operation, but received only 336 officers and 4,953 enlisted men. He never knew when replacements would arrive, whether they would be combat or service troops, or their specialties.
Chapter 58
How did American artillery and tanks support the Breakneck Ridge fighting?
Artillery fired ten-minute concentrations before attacks, heavy interdiction fires at night, and white phosphorus preparations. Company C, 85th Chemical Battalion kept constant harassing fire on reverse slopes at about two 4.2-inch mortar rounds every five minutes. Tanks of Company A, 44th Tank Battalion destroyed an estimated twenty-five enemy automatic-weapons positions; one stuck tank was rescued and then shelled to prevent Japanese use.
Chapter 58
Section 604 cards
What did the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry accomplish from 12 to 23 November?
It held a roadblock south of Limon under constant fire and while greatly outnumbered, preventing General Suzuki from sending reinforcements into Limon. The 24th Division's operations report says the battalion disrupted Japanese supply lines and blocked strong reinforcements on the Ormoc road, and the unit received a presidential citation. The report notes 241 of its officers and enlisted men were hospitalized for skin disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue, and exhaustion.
Chapter 60
What was the cost of the battle of Breakneck Ridge to both sides?
The 24th and 32d Divisions suffered 1,498 total casualties, killed, wounded, and missing in action. The Japanese lost an estimated 5,252 killed, with 8 captured. With the occupation of Limon the battle was over, though bypassed pockets of resistance were not eliminated until mid-December. The Japanese had failed to block Highway 2 at the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley.
Chapter 60
Why did Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion land at Carigara Bay on 10 November?
General Irving ordered the 34th Infantry to send a battalion around the Japanese west flank to harass the enemy rear and relieve pressure on the 21st Infantry's frontal attack on Breakneck Ridge. Clifford's battalion, reduced to 560 effectives, moved in eighteen LVT's and was to seize Kilay Ridge, about 3,000 yards behind the Japanese front lines. It left without sufficient rations because of the scant time allowed.
Chapter 60
How did Filipino guides and guerrillas aid Clifford's battalion on Kilay Ridge?
Because his maps were inaccurate, Colonel Clifford relied on Filipino guides from the landing onward. The guerrilla 96th Infantry's 1st Battalion commander gave him a résumé of the enemy situation, and the guerrillas furnished intelligence and protected the unit's rear throughout the episode. Filipinos also supplied food when airdropped rations failed to arrive and served as carriers from the Consuegra supply dump.
Chapter 60
Section 613 cards
How did Colonel Clifford earn the Distinguished Service Cross?
While investigating Company B's bitter fight, he saw the company take six casualties. One man was shot through the thigh and could not walk; heavy underbrush and bad trails made a two-man litter carry impossible. Clifford carried the wounded soldier on his back about a mile to the command post, over a difficult mountain trail running several hundred yards in a swift stream bed.
Chapter 61
What conditions weakened the battalion during the fighting around 19-20 November?
Constant rain churned the ridge into slick mud and slime. Men were tired, with insufficient rations, broken sleep in sodden foxholes, and constant harassing fire. Many sickened; fever, dysentery, and foot ulcers were commonplace. Ammunition also ran critically low, and on 20 November the rain was so intense that the artillery liaison party adjusted fire almost entirely by sound.
Chapter 61
What happened to Company C on the morning of 20 November?
Company C withdrew silently in the rain without the Japanese knowing. Thirty minutes after the position was vacated, the enemy threw a company-strength attack against it. Company C then established a strong position 200 yards south of the battalion command post. Clifford had ordered the withdrawal from Ridge Number 2 because of strong resistance, attrition, and extreme scarcity of ammunition.
Chapter 61
Section 624 cards
What did General Gill tell Colonel Clifford on 25 November 1944?
At 1000 on 25 November, General Gill messaged Colonel Clifford praising him and his men: "You and your men are doing a superb job. Hang on and keep killing the Japs." The message came during two days of comparative quiet in the sector, broken only by patrol activity and intermittent fire, before a heavy enemy assault that nightfall against Company A's perimeter.
Chapter 62
What did Colonel Dahlen advise Clifford when the 32d Division could give no immediate help?
At 1630 Colonel Dahlen told Clifford he was "in a tight spot" because the 32d Division could offer "no immediate help," and advised him to "use artillery and hang on." This came after the enemy's night assault on Company A, when it became apparent the Japanese were disposed to attack from different directions.
Chapter 62
What did the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, accomplish at Kilay Ridge and what recognition did it receive?
The battalion withdrew 4-6 December through Consuegra and Calubian to Pinamopoan, having lost 26 killed, 2 missing, and 101 wounded, while estimating it killed 900 men of the Japanese 1st Infantry Regiment. The author states it prevented the Japanese from reinforcing the Limon forces and imperiling the 32d Division, and it received the presidential unit citation.
Chapter 62
Why did General Krueger station X and XXIV Corps elements at Leyte Valley entrances?
General Suzuki had ordered the Japanese 1st and 49th Infantry Regiments to the central mountain range to block American infiltration into Ormoc Valley and exploit chances to break into Leyte Valley; about 8 November the 102d Division arrived at Ormoc and was sent into central Leyte's mountains. General Krueger had anticipated this and stationed X and XXIV Corps elements at the principal entrances into Leyte Valley.
Chapter 62
Section 634 cards
What terrain and weather conditions hampered the 1st Cavalry Division in Leyte's central mountains?
The northern mountains between Ormoc and Leyte Valleys were high, rugged, and heavily forested, with ground pockets forming natural fortresses for the Japanese. Trails were scarcely better than pig trails, the area was not properly mapped, and troops were handicapped by insufficient terrain knowledge. Nearly constant rainfall bogged down supply and made hillsides slippery and treacherous, keeping the supply situation precarious.
Chapter 63
How long did it take supplies to travel from warehouses to front-line troops, and by what means?
It took four days. Motor transport hauled supplies thirty miles from Tacloban to Carigara; LVT's of the 826th Amphibian Tractor Battalion carried them through waist-deep rice paddies to Sugud; they were manhandled into trailers towed by artillery tractors into the foothills. About 300 Filipino carriers moved loads from the base camp to a relay station, where another 300 made the final leg.
Chapter 63
What was the 112th Cavalry's mission on 23 November and what did it encounter?
General Mudge ordered the 112th Cavalry southwest from Mt. Minoro toward Highway 2, to relieve pressure on the 32d Division driving south. The combat team met sporadic resistance and on 30 November reached a ridge about 2,500 yards east of Highway 2, where a strongly entrenched enemy force resisted all attempts to dislodge it.
Chapter 63
Why did Troop G's attacks on the enemy ridge on 3 December fail?
The slope was so precipitous that troops could not climb and shoot simultaneously, and the Japanese threw grenades without exposing themselves. After artillery concentrations, the Japanese quickly regained their former positions once fire ceased and repulsed Troop G again with grenades and small arms fire. The troop withdrew, and artillery harassing fire continued while patrols probed the flanks.
Chapter 63
Section 644 cards
What did the night infiltration party accomplish against the Japanese bunkers?
During the engagement fifteen to twenty enemy bunkers were observed on each side of the ridge and four machine guns were definitely spotted. A night infiltration party armed with hand grenades, rifles, and knives was sent to knock out these bunkers. It destroyed two machine guns and killed four Japanese.
Chapter 64
How did the 2d Squadron finally take the ridge on 15 December?
After artillery and mortars registered heavy fire on the Japanese strong point, Troop G attacked frontally at 1200 while Troop F moved in from the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G knocked out four bunkers and destroyed several machine guns, pushing fifty yards beyond the enemy front lines. By day's end the enemy was rooted off the high ground and the squadron held the ridge.
Chapter 64
What happened to the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, in the rice paddy near Bloody Ridge?
The 1st Battalion advanced through a waist-deep swampy rice paddy and came under mortar and automatic weapons fire in the open at 1445. Immobilized until nightfall, the troops withdrew with artillery smoke; men abandoned packs, machine guns, radios, and rifles to crawl back through the muck. Some wounded drowned in the swamp. After every officer in Companies B and C was killed or wounded, 1st Sgt. Francis H. Thompson organized the evacuation.
Chapter 64
Why was Dagami strategically important to both sides on Leyte?
Dagami sat at the foot of the central mountain range and was the center of a road network leading to all parts of Leyte Valley and the airfields. The author notes it was one of the key positions for control of the valley, so its recapture would greatly benefit General Suzuki's 35th Army. West of Dagami, the central mountain range served as a natural fortification, with the 16th Division building coconut-log and concrete pillboxes at key points.
Chapter 64
Section 653 cards
How did the 382d Infantry neutralize the concrete pillbox believed to be a command post?
Grenades had no effect, so the Americans poured gasoline down the ventilation pipes and set the pillbox afire, killing two officers and nineteen enlisted men inside. The pillbox was thought to be a command post because it had no firing apertures. After this, the Japanese continued to fight tenaciously without withdrawing, but by day's end only isolated pockets of resistance remained.
Chapter 65
What condition of the Japanese 16th Division led it to withdraw to the Dagami area?
The 16th Division was taking a bad beating: its provisions had run out, and all battalion commanders, most company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November it contracted its battle lines and the next day took up a new position in the Dagami area, ranging from a hill northwest of Dagami to a point northwest of Burauen.
Chapter 65
What tactical shortcomings did the Americans show on Leyte, according to the chapter's evaluation?
The chapter states frontal assaults were usual and envelopments underused, though envelopments nearly always succeeded when tried. American infantrymen were reluctant to close with the enemy, sometimes sitting back after probing Japanese positions, and were too road-bound, letting road resistance halt whole divisions. Troops also became too dependent on artillery, prompting General Krueger to insist infantry close in immediately after the barrage lifts.
Chapter 65
Section 664 cards
How did American battle preparations telegraph attacks to the Japanese on Leyte?
The author describes a pattern: artillery pounded Japanese positions in the morning, then mortars fired for nearly half an hour, then infantry moved out. When infantry delayed attacking after these preparatory fires, the Japanese gained time to regroup and consolidate, nullifying the fires' effects.
Chapter 66
What did Colonel Okabayashi estimate as the distribution of Japanese 1st Division losses by cause?
Colonel Junkichi Okabayashi, chief of staff of the Japanese 1st Division, estimated losses as 60 percent from artillery, 25 percent from mortars, 14 percent from infantry fire, and 1 percent from aircraft. The chapter notes that although casualties per shell were few, cumulative effects of prolonged artillery and mortar fire were very great.
Chapter 66
Why were tanks lost or disabled in the Leyte fighting, according to the chapter?
Tanks needed close infantry and engineer support. In one case tanks took an objective, withdrew at nightfall when infantry failed to arrive, and four were lost to Japanese mines on returning. Elsewhere engineers failed to clear mines or repair a bridge that collapsed under three tanks, disabling them; the Americans destroyed disabled tanks to prevent Japanese use as pillboxes.
Chapter 66
What measures did one corps commander use to stop promiscuous night firing?
He employed a reserve battalion to cover an area extending one mile outward; when no Japanese were found, this was announced over a loudspeaker. Second, any man caught firing before dawn was immediately court-martialed and fined fifty dollars. The chapter states there was very little promiscuous firing thereafter.
Chapter 66
Section 674 cards
Why did the 7th Division rarely use the 37-mm gun against Japanese positions?
The 37-mm gun was an antitank weapon, but there were few Japanese armored vehicles to use it against. Manhandling it into position to fire on pillboxes and machine guns was excessively difficult, making it ineffective for that role. Demolitions were likewise limited, used mainly to destroy enemy ammunition dumps that were inaccessible or not salvageable.
Chapter 67
What did General Krueger recommend regarding tanks and tank destroyers, and how did commanders respond?
Krueger recommended infantry use direct fire from tanks or tank destroyers when indirect artillery was impractical due to overhead cover or risk to enveloping infantry. He felt tank destroyer commanders lacked aggressiveness and skilled direction. Those commanders admitted being idle but said infantry had not called for them. The author notes infantry commanders seemed unaware of armored vehicles' capabilities and often used them poorly.
Chapter 67
What was the most fruitful source of intelligence on the Japanese, and what did captured documents reveal?
Captured documents were the most fruitful source. Though the Japanese made some attempts to destroy dog tags and identification before battle, they were not very successful, and many officers carried orders and maps. Krueger learned of the Japanese ground offensive planned for mid-November from papers on a Japanese officer's body, which the author says was not an isolated incident.
Chapter 67
How did the Japanese learn the American order of battle on Leyte, according to General Tomochika?
General Tomochika said 35th Army Headquarters did not know the number or names of American units at landing, but within a day learned them by tuning in to San Francisco broadcasts. He said this was the only way they got such information, and it arrived before reports from front-line units, so headquarters depended on American broadcasts for much intelligence.
Chapter 67
Section 684 cards
What was General Krueger's planned trap for the Japanese on Leyte's west coast?
Krueger planned a drive north from Baybay along Highway 2 on the Camotes Sea coast while X Corps elements (the 24th Division, later the 32d Division) drove down the Ormoc corridor to Ormoc, catching the enemy between the jaws of a trap. But the need to block exits from the central mountains and scarce combat troops forced him to postpone a strong force to the Camotes Sea until reinforcements arrived in mid-November.
Chapter 68
What condition did the 26th Division arrive in at Ormoc on 9 November?
The 26th Division landed at Ormoc after a rough voyage from Manila during which Allied aircraft repeatedly attacked the transports, damaging landing barges and ship hatches. Many barges were run aground and destroyed, and the transports sailed away before being fully emptied, carrying most ordnance, provisions, and munitions with them; all vessels were sunk on the return trip. The division came ashore underequipped with only light, portable weapons.
Chapter 68
Why was the 32d Infantry's position called 'Shoestring Ridge'?
The name referred to the supply technique rather than terrain, since the 32d Infantry's supply throughout the battle was precarious. Colonel Finn said the old slogan 'Too little and too late' became 'Just enough and just in time' for them. The ridge itself was the southernmost of two ridges along the Palanas River, rising steeply from the fields with its north face dropping over 125 feet.
Chapter 68
Why did General Arnold forbid reinforcing the Shoestring Ridge front lines without his permission?
Arnold feared that increasing defensive strength on the ridge would place the bulk of the forces where they could be surrounded if the Japanese breached the line. To prevent such an envelopment, he directed that the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, not be used to reinforce the front without his permission. This left only Lt. Col. Glenn A. Nelson's 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, holding the front.
Chapter 68
Section 693 cards
Why was the 32d Infantry's line on 23 November not continuous?
The chapter states the defenses were stretched very thin, and because of the great distance involved it was not possible to have a continuous front line from the sea to the mountains. Some passages of approach therefore had to be left open to the enemy; only the longest and most difficult were undefended.
Chapter 69
How did the Marine machine gunner help the besieged Company K platoon?
A Marine machine gunner from the 11th 155-mm. Gun Battalion, stationed on high ground south of the draw, opened fire and knocked out the enemy machine guns that had cut off the platoon's withdrawal. He then raked the ridge across the draw from end to end, and after the enemy guns were silenced the platoon withdrew in order.
Chapter 69
What ammunition resupply reached the front lines by nightfall on 24 November?
Service troops worked feverishly to move badly needed ammunition forward. The two most critical items were 105-mm. and 81-mm. ammunition, and by nightfall the front lines had received 1,400 rounds of the former and 1,600 rounds of the latter.
Chapter 69
Section 704 cards
How did Battery B of the 49th Field Artillery get a gun working after all four were knocked out?
All four of Battery B's guns were knocked out by enemy fire, but the battery "cannibalized" the damaged guns, stripping parts from them to restore one gun to operation by dawn. The chapter presents this as an improvised repair under fire, not a planned procedure.
Chapter 70
What happened when part of Company G withdrew without authorization on the night of the Japanese assault?
A listening-post NCO got permission for his three-man group to pull back, and his shout drew in the left platoon and two squads of the center platoon; they believed the withdrawal was authorized. Ordered back 250 yards down the road, the left platoon regained its position, but the two squads found about two hundred Japanese with twenty machine guns dug in at their old bamboo thicket.
Chapter 70
What did the 32d Infantry do at dawn on 25 November to prevent Japanese movement?
Each company sent scouting patrols 2,000 yards to its front to forestall any Japanese attempts to move in, and the patrols stayed out all day. Company I reinforced the front lines by moving into the draw between Companies K and L, and troops occupied those positions only at night because they lay in a swampy rice paddy.
Chapter 70
How heavy were the 32d Infantry's casualties during the fighting of 26-27 November?
Despite the intense fighting, the chapter states the 32d Infantry's casualties were surprisingly light. For the twenty-four-hour period ending at 1430 on 27 November, four officers and fifteen enlisted men were wounded and one enlisted man was killed, while the Americans counted 400 Japanese dead the next morning.
Chapter 70
Section 714 cards
Why did General Suzuki risk his right flank before the Burauen operation?
Suzuki wanted to concentrate the 26th Division for a move across the mountains to strike the Americans near the Burauen airfields, which he believed would jeopardize all American forces on Leyte. He left only the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, one and one-half battalions of the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment, and one battery of the 26th Artillery Battalion with two mobile guns to block the Americans from reaching Albuera.
Chapter 71
How was the bamboo thicket finally cleared on 27 November?
After two attacks by A Company were halted by heavy machine gun fire, a very heavy artillery concentration was placed on the thicket at 1430. C Company then moved in swiftly and cleared and secured the area by 1600. A total of 109 enemy dead was counted and twenty-nine machine guns were removed.
Chapter 71
What new roles did the 184th Infantry receive on 28 November?
Colonel O'Sullivan's 184th Infantry was to relieve the 32d Infantry and then attack to the front, covering the division's left sector. The 1st Battalion relieved Company F, 32d Infantry; the 2d Battalion, supported by the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, relieved Companies G and E and attacked toward Hill 918; the 3d Battalion went into regimental reserve at San Agustin. The 32d Infantry fell back to Tinagan.
Chapter 71
Why was Hill 918 tactically important to the 7th Division?
Hill 918 was especially important because from it one could observe the entire coast to the south and as far as Ormoc to the north. It was one of a series of sharply edged ridges with many spurs, heavily overgrown with bamboo thickets and high cogon grass, that rose from the coastal plain to the central mountain range.
Chapter 71
Section 723 cards
What did General Arnold order the 7th Division to do on 5 December?
General Arnold ordered the 7th Division to renew the attack north at 0800 on 5 December with regiments abreast: the 17th Infantry on the right and the 184th Infantry on the left. Their objective was to secure the Talisayan River about three and a half miles north, along with the intervening enemy positions on Hills 918, 380, and 606. The regimental boundary was roughly 2,000 yards from the beach.
Chapter 72
Why were Japanese reverse slope defenses so effective against the advancing infantry?
The chapter explains that numerous finger ridges inland were cut by deep ravines and gorges coming within a few hundred yards of the coast. Entrenched Japanese using reverse slope tactics could deliver deadly fire on the advancing infantry. In many cases the reverse slopes were so steep that effective artillery fire could not be placed upon them, leaving the attackers without adequate supporting fire.
Chapter 72
What happened when a gap opened between the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry?
As enemy gunfire pinned down the troops, the 1st Battalion lost contact with Company G, 2d Battalion, and a gap developed between the battalions. The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment threw about a company armed with machine guns and mortars into the gap. Though they did not penetrate completely, they secured a position making any forward movement of the 1st Battalion very costly.
Chapter 72
Section 734 cards
Why did Companies E and F withdraw after securing the spur crests on 5 December?
After taking the crests, both companies came under automatic weapons and rifle fire from the northwest ridge. Company F's left flank was in tall cogon grass, making enemy observation nearly impossible, while Company E stood on bare, open ground exposed to machine gun and mortar fire from Hill 918. Long-range machine gun fire from near Kang Dagit also hit them. Envelopment was impractical—E's flank rested on a deep ravine, and a left envelopment meant descending the hill and circling behind Company G—so both companies and their wounded withdrew to form a line with Company G.
Chapter 73
What did the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, accomplish on 6 December?
Before the battalion jumped off, a platoon from Company K secured the first ridge north of the battalion position. At 1000 the rest of the battalion reached the top of Hill 380 and captured an enemy field artillery observation post overlooking a deep valley north of Hill 380. Elements of the 26th Division then set up machine guns and delivered mortar and artillery fire on Hill 380 throughout the afternoon. The battalion set up its night perimeter on Hill 380.
Chapter 73
How did the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, fare in its 6 December advance across the Palanas River?
The 1st Battalion reached the ridge west of Hill 918 overlooking the Palanas River, finding abandoned but strong enemy positions. Advance platoons from Companies B and C crossed to the next ridge overlooking the Tabgas River, with the battalion following about 500 yards behind. Company C was pinned by heavy machine gun cross fire, and Company B's attempted envelopment from the west met heavy fire. At 1500 six machine guns from Company D broke up an enemy counterattack on Company C's left flank, and the battalion dug in halfway up Hill 380.
Chapter 73
What had the 7th Division secured by the end of 6 December?
At the end of the day the 7th Division had secured the barrio of Balogo, overrun Hill 918, and occupied Kang Dagit. It had also established elements on the banks of the Palanas River and on part of Hill 380. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 17th Infantry, were in contact along a line on the Palanas River, and the night of 6-7 December was quiet.
Chapter 73
Section 744 cards
What did the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, do about the enemy weapons found near its lines at dawn?
A dawn patrol from the 1st Battalion located an enemy heavy machine gun, two light machine guns, and a mortar emplaced 150 yards from the battalion's lines. When the patrol returned, mortar fire was placed on the position and it was wiped out. The battalion then moved out at approximately 0900 despite long-range fire and small arms fire on Company C's left flank.
Chapter 74
How did Company G take Hill 380, and what counterattack followed?
Company G made a wide envelopment, dropping below the military crest of the southern slope at 0930 and moving slowly through steep terrain and thick cogon grass. After a five-minute preparatory fire by the 49th Field Artillery Battalion at 1200, the troops routed the surprised defenders. At 1355, after a heavy mortar barrage, about fifty men of the 26th Division counterattacked, but Company G held firm and mowed them down.
Chapter 74
Why could Company G not aid Company E's advance despite holding the top of Hill 380?
Although Company G occupied the top of Hill 380, it could not aid Company E's advance because the Japanese were dug in on the reverse slopes and could only be rooted out by close-in fighting. The 2d Battalion commander therefore committed Company F down the main spur, supported by Companies E and G and machine guns from Company H, and the attack succeeded after mortar concentrations.
Chapter 74
What did the 7th Division's success at Hill 380 mean for the Leyte Campaign?
Securing Hill 380 gave the 17th Infantry command of the Tabgas River valley, and the 184th Infantry reached the banks of the Tabgas River. The author states that the backbone of Japanese resistance was broken and the Battle of the Ridges virtually won. The 7th Division had pushed over the mountain road between Abuyog and Baybay and forced General Suzuki to send south much of his tactical strength.
Chapter 74
Section 754 cards
Why did Krueger set aside his mid-November Ormoc landing plan?
The naval forces lacked the assault and resupply shipping needed both to mount the Ormoc operation and to execute the Mindoro operation scheduled for 5 December. The local naval commander also judged that insufficient air support left a convoy entering Ormoc Bay in jeopardy, and that Japanese suicide bombing tactics could cause heavy losses. Unable to secure the assault shipping, Krueger temporarily set the plan aside.
Chapter 75
What change on 30 November made the Ormoc amphibious landing possible?
General MacArthur postponed the Mindoro operation for ten days, which freed the amphibious shipping and naval support needed for a landing in the Ormoc area. Admiral Kinkaid, after weighing the risks of Japanese aerial attacks on shipping needed for Mindoro and Luzon, decided to give Krueger the shipping for the move below Ormoc. Krueger issued a warning order on 1 December and ordered the main effort on 4 December.
Chapter 75
How did the 77th Division come to be assigned to Leyte?
The Sixth Army had designated the 77th, then on Guam, as a reserve division. MacArthur, expecting it would not be needed, transferred control from Krueger to Nimitz on 29 October without Krueger's concurrence. After Japanese reinforcements and a captured field order revealed a mid-November all-out offensive, MacArthur asked Nimitz to divert the division to Leyte; Nimitz agreed, and it landed near Tarragona and Dulag on 23 November.
Chapter 75
What were the naval and air arrangements for the Ormoc landing?
Rear Adm. Arthur D. Struble commanded Task Group 78.3, divided into fast, light, and heavy transport units, an escort of twelve destroyers, a mine-sweeping unit, and a control and inshore support unit. The landing was between the Baod and Bagonbon Rivers, beaches White I and White II, with six destroyers bombarding. The Fifth Air Force provided day and night cover for the convoy and landings, with bombers and fighters on call.
Chapter 75
Section 761 cards
Why had the Japanese not built beach obstacles at Ormoc Bay by mid-November?
Until the middle of November, the commander of the Japanese 35th Army had put no beach obstacles along Ormoc Bay, since he believed there was little likelihood of an American thrust up the bay. General Suzuki thought the Americans would be deterred by the Japanese naval base on Cebu in front of Bohol Strait. As American naval activity increased, the Japanese conceded a landing was possible.
Chapter 76
Section 783 cards
What was the 305th Infantry's mission during the 77th Division's advance northward?
During the day the 305th Infantry protected the southern and southeastern flanks of the 77th Division as it advanced northward. At night its defensive perimeter centered around Ipil but extended as far south as the Baod River. Later, at 1245 on 9 December, General Bruce reassigned it: the 2d Battalion was to guard the division's rear south of Ipil, while the 1st and 3d Battalions moved north of the Panilahan River to complete an all-around defense of Camp Downes.
Chapter 78
How did the Japanese defenses around Ormoc blunt American artillery and mortar fire?
The Japanese dug strong positions in bamboo thickets, on reverse slopes, along creek beds, and under buildings. Individual spider holes about six feet deep were covered with logs and earth and "beautifully camouflaged." Against such positions, artillery and mortar fire did little more than daze the defenders, so each position had to be searched out and destroyed. The author notes the enemy used "excellent judgment" in selecting defensive positions on ridges and high ground overlooking approaches to Camp Downes and Ormoc.
Chapter 78
What happened to the Japanese defenders as the 306th and 307th Infantry closed on Ormoc?
The 306th Infantry enveloped the northeast flank while the 77th Division drove up the shore of Ormoc Bay, ending any Japanese hope of escaping southeast by Highway 2. The author describes the two regiments squeezing the enemy "like a tube of toothpaste," pushing them through Ormoc to the north. Earlier, on 9 December, the commander of the Japanese 35th Army had ordered four companies of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment back from north of Ipil to help defend Ormoc.
Chapter 78
Section 794 cards
What effects did the capture of Ormoc have on the Japanese?
The chapter states that capturing Ormoc divided Japanese forces and isolated the enemy 26th Division, drew off and destroyed uncommitted reserves, hastened the juncture of X Corps with XXIV Corps, denied Japan use of Ormoc as a port for reinforcements and supplies, and drove the Japanese north up Ormoc Valley. General Krueger had realized an important part of his plan for seizing Ormoc Valley.
Chapter 79
What was the Japanese plan to seize the Leyte airfields?
The Japanese planned a coordinated ground and air effort. From 23 to 27 November, army air forces would attack American air power; on the night of 26 November, aircraft carrying demolitionists would crash-land on Dulag and Tacloban airstrips. The 3d and 4th Airborne Raiding Regiments would descend on Burauen, while the 26th, 16th Divisions and 68th Independent Mixed Brigade infiltrated through the mountains to attack the fields.
Chapter 79
Why did the timing of the Japanese airborne attack go wrong?
Bad weather forecast for 5 December led General Yamashita to move the attack to the night of 6 December, despite refusing Suzuki's request to postpone to 7 December. The 26th Division received the change, but radio difficulties meant General Makino of the 16th Division never got the message, so he prepared for the original 5 December date.
Chapter 79
Why was the Japanese airfield operation futile?
The chapter states the Japanese were unwittingly 'flogging a dead horse': General Krueger had stopped all work on the Burauen airfields on 25 November. Meanwhile the 11th Airborne Division, originally meant only to stage on Leyte, relieved the 7th Division by 28 November and secured the mountain exits, patrolling west and guarding the Buri and Bayug airfields.
Chapter 79
Section 804 cards
What did XXIV Corps intelligence conclude about the Japanese assault plan on Burauen airfields?
Intelligence officers of the XXIV Corps believed the Japanese were not capable of executing the planned co-ordinated ground and airborne attack. Patrols west of Burauen found no new trails and no heavy use of old ones, and the Americans had blocked all known trails leading east over the mountains. The officers conceded an airborne attack was possible but judged the enemy not capable of a major co-ordinated ground-airborne effort in the area.
Chapter 80
What did the Americans conclude about the first Japanese airborne landing on 27 November?
After finding many abandoned demolition charges in a crashed plane and seeing no follow-up airborne attack in force, the Americans concluded the Japanese were on a suicide mission of demolition and destruction in the Dulag and Burauen airfield areas. The operation caused no damage, yet Radio Tokyo told the Japanese people it was 'most successful.' The Americans warned more airborne troops might still land.
Chapter 80
What condition left the Burauen area thinly defended by 5 December?
The 2d Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry had rejoined its regiment fighting for mountain passes toward Albuera, and the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry reverted to the 77th Infantry Division, which was embarking for the Ormoc operation. The only infantry unit left in the Burauen area was the 1st Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry (less one company) on San Pablo airfield. The G-2 report assumed organized resistance had about ceased.
Chapter 80
How did the 16th Division's attack on Buri airstrip unfold on 6 December?
About 150 Japanese moved toward Buri on the night of 5-6 December, though the division still expected the postponed operation to begin later. At 0630, led by a Filipino, they broke into the American bivouac while men slept, bayoneting some in their blankets. Others fled shoeless up the bluff or to the road, where an infantry company supported them; the Japanese then entrenched in woods north of the strip.
Chapter 80
Section 814 cards
What mission did General Hodge give the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, at Buri airfield?
Hodge released the battalion from the 96th Division to General Swing's 11th Airborne Division control and sent it immediately to aid two airborne companies at Buri. He called the area "critical" and said it "must be kept closed," warning it would be dangerous to let the enemy reach service troops along the road and around airfields. One reinforced company was already there; the rest prepared to follow.
Chapter 81
How was the Japanese parachute operation at the Burauen airfields divided into phases?
Five phases: first, on landing, destroy aircraft on the ground and attack barracks and communications, ending at moonrise; second, until about 2230, destroy matériel, ammunition dumps, bridges, and remaining barracks; third, 2330 to 0300, destroy remaining aircraft and installations; fourth, 0300 to 0600, build defensive positions; fifth, from 0600, prepare for future operations.
Chapter 81
What happened to the abandoned arms at Buri airfield on the night of 6-7 December?
Air Corps service personnel abruptly quit the Buri airfield, leaving carbines, rifles, grenades, small arms ammunition, and machine guns behind. Lt. Rudolph Mamula of the 767th Tank Battalion was ordered to coordinate forces and recover the abandoned armament, but he was apparently unsuccessful; later that day the Japanese made "the best use" of the same arms and ammunition, and by mid-morning on 7 December held the strip completely.
Chapter 81
How did the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, approach the Buri airstrip on 7 December?
Moving out at 1430 with Companies A and C abreast, the troops covered 400 yards before a rain-swollen swamp stopped them. Bypass attempts failed, so they waded through shoulder-high water, losing contact. Company A reached Buri about 1630; Company C, delayed by a skirmish, arrived about 1800. Because of the hour and reports of "many more Japanese" than Swing estimated, they established night perimeters.
Chapter 81
Section 824 cards
What did the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, achieve by 7 December at Buri?
By the end of 7 December the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, had established a toe hold on the southwestern fringe of the Buri strip. During the day the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, advanced southeast toward the Buri airstrip, and at 1630 the two battalions established contact at the western end of the strip. The sector was reported quiet at 2000.
Chapter 82
How did Pfc. Perkins and Pvt. Kelley respond to the Japanese machine guns on 8 December?
Two Japanese machine guns emplaced in front of Company A, 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, opened grazing fire at dawn and pinned the company down. Pfc. Warren G. Perkins located the guns under fire and called mortar fire on them, falling within fifty yards of himself. Pvt. Ova A. Kelley then charged with an M1 rifle and a carbine, killing eight of the enemy before he was slain.
Chapter 82
Why did General Suzuki end the Japanese attacks on the Burauen airfields?
The 19 December attack was the last major Japanese effort against the Burauen airfields. Only a little more than a battalion of the 26th Division reached the airstrips, in disorganized condition. General Suzuki, commanding the 35th Army, then learned the 77th Division had landed below Ormoc, the southern entrance to Ormoc Valley. He ordered operations against Burauen discontinued and all troops to repair to Ormoc Valley.
Chapter 82
What did the Japanese achieve, and fail to achieve, against the Burauen airfields?
The author argues the Japanese failed to achieve any major objective. They destroyed minor fuel and supply dumps and a few American aircraft, delayed airfield construction, and isolated Fifth Air Force headquarters for five days, but did not appreciably delay the Leyte operation. The attempt to take the initiative from the Americans failed, and the Sixth Army stood at both entrances to Ormoc Valley.
Chapter 82
Section 834 cards
What problems delayed construction of the Dulag airfield?
The Dulag airfield sat on the flat flood plain of the Marabang River. Difficulties included thirty-five inches of rain in forty days, air alerts, very poor drainage requiring drag-line trenches to the river, and very poor access roads that demanded excessive time, labor, and material. Despite this, by 25 December one runway, alert areas, a matted transport parking area, 133 dispersal areas, and 24,200 feet of dispersal taxiways were built.
Chapter 83
Why was the Burauen airfield work abandoned, and what replaced it?
In late November all construction stopped on the three Burauen airfields after considerable time and effort had been spent in futile attempts to make them usable. Since they could not be made serviceable, General Krueger got permission from General MacArthur to build an airfield in the Tanauan area, moving his headquarters from Tanauan to Tologosa on 28 November. The new site had good sandy surface and satisfactory drainage, and became operational by 16 December.
Chapter 83
How did poor roads affect supply on Leyte?
Roads were as vexatious as airfields. The Dulag-Burauen-Dagami road became impassable for about two miles on each side of Burauen and was rebuilt with roughly three feet of gravel; other roads flooded or disintegrated. A battalion could do no more in a month than a platoon in a week in good weather. Because priority went to principal roads and airfields, access roads and hardstands were delayed, which General Krueger said hurt supply, storage, and equipment repair.
Chapter 83
How were troops in the mountains supplied by air?
The 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron airdropped supplies from stocks in the Leyte area. From about mid-November to late December, 1,167,818 pounds were dropped or delivered by air in 282 plane loads using 2,776 parachutes. Because of terrain and proximity to the Japanese, only 65 to 90 percent of airdropped supplies could be recovered, and about 60 percent of the parachutes were recovered and returned to the squadron.
Chapter 83
Section 842 cards
What did the second resupply echelon scheduled for 11 December contain?
General Hodge notified General Bruce that the second echelon would arrive at 2359 on 11 December at any beach Bruce chose. It carried 40,000 rations, 1,000 gallons of 80-octane gasoline, 500 gallons of diesel oil, 100 tons of ammunition, and 10 tons of medical supplies, plus certain tactical and service units sent forward.
Chapter 84
What action did General Krueger take on 15 December regarding the supply crisis?
General Krueger sent a radio message to Admiral Kinkaid reviewing the critical supply situation and requesting that sufficient amphibious shipping be made available immediately to carry supplies to the forces on the west coast. Admiral Kinkaid acquiesced, and on 22 December a resupply convoy reached Ormoc with enough supplies and equipment to alleviate the critical situation.
Chapter 84
Section 854 cards
What enemy unit and fortified position blocked the 77th Division at the Antilao River?
The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment held a fortified position on the north bank of the Antilao River at Cogon, a barrio on Highway 2 north of Ormoc. It sat on an elevated plateau with spider holes and a three-story reinforced concrete building converted into a blockhouse, all camouflaged in underbrush and waist-high cogon grass so it was undetectable beyond ten feet. An estimated reinforced battalion with machine guns, antitank guns, and field pieces defended it.
Chapter 85
Why could the Americans not dislodge the Japanese at Cogon on 11 December?
Artillery fired on enemy front lines only twenty-five yards ahead of the assault troops but failed to dislodge the Japanese. The battalions then delivered point-blank fire from tank destroyer guns, amphibian tank guns, machine guns, and infantry weapons, still without success. The lack of shipping had prevented the division from bringing its medium tanks. Unable to advance, the battalions set perimeters along a line just north of Ormoc.
Chapter 85
What happened to the Japanese night landing force in Ormoc Bay on 11 December?
Beach defense units spotted a convoy carrying the Special Naval Landing Force steaming toward Ormoc, apparently believing the town was still Japanese-held. Shore weapons withheld fire until a landing barge was within fifty yards of the pier, then destroyed it; men aboard reportedly screamed 'Don't shoot.' A second vessel was sunk by tank destroyer and artillery fire, though about 150 men, two tanks, and weapons were unloaded first. No U.S. craft was damaged.
Chapter 85
What was General Bruce's plan for the 77th Division's drive toward Valencia?
Bruce planned daily attacks toward Valencia, about six and a half miles north of Ormoc, with the division eventually cutting loose from the Ormoc defenses and taking an all-round defense each night. The 305th Infantry would move along Highway 2; the 306th, protecting the right flank, would move 2,000 to 3,000 yards east of the highway through the hills, then turn west to capture Valencia; the 307th would protect the left flank and be ready to relieve the 305th.
Chapter 85
Section 864 cards
What force did Colonel Freeman command on 14 December and what did it accomplish?
Colonel Freeman commanded a special assault force of Companies E and L, 305th Infantry. At 1030 the troops moved out under artillery cover; by 1105 they had advanced 100 yards. Company L knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a tank destroyer gun, while Company E forced the enemy from foxholes in hand-to-hand fighting. At 1240 the blockhouse was secured.
Chapter 86
What did Captain Robert B. Nett do and what award did he receive?
Captain Nett, commanding officer of Company E, was seriously wounded but refused to relinquish command. He led his company forward and killed seven Japanese with his rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the Medal of Honor.
Chapter 86
How did armored bulldozers and tank destroyers help reduce the Japanese foxholes?
For a hundred yards around the blockhouse the enemy had dug deep foxholes only a few yards apart, covered with coconut logs and earth, improvised metal lids, or in one case an upturned bathtub. Armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers drove over the positions, their blades cutting off the foxhole tops, after which small arms fire killed the occupants. Tank destroyer crews also fired point-blank and dropped grenades into the holes.
Chapter 86
What were the 77th Division's estimated casualties and enemy losses from 11 through 15 December?
The 77th Division estimated that for the period from 11 through 15 December it had taken 9 prisoners and killed 3,046 of the enemy. Its own casualties were 2 officers and 101 enlisted men killed, 22 officers and 296 enlisted men wounded, and 26 enlisted men missing in action.
Chapter 86
Section 874 cards
What terrain and conditions made the 511th Parachute Infantry's move to Mahonag so difficult?
The central mountain range rose abruptly to peaks of 4,000 feet or more, with deep gorges impassable even to foot soldiers and no roads, only short footpaths. Trails crossed boulder-strewn streams, were bridged by single logs over thirty- to forty-foot drops, and were so steep that footholds were cut into hillsides. Heavy rainfall, sucking mud, jungle vines, and lurking Japanese added to the hardship.
Chapter 87
How did the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment travel to Mahonag, and when did its 3d Battalion arrive?
The regiment could not move as a unit over the almost impassable terrain, so it advanced in small parties, sometimes smaller than a squad. The 3d Battalion, after considerable hardship, entered Mahonag on 6 December. On 9 December the 2d Battalion pushed forward despite heavy machine-gun, mortar, and rifle fire and made contact with other 511th units there.
Chapter 87
What dilemma did Colonel Finn raise about contacting the 511th, and how did General Arnold resolve it?
An impassable canyon several hundred feet deep blocked the direct route, forcing a long detour north, down to the coast, or across the Talisayan River. Colonel Finn asked whether the 32d was to contact the 511th personally and lead it out by hand. General Arnold decided to withdraw the 1st and 3d Battalions and send the fresher 2d Battalion to establish contact.
Chapter 87
What condition had the Japanese 1st Division reached by early December, and how did this change Japanese plans?
By 2 December, 3,000 of the division's men had been killed or wounded, and one third of the 1st Infantry Regiment's weapons and two thirds of the 57th Infantry Regiment's were inoperable. Short of grenades and ammunition, the men suffered from continuous fighting, lack of provisions, overwork, and lack of vitamins. General Suzuki abandoned the three-route advance and used the 1st Division strictly defensively along Highway 2.
Chapter 87
Section 882 cards
What made Japanese defenses south of the Leyte River bridge so hard to reduce?
The 127th Infantry faced well-camouflaged positions of numerous foxholes and ten-foot-deep spider holes, many linked by interlacing communication trenches. The terrain of deep ravines, steep hills, and heavy rain forest with dense underbrush let the enemy dig in on forward and reverse slopes. Nearly constant rainfall hampered observation and maps were very inaccurate, so artillery and mortar fire could not be used to full advantage.
Chapter 88
What position had the 32d and 77th Divisions reached by 14 December?
By 14 December the 32d Division had advanced more than two miles south of Limon and reached the main Japanese defensive line. The 77th Division had crushed the Cogon defenses and was positioned to drive north and join elements of the X Corps. The northern and southern entrances to Ormoc Valley were denied to the Japanese, and the jaws of the Sixth Army trap were starting to close.
Chapter 88
Section 894 cards
What plan did General Bruce adopt after patrols found little resistance west of Highway 2?
Reports from the 306th and 307th Infantry reconnaissance patrols indicated little enemy resistance west of Highway 2, so General Bruce decided to envelop the enemy from the west. The 306th and 307th were to strike the flanks and rear of the Japanese defending the highway, permitting the 305th Infantry to advance more rapidly along the road.
Chapter 89
How did the 307th Infantry travel to San Jose on 16 December?
The 307th crossed the line of departure on time and moved across rice paddies, through waist-deep rivers, and over terrain impassable to vehicles. Troops hand-carried supplies, and Filipinos joined the column to carry supplies as the advance progressed. The regiment met only scattered resistance, destroyed two enemy platoons near San Jose, and dug in there at 1645 after covering eight miles.
Chapter 89
What did General Suzuki order on 15 December, and why did he change it?
General Suzuki, commander of the 35th Army, arrived at Huaton on 13 December and on 15 December ordered an attack starting 17 December against American forces in the Ormoc area. The fall of Cogon and the western envelopment forced him to change plans again: the 12th and 77th Infantry Regiments were to conduct a delaying action instead.
Chapter 89
Why did General Bruce decide to take Valencia quickly?
General Bruce decided to push forward rapidly and take Valencia before the enemy could regroup, since its fall might break organized Japanese resistance in Ormoc Valley. General Krueger requested air strikes against Valencia from General Whitehead, weather permitting, and nearly all available division artillery plus the 226th Field Artillery Battalion would shell the town until ordered to lift fire.
Chapter 89
Section 904 cards
What objectives did the 305th and 306th Infantry receive for the drive up Highway 2?
The 305th Infantry was to drive rapidly north on Highway 2, clearing the Japanese 200 to 300 yards on each side of the road, even if that meant bypassing enemy groups on the flanks; a patrol would operate east of its sector. The 306th Infantry was to drive east to Highway 2, then north, clearing a lane 200 to 300 yards wide, and halt 500 to 600 yards north of Cabulihan to await orders, ready to send a battalion south to help the 305th.
Chapter 90
What did General Bruce's armored column consist of and what was its purpose?
General Bruce organized an armored column to carry rations and ammunition to the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments, moving north on Highway 2. It consisted of five light tanks from the 7th Division, the Cannon and Tank Destroyer Companies of the 306th and 307th, part of Company C of the 302d Engineer Battalion, a platoon from the 305th Infantry, and enough LVTs to carry men and supplies, with an artillery observer along.
Chapter 90
How did the 77th Division's three-day attack disrupt General Suzuki's plans?
In three days of relatively fast fighting and maneuvering, the 77th Division badly shook the Japanese and disrupted General Suzuki's plans. The 307th Infantry made a wide envelopment of the west flank and captured Valencia and its airfield; the 306th made a smaller envelopment and bisected Highway 2 at Cabulihan while the 305th moved up the highway from Cogon. All of southern Ormoc Valley from Ormoc to Valencia, about six and a half miles, was securely in American hands.
Chapter 90
Why did General Krueger enlarge the XXIV Corps zone of action on 19 December?
Because elements of the XXIV Corps had made more rapid progress through Ormoc Valley than the X Corps units, General Krueger on 19 December enlarged the zone of action of the XXIV Corps to include Libongao, the barrio just below the juncture of Highway 2 with the Palompon road. General Hodge then ordered the 77th Division to continue north, seize Libongao, secure the Palompon road, and establish contact with the X Corps.
Chapter 90
Section 914 cards
What mission did General Bruce assign the 306th Infantry after the 307th moved up Highway 2?
The 306th was to move across country northwest toward the Palompon road, advancing roughly 2,300 yards west of the 307th. On reaching the road near the Togbong River, it would strike west for the crossing and then move east to the road junction. The 305th took over defense of Valencia and its airfield, freeing the 306th and 307th for these assignments.
Chapter 91
How did the 307th Infantry overcome Japanese defenses along Highway 2 on 19 December?
Advancing north at 0900, the 307th found machine gun and light artillery emplacements dug in along the road, with a battalion-strength force entrenched in depth along streams and ridges. Using grenades, the regiment routed the defenders, a battalion of the Takahashi Detachment. It pushed steadily north, advanced nearly three miles, and at 1800 set up a night perimeter, having captured much enemy equipment.
Chapter 91
What happened to the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, at the Togbong River bridge on 20 December?
The 1st Battalion reached the eastern bank at the destroyed bridge, where a Japanese battalion on a commanding ridge west of the river blocked further advance. The left company crossed south of the bridge site, but the right company failed despite repeated attempts. At 1630 the battalion was ordered to night defensive positions on the eastern bank; it repulsed three night counterattacks and counted over 400 Japanese dead.
Chapter 91
Why did the Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment take a defensive stand on 21 December?
The 5th Infantry Regiment had assembled at Libongao with orders to move to the Valencia sector, but the 77th Division advanced so rapidly that it was attacking the 35th Army Headquarters. The Takahashi Detachment, badly mauled, withdrew to Matagob. On 21 December General Suzuki ordered the regiment to make a defensive stand so the main force of the 35th Army could withdraw to the Palompon sector on the Camotes Sea.
Chapter 91
Section 924 cards
Which two soldiers of the 32d Division received the Medal of Honor, and for what actions?
Pfc. Dick J. Vlug single-handedly destroyed five enemy tanks moving north along the highway. Sgt. Leroy Johnson threw himself upon an enemy grenade, which killed him but did not hurt nearby comrades. Both men were awarded the Medal of Honor for these outstanding acts of individual bravery during the 32d Division's slow, costly advance.
Chapter 92
What did the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, capture after its preparatory fire on 17 December?
Massed mortar, machine gun, 37-mm., and four medium tank fires hit enemy foxholes, coconut-log pillboxes, and L-shaped mountain fortifications. The preparatory fire was judged excellent. Moving out at 1100, the 2d Battalion quickly secured the ridge and captured three 47-mm. antitank guns, three 75-mm. mountain guns, and two 70-mm. battalion guns. About 150 enemy were killed.
Chapter 92
How did Company B, 126th Infantry, finally take the last enemy position on the ridge?
During the night of 19-20 December the company commander placed one platoon on the ridge's eastern side and another on the western side while keeping pressure from the south. All night the company fired at known positions, and each man threw hand grenades periodically. At first light, without breakfast, the troops rushed the position; Japanese resistance collapsed and by 1000 the company held the last of three positions.
Chapter 92
What did General Sibert order the 1st Cavalry Division to do, and what limited the 102d Division's role?
Since the 32d Division had borne the brunt of the assault, General Sibert ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to make the main attack south. It was to help the 32d Division advance to a bridge 1,000 yards north of Lonoy, then move south and contact the 77th Division. The 102d Division, after reaching Ormoc, went into the mountains near Mt. Pina and did not play a significant role in the campaign.
Chapter 92
Section 934 cards
What was the 12th Cavalry ordered to do on 14 December?
On 14 December the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue west to Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, establish a roadblock on the highway, and attack hostile forces to the north between it and the 32d Division. The 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December to a banana plantation about 1,800 yards east of Lonoy.
Chapter 93
How did the 1st Squadron capture the enemy hill on 11 December?
After an intense mortar and artillery concentration, the 1st Squadron moved out at 0715 with Troop A in the lead, followed closely by Troop B, charging up the hill throwing grenades and firing from the hip. The enemy held seven or eight pillboxes and many caves in rugged terrain. The hill fell at 1003 after very heavy hand-to-hand fighting; Troop E was held up by terrain and could not assist.
Chapter 93
What happened to the concealed Japanese 105-mm. gun near Lonoy?
The Japanese concealed a 105-mm. gun in the gap between the two squadrons, about 600 yards from the regimental observation post. It killed one man and wounded fifteen of the command-post group, then later caused tree bursts that killed five and wounded fifteen. Troop G and the Antitank Platoon attacked and destroyed the gun and four of its crew. The 271st Field Artillery Battalion later destroyed another enemy 105-mm. gun.
Chapter 93
What did General Mudge say about the 12th Cavalry?
General Mudge, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, said the 12th Cavalry's stout-hearted efforts brought division elements within 2,500 yards of contact with the 77th Division. He noted the regiment had been reduced to 50 percent strength by the rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the mountains, and called its courage, stamina, and drive a credit to the best traditions of the United States Cavalry.
Chapter 93
Section 943 cards
How did the X and XXIV Corps finally join hands on Leyte?
On 21 December the 12th Cavalry's 1st and 2d Squadrons, supported by the 271st Field Artillery Battalion, assaulted Kananga from north and east and cleared it. Meanwhile the 306th Infantry pushed east along the Palompon road, slowed by enemy fire until reinforced by the 307th Infantry. At 1645 the 306th and Troop A, 12th Cavalry, made physical contact; on 22 December Colonel Stadler met General Bruce, opening Highway 2 from Ormoc to Pinamopoan.
Chapter 94
What naval escort did Admiral Kinkaid provide for the Palompon landing?
General Krueger asked Admiral Kinkaid for naval support to escort and guide an amphibious move from Ormoc to Palompon on the night of 23-24 or 24-25 December, preferably with a destroyer escort. Kinkaid replied that because of preparations for other operations a destroyer escort would be 'most difficult,' but he could furnish a PT escort, which he believed sufficient. Krueger accepted and ordered XXIV Corps to plan the movement.
Chapter 94
How did the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, execute the Palompon landing?
The reinforced 1st Battalion moved to Ormoc on 23 December and embarked at 1930 on 24 December; the convoy departed at 2000 with LCMs and LVT's of the 718th and 536th Amphibian Tractor Battalions, protected by PT boats and close air support. The ten-hour trip met no enemy action, though three LVT's sank from mechanical failure. Arriving about 0500 on 25 December, mortar-firing LCM's were to bombard the shore before Companies C and B assaulted a beach about 1,500 yards north of Palompon.
Chapter 94
Section 952 cards
How did the 302d Engineer Battalion support the advance, and what limited its progress?
The engineers fought the 'battle of bridges,' working around the clock, often without infantry protection, to restore bridges first for 2 1/2-ton trucks, then 20 tons for M8s, and eventually 36 tons for M10s. General Bruce hoped for Bailey bridges to span crossings while wooden bridges were built beneath, but only a limited number were furnished, slowing engineer progress west.
Chapter 95
What ruses did General Bruce order on the night of 26 December, and with what result?
Bruce ordered troops to build bonfires, sing, and use other ruses hoping the Japanese would think they were celebrating Christmas and try to enter the perimeters. The ruses failed in the assault battalions' sectors, but a similar one at the regimental command post attracted Japanese patrols, which were destroyed or driven off.
Chapter 95
Section 964 cards
How did General Bruce plan to trap the Japanese defenders along the Palompon road?
General Bruce sent the 2d Battalion overwater to Palompon, at the road's western terminus, so it could attack east while the 3d Battalion attacked west. This Provisional Mountain Force moved via Ormoc and LCMs, arriving at Palompon at 1500 on 28 December. The plan put the Japanese under fire from both front and rear.
Chapter 96
What ended organized resistance along the Palompon road, and what route did it secure?
At 1225 on 31 December, two miles northeast of San Miguel, the 3d Battalion and the Provisional Mountain Force met, ending all organized resistance along the Palompon road. This secured an overland route from Highway 2 in the Ormoc Valley to Palompon on the west coast.
Chapter 96
What obstacles slowed the 1st Cavalry Division's march to the west coast?
The 1st Cavalry Division met only scattered resistance after leaving Highway 2 on 23 December. Its chief obstacles were waist-deep swamps in the 12th Cavalry's zone, waded on 24 December, plus tangled vegetation and sharp, precipitous ridges. The foremost elements of the 5th and 12th Cavalry reached Tibur on the west coast on 28 December.
Chapter 96
What did the 77th Division estimate its casualties were from 21 to 31 December 1944?
The 77th Division estimated that from 21 through 31 December 1944 it killed 5,779 Japanese, took 29 prisoners, and lost 17 men killed, 116 wounded, and 6 missing in action. The chapter calls this an astounding estimate.
Chapter 96
Section 973 cards
What did the 34th Infantry find in Japanese packs after the fight at Tuktuk?
Approximately thirty enemy dead were counted in the barrio and vicinity. The Japanese had obviously been looting, since linens, silverware, and women's clothing were found in their packs. One soldier even had a baby's high chair tied on top of his pack. The fleeing defenders were later destroyed by patrols working over the sector.
Chapter 97
Why did Japanese troops on Leyte face starvation after 1 December?
The 1st Division brought one month of food and ammunition when it arrived on 1 November, and by 1 December this was exhausted. A half-month's additional supply landed at Ormoc on 3 December but was destroyed or captured by the 77th Division. After 1 December all Japanese troops were on a starvation diet, living off coconuts, grasses, bamboo shoots, and coconut trunk fibers.
Chapter 97
How did the 2d Battalion take Taglawigan and Daha on 27 December?
Companies F and G embarked at Villalon on the night of 26 December, moved to Gigantangan Island, then sailed to Taglawigan, landing at 0730 after strafing the shore and meeting no resistance. Company F pushed east and south to encircle Taglawigan. By noon, some 2d Battalion elements moved overland to Daha while others went by water, and both Taglawigan and Daha had fallen.
Chapter 97
Section 982 cards
What did MacArthur direct Eichelberger's Eighth Army to do on 15 December?
MacArthur directed the Eighth Army to be prepared to assume control of nearly all Sixth Army units in the Leyte area at 0001 on 26 December 1944, relieving the Sixth Army for future operations. The Eighth Army was to take over all duties and missions except certain logistics and construction ones, which went to USASOS (SWPA); Allied Naval and Air Forces would continue supporting the Eighth Army.
Chapter 98
What did MacArthur declare after Palompon was seized on 25 December?
When elements of the 77th Division seized Palompon, the last important port on Leyte, MacArthur declared all organized resistance had ended. He congratulated Krueger, saying the capture closed a campaign with few counterparts in the utter destruction of the enemy's forces with maximum conservation of our own, calling it a magnificent performance by all concerned.
Chapter 98
Section 992 cards
How did the Japanese on western Leyte feed themselves at the end of the harvest season?
They arrived at the end of the harvest season and secured large quantities of provisions the Filipinos had stored, plus many coconuts and sweet potatoes. Soldiers used the island's carabaos as meat and obtained salt from sea water. For vegetables the army relied chiefly on wild ferns, tokay grass, and wild spinach. The account concludes no one died of starvation, though food was insufficient to increase fighting power.
Chapter 99
What did General Suzuki decide about withdrawing troops from Leyte?
Suzuki felt there were too many soldiers on Leyte for self-sufficiency, so he decided to transfer those in good physical condition and morale to other islands, dropping the sick, weak, and wounded from units to be withdrawn. He chose Davao on Mindanao for the new 35th Army headquarters because of its 15,000 Japanese residents. The 16th Division and 68th Independent Mixed Brigade were to remain under Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino.
Chapter 99
Section 1004 cards
How many men of the 1st Division were evacuated to Cebu, and what equipment went with them?
About 743 men were evacuated to Cebu, including 73 from 1st Division Headquarters, 72 from the 1st Infantry Regiment, 208 from the 49th, 178 from the 57th, and 212 from the 1st Transport Regiment. Equipment included 332 rifles, 4 heavy machine guns, 11 light machine guns, 5 grenade launchers, and a small amount of small arms ammunition. Several hundred more men found their own transport to other islands.
Chapter 100
What happened to General Suzuki after he left Leyte in March 1945?
Suzuki and part of his staff boarded two Japanese vessels on the evening of 17 March and left Leyte at 0030 on 18 March. For days the vessels sailed among the Visayas islands, finding the Americans already in possession. On the evening of 16 April, the vessel bearing Suzuki was bombed by American aircraft off Negros Island, and Suzuki was killed.
Chapter 100
What were total U.S. Army casualties for the Leyte Campaign?
Total Army casualties for the Leyte Campaign exceeded 15,500: more than 3,500 killed and nearly 12,000 wounded. Table 4 gives 15,584 total from 20 October 1944 to 8 May 1945, with 3,504 killed, 11,991 wounded, and 89 missing. During the peak month, January 1945, there were 257,766 American Army troops, including Air Forces, on Leyte.
Chapter 100
Why could Japanese casualty figures for Leyte not be determined exactly?
The chapter states it is impossible, with data then available, to determine exactly how many Japanese participated or their casualties. Sixth and Eighth Army estimates vary greatly, as do Japanese sources. The Sixth Army estimated 56,263 killed and 389 captured; the Eighth Army counted 24,294 killed and found dead and 439 captured in the mop-up. General Tomochika gave differing totals of 59,400 and 61,800.
Chapter 100
Section 1013 cards
What was the target date for A Day in the Leyte operation?
Operations Instruction Number 70 sets the Target Date for A Day as 20 October 1944. On that day the Southwest Pacific Forces, covered and supported by the Third Fleet, were to seize and occupy objectives in the Leyte and western Samar areas and establish naval, air, and logistic facilities there for subsequent operations to reoccupy the Philippines.
Chapter 101
What missions did the Third Fleet have under Admiral Halsey?
The Third Fleet, commanded by Admiral W. F. Halsey, covered and supported the Leyte Gulf-Surigao Strait Operations by containing or destroying the Japanese Fleet; destroying hostile air and shipping in the Formosa, Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao areas from A-9 through A-3 and A Day through A+30; destroying ground defenses and installations from A-2 until escort carriers took over direct support; and providing direct support with fast carrier aircraft as required.
Chapter 101
How was direct air support to transfer from naval to Allied Air Forces?
The Commander Allied Naval Forces was to transfer the mission of direct air support to the Commander Allied Air Forces when land-based fighters and light bombers were established in the Leyte area, at a time arranged between them. The Allied Air Forces were to assume that mission at the earliest practicable date after fighters and light bombers were established, as arranged with the naval commander.
Chapter 101
Section 1024 cards
What did the order say about designating areas of responsibility for Third Fleet and Southwest Pacific naval and air operations?
The order stated that areas of responsibility for naval and air operations of the THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Forces would be designated later. Similarly, instructions for long range reconnaissance and bombing and attack restrictions were to be issued in subsequent Operations Instructions, and the logistics annex was to be issued later.
Chapter 102
Where were the rear and advanced echelons of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, located?
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, was at Hollandia, with its Rear Echelon at Brisbane and an Advanced Echelon at Leyte, whose date and hour of opening were to be announced later. The Sixth US Army was at Leyte with a Rear Echelon at Hollandia, while the First Australian Army was at Lae and the Eighth US Army at Hollandia.
Chapter 102
Which records does the bibliographical note identify as especially valuable for studying the Leyte Campaign?
The note lists manuscript histories of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Fighter Squadrons of the 49th Fighter Group, 86th Fighter Wing, V Fighter Command, Fifth Air Force; V Fighter Command; V Bomber Command; XIII Bomber Command; Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force; and Far East Air Forces. It also cites two studies: Far East Air Forces Staff Study Operation KING II and the Fifth Air Force Fighter Cover Plan for Ormoc Bay.
Chapter 102
How does the bibliographical note assess the operations reports of the 32d Infantry and the 11th Airborne Division?
The note calls the operations report of the 32d Infantry excellent and a model for a perfect regimental operations report. In contrast, it describes the operations reports and journals of the 11th Airborne Division and subordinate units as very poor and incomplete. It also notes that the 24th Infantry Division prepared a superb operations report and kept good journals.
Chapter 102
Section 1034 cards
How does the author characterize the guerrilla records collection?
The author describes the guerrilla materials in the Office of the Chief of Military History as a large, completely disorganized collection of heterogeneous materials that is incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some bands kept no records, and others are known only through violently prejudiced sources. He argues that published American guerrilla memoirs are impressionistic and full of derring-do, giving them scant value as sources.
Chapter 103
What did MacArthur order Japanese ministries to prepare after hostilities ceased?
At the cessation of hostilities, General MacArthur ordered the former Japanese War and Navy Ministries to prepare studies on Japanese plans and operations in World War II. The resulting translations and originals are on file with the Office of the Chief of Military History. The author notes errors in dates, unit designations, and facts, but calls them the best sources on Japanese plans and operations.
Chapter 103
Which Japanese study does the author single out as an exception, and why?
The author singles out the independent study by General Tomochika, The True Facts of the Leyte Operation, as an exception. Despite its garish title, he calls it very good and says it contains much human interest. He adds that Tomochika was evidently a man of strong prejudices and at times was unduly critical of some of his fellow officers.
Chapter 103
What caution does the author give about the Strategic Bombing Survey interrogations?
The author notes that the Interrogations of Japanese Officials contains much highly important material, but warns that the interrogated Japanese officers were naturally desirous of making a good case for themselves while also anxious to give answers that would please the interrogator. He therefore treats the material with caution rather than accepting it at face value.
Chapter 103
Section 1043 cards
What does the series preface say about the planned subseries of the Army in World War II?
The preface lists the subseries as tentatively planned, including The War Department, The Army Air Forces, The Army Ground Forces, The Army Service Forces, The Defense of the Western Hemisphere, The War in the Pacific, The European Theater of Operations, The War in the Mediterranean, The Middle East Theater, The China-Burma-India Theater, Civil Affairs, The Technical Services, Special Studies, and Pictorial Record. It then notes which volumes have been published or are in press.
Chapter 104
Who composed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to whose decisions was their Pacific war conduct subject?
Note 4 names the Joint Chiefs as General George C. Marshall, Admiral Ernest J. King, General Henry H. Arnold, and Admiral William D. Leahy. They were responsible for conducting the Pacific war subject to the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who represented the United States and the United Kingdom; the Joint Chiefs represented the United States.
Chapter 104
Why does the chapter say the full story of the Leyte guerrillas can probably never be told?
Note 44 states that the guerrillas' records are incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some bands kept no records at all, and what is known of others comes from violently prejudiced sources. The material on guerrillas is therefore based on the Guerrilla Papers, a disorganized collection held in the Documents Files Section, G-2, Department of the Army.
Chapter 104
Section 1053 cards
What did Lt. Gen. Brereton say about Major Villamor?
Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, in his book The Brereton Diaries, called Major Villamor "the most daring of the Filipino pilots." This is a quoted characterization from a published memoir, not the author's own assessment.
Chapter 105
Who made up the party under Major Villamor?
The party consisted of Major Villamor, 1st Lt. R. C. Ignacio, 2d Lt. D. C. Yuhico, 2d Lt. E. F. Quinto, Sgt. P. Jorge, and Sgt. D. Malie, according to the interview with Major Villamor on 12 October 1950.
Chapter 105
What was the King II staff study of 20 September 1944?
The GHQ SWPA staff study King II, 4th edition, dated 20 September 1944, was not a directive but a basis for planning the operation, as the chapter's note specifies.
Chapter 105
Section 1064 cards
According to note 279, how did the boat crews' rations compare with the assault troops'?
Note 279, citing the report of the Supply Officer to the commanding officer of the USS Frederick Funston, states that boat crews and beach parties were fortified with a lunch of turkey salad, ham and cheese, hot steak sandwiches, ice cream, and cold fruit juices, while the Army assault troops carried K rations.
Chapter 106
What source does the chapter cite for the organization of Japanese forces?
The chapter states that the organization of Japanese forces is discussed in detail in the History of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, citing pages 140-41 and, in a later note, pages 132-33, 135, and 140 plus an errata sheet.
Chapter 106
Which document is the source for the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion's activities?
Note 190 states that, unless otherwise noted, the account of the activities of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion is taken from the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion Operations Report Leyte.
Chapter 106
What is the source for the account of the 7th Infantry Division's operations?
Note 258 states that, unless otherwise stated, the part of the subsection dealing with the 7th Infantry Division is taken from the 7th Infantry Division Operations Report Leyte, pages 3-5; the 7th Infantry Division G-3 Journal for 20 October 1944; and 7th Infantry Division Field Order 9 of 1 October 1944.
Chapter 106
Section 1073 cards
How does the author justify limiting coverage of the Leyte Gulf naval battle?
The author states it is outside the scope of this history to cover the Japanese-American naval battle, calling it the greatest naval battle of WWII and the largest engagement ever fought on the high seas. He notes a full discussion would require a volume, mentions Morison's forthcoming study and existing accounts by Field and Woodward, and says this volume presents only facts needed to understand the battle's effect on land operations.
Chapter 107
What does the AAF Evaluation Board report mean by close support?
Footnote 322 identifies the AAF Evaluation Board POA Report 3, The Occupation of Leyte, prepared by Brig. Gen. Martin F. Scanlon, who accompanied XXIV Corps to Leyte as an air observer for the Army Air Forces in the Central Pacific. The report defines close support as operating to the immediate front of the first-line troops.
Chapter 107
What units made up the Japanese force noted in footnote 382?
Footnote 382 states that this unit consisted of the 9th Infantry Regiment (less the 2d Battalion) and two batteries of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment. The note clarifies the composition of the Japanese force referenced in the surrounding account of 96th Division operations on Leyte in late October 1944.
Chapter 107
Section 1084 cards
Whose manuscript underlies much of this chapter's account of Dagami?
Lt. Russell A. Gugeler's manuscript, Battle for Dagami. Gugeler was a combat historian attached to the 7th Division after the operation; he knew many participants and supplied details absent from official records. The chapter states much of its material rests on his manuscript.
Chapter 108
How did Pfc. Leonard C. Brostrom and Pfc. John F. Thorson earn the Medal of Honor?
During the day's action, Brostrom of Company F singlehandedly destroyed a pillbox and killed six Japanese before collapsing from his wounds. Thorson of Company G sacrificed his life by throwing himself on an enemy grenade that landed in his platoon's defensive position. Both received the Medal of Honor.
Chapter 108
When and how did Colonel Drake, commander of the 5th Cavalry, die?
At 0500 on 21 October, Colonel Drake, commanding officer of the 5th Cavalry, was killed while inspecting the regimental perimeter defenses in the vicinity of Caibaan, according to the 5th Cavalry Operations Report.
Chapter 108
What anecdote illustrates the inaccuracy of Leyte situation maps?
Sergeant Charles W. Capps and Private Harold O. Mottlet of G-3 were hunting for Alangalang on a situation map when a Japanese sniper's bullet hit near them. After resuming work they found a bullet puncture practically through Alangalang on the map, an anecdote the 24th Division report uses to highlight map problems.
Chapter 108
Section 1093 cards
What did the 34th Infantry's battalion journal record about Company L on 29 October?
The battalion journal laconically notes that Company L "meets slight resistance--kill appx. 50 Japs and continues." The entry is cited from the 3d Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 29 Oct 44, and is quoted in the chapter as an example of the terse style of unit records.
Chapter 109
What role did the 5th Cavalry Regiment play during the Carigara attack?
The 5th Cavalry had moved behind the 34th Infantry along Highway 2 toward the Mainit River bridge. When the 34th moved south to Jaro, the 5th Cavalry took over the Cavite area and, during the Carigara attack, was responsible (less its 2d Squadron) for protecting the line of communication from Cavite to Barugo.
Chapter 109
According to Colonel Okabayashi, how did Japanese Army unit commanders handle changes to plans?
Okabayashi states it is not ordinary practice for higher headquarters to provide unit commanders with alternate plans. While alternatives are discussed at conferences and commanders are oriented on the general plan, if an original order cannot be carried out due to the changing battle situation, responsibility for changing plans devolves upon the commander of the unit concerned.
Chapter 109
Section 1104 cards
What did Colonel Verbeck say about Colonel Weber after the campaign?
In a 26 September 1951 interview, Colonel Verbeck stated that for the remainder of the campaign Colonel Weber was an excellent and loyal executive officer. The note appears in the chapter's source citations, attributing the remark to Verbeck's own recollection rather than to a contemporaneous document.
Chapter 110
What message did Colonel Clifford's men receive, and what news did it include?
The message to Colonel Clifford, a former all-American football player from West Point, concluded that he and his men had not been forgotten and were the talk of the island and perhaps the United States. It added that Army had beaten Notre Dame 59 to 0, the worst defeat on record.
Chapter 110
Why is the ridge in the 34th Infantry sector properly called Henry Kilay's ridge?
Jan Valtin's Children of Yesterday states that Henry Kilay owned the ridge, and the chapter notes that the ridge properly bears his name. The correction appears in the source notes, attributing the ownership claim to Valtin's account rather than to military records.
Chapter 110
What did Major General Toshio Nishimura contribute to the chapter's account?
The chapter cites a statement by Maj. Gen. Toshio Nishimura, Assistant Chief of Staff of the 14th Area Army, in the Historical Division's Statements of Japanese Officials of World War II. His statement appears among the sources used for the Japanese side of the Leyte operations.
Chapter 110
Section 1113 cards
What did Krueger's critique of the K-2 Operation address?
The chapter draws on a letter from the Sixth Army commander to X Corps and others titled 'Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in K-2 Operation,' dated 25 November 1944 and printed in the Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte. The author notes that, unless otherwise stated, the chapter is based upon General Krueger's critique.
Chapter 111
How were guerrillas restricted during the Shoestring Ridge fighting?
Acting on Sixth Army instructions that guerrillas not be given missions beyond their capabilities, General Arnold ordered Colonel Finn on the evening of 23 November 1944 to use guerrillas only as outposts, not as part of the main line of resistance.
Chapter 111
Which units are credited with the Shoestring Ridge accounts?
The author states the 7th Division's western-coast operations were more adequately covered than any other Leyte action. Combat historians Capt. Tucker Dean and 1st Lt. Russell A. Gugeler prepared complete manuscripts on Shoestring Ridge, and Col. John M. Finn, who commanded the 32d Infantry, wrote an account in the Infantry Journal.
Chapter 111
Section 1122 cards
How did General Krueger describe losing the 77th Division?
Krueger later wrote that the 77th Division was actually taken away from him without his knowledge, and that he complained about it. The chapter cites this in a letter from General Krueger to General Ward dated 13 August 1951, held in OCMH files.
Chapter 112
What did General Bruce say about studying history for the Ormoc operation?
In a 19 January 1951 lecture at the Command and General Staff College, General Bruce indicated his previous study of the Civil War helped him plan the 77th Division's part, urging his audience not to sell short the study of history. He said one does not parallel history, but his earlier study of Jackson's Valley Campaign in friendly territory influenced his thinking.
Chapter 112
Section 1133 cards
What anecdote does the 11th Airborne Division history tell about the third plane's landing?
The 11th Airborne Division history recounts that an antiaircraft machine gun crew, whose outfit is now forgotten, was on alert for enemy aircraft. When the plane landed and halted, they called across a small river asking if help was needed; someone yelled back that everything was OK, and the crew returned to watching the skies. The story appears in Maj. Edward M. Flanagan, Jr.'s The Angels.
Chapter 113
What did General Tomochika say about Colonel Imahori and his detachment?
General Tomochika was unqualified in his praise of the Imahori Detachment's commander. He said Colonel Imahori had a good personality and was a good leader, and that his subordinates were willing to join suicide squads as American forces increased. Tomochika added they had no worries about attacking Americans on that front because the suicide squads brought good results.
Chapter 113
What does note 1020 record about Private Kelley?
Note 1020 records that Private Kelley was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. The note provides no further details about the action for which he received the award or the date of the award.
Chapter 113
Section 1144 cards
What did Pvt. Elmer E. Fryar do on 7 December 1944?
Private Fryar of Company E was killed on 7 December when he voluntarily got in the way of enemy fire to shield his platoon leader. He posthumously received the Medal of Honor for this act.
Chapter 114
How did Pfc. William A. McWhorter die on 5 December 1944?
A Japanese grenade was thrown into his position. McWhorter deliberately held the grenade next to his body and away from his comrade; the charge exploded and killed him instantly but did not harm his companion. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
Chapter 114
How did General Tomochika criticize the Japanese 1st Division, and how does Cannon respond?
Tomochika said its personnel were brave but officers lacked modern-warfare training; he faulted Lt. Gen. Kataoka for worrying about troop losses, lacking bold command, and refusing to commit a key unit to Highway 2's defense. Cannon calls this less than fair, noting the division contested every foot of X Corps' advance; General Krueger said it more than any other hostile unit extended the Leyte Operation.
Chapter 114
What did the small force at Linao destroy and bring back, per the 77th Division report?
It destroyed 6 amphibious tanks, 7 landing barges, a two-masted schooner, 50 tons of ammunition, about 25 tons of supplies, four 40-mm and four 20-mm AA guns, a dual-purpose gun, machine guns, a radio transmitter and generator, and a range finder, and burned about half of Linao. It returned a range finder, a large radio transmitter, and two 20-mm AA guns.
Chapter 114
Section 1154 cards
What did General Bruce order regarding turkey for the 77th Division?
General Bruce issued an administrative order that organization commanders serve turkey to every man in the command on 26 December 1944, with distribution from the Valencia ration dump at 0900 on 25 December. He arranged air drops to troops in areas not accessible by road, wishing them to have turkey on the same day Christmas is observed in the States.
Chapter 115
Who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor during the 306th Infantry's action?
Pfc. George Benjamin, Jr., a radio operator from Company A, killed the crew of a machine gun nest at the cost of his life during the action recorded in the 306th Infantry operations report for 21 December 1944. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
Chapter 115
What spelling discrepancy does the chapter note for Mt. Cabungaan?
The chapter states that the spelling Mt. Cabungaan follows the maps used by the combat troops, while the Board of Geographic Names gives the official spelling as Mt. Cabungangan. The note appears in connection with the 12th Cavalry's operations on Leyte in December 1944.
Chapter 115
What units made up the Special Task Force with 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry?
Besides the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, the Special Task Force included the Amphibian Tractor Company; Company A, 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion; one platoon of Company D, 706th Tank Battalion; three guns from the regimental Cannon Company; the 2d Platoon of Company A, 302d Engineer Battalion; a detachment from Company A, 302d Medical Battalion; the 292d JASCO detachment; the 305th Field Artillery Battalion; a detachment of the 306th Field Artillery Battalion; and a detachment from Battery A, 531st Field Artillery Battalion.
Chapter 115
Section 1163 cards
What caution does the chapter give about the strength accounting figures for Leyte?
The chapter states the figures from the Strength Accounting Branch, AGO, must be treated with caution because they include, besides troops who actually participated, soldiers who were merely staging on the island and had played no part in the operation. It also stresses that throughout the Leyte Campaign troops and units were constantly coming and going.
Chapter 116
Which Japanese sources does the chapter cite for the 35th Army's operations on Leyte?
The notes cite Tomochika's 'True Facts of Leyte Opn' at several pages, the '35th Army Opns' volume, and 10th I&HS Eighth Army staff studies, including interrogations of Col Junkichi Okabayashi of the 1st Division and Maj Chuji Kaneki of the 102d Division. A message from Gen Yamashita to Gen Suzuki, 30 December 1944, is also cited.
Chapter 116
What does the chapter note about the forthcoming volume by Cannon and Smith?
The chapter references 'Luzon and the Southern Philippines,' a forthcoming volume in the same series by M. Hamlin Cannon and Robert Ross Smith, citing it twice in the notes. It also notes that volumes on the Army Air Forces, published by the University of Chicago Press, are not included.
Chapter 116
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Text used: Project Gutenberg eBook #48991 (Public domain in the United States). Generated from the full text; cards paraphrase the source.
Version: Public domain edition. Retrieved 2026-10-28. Cards reviewed 2026-10-28.
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