Corbett argues that maritime strategy, not naval strategy alone, determines war outcomes, and that theory clarifies war’s enduring principles while acknowledging its limits. The deck covers his definitions, the science-versus-art debate, civil-military relations, and war as an instrument of policy.
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Chapter 1 · Question
What does Corbett claim theory can and cannot do for a commander?
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Chapter 1 · Answer
Corbett argues theory does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims only to increase the effective power of conduct. Its main practical value is helping a capable man acquire a broad outlook so his plan covers all the ground and he seizes the factors of a sudden situation with greater rapidity and certainty. He quotes the greatest theorist: theory should educate and guide the leader to self-education, but should not accompany him on the battlefield.
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Section 14 cards
What does Corbett claim theory can and cannot do for a commander?
Corbett argues theory does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims only to increase the effective power of conduct. Its main practical value is helping a capable man acquire a broad outlook so his plan covers all the ground and he seizes the factors of a sudden situation with greater rapidity and certainty. He quotes the greatest theorist: theory should educate and guide the leader to self-education, but should not accompany him on the battlefield.
Chapter 1
How does theory aid solidarity between a chief and his subordinates?
Corbett argues every man concerned must be trained to think in the same plane, so the chief's order awakes the same process of thought in every brain and his words carry the same meaning for all. He illustrates with 1780: had a theory of tactics existed and Captain Carkett been trained in it, he could not have misunderstood Rodney's signal, whose real intention was obscure and unexplained, robbing the country of a victory at an hour of direst need.
Chapter 1
What further value does Corbett see in theory beyond the chief-subordinate relationship?
Corbett argues theory produces solidarity between a commander and his superiors at the Council table at home. Officers often dumbly acquiesce in ill-advised operations for lack of mental power and verbal apparatus to convince an impatient Minister where his plan errs. Statesmen and officers also fail to decide coherent plans from inability to analyse the situation scientifically and recognise the general character of the struggle. Theory reduces, though cannot eliminate, the distortion of close-range accidental factors.
Chapter 1
How does Corbett define the theory or science of war?
Corbett defines it as a process by which we co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words we use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential factors, and fix and expose the fundamental data on which everyone is agreed. This prepares the apparatus of practical discussion, secures means of arranging factors in manageable shape, and permits deducing a practical course of action with precision and rapidity. Without it, no two men can even think on the same line.
Chapter 1
Section 23 cards
What do classical strategists say about strategy as science versus art?
The author notes that classical strategists repudiate the name "Science" and prefer the older term "Art." They permit no laws or rules, holding that friction from incalculable human factors is stronger than any law, and that a strategical maxim is even less to be trusted in action than a misleading legal maxim.
Chapter 2
What tangible results can theoretical study of strategy achieve, according to Corbett?
The author argues theory can at least determine the normal: by collating past events it shows that certain lines of conduct normally produce certain effects, that wars take forms related to the object and value of the war, and that the human factor is not entirely indeterminable. With a normal established, proposals can be compared and departures discussed, though every case must be judged on its merits.
Chapter 2
How does Corbett relate naval strategy to the larger concept of maritime strategy?
The author argues that naval and military strategy are wrongly treated as distinct branches. A larger strategy embraces both, regarding fleet and army as one weapon and co-ordinating their action. Naval strategy is not a thing by itself; its problems can seldom be solved on naval considerations alone. It is only part of maritime strategy, which teaches that army and navy must be used as intimately connected instruments.
Chapter 2
Section 33 cards
How does Corbett distinguish maritime strategy from naval strategy?
Corbett defines maritime strategy as the principles governing a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is only the part that determines fleet movements once maritime strategy has assigned the fleet its role relative to land forces. He notes it is almost impossible for a war to be decided by naval action alone, since unaided naval pressure works only slowly by exhaustion.
Chapter 3
Why does Corbett say naval pressure alone rarely decides a war?
Corbett argues unaided naval pressure can only work by exhaustion, and its effects are slow and so galling to one's own commercial community and to neutrals that the tendency is to accept inconclusive peace terms. For firm decision a quicker, more drastic pressure is needed. Since men live on land, great issues are decided by what the army does to enemy territory, or by fear of what the fleet enables the army to do.
Chapter 3
What does Corbett mean by saying war is a continuation of policy?
Corbett presents the theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of political intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes. A staff asked to plan war must first ask ministers what the war will be about, since the object determines the means. He credits this theory, arrived at in the early nineteenth century, with revolutionising strategy and enabling modern war planning.
Chapter 3
Section 44 cards
What four ideas does Corbett say are mingled in the current notion of the Napoleonic system?
Corbett identifies four: making war with the whole armed nation rather than a standing army (inherited from the Revolution and far older); strenuous, persistent effort pressing the enemy without rest (anticipated by Cromwell); taking the offensive (nothing new, pressed by Frederick the Great); and making the enemy's armed forces, not territory, the main objective.
Chapter 4
Why does Corbett argue war cannot change in its essentials?
The author argues that neither war nor anything else can change in its essentials; if it appears to, we are mistaking accidents for essentials. He says Napoleon's methods succeeded only in wars of a certain nature and failed in Spain and Russia, while England succeeded without changing her methods.
Chapter 4
How does Corbett use Napoleon's Austerlitz campaign to challenge the 'main army objective' idea?
Corbett notes that at Austerlitz Napoleon made the hostile capital his objective, apparently believing its occupation was the most effective step toward overthrowing the enemy's power and will to resist. He did not make the enemy's main army his primary objective, since the main army was the Archduke Charles's, not Mack's.
Chapter 4
Who does Corbett credit with first explaining the Napoleonic era, and what was his background?
Corbett credits General Carl von Clausewitz as the first to enunciate a theory explaining the Napoleonic phenomena and co-ordinating them with previous history. A soldier of the severest school, pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, he served on Blücher's staff in 1813 and was Director of the Berlin War Academy for over ten years.
Chapter 4
Section 54 cards
What did Clausewitz call war waged with the utmost exertion of will and all means?
Clausewitz began from the abstract definition that war is an act of violence to compel our opponent to do our will. Followed to its logical conclusion, this means violence performed with the whole of the means at our disposal and the utmost exertion of will, producing two armed nations flinging themselves at each other until one can no longer resist. This conception he called "Absolute War."
Chapter 5
Why did Clausewitz reject the absolute idea of war as a working theory?
His practical experience and study of history showed that "Real War" was radically different. A theory built on the abstract idea would exclude almost the whole of war from Alexander's time to Napoleon's, and could not guarantee future wars would follow the Napoleonic type. He held that such a theory is powerless against the force of circumstances, and wars of the mid-nineteenth century did revert to the pre-Napoleonic type.
Chapter 5
What did Clausewitz identify as the underlying cause of varying intensity in war?
Casting about for the causes of oscillations in the energy of hostile relations, Clausewitz concluded that war was never purely military endeavour aiming at the extreme. The energy exhibited would always be modified by political considerations and by the depth of the national interest in the object of the war. Real war, he saw, is an international relation differing from others only in the method adopted to achieve the object of policy.
Chapter 5
According to Clausewitz, what is the first and most far-reaching of all strategical questions?
The first, greatest and most critical decision for the Statesman and General is to determine the nature of the war, ensuring they do not mistake it for something else or seek to make of it something its inherent conditions forbid. Clausewitz declares this the first and most far-reaching of all strategical questions. The author adds that assuming one method suits all wars is to fall victim to abstract theory.
Chapter 5
Section 64 cards
According to Clausewitz, why must war be seen as a political instrument?
The author credits Clausewitz with the theory that war is not an independent thing but a political instrument. Only by regarding it this way, he insists, can we read history aright and understand how wars must differ in character according to the motives and circumstances from which they proceed. This conception lets us classify wars and avoid applying operations successful in one nature of war to another.
Chapter 6
How does Jomini classify wars, and what does he conclude follows from that?
Jomini devotes the first chapter of his Précis de l'art de la Guerre to the politics of war, classifying wars into nine categories according to their political object. He lays down that these different kinds of war will influence the nature of operations demanded, the energy put forth, and the extent of undertakings, adding that operations will differ greatly according to the risks run.
Chapter 6
Why does the author call 'offensive and defensive' an objectionable label for the classification?
The author argues the label is objectionable because it obscures the real distinction, which is a difference of political object, not of means. It invites the false assumption that positive war means using attack while negative war is content with defence. In fact neither category excludes offensive operations, and defence is not passive but an attitude of alert expectation awaiting a counter-stroke.
Chapter 6
Why can a maritime Power not keep its defensive war purely defensive?
The author argues that for a maritime Power it is impossible to establish defence or develop offence without securing working control of the sea by aggressive action against the enemy's fleets. However strictly defensive the aim, the most effective means has been counter-attack over-sea, either to support an ally or to deprive the enemy of colonial possessions. So the general plan is preventive, but action tends to the offensive.
Chapter 6
Section 74 cards
Why does Corbett reject the labels 'offensive' and 'defensive' for classifying wars?
The author argues the terms falsely imply the two ideas are mutually exclusive, when in truth they are mutually complementary: all war must be both offensive and defensive. Even aggressive strategy needs defensive support on secondary lines, and defence must be supplemented by counter-attack. He therefore proposes 'positive and negative' instead, though he admits that substitute also has difficulties.
Chapter 7
What problem does Corbett identify with the substitute terms 'positive' and 'negative'?
He notes many wars used positive methods throughout to secure a negative end, so they fit neither class. In the War of Spanish Succession Britain's aim was preventive—keeping the Mediterranean from becoming a French lake—yet the method was seizing Gibraltar and Minorca. Similarly Japan's negative aim of preventing Russian absorption of Korea was achieved by taking Korea herself, making the war positive in practice.
Chapter 7
When have great commanders chosen the defensive, and what makes defence strong?
Corbett says energetic masters of war chose defence when inferior in physical force and believing no aggressive spirit could redress it. Defence's strength lies in a position so good the enemy must break it down before reaching his objective: you choose the ground, are hidden on familiar terrain, and can lay traps by counter-attack. Hence his paradoxical doctrine that where defence is sound, the advantage of surprise lies against the attack.
Chapter 7
What causes does Corbett give for defence's ill reputation, and what is its real weakness?
The author argues defence's real weakness is that unduly prolonged it deadens the offensive spirit. Its ill name comes from confusion: counter-attacks from a defensive attitude being mistaken for pure offence (Frederick the Great, Tegetthoff at Lissa, the Spanish Armada); defence confused with a wrongly arrested offensive; choosing a bad position the enemy can turn; and trying to guard every line, attenuating one's force.
Chapter 7
Section 83 cards
What does Corbett say about the possibility of a defensive at sea strategically?
Corbett argues that while a defensive is generally true for tactics but not universally (defended anchorages, mines), strategically the claim that there is no defensive at sea is not true at all. A strategical defensive has been as common at sea as on land, and Britain's gravest problems often involved breaking down an enemy who assumed it near his own bases.
Chapter 8
What made the strategical defensive effective in Corbett's view?
Corbett argues its essence was preserving the aggressive spirit in its most daring form. Success depended on the will to seize every occasion for bold, harassing counter-attacks, like Drake and his colleagues against the Armada. Once the defensive stops fostering power to strike and reducing the enemy's attack power, it loses all strength and is not war.
Chapter 8
How does Corbett judge submitting to blockade as a form of defensive?
Corbett calls it another form of defensive but one that is almost wholly evil. For a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations elsewhere that would otherwise be impossible. But if prolonged, it will sooner or later destroy the spirit of the force and render it incapable of effective aggression.
Chapter 8
Section 94 cards
How did Clausewitz's view of war change after recognizing the moral factor?
The author explains that Clausewitz began with the theory of "Absolute War" as the ideal all wars should attain. Once he grasped that the moral factor always overrides the purely military factor, he saw his basis was too narrow and theoretical, ignoring the human factor. He concluded it was logically unsound to assume one pattern all wars must conform to, and divided wars into "Unlimited" and "Limited" categories.
Chapter 9
What distinguishes Limited from Unlimited war in Clausewitz's scheme?
The author states Unlimited war occurs when the political object is so vital to both belligerents that they fight to the utmost limit of endurance. Limited war occurs when the object's value is not worth unlimited sacrifices of blood and treasure. "Limited" does not mean exerting less vigour, but that a point exists beyond which spending more vigour would be bad policy, and it is wiser to abandon the object.
Chapter 9
How does Limited war differ from the standing-armies distinction?
The author stresses that Limited versus Unlimited war must not be confused with Clausewitz's earlier distinction between modern wars of armed nations and seventeenth- and eighteenth-century wars of standing armies. That distinction is real and far-reaching, but unrelated: war may be waged on the Napoleonic system for either a limited or an unlimited object. The Russo-Japanese War, fought for a limited territorial object by modern armed nations, illustrates this.
Chapter 9
What cardinal difference in war plans follows from the Limited/Unlimited distinction?
The author explains that with an unlimited object, no firm decision is possible until the enemy's war power is crushed, so the main strategical offensive must target his armed forces; absent reasonable hope of this, one should not go to war. With a limited object, complete destruction of the enemy's force is unnecessary: one may make the object itself the objective, seize it, and use the defensive to make dislodging you cost more than the object is worth.
Chapter 9
Section 104 cards
Why did Jomini and Clausewitz commend the lower method of war despite being apostles of Napoleon's method?
The author explains that both were veteran staff-officers, not mere theorists, who knew Napoleon's method only worked with real physical or moral preponderance. They commended the lower road not as better, but because a belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his strength or beyond the effort the nation's spirit will make. They studied the lower road's potentialities for cases of hard necessity.
Chapter 10
What two natures of war does Clausewitz define in his 1827 note?
Clausewitz defines first those wars whose object is the overthrow of the enemy, whether aiming at his political destruction or merely disarming him and forcing peace on our terms. Second, those whose object is merely to make some conquests on the enemy's frontiers, either to retain them permanently or to use them as exchange in settling peace terms.
Chapter 10
Why does the author say Clausewitz's classification of the two natures of war was ignored?
The author argues the distinction is not clearly formulated in Clausewitz's first seven books, the only ones left nearly finished. He only saw its vital importance in his eighth book, On War Plans, which was never completed. Clausewitz left a Note warning against treating the earlier books as his full developed ideas, but the fragmentary state of the eighth book helps explain the neglect.
Chapter 10
How did Clausewitz's 1830 war plan against France reflect the lower form of war?
Facing France nearly single-handed and sapped by revolution, Prussia could not destroy the enemy's armed force. So Clausewitz designed a plan not on the Napoleonic method but on seizing a limited territorial object, Belgium, forcing an exhausting counter-offensive on France. The author compares this to the Seven Years' War, Japan's war with Russia, and Moltke's 1859 plan to occupy Alsace-Lorraine.
Chapter 10
Section 114 cards
What dual distinction did the Napoleonic period yield in war theory?
The matured fruit of the Napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on a single absolute idea but on the dual distinction of Limited and Unlimited. Corbett says whatever practical importance one attaches to it, this much must be admitted on the clear and emphatic pronouncements of Clausewitz and Jomini.
Chapter 11
Why did Clausewitz's limited-war theory remain inchoate?
Corbett argues Clausewitz never apprehended the full significance of his brilliant theory. His outlook was still purely continental, and the limitations of continental warfare veil the fuller meaning of his principle. Had he lived he would likely have worked it out logically, but his death condemned the theory of limited war to remain inchoate as he left it.
Chapter 11
What two conditions must a truly limited object satisfy?
To satisfy the full conception of a limited object, one of two conditions is essential: it must be not merely limited in area but of really limited political importance; and it must be so situated as to be strategically isolated, or capable of being reduced to practical isolation by strategical operations. Otherwise either belligerent may pass to unlimited war.
Chapter 11
Why did Clausewitz's frontier-conquest examples fail as true limited objects?
Corbett argues such objects are not truly limited for two reasons: the territory is usually an organic part of the enemy's country or important enough that he will use unlimited effort to retain it; and there is no strategical obstacle to his using his whole force. Clausewitz's Saxony and Silesia examples were therefore not really examples at all.
Chapter 11
Section 124 cards
For Corbett, when does the limited/unlimited war distinction become organic rather than a matter of degree?
Corbett argues that between contiguous continental states the line is too shadowy to support a solid classification—a difference of degree, not kind. But when the view extends to wars between worldwide empires, the distinction becomes organic, because oversea possessions are in a different category from the limited objects Clausewitz contemplated and can be isolated by naval action.
Chapter 12
What two essentials does Corbett require for a true limited object?
Corbett states two essentials: the power to isolate the object by naval action, and the power, through a secure home defence, to bar an unlimited counterstroke. He notes that if belligerents share a common frontier, the superior can pass at will to unlimited war by invasion, even when separated only by a weak neutral state.
Chapter 12
What final proposition does Corbett reach about when limited war is permanently possible?
Corbett concludes that limited war is only permanently possible to island Powers or between Powers separated by sea, and then only when the Power desiring limited war commands the sea enough both to isolate the distant object and to make invasion of its home territory impossible. This, he argues, is the true meaning and highest military value of command of the sea.
Chapter 12
How does Corbett use Jomini and Clausewitz to frame his argument?
Corbett argues Jomini approached but never detached the point: he saw distant expeditions need fleets for advanced bases but gave no hint of the fleet's isolating and preventive functions, and never mentioned Canada. Corbett regrets Clausewitz did not see with Bacon's eyes, since Bacon's aphorism on commanding the sea reveals the ultimate significance of Clausewitz's doctrine.
Chapter 12
Section 134 cards
Why did Clausewitz find war limited by contingent embarrassing to his theory?
Clausewitz left only a fragment on this form of hostility, confessing such cases were "embarrassing to his theory." He noted that if an auxiliary force were placed unreservedly at the chief belligerent's disposal the problem would be simple, but this seldom happened: the contingent was always more or less controlled according to the furnishing government's special political aims. He concluded it was a form of limited war apparently differing essentially from war limited by object.
Chapter 13
What proposition does Corbett reach about the distinction "limited by contingent"?
Corbett argues the distinction is not inherent in war and is out of line with the theory in hand. In reality, he argues, it is not a form of war but a method employable for either limited or unlimited war. If treated as a legitimate form, the contingent must take one shape frankly: either act as an organic unit of unlimited war without reservations, or receive a definite territorial object with independent organisation and limited function.
Chapter 13
What two classes of combined operations expressed the British limited-war method?
Corbett identifies two main classes. First, operations designed purely for conquering the war's objects, usually colonial or distant oversea territory. Second, operations on the European seaboard designed not for permanent conquest but to disturb the enemy's plans and strengthen allies and Britain's own position. These ranged from insignificant coastal diversions up through all degrees of importance until, as in Wellington's Peninsula operations, they became indistinguishable in form from regular continental warfare.
Chapter 13
What made the British contingent sent to Frederick the Great succeed?
Corbett notes the support fully achieved its purpose, but the operations were limited by contingent and also by object. The force formed part of a British subsidised army under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, organisationally distinct from Frederick's, assigned the definite limited function of preventing the French occupying Hanover and turning the Prussian right flank. Its success was due to a theatre where it could not lose touch with the sea, nor have its supply and retreat lines cut.
Chapter 13
Section 144 cards
What made the British maritime form of limited war distinctive, according to Corbett?
Corbett argues the vital factor is touch with the sea. The British form combines the limit by contingent with a definite, independent function and a sea-girt theatre. Control of the sea let Britain select a theatre that was truly limited, applying the limited method as ancillary to the larger operations of allies in an unlimited war.
Chapter 14
Why did British intervention in North-Western Europe early in the Great War fail?
Corbett states that although Britain had the limited function of securing Holland and complete touch with the sea, the theatre was not independent. Intimate concerted action with other forces was involved, and in every case the result was failure. Success came later only where isolation was attainable, as in Sicily.
Chapter 14
What did Wellington tell Rear Admiral Martin was the history of the Peninsular War?
Wellington said that if anyone wished to know the history of the war, it was British maritime superiority that gave him the power of maintaining his army while the enemy could not. Corbett cites this from the Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin to show the sea was the essential factor.
Chapter 14
How did Corbett assess the Walcheren expedition despite its failure?
Corbett argues historians condemn Walcheren as fatuous administration while ignoring it was the final step in the post-Trafalgar policy of using the army to perfect command of the sea. Failure causes were accidental and success came within a week; Napoleon was shocked enough to plan 300,000 National Guards for coastal defence.
Chapter 14
Section 154 cards
What two classes of potent naval intervention does Corbett identify?
Corbett identifies two classes: first, intrusion into an enemy war plan he designed without allowing for intervention and is irrevocably committed to by his opening movements; second, intervention to deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. The second rests on the principle that unlimited wars are not always decided by destroying armies, since conquering an exhausted people remains, and a small fresh force from the sea may turn the scale.
Chapter 15
What does Napoleon's staff order show about ignoring threats?
Corbett cites Napoleon's recognition of the principle in a staff order to the principal officer concerned, not a speech made for ulterior purpose. He notes that ignoring a threat is too often to create an opportunity, and that such opportunities may occur late or early. Lord Ligonier and Wolfe laid down that surprise is not necessarily to be looked for at the beginning; we usually must create or wait for the opportunity.
Chapter 15
Why is limited war strong for a weaker power, per Corbett?
Corbett argues limited war lets a weak military Power beat a stronger one, too often to be accidental. The navy can restrict the force the army faces where geography favors it. More fundamentally, limited war permits defensive use without its usual drawbacks: it need not surrender the initiative or moral exhilaration of the offensive. If we establish ourselves in the territorial object first, we hold the initiative and the enemy must conform.
Chapter 15
How does Corbett map Moltke's strongest form onto limited war?
Corbett accepts Moltke's modification of Clausewitz: the strongest form of war is strategic offensive combined with tactical defensive. In limited war, if theatre and method are rightly chosen, major strategy is offensive, aiming at occupation of the territorial object, while minor strategy is defensive, designed to develop utmost counter-attack once the enemy tries to dislodge us. Since tactics and minor strategy can no longer be divided, this matches Moltke's position.
Chapter 15
Section 164 cards
What does Von der Goltz say about annihilating the enemy's army as the object?
Von der Goltz protests against the common error of treating the annihilation of the enemy's principal army as synonymous with complete attainment of the object. He asserts the current doctrine only holds good "when the two belligerent states are of approximately the same nature." Corbett uses this to argue occupation of territory may sometimes be a distinct operation from defeating the enemy's forces.
Chapter 16
What conditions does Clausewitz require before employing the higher form of war?
Corbett notes Clausewitz distinctly lays it down that the higher form presupposes in the belligerent employing it a great physical or moral superiority, or a great spirit of enterprise—an innate propensity for extreme hazards. Jomini would have ruled out that propensity, judging it led Napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing.
Chapter 16
Why does Corbett say Britain tends toward the lower or limited form of war?
Corbett argues the tendency of British warfare toward the lower form is clearly marked and is not due to inherent lack of warlike spirit, which results contradict. He attributes it instead to a sagacious instinct for the kind of war best according with the conditions of Britain's existence, sometimes applied even when acting with continental allies for an unlimited object.
Chapter 16
How does the Russo-Japanese War illustrate the limited form succeeding?
Corbett calls it a striking example of a small Power forcing its will on a much greater Power without overthrowing it—beyond Japan's strength. Though the abstract object was unlimited, only England, with her tradition for what an island Power may achieve by lower means, thought Japan had a reasonable chance; the Continent regarded the resort to hostilities as madness.
Chapter 16
Section 174 cards
How did Japan convert its abstract quarrel with Russia into a concrete objective?
The author explains that Japan reduced the intangible aim of asserting prestige to a territorial objective: Russian penetration into Manchuria threatened to absorb Korea, which Japan saw as fatal to its position. Maintaining Korean integrity became the visible sign of its ability to act as a Pacific Power, just as the Western Powers' quarrel with Russia in 1854 crystallized into Sebastopol.
Chapter 17
Why was Korea an exceptionally suitable object for limited war by Japan?
The author argues Korea could be practically isolated by naval action, given its geography and the vast undeveloped territories separating it from Russia's center of power. Seizing it also fulfilled Clausewitz's key condition: it strengthened rather than weakened Japan's home defence. Though offensive in intention, it was sound defensive work, covering Japan's heart almost impregnably.
Chapter 17
What two objectives did Japan face in the second stage, and how was the problem solved?
Japan had to make the Korean frontier inviolable and isolate Korea by sea, which meant destroying the Russian fleet and reducing Port Arthur. This committed it to two lines of operation with distinct objectives—Port Arthur and the Manchurian army—a vicious situation. By advancing the Korean army into Manchuria and landing another force, the corps could concentrate and threaten Liao-yang before Russian concentration completed.
Chapter 17
What did the battle of Tsushima accomplish for Japan's position?
By Tsushima the territorial object was completely isolated by sea, and Japan's position in Korea was rendered as impregnable as Wellington's at Torres Vedras. The final advance to Mukden then showed Russia that accepting the situation was better than trying to break it. Japan obtained its end far short of overthrowing its enemy, whose offensive power had never been stronger.
Chapter 17
Section 194 cards
What does Corbett say is the object of naval warfare?
The object of naval warfare must always be, directly or indirectly, either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it. Corbett stresses the second half of this proposition, warning against the common error of assuming that when one belligerent loses command it passes automatically to the other.
Chapter 19
What is the normal state of command at sea, according to Corbett?
Corbett argues the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has command; the normal position is an uncommanded sea, not a commanded one. The command is normally in dispute, and it is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, since pure naval strategy ends once command is lost or won.
Chapter 19
Why does Corbett call the conquest-of-territory analogy for command of the sea false?
Corbett argues the analogy is false for two reasons: you cannot conquer the sea because it is not susceptible of ownership outside territorial waters, and you cannot exclude neutrals from it as from conquered territory. Nor can you subsist your armed force upon it as upon enemy territory. Such phrases, he says, are rhetorical expressions founded on false analogy.
Chapter 19
What does command of the sea actually mean, and how does it work toward peace?
Corbett argues command of the sea means nothing but control of maritime communications, commercial or military — not conquest of territory. The sea is both a means of communication and a barrier. By occupying an enemy's maritime communications and closing their points of distribution, we destroy the national life afloat and check its vitality ashore, though far less coercively against a continental State.
Chapter 19
Section 204 cards
What term does Corbett prefer over 'commerce destruction,' and why?
Corbett argues the logical term is 'commerce prevention,' because the object of naval warfare is control of communications, which carries the right to forbid passage of both public and private property at sea. Capture or destruction of sea-borne property is the penalty imposed on an enemy who uses communications he does not control—the ultimate sanction of the interdict.
Chapter 20
According to Corbett, why were privateering and plunder ashore abolished?
Corbett argues they were not abolished for humanitarian reasons but because war became more scientific. Plunder demoralized troops and unfit them for fighting, and ravaging coerced the enemy less effectively than regular requisitions that exploited the occupied country to supply and extend the range of one's own army. The reform arose from husbanding the enemy's resources rather than wasting them.
Chapter 20
What two fallacies does Corbett identify in proposals to abolish private capture at sea?
Corbett argues the proposals rest on two fallacies: that you can avoid attack by depriving yourself of the power of offence and relying on defence alone, and that war consists entirely of battles between armies or fleets. The second ignores that battles are only means to exert pressure on citizens and their collective life, as Von der Goltz's remarks on forcing a peace illustrate.
Chapter 20
Why does Corbett say abolishing private capture at sea would defeat humanitarians' aims?
Corbett argues commerce and finance control or check nations' foreign policy, and while private capture exists they lose immediately in any maritime war, making them a powerful deterrent. Abolish the right and the deterrent disappears; they might even gain from wartime government expenditure and expanded sea commerce. Losses confined to land would be remote except in complete defeat, which no one expects.
Chapter 20
Section 214 cards
How does economic pressure at sea differ from economic pressure ashore?
The author argues that ashore economic pressure can only be exerted after victory or acquired domination by military success. At sea the process begins at once, and the first act of hostility in maritime wars has often been the capture of private property at sea. Interference with private property ashore is essentially a military act, not part of the secondary phase of economic pressure.
Chapter 21
Why are maritime communications said to be common to both belligerents?
Corbett argues maritime communications correspond in strategical value to a nation's internal lines of communication ashore, not to an army's supply lines. At sea the communications are mostly common to both belligerents, whereas ashore each side has its own in its own territory. Therefore at sea strategical offence and defence tend to merge, and attacking the enemy's communications usually means defending your own.
Chapter 21
What two reasons justify using economic pressure from the start of a naval war?
First, it is an economy of means to use defensive positions for attack when attack does not vitiate those positions, provided fleet cruisers operate with restraint. Second, interference with the enemy's trade is both a means of secondary economic pressure and a primary means toward overthrowing the enemy's power of resistance, since finance is scarcely less important than force and the longer purse wins when other things are equal.
Chapter 21
What does the maxim 'the sea is all one' mean, and what error trails it?
Corbett says the truth in the maxim is that local control can usually only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy has a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to overthrow our control of any special sea area. The error is treating the maxim as absolute; control of communications may be general or local, and the point needs emphasising.
Chapter 21
Section 224 cards
What does Corbett say the maxim about mobility at sea amounts to?
The author argues it is little more than a rhetorical expression emphasizing the high mobility of fleets compared with armies and the absence of physical obstacles to that mobility. He accepts consecrating this vital feature in a maxim, but condemns caricaturing it into a doctrine that no battalion may move oversea until the enemy's fleet is entirely overthrown.
Chapter 22
How did American and Japanese strategy differ in Corbett's examples?
The author argues the Americans, cramped by the travestied maxim, hesitated to send ready troops to Cuba because an undefeated Spanish fleet existed somewhere, and were nearly lost. The Japanese, without striking any naval blow and with a hostile fleet in the theatre, began their essential oversea movement, content to deny effective control to the enemy rather than secure control themselves.
Chapter 22
What degrees of command does Corbett identify for framing plans?
Command may be general or local, and permanent or temporary. General command may be either permanent or temporary, but mere local command, except under very favourable geographical conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary, since it is normally liable to interruption from other theatres so long as the enemy possesses an effective naval force.
Chapter 22
Why can permanent general command never be absolute?
No degree of naval superiority can secure communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers or boldly led raiding squadrons. Even after Hawke's victory at Quiberon, a British transport was captured between Cork and Portsmouth and an Indiaman in sight of the Lizard. General and permanent control means the enemy cannot seriously affect the issue of the war or carry on his own trade except at hazard.
Chapter 22
Section 233 cards
According to Corbett, what determines the classes of ships that constitute a fleet?
Corbett argues that ship classes are, or ought to be, the material expression of the strategical and tactical ideas prevailing at a given time. They vary not only with those ideas but also with the material in vogue, and more broadly with the theory of war dominating naval thought—even when that theory is unformulated or only dimly perceived.
Chapter 23
How did Henry VIII originally organise his Royal Navy, and what was missing?
Henry organised a twofold constitution: sailing battleships of subservient movement and oar-driven vessels of free movement. Practically all his battleships were sailing vessels, though he gave oars to some when the French brought up galleys. The constitution was battleships and flotilla—there were no cruisers as later understood, scouting fell to Row-barges and Pinnaces, and merchantmen mostly defended themselves.
Chapter 23
What was the basis of the arbitrary rating system before Anson's reforms?
Corbett argues the rating system was purely arbitrary, with no logical distinction between large and small battleships, battleships and cruisers, or cruisers and flotilla. The only marked break was between 40-gun two-deckers and 20-gun cruisers. Since the latter and the sloops used sweeps, he concludes the only basis was Henry VIII's old sailing-versus-oars distinction, long obsolete.
Chapter 23
Section 244 cards
What formula does Corbett give for cruisers versus the battle-fleet?
Corbett argues that on cruisers depends the exercise of control, while on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. He says the maxim that command of the sea depends on the battle-fleet is sound only if it includes the other facts on which it hangs. The battle-fleet's true function is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work, chiefly by destroying the enemy's power to interfere.
Chapter 24
How does Corbett characterize Anson's threefold constitution and specialization?
Corbett describes the First Lord's reforms as a clearly apprehended threefold constitution in which groups were frankly specialised by function. He calls specialisation the note of the development process: instead of one weak ship type doing line and commerce duty poorly, battleships should be as powerful as possible and relieved of cruising functions by a class specially adapted for that purpose. He asks whether this specialisation was in the true line of development.
Chapter 24
What was Nelson's practice regarding cruisers, per Corbett?
Corbett argues Nelson's paramount use of cruisers was exercising the control he was securing with his battle-squadron, not scouting. Nelson constantly demanded more cruisers in the Mediterranean, using them for control even when that left fleet cruisers below bare necessity. On one occasion an enemy battle-fleet escaped, yet Nelson retained the control he was charged to maintain. Corbett says Nelson grasped that the object was controlling communications.
Chapter 24
When does Corbett say the battle-fleet should be relegated to secondary position?
Corbett argues that if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a secondary position, because cruisers are the means of exercising control while the battle-fleet only prevents their being interfered with. He notes we cannot exercise control with battleships alone, but could with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet. Had the French been ready to risk a fleet action, Nelson's priorities would rightly differ.
Chapter 24
Section 254 cards
According to Corbett, what is the primary function of cruisers?
The author argues cruisers should be regarded as primarily concerned with the active occupation of communications. Withdrawals of cruisers for fleet purposes should be reduced to the furthest margin of reasonable risk, since every cruiser attached to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its true function. The exact margin can only be decided by the circumstances of each case and the personal characteristics of the responsible officers.
Chapter 25
What dilemma does Corbett identify in fleet constitution regarding cruisers?
Cruisers' power of exercising control is proportional to command, but their resistance is in inverse proportion to that control power: the more numerous and better adapted for preying on commerce, the weaker their individual fighting power. Giving them resistance without reducing control power is impossible. The accepted solution in Anson's school was a covering force of battle units, but battle units given fighting power lose scouting power, and the battle-fleet must have eyes.
Chapter 25
Why does Corbett warn against concentrating cruisers to face the enemy battle-fleet?
The author argues the normal condition is that the enemy will avoid a decision on our terms and remain on the defensive. Without stirring from port his fleet does its work: the more closely he induces us to concentrate cruiser force in face of his battle-fleet, the more he frees the sea for his own trade and exposes ours to cruiser raids. Theory and experience alike dictate minimizing withdrawals for fleet purposes.
Chapter 25
What was the cardinal mistake Corbett attributes to the War of American Independence?
The author argues the cardinal mistake was suffering the enemy's battle-fleets to get upon and occupy the vital lines of passage and communication without first bringing them to action. This error was partly due to the unreadiness of a weak administration and partly to insufficient allocation of cruisers to secure contact at the right places. Where the Admiralty's grip on communication principles loosened, confusion and unnecessary failures followed.
Chapter 25
Section 263 cards
Why does the author expect wireless telegraphy to increase the strategic value of the supporting ship?
The author argues that in sailing days the supporting ship's power was weak because distant communication between ships at sea was imperfect and nonexistent beyond visual range. As wireless telegraphy develops, he expects the intermediate ship's strategic value to exceed anything in sailing days, with cruiser lines approximating more and more in resisting power to that of their strongest unit for dealing with sporadic disturbance.
Chapter 26
What dual role do fleet cruisers perform, according to the chapter?
Though called the eyes of the fleet, their purpose is almost equally to blindfold the enemy. Their duty is not only to disclose enemy movements but also to act as a screen concealing our own. The chapter notes this was specially marked in blockades, where old 50-gun ships served with the inshore cruiser squadron to prevent it being forced by inquisitive frigates.
Chapter 26
How did the flotilla's acquisition of battle power change the battle-fleet's situation?
The chapter calls this entirely new, unknown until the mobile torpedo's development. Once the flotilla gained battle power, the battle-fleet could no longer ensure its own defence unaided; it required screening from observation and flotilla attack. The problem became not how to increase offensive power but how to defend the fleet, forcing wider screens, more cruisers withdrawn from primary duties, and armoured cruiser squadrons to support the screen.
Chapter 26
Section 274 cards
Why does Corbett say the battle-fleet now needs protection from cruising ships?
The author argues the battle-squadron has become so insecure and imperfect as a self-contained weapon that its needs override the old order. The cruising ship's primary function inclines to be no longer exercising control under cover of the battle-fleet; instead the battle-fleet demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity.
Chapter 27
What two causes does Corbett give for the present fleet situation?
Corbett attributes it most obviously to two causes: the excessive development of the 'intermediate' ship, originally devised for commerce protection and dictated by a menace taught by the American War; and the introduction of the torpedo, with the consequent vulnerability of battle-squadrons not securely screened. He notes nothing of the kind influenced the seventeenth-century fleet constitution.
Chapter 27
What did Nelson and Strachan each want, according to Corbett?
Corbett says that in 1805 Nelson felt for a battleship of cruiser speed, while Strachan desired a cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a fleet action. Strachan used heavy frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a 'Light Division' with a definite tactical function. The collapse of the French Navy stopped further development of either idea.
Chapter 27
What earlier squadron did the 'Light Division' concept originate from?
Corbett traces it to the late eighteenth-century Mediterranean, where control conditions required such wide dispersal and numbers of cruisers that a battle-squadron had to do much of its own scouting. The fastest and lightest ships-of-the-line formed a separate unit first called the 'Observation Squadron.' Nelson tried to give it a tactical function, but his idea was never realised by himself or his successors.
Chapter 27
Section 284 cards
What three senses does military phraseology give to 'concentration'?
Corbett identifies three: assembling units after mobilisation (mainly administrative), moving the formed army to localities from which operations can best begin (culminating in strategic deployment), and the final stage when the deployed army is closed on a line of operations for a concentrated blow. He notes the last two are largely contradictory, since deployment prizes flexibility while massing for a blow brings rigidity.
Chapter 28
Why does Corbett say 'concentration' needs a more precise meaning at sea?
He argues extending land terminology to sea magnifies the error at every step, making clear thinking difficult. Strategic deployment aims at dispersal and flexibility for choosing combinations, while an army massed for a blow is rigid with restricted mobility. Since the word hovers between forming fleets and their strategical distribution, it becomes a common source of conflicting opinion and questionable judgments.
Chapter 28
What does Corbett conclude is the merit of concentration in its natural sense?
Following dictionary definitions, he places concentration between completed mobilisation and final massing for battle — an incomplete, continuing act whose ultimate consequence is the mass. Its merit is permitting the mass to form in time at one of the greatest number of points where it may be required, since the choice of time and place depends on the enemy's dispositions and movements.
Chapter 28
How does the quoted critical authority describe concentration, and what image does he use?
The authority says concentration is 'not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will.' He compares vessels in concentration to a fan that opens and shuts. Corbett reads this as a compound organism controlled from a common centre, elastic enough to cover a wide field without sacrificing mutual support.
Chapter 28
Section 294 cards
How does Corbett define naval concentration, as distinct from mere assembly or mass?
Corbett defines it as coherent disposal about a strategical centre, the naval counterpart of strategic deployment on land. Its object is to cover the widest possible area while preserving elastic cohesion, so that any two or more parts can rapidly condense at the will of the controlling mind, and above all the whole can condense surely and rapidly at the strategical centre.
Chapter 29
What two tensions does Corbett say practical strategy must continually adjust?
Corbett argues concentration implies a continual conflict between cohesion and reach, and that the right adjustment of these two ever-shifting tensions constitutes the greater part of practical strategy. The war plan rests on an ultimate central mass yet still delivers or meets minor attacks in any direction, controlling the sea while working for a decision without prejudicing full force later.
Chapter 29
Why is the concentration stage more sharply distinct at sea than ashore?
Corbett argues that with vast armies, restricted lines of movement, and lower mobility, assembly, concentration, and forming the battle mass grade into one another, and an army may reach strategic deployment straight from mobilisation bases or concentrate on the battlefield. At sea, free communications and high mobility let a fleet assemble at a port, move distinctly to the strategical centre, and reach out in divisions.
Chapter 29
What does Corbett say about the virtue of massing and the role of division?
Corbett argues the idea of massing as a virtue in itself is bred in peace, not war, and reflects the debilitating wish to avoid rather than inflict defeat. He holds victories must be worked for by bold strategical combinations that usually entail at least apparent dispersal, and that division is bad only when pushed beyond well-knit deployment, since without division no strategical combinations are possible.
Chapter 29
Section 304 cards
Why does Corbett say Monk's division of his fleet was not a strategical fault?
Corbett argues division was a necessity, not a fault: keeping the fleet massed against De Ruyter would have left Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight open to the French, while moving against the French would have exposed the Thames to De Ruyter. He compares this to Nelson dividing his defence force in 1801. The real fault, Corbett says, was tactical judgment—extending reach without preserving cohesion.
Chapter 30
What does Corbett say was Monk's actual fault, and what course should he have taken?
Corbett holds the fault was tactical judgment, not strategy: Monk over-estimated his surprise and the relative fighting values, believing he could win single-handed. Most flag-officers thought he should not have fought when he did. On Kempenfelt's principle he should have hung on De Ruyter, fallen back slowly drawing the Dutch after him, and fought only once his loosened concentration was closed up again.
Chapter 30
How does Corbett challenge the maxim that concentration begets concentration?
Corbett argues history flatly contradicts the maxim. If the enemy will hazard all on battle it holds, but if we are too superior or too well concentrated for him to hope for victory, our concentration has almost always forced him to disperse for sporadic action. So in old wars where Britain was usually superior, she adopted the loosest possible concentrations to prevent sporadic action.
Chapter 30
How does Corbett describe the British distribution in the campaign of 1805?
Corbett describes a wide distribution based on several concentrations: one centred in the Downs covering the North Sea and invasion passage; the Western Squadron off Ushant spread over the Bay of Biscay with squadrons before Ferrol and Rochefort and off Ireland; a Mediterranean concentration under Nelson at Sardinia with sub-centres at Malta and Gibraltar; and after war with Spain in 1804, a fourth off Cadiz joining at Cape Finisterre.
Chapter 30
Section 314 cards
How did the British fleet maintain cohesion despite wide distribution?
A minor cruiser centre at the Channel Islands let the Downs and Ushant concentrations cohere rapidly; the Cadiz concentration linked with Ushant at Finisterre. Provision was made for all concentrations to condense into one mass off Ushant before a hostile mass could gather there. The author argues this left the British fleet in a state of concentration that only luck could break.
Chapter 31
Why did Villeneuve abandon the campaign after reaching Ferrol?
Villeneuve had united three divisions at Ferrol, but news that Nelson had reappeared at Gibraltar and steered northward convinced him the whole enemy European fleet was concentrated. He wrote that their concentration was more serious than any previous disposition and could meet the combined forces of Brest and Ferrol in superiority. The author notes this knowledge overpowered him, so he gave up the game as lost.
Chapter 31
Why did the British not want to prevent French concentration?
The author argues the British had no reason to prevent enemy concentration, since it was their best chance of a decisive naval decision. While the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected. Only when the enemy attempted concentration and reached its last stage was the situation in British hands, simplified to closing up their own concentration off Ushant.
Chapter 31
What did concentration mean to Barham and the admirals?
It meant the possibility of massing at the right time and place—disposing squadrons about a strategical centre from which fleets could condense for massed action in any direction and fall back when pressed. The ultimate centre was the Channel narrows, but no massing occurred there. The author argues such crude massing would have meant a purely defensive attitude, waiting to be struck, which was arch-heresy to the old masters of war.
Chapter 31
Section 323 cards
In 1782, how did Britain divide its naval effort between home waters and the Caribbean?
Britain concentrated for offensive action in the Caribbean under Rodney, sending everything not absolutely needed for home defence. The home fleet under Howe was reduced so far below enemy strength in European waters that offence there was out of the question. The aim was to secure the most critical area rather than attempt the offensive in both.
Chapter 32
What was Howe's defensive concentration based on in 1782?
It rested on a central mass or reserve at Spithead, a squadron in the Downs watching the Texel for North Sea trade, and another squadron westward watching Brest and interrupting its transatlantic communications. Kempenfelt's capture of Guichen's convoy showed what the western squadron could achieve before Barrington relieved him.
Chapter 32
Why did Howe refuse to detach ships against Dutch trade in May 1782?
The Government thought Howe could use his position off the Texel for offensive operations against Dutch trade. The author argues Howe saw this as losing hold of the design and sacrificing cohesion. He told them he had not detached ships 'not knowing how suddenly there might be a call, for the greater part of it at least, to the westward.'
Chapter 32
Section 334 cards
Why did Howe avoid battle with Langara's fleet on July 12th?
Howe sighted thirty-six of the line under Langara and judged a successful action impossible given his circumstances. He steered north to pass between Scilly and the Land's End, aiming to get westward of the enemy both to protect the Jamaica convoy and to gain a positional advantage for bringing them to action, which the difference in numbers made desirable.
Chapter 33
What general principle governs the degree of division a fleet requires?
The author argues division should be proportional to the number of enemy naval ports and the extent of coastline along which they are spread. This springs from the tradition of not merely preventing attacks on the heart but striking the moment the enemy attempts anything, making every attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. Wars with France, Spain, and Holland required wide distribution; wars with the Dutch alone allowed close concentration.
Chapter 33
Why must a home fleet be kept regardless of the enemy faced?
The author argues a fleet must always stay home: it defends home trade terminals and serves as a central reserve from which divisions can reinforce distant terminals and seize opportunities for counterstrokes. Lord Barham called it the mainspring from which all offensive operations proceed. If enemy lines of operation traverse home waters, as with the Dutch, home concentration suffices; if not, as with the French, close concentration on it will not serve.
Chapter 33
Why does Corbett reject leaving some enemy ports unwatched to entice concentration?
The author argues that leaving ports open frees the unwatched squadrons for sporadic action. Unless one is sure the enemy intends to concentrate for a decisive action, the only way to simplify the situation is to watch every port closely enough to interfere effectually with sporadic action. Then, denied sporadic action, the enemy must either do nothing or concentrate.
Chapter 33
Section 343 cards
Why can the naval maxim 'seek out and destroy the enemy's fleet' not be applied as on land?
Corbett argues that on land it is always theoretically possible to strike the enemy's army, but at sea the enemy can remove his fleet from the board by withdrawing into a defended port, out of reach without an army. No naval force or offensive spirit can then avail, arresting the offence and leaving the superior fleet in a theoretically weak position.
Chapter 34
What three general principles of military lore does Corbett identify, and how do they differ at sea?
Corbett lists concentration of force (overthrowing the enemy's main strength), strategy as a question of definite lines of communication, and concentration of effort (single-minded focus on the force to overthrow). He argues all three differ materially at sea: the fleet can be removed from the board, there are no roads or obstacles afloat, and freedom of movement is nearly unlimited.
Chapter 34
How did the English adapt when the Dutch retired to their coasts and decisive battle could not be forced?
Corbett recounts that when the enemy assumed a defensive attitude and could not be reached or decisively beaten, the English fell back on threatening his commerce. Their fleet sat on the fairway of his homeward-bound trade, on the Dogger Bank or elsewhere, hoping to cost him either his trade or his battle-fleet, or both—subsidiary operations of an ulterior strategical character.
Chapter 34
Section 354 cards
Why did the Government reject Drake's plan to station off the Armada's port?
Corbett argues the Government was not merely pusillanimous or lacking strategic insight. Rather, it feared the chances of Drake missing contact were too great if the Armada sailed before the English fleet could get into position. The enemy's objective was uncertain—Channel, Ireland, or Scotland—and a Spanish invasion army and possible Guise action complicated matters.
Chapter 35
Why does Corbett say 'destroy the enemy's fleet' fails as a practical canon?
Corbett concedes it is a truism as a principle, but untrue as a canon of practical strategy. If the enemy refuses to let you destroy his fleets, you cannot leave trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser raids while awaiting opportunity. The more you concentrate to force a decision, the more trade is exposed to sporadic attack, so you may be forced to occupy positions covering trade rather than the best ones.
Chapter 35
Why was maintaining a close watch off enemy ports preferred despite Nelson's doubts?
Corbett notes the maxim that the enemy's coast should be our frontier is not purely military, though often treated as interchangeable with seeking out the enemy's fleet. Close watch off enemy ports was never the likeliest route to decisive action—Nelson declared as much—but it was the best and often only way to keep the sea clear for friendly trade and for cruisers against enemy trade.
Chapter 35
What two broad classes of object do all naval operations relate to?
Corbett groups naval operations into two classes: obtaining or disputing command of the sea, and exercising such control of communications as one has, whether or not complete command is secured. He grounds this dual conception in the sailing period's fleet constitution and the theory of war. Practically the classes overlap—battle-squadrons often exercised control, and cruiser lines served as outposts warning the battle-fleet.
Chapter 35
Section 364 cards
What two difficult problems did the battle doctrine entangle old admirals in?
Corbett states that in the normal case of strength, the thorny question was not how to defeat the enemy but how to bring him to action; in casual cases of temporary weakness, it was not how to sell your life dearly but how to maintain the fleet actively on the defensive, denying the enemy the decision he sought while preventing his attaining his ulterior object.
Chapter 36
How does Corbett group all naval operations?
He groups them into three: methods of securing command (by decision or by blockade); methods of disputing command (the fleet in being and minor counter-attacks); and methods of exercising command (defence against invasion, attack and defence of commerce, and attack, defence and support of military expeditions).
Chapter 36
What does Corbett say is the only way to secure permanent command of the sea by naval means?
He states that whatever the nature of the war, permanent and general command of the sea is the condition of ultimate success, and the only way to secure such command by naval means is to obtain a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet. Sooner or later it must be done, and the sooner the better.
Chapter 36
How did the Americans misuse the 'seek out the enemy's fleet' maxim in the Spanish-American War?
The author argues their limited war plan aimed to seize the initiative by establishing themselves in western Cuba in support of the insurgents, and a defensive covering attitude could reduce risk almost to security. Yet when a Spanish squadron was reported crossing the Atlantic, their covering force was diverted to seek out and destroy the enemy fleet.
Chapter 36
Section 374 cards
What mistake did the Americans make at Puerto Rico, and why did it fail?
Admiral Sampson was sent to Puerto Rico, the most obvious point, but the author notes that what is obvious to you is usually obvious to your enemy. The Americans failed to make contact, uncovered their own army's line of passage, and paralysed the initial movement. Only pure chance let them retrieve the error; had the Spanish squadron reached Cienfuegos or Havana instead of Santiago, the campaign would have been lost.
Chapter 37
What principle does Admiral Mahan say the American movement violated?
Mahan, in Lessons of the War with Spain, argues the eastward voyage of the Havana division was a mistake because it was inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by conditions. That principle condemns eccentric movements. By disregarding it, the Americans uncovered both Havana and Cienfuegos, which it was their object to close to the enemy's division.
Chapter 37
How did Japanese strategy in the Russo-Japanese War differ from the American approach?
The Japanese advanced their base near Port Arthur to cover the army's lines of passage, not with fixed intent to destroy the Russian fleet, since there was small hope of that at sea. The true offensive was on land. Except once under express orders from Tokio, Togo and Kamimura never jeopardized their preventive duty. Later, Togo did not seek out the Baltic fleet but waited on the defensive, assured the enemy must come to him.
Chapter 37
What does Corbett say about the maxim of 'seeking out' the enemy's fleet?
Corbett argues the maxim, despite its moral exhilaration and value as an expression of sound naval spirit, must not displace well-reasoned judgment: it is a trusty servant but a bad master, as the Americans found. He says it expresses the secret of British success at sea, yet cannot be done without or in its nakedness. He traces its germ to Drake's 1588 despatch, where 'impeach' meant to prevent, not destroy.
Chapter 37
Section 384 cards
What two principles does Corbett distill from the original case of 'seeking out'?
Corbett draws two principles from the Elizabethan case: first, the moral value of seizing the initiative, and second, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilisation is complete. He notes the idea of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present, unless in the admirals' unclear notion of striking a demoralised fleet, as the Armada was after its first rebuff.
Chapter 38
Why did the English Government forbid Drake's proposed movement to the Spanish coast?
The Government feared a forward movement would result in a blow in the air and uncover the vital position without bringing the enemy to action, as in the recent American case. Corbett cautions this was not necessarily pusillanimity or failure to grasp Drake's idea. Drake insisted it was a question of time as well as place.
Chapter 38
What dilemma did Tromp raise about seeking out the enemy versus convoy duty?
Tromp saw the incompatibility of his two functions and asked for clearer instructions. He questioned whether, on finding a chance to blockade the English fleet, he should leave the merchant fleet prey to fast frigates or continue escort duty. He protested he wished to have only one duty, since doing both was attended with great difficulties.
Chapter 38
What four ideas does Corbett say took shape in the winter after Dungeness?
Corbett credits that winter with the Articles of War making discipline possible, the first attempt to formulate Fighting Instructions conceiving a tactical system, the conviction that sea war meant operations against the enemy's armed fleets to destroy naval resistance rather than reprisals against trade, and the view that such warfare required a fleet of State-owned warships with minimal private assistance.
Chapter 38
Section 394 cards
What did Monk forbid in the last action of the first war?
Monk forbade taking possession of disabled vessels so that nothing would check the work of destruction; all were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as destruction would permit. The author presents this as the new doctrine carried to exaggeration, since naval thought centered entirely on battle-fleet action and made no provision for adequate control.
Chapter 39
Why did the Dutch attack Sheerness and Chatham succeed?
The author argues it stemmed directly from exaggerating the new doctrine: massing for offensive action was pressed so far that no reliefs sustained it, so the fleet suffered periods of exhaustion and had to return to base. The British Government believed the St. James's Fight had settled command, opened peace negotiations, and laid up the bulk of the battle-fleet for financial reasons, leaving the Dutch free to strike.
Chapter 39
What did the narrow-sea condition prove about decisive victory?
The author argues that where belligerents face each other across a narrow sea, a complete decision is not to be looked for without very special strategical preparation, because retreat is easy and pursuit is restricted. The lesson of the war was that such victories required working for, not merely seeking out the enemy on his own coasts.
Chapter 39
What did Cornwallis order Cotton if the French put to sea unseen?
Cornwallis ordered Cotton not to follow the French unless absolutely sure of their course. Leaving the entrance of the Channel unprotected would let the enemy profit by it and assist the invasion threatening His Majesty's dominions, whose protection was Cotton's principal object. The author cites this as typical of the admirals' cunning, refusing to merely conform to the enemy's movements.
Chapter 39
Section 404 cards
Why did Nelson pursue Villeneuve to the West Indies, according to Corbett?
Corbett argues Nelson's dominant object was to save Jamaica from capture, not primarily to bring Villeneuve to action. If mere contact were the aim, Nelson would have been better placed waiting off St. Vincent or closing on the strategical centre off Ushant. Corbett adds that the pursuit did not uncover the Mediterranean, which was made secure first, and that as a purely strategical movement it had no demonstrable influence on the campaign.
Chapter 40
What example does Corbett offer as the true model of 'seeking out'?
Corbett points not to Nelson's chase but to Barham's restrained orders to Cornwallis and Calder. They were to move out on Villeneuve's two possible lines of approach for such time and distance as would make decisive action almost certain, while ensuring vital defensive positions were preserved if contact were missed. Corbett argues Barham avoided being jockeyed into sacrificing the position Napoleon wished to secure.
Chapter 40
How does Corbett distinguish naval from commercial blockade?
Corbett treats naval blockade as a method of securing command and a function of battle-squadrons, aiming to prevent an enemy's armed force leaving port or to bring it to action. Commercial blockade is a method of exercising command, mainly an affair of cruisers, stopping the flow of the enemy's sea-borne trade in his own or neutral bottoms by denying him trade communications.
Chapter 40
What does Corbett mean by 'close' versus 'open' blockade?
Corbett adopts 'close' and 'open' from Nelson's protest that he did not intend to close-watch Toulon but offered the enemy every opportunity to put to sea. Close blockade aims to shut the port; open blockade watches it so the enemy sails and can be brought to action. Corbett notes close blockade as formerly conceived is generally regarded as no longer practicable, but the antithetical ideas remain strategically relevant.
Chapter 40
Section 414 cards
Why did the author argue a too-rigorous naval blockade could be counterproductive?
The author argues that too rigorous a blockade could deter the enemy from coming out to fight, when a decisive battle was usually the desired end. Where no higher military consideration intervened, such as imminent invasion or an expedition in hand, it was in the blockader's interest to tempt the enemy toward the bolder choice by seeming weaker or withdrawing to a distance.
Chapter 41
How did Nelson's 1805 disposition off Cadiz exemplify open blockade?
Nelson sought to bring Villeneuve to action by tempting him with a prospect of success, leading him to believe the blockading force was smaller or removing it to a distance. But merely leaving a port open does not fulfill the idea of open blockade; Nelson added the pressure of a commercial blockade on adjacent ports to starve Villeneuve into taking to the sea.
Chapter 41
What three postulates must be kept in mind for open blockade?
First, since the object is to get the enemy to sea, the position must give him an opportunity to do so. Second, since contact for a decisive battle is desired, the position must be no further from his port than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can effect his purpose. Third, economy: adopt the method least exhausting to the fleet and best preserving battle fitness.
Chapter 41
How does close blockade differ from open blockade in strategic purpose?
Close blockade is characteristically a method of securing local and temporary command; its dominating purpose is usually to prevent the enemy's fleet acting in a certain area for a certain purpose. Open blockade, by aiming at the destruction of the enemy's naval force, is a definite step toward securing permanent command. The author notes the choice between them is one of extreme complexity.
Chapter 41
Section 423 cards
Why did the new form of blockade succeed against the French in home waters?
Corbett notes the success owed less to strictness than to the French making no further effort to cross the Atlantic. In certain weather the fleet had to raise the blockade and run to Torbay or Plymouth, giving the French a two or three days' start southward. Against attempts to reach the east or north to dispute command of the Channel, however, the system was thoroughly efficient and unaffected by these intervals of open form.
Chapter 42
Why did Howe favor open blockade over closing Brest?
Howe held the enemy could always escape after a gale that drew off or dispersed the blockading squadron, damaging ships and enheartening the enemy. He said an enemy is not restrained by a station off their port with a barely superior squadron. His force was reduced to defensive strength, so his first duty was keeping it in being, husbanding ships and training recruits at Spithead or St. Helen's.
Chapter 42
What reasons does Corbett give for the open system's failure in the American Independence War?
Corbett says the causes were not all inherent in the system. Relieving Gibraltar prevented the Western Squadron devoting itself entirely to its watch; defective administration meant winters were not used energetically to prepare the fleet for spring; and failure came less from letting the French cross the Atlantic than from not dealing faithfully with them on arrival. Rodney and his fellows were found wanting — defective execution as much as design.
Chapter 42
Section 434 cards
Why did Howe's 1796 dispositions draw criticism, and what was his actual aim?
Critics condemned Howe for not closing Brest, but the author argues the situation differed from 1800: the French fleet was nearly destroyed, no invasion threatened, and policy sought offensive pressure on French trade and territory to force peace. Keeping the Brest fleet at sea, not in port, was desired so it would expose itself defending French maritime interests.
Chapter 43
How was the home fleet distributed in 1796, and what was the reserve's purpose?
The fleet was split into three active squadrons—North Sea, before Brest, and cruising westward—with a strong reserve at Portsmouth. The author argues the reserve was a general reserve able to act in the North Sea or wherever needed, not merely the Brest squadron's reserve, and also served as a training and depot squadron anticipating the addition of the Spanish fleet.
Chapter 43
Why did the 1796 Irish expedition fail despite Howe's dispositions?
The disposition did not prevent part of the Irish force landing, but it made the venture so difficult it was deferred to mid-winter, when weather broke up the expedition. The author notes the force was seen leaving Brest by the inshore cruiser squadron and reported to Colpoys, and only a dense fog let it escape—an evasion no naval defence can certainly guarantee, especially in winter.
Chapter 43
Why did Nelson not use close blockade in the Mediterranean, according to the author?
The author argues Nelson's desire to bring the Toulon squadron to action was kept subordinate to his defensive duty of preventing a descent on Neapolitan or Levantine territory. Close blockade was the most effectual means, but one usual condition was absent: he lacked such preponderance of force as would sustain it to perfect continuity, making the close form too weak or exhausting.
Chapter 43
Section 444 cards
What did Nelson recommend in his 1801 letter to the Admiralty about blockading?
Nelson urged keeping squadrons compact and in good order, with Dungeness as their principal station. In fine weather they should go out and show themselves, but never risk being crippled or drawn into the North Sea, so an effective force would always be ready. Corbett notes the case concerns direct resistance to invasion, not general command, but shows Nelson's view on balancing risks.
Chapter 44
How did Lord Melville argue against maintaining a strict winter blockade?
Melville recommended relaxing the strictness of blockade, protesting that available means were insufficient if ships were to be torn apart by winter tempests. He craved a decisive action to end the strain, reminding Cornwallis that victories generally came when fleets were away from the blockading station. Cornwallis nonetheless had his way, and history approved for moral effect.
Chapter 44
According to Corbett, what two situations justify close blockade?
First, it may be essential to secure local and temporary command of a theatre, as when invasion threatens, an expedition must cross, or commerce exigencies demand it. Second, even when seeking a great decision, one squadron may be closely blockaded to induce the enemy to attempt breaking it, leading him to be struck in detail or to concentrate where we desire.
Chapter 44
What does Corbett conclude about choosing between close and open blockade?
Corbett argues we can never say close blockade is better than open, or the reverse; it must always be a matter of judgment, since war is 'an option of difficulties.' He does hold that close blockade is inherently weak and more exhausting, requiring relatively superior force, while modern conditions have widened the field for open blockade.
Chapter 44
Section 454 cards
What is the inherent weakness of close blockade according to Corbett?
Corbett argues close blockade is an offensive operation with a negative object, but it produces an "arrest of the offensive": once the blockaders seize the communications they can do no more, and must wait defensively for the enemy to attack. During that arrest, the advantage of surprise passes to the enemy, leaving the blockaders on the defensive without its material benefits.
Chapter 45
Why does Corbett say modern conditions practically prohibit the old close blockade?
Corbett argues steam and new weapons degrade the old close blockade. A steam fleet in port suffers less than a sail fleet, but blockaders face greater physical strain, supply difficulty while coal is fuel, and constant vigilance since wind no longer limits enemy movement. Surprise now may mean the blockaders' own destruction by mine or torpedo, not merely escape.
Chapter 45
How can the old close blockade be given a modern form?
Corbett proposes the shoreward limit be set at the night range of destroyers and day range of submarines—half the distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn and dark—unless a torpedo-proof base can be established within it. This corresponds in principle to the old close blockade, as the Japanese blockade of Port Arthur showed.
Chapter 45
What advantages does Corbett claim for adopting open blockade frankly?
Corbett argues open blockade substitutes a true defensive disposition for an arrested offence, avoiding exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men—especially the flotilla screen. It offers a position secure from surprise, keeps the fleet at high striking energy, and, where geography promises contact, makes quick decision more probable. Concealment also allows traps, like Nelson's for Villeneuve in 1805.
Chapter 45
Section 463 cards
What was Barham's objection to Howe's open blockade?
Barham objected on purely physical, not moral, grounds: open blockade left the enemy too free to raid British trade routes. In a 1794 letter to Pitt he warned that if the French sailed with an easterly wind while Howe stayed at Torbay, the Mediterranean and Jamaica convoys would be in a critical situation, since both fleets were nearing the Channel and could not enter it while the easterly wind held.
Chapter 46
What general conclusion does Corbett reach on open versus close blockade?
Corbett concludes that however strong the purely naval and strategical reasons for open blockade as the best route to a decision against the enemy's fleet, the ulterior object—trade protection or the security of military expeditions—will seldom leave commanders entirely free to use the open method. They must be prepared at times to use a blockade as close to the old close blockade as changed conditions permit.
Chapter 46
How does a defensive fleet hold command in dispute, and what examples does Corbett give?
Corbett argues a Power too weak to win command offensively may hold it in dispute by a general defensive attitude, preventing enemy positive results and buying time to win ends ashore. In the Seven Years' War the French delayed Canada's reduction for five campaigns; Napoleon avoided general actions and kept command in dispute until alliances gathered force, continuing nine years after his fleet failed.
Chapter 46
Section 474 cards
According to Corbett, what is the keynote of naval defence?
The author argues that at sea the essence of defence is mobility and an untiring aggressive spirit, not rest and resistance. The main conception is avoiding decisive action through strategical or tactical activity so as to keep the fleet in being until the situation develops favourably. Everything is counterattack, whether on the enemy's force or his maritime communications.
Chapter 47
Why are defended positions less admissible at sea than on land?
Corbett argues a fleet withdrawing to a defended position leaves open to the enemy the ulterior object, control of sea communications, whereas on land an army in position may cover territory for a prolonged period. An army in position exhausts its opponent, but an inactive fleet too often lets the enemy exhaust its own country's resources.
Chapter 47
How does Corbett say 'a fleet in being' has been misunderstood?
The author argues the phrase has been restricted, through misunderstanding the circumstances of its invention, to defence against invasion. He says if extended to mean defence against any kind of maritime attack, whether on territory or sea communications, its broad truth becomes apparent and gives the true conception of the idea as held in the British service.
Chapter 47
What was Torrington's plan in the 1690 crisis?
Facing Tourville's superior French fleet, Torrington decided with his council of war to act on the defensive, avoid battle, and try to concentrate with Killigrew, Shovel, and the Plymouth division by getting westward, or retire to the Gunfleet to repel attack amid the shoals. He held that hazarding a decision in inferior strength was the best way to lose the command.
Chapter 47
Section 484 cards
Why did Nottingham reject Torrington's plan, according to Corbett?
Corbett argues Nottingham misunderstood rather than failed to appreciate the design. The minister believed Torrington meant to retire at once to the Gunfleet, thinking a fleet safe in port counted as "in being." Torrington actually meant the Gunfleet as his extreme point, retiring only if the French forced him. Nottingham feared this would preserve the fleet while exposing everything else to destruction.
Chapter 48
What did the Queen's order to Torrington permit and require?
The order said the consequences of retiring to the Gunfleet seemed so fatal that Torrington should rather, on any advantage of the wind, give battle than retreat further than necessary to gain advantage. It left him discretion to go westward to complete concentration, provided he never lost sight of the French fleet, so they could not attempt the shore, the Medway or Thames, or escape without fighting.
Chapter 48
What was the real fallacy of the Government's plan, per Corbett?
Corbett argues the plan had a specious appearance of bold offensive but could achieve only a negative result. The most a battle could give was leaving command in dispute; the worst would give the enemy a positive result gravely compromising William's campaign in Ireland. Torrington's plan was safer and calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end.
Chapter 48
How did Torrington's design succeed despite fighting at the wrong time?
Though forced to fight at Beachy Head, Torrington disengaged when the wind dropped, refusing the French a real decision. Retiring eastward, he drew the French to Dover before running to the Nore, so Tourville could not return west until the endangered ships were safe in Plymouth. He prevented French gains affecting the war and foiled Tourville's plan of destroying the British fleet in detail, though retribution by offensive was no longer possible.
Chapter 48
Section 494 cards
How did Kempenfelt describe the value of a 'fleet in being'?
Kempenfelt argued an inferior fleet kept actively in being could permit a drastic offensive even when inferior overall, by seeking superiority at some part where the enemy has designs. A flying squadron of two-decked ships should hang on the enemy's large fleet, profit from accidental separation, intercept supplies and intelligence, and check the enemy's motions. The author presents this as the developed idea of a 'fleet in being' with a high aggressive spirit.
Chapter 49
What did Nelson predict about Jervis and the inferior British fleet?
Writing from the Mediterranean in 1796, Nelson said he would venture his life that Sir John Jervis would defeat the combined fleet—not by a regular battle, but through the admiral's skill and the officers' and seamen's activity and spirit. He argued the country's variable winds meant that within twenty-four hours part of a large fleet could be attacked while the rest was becalmed or had contrary winds.
Chapter 49
What limit does the author place on a 'fleet in being' against invasion?
The author insists the doctrine concerns only general command of the sea, holding it in dispute as Torrington used it. Preventing a particular operation like oversea invasion depends on local conditions: if the fleet can be contained so it cannot reach the invading line of passage, it is no bar to invasion. He notes that in 1690 Tourville was himself as well contained as Torrington, since his retreat left Shovel's and Killigrew's squadrons unfought.
Chapter 49
How did Kempenfelt's theory prove itself off Ushant?
Commanding the flying squadron he postulated, Kempenfelt seized a favourable opportunity for action off Ushant, capturing a convoy of military stores essential to French operations in the West Indies. The capture occurred under the nose of De Guichen, whose escort was nearly twice Kempenfelt's force. The author cites this as demonstrating the positive side of Kempenfelt's theory in a brilliant and convincing manner.
Chapter 49
Section 504 cards
Why does Corbett doubt the value of Tourville's 1691 campagne au large?
Corbett argues Tourville kept the sea off the Channel for fifty days while the British Channel fleet made no systematic effort to seek him out, but Russell simply covered the Smyrna convoy's approach, then took position off Ushant between Tourville and his base. With communications cut and retreat threatened, Tourville escaped into port, having accomplished nothing beyond taking a few ships from a West India convoy.
Chapter 50
What does Corbett say about French defensive strategy and policy?
The author argues the defensive bred a habit of mind that left France incapable of striking hard when strong, which he says explains her conduct in the War of American Independence. Yet he insists policy must be distinguished from strategy: it was often not the defensive strategy that was bad but the policy condemning admirals to negative operations, a policy continental exigencies permitted no escape from.
Chapter 50
What does Corbett say about the moral danger of the defensive?
Corbett argues the danger of the defensive lies in its moral reactions, so insidious as to tempt one never to utter the word. Yet with Torrington, Kempenfelt, and Nelson in mind, he says it would be folly to ignore it, and it must be studied to learn how to break it down. Study is safe only if one keeps the spirit of restless, vigilant counter-attack that Kempenfelt and Nelson regarded as its essence.
Chapter 50
Why does Corbett caution against overrating the Port Arthur torpedo attack?
Corbett notes only one case exists, so extreme caution is needed. He compares it to fireships: a new weapon that prepared a decisive success in 1588 but achieved less and less as naval science developed, until it was nearly negligible. At Port Arthur, uncertain intelligence diverted two of five destroyer divisions to Dalny, where no enemy was found, suggesting conditions favor the defence.
Chapter 50
Section 514 cards
What two lessons does Corbett draw from the Port Arthur torpedo attack?
The author argues the case shows, first, that measures to confuse the enemy and even lay traps for his flotilla should be taken before war; second, that even the flimsiest defence has great power against such attacks, so the chances of success can scarcely ever justify the risk. Everything favoured the Japanese, yet the attack's physical effect was small.
Chapter 51
Why does Corbett insist the Port Arthur case was far from normal?
It was a blow before declaration, when the menace of strained relations had been almost entirely ignored by the Russians. The Russian squadron was also not ordinarily efficient but had fallen into a lax condition scarcely likely to recur in another naval Power. In such exceptional circumstances, the author argues, a minor attack could always be counted on for some success.
Chapter 51
What was the actual material result of the Port Arthur attack?
The author argues it swung the balance enough for the Japanese to exercise local control long enough to land troops and isolate Port Arthur. But the physical effect was so small that the squadron recovered and became potent again before the siege could be formed, even without an adequate dockyard. The minor attacks that followed were all failures.
Chapter 51
How does Corbett assess submarines and torpedo warfare for future war?
The author argues torpedo range and offensive power have grown faster than means of resisting it, though a squadron in a defended port is probably no easier to injure and one at sea that shifts position remains hard to locate. The unproved value of submarines deepens the mist; strategically they are a new factor favouring naval defence and the 'Fleet in being,' with considerable moral influence early in a war.
Chapter 51
Section 524 cards
According to Corbett, what is the primary objective in operations for exercising control, such as defence against invasion?
The author argues that in operations for exercising control—especially defence against invasion—the primary objective is the enemy's army, not the enemy's fleet. The fleet is the objective only for operations securing control, so long as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. Corbett says British plans for resisting invasion were built on this postulate from the Armada to 1805.
Chapter 52
Why does Corbett say operations for exercising command must accompany, not merely follow, those for securing command?
Corbett concedes that logically securing command by destroying the enemy's forces should come first. But he argues war is not conducted by logic: extraneous necessities intrude, and war is a complex sum of naval, military, political, financial, and moral factors. The naval factor cannot ignore the others, so some operations for exercising command will not wait their turn, and both categories usually start together.
Chapter 52
How did Hawke's 1759 blockade and Anson's orders treat the French transports?
Corbett cites Hawke's blockade keeping a firm hold on the transports in the Morbihan. When Hawke sought to extend operations against the Rochefort squadron, Anson reminded him that the principal object was first the interception of the enemy's embarkations at Morbihan, and second keeping the ships of war from coming out of Brest. Admirals' instructions called transports the 'principal object.'
Chapter 52
How did Sir John Norris plan to handle the 1744 case where an invading army at Dunkirk and a French fleet both threatened?
Norris intended to take his whole squadron off Dunkirk to prevent the transports sailing. If they escaped and went north, he would detach a superior force to destroy them, using the remainder to fight or observe the French fleet. If the transports put to sea, he meant to attack them offensively while merely containing the enemy's battle-fleet by defensive observation.
Chapter 52
Section 534 cards
What was Nelson's plan for attacking Napoleon's Egyptian expedition?
Nelson organized his fleet into three sub-squadrons: one of six sail and two of four each. According to Berry, his flag-captain, two sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war while the third pursued and destroyed transports. This meant using no more than ten, possibly only eight, of his battleships against the enemy's eleven, to make sure of Napoleon's army.
Chapter 53
Why can an invasion of Great Britain never occur over a commanded sea?
The author argues that if Britain has gained complete command, no invasion can take place or will be attempted. If command is lost completely, no invasion is necessary, since Britain must make peace on the best terms available. Therefore any invasion attempt must come over an uncommanded sea, where command is always in dispute.
Chapter 53
Why did Santa-Cruz's original plan of transports and fleet in one mass fail?
The author argues that a mass of transports and warships is the most cumbrous and vulnerable engine of war ever known. Ripening military science convinced Santa-Cruz of its weakness. Where contact with the enemy's fleet is certain, especially in narrow seas, the defender gets every chance he could desire, provided he makes the army in its transports the main objective rather than its escort.
Chapter 53
What vicious circle do all invasions of England without command of the sea enter?
The author argues the invader must either defeat the covering battle-fleet in battle or close his own battle-fleet on the transports, setting up the very situation he designed to avoid. Reinforcing the transport escort requires dividing the fleet, which risks defeat in detail. So the invader is forced to bring his whole force to the army or abandon the attempt until command is secured by battle.
Chapter 53
Section 544 cards
On what does the traditional British anti-invasion system fundamentally rest?
Corbett states the system is built on the flotilla hold on the invading army, maintained by flotilla blockade and defence, stiffened as circumstances dictate by higher units, and by battle-fleet cover. The local danger to that hold determines how much stiffening the flotilla needs, and the security of the hold determines the battle-fleet's position and action.
Chapter 54
What did Parma require of the Spanish fleet for the 1588 enterprise?
Parma, the military commander-in-chief, laid down that the Spanish fleet would have to protect his passage and support his landing, and also keep open his communications for the flow of provisions and munition. The design was a true invasion, a continuing operation for permanent conquest, though internal support from Catholic malcontents was expected.
Chapter 54
How did English dispositions shape the Armada battle, per Corbett?
Corbett argues the English secured contact far from the line of passage, permitting prolonged harassing attacks in waters unfamiliar to the enemy and close to English support. No battle to the death was needed until the Spaniards were herded into narrow waters where both fleet sections massed. He says only a lucky shift of wind saved the Armada from total destruction on the Dutch banks.
Chapter 54
Why was the French invasion attempt of 1744 so favourable to the invader?
Corbett lists Jacobite sedition in England, restless Scotland, a navy at its worst for spirit, organisation and command, and the 'Drunken Administration.' After unsuccessful war with Spain and Continental support for Maria Theresa, home defence was at its lowest ebb: only forty-three ships, including eighteen of the line, were available for home waters, and over half the home army was abroad.
Chapter 54
Section 554 cards
Why did Marshal Saxe refuse to cross to England without a naval escort?
Saxe would not attempt the passage without escort because the Thames held too many privateers and armed merchantmen, plus cruisers on commerce-protection duty. The plan therefore detached a division from the Brest fleet to join the transports off Dunkirk, while Roquefeuil held the British ships at Portsmouth by battle or blockade.
Chapter 55
Why does Corbett argue Norris's move to the Downs did not save Britain from invasion?
Corbett rejects the usual claim that the false movement was a happy chance that saved the country. He argues Saxe had already decided not to face the Thames ships without escort, and those ships could have destroyed him. The forced move actually spoilt the campaign, preventing Norris from destroying the Brest fleet as well as stopping the invasion.
Chapter 55
What was Norris's plan for dealing with the enemy army and fleet?
Norris resolved to keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy fleet, using close blockade off Dunkirk. If the transports slipped out, he would detach a superior force to pursue them, and with the remainder fight or observe the French fleet. He would treat the enemy army offensively and their fleet defensively; the King approved.
Chapter 55
What advantage did Roquefeuil's need to close on the army give Norris?
Roquefeuil's orders required him to bring the British fleet to action or prevent concentration while detaching Barraille to escort the transports, effectively dividing the French fleet. This gave Norris the interior position. Learning Roquefeuil had only fifteen of the line at Dungeness, he saw time to throw his whole force at the fleet without losing hold of the army's line of passage.
Chapter 55
Section 564 cards
What was the new feature of the French invasion plan of 1759?
The army would start from three widely separated points in more open waters: a diversionary raid from Dunkirk and two forces from Havre and the Morbihan. This gave the Western Squadron off Brest two cruiser blockades to secure, one on either side of it, while a concentration on the Brest fleet from the Mediterranean and West Indies was meant to provide control.
Chapter 56
How did the British defend against the 1759 plan, and what happened to Conflans?
Cruiser squadrons held the Dunkirk and Morbihan divisions, and a supported flotilla held the Havre division, whose flat boats could not move without a squadron. Boscawen beat the Mediterranean squadron off Lagos, so Conflans protested his force was too weak to divide. He took his whole fleet to the Morbihan transports, and Hawke caught him at Quiberon.
Chapter 56
What did Kempenfelt argue about a nimble inferior fleet?
Kempenfelt argued the comparative force of two fleets depends much on their sailing, since the faster fleet can engage or not as it pleases and choose its opportunity. He held that twenty-five coppered sail of the line could harass the unwieldy combined Armada, dart on separated ships, cut off provisions, and force the whole fleet to escort the transports.
Chapter 56
Why did Hardy retreat to St. Helen's in 1779, and how is it justified?
Hardy kept his fleet westward and undefeated until he needed supplies, then ran to St. Helen's rather than Plymouth, avoiding the enemy. The author argues this matched the principle making the invading army the primary objective: replenishment belonged on the invader's line of passage, so invasion could not proceed until his fleet was defeated.
Chapter 56
Section 574 cards
Why did d'Orvilliers fail to bring Hardy to decisive action in 1778?
Count d'Orvilliers, the allied commander-in-chief, made the Lizard on August 14th and spent a fortnight trying to force Hardy into decisive action. Until he succeeded he dared not enter the Channel or detach a squadron to break the cruiser blockades at the invasion bases. His efforts exhausted his fleet's endurance, already sapped by the distant concentration at Finisterre, and he returned impotent to Brest.
Chapter 57
What did Dumouriez believe could have made the invasion succeed?
Dumouriez thought the enterprise might have gone through if the bulk of the fleet had made a diversion against Ireland, with a coup de main delivered on the Isle of Wight under its cover, for which he said six or eight of the line would have been enough. Corbett argues it is inconceivable that Hardy and Kempenfelt would have been so easily beguiled of their hold on the line of passage.
Chapter 57
What was Napoleon's only new idea for the invasion flotilla, and why did it fail?
Napoleon's only new idea was to arm his transport flotilla to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. The British replied by strengthening their flotilla. Convinced by experiment that the scheme was now impracticable, he turned to breaking the blockade by a sudden flying squadron from a distance, but plan after plan melted in his hand.
Chapter 57
What four relations does Corbett say the old defensive system depended on?
Corbett states the old system's success depended on four relations: the speed of mobilisation and embarkation versus the speed of reporting restlessness in foreign ports; the speed of convoys versus cruisers and flotilla; the destructive power of cruisers and flotillas against a convoy versus sailing days; and the speed of convoys versus battle-squadrons, which governs securing an interior position.
Chapter 57
Section 583 cards
Why does Corbett say attack on trade implies naval inferiority?
The author argues that a belligerent making commerce destruction his primary object implies inferiority at sea; with superiority his aim would be to convert it into working command by battle or blockade. Except in rare cases of equal forces, the commerce raider must therefore deal with a superior fleet, which shapes the whole problem of trade war.
Chapter 58
What is the controlling paradox of war on commerce?
The author argues that where attack is most to be feared, defence is easiest. Trade is vulnerable only in the few narrow areas where it congregates, and those areas can be easily occupied by a superior force. Beyond them effective occupation is impossible, but so is effective attack; hence facility of attack means facility of defence.
Chapter 58
Why are attack and defence of trade almost indistinguishable?
Because sea communications are common to both sides, occupying them satisfies both ideas. The strongest attack is occupying the enemy's terminals and blockading their ports, but that usually requires blockading an adjacent naval port, which also defends one's own trade. In focal areas the two ideas are even more inseparable, since most such areas lie on common lines of communication.
Chapter 58
Section 594 cards
How did the defended terminal and focal areas theory work against raiding squadrons?
The system held in force those waters made most fertile by converging trade, giving raiding squadrons an adequate field. Despite elaborate defences, raiders could intrude by surprise or stealth and defy convoy escorts and cruiser outposts. But terminal defence by battle-squadrons prevented raiders from staying long enough to cause serious harm; only a regular fleet of superior strength could break the system down.
Chapter 59
How were the great routes connecting defended areas secured, and why?
Not by patrols but by escort: the convoy system. Its theory held that vessels on great routes faced only sporadic attack, so they were collected into fleets with escort sufficient to repel such attack. Cruiser escort sufficed in theory; in practice, ships-of-the-line bound to or from distant terminal squadrons supplemented it, with battle units specially detailed only exceptionally.
Chapter 59
What was the most serious strategical objection to the convoy system?
Its liability to deflection. A convoy on a great route tended to attract a squadron, losing the route's comparative immunity. Enemy ports were watched within defended areas, but the guard was not impenetrable; an escaping squadron toward a critical route had to be followed. At Trafalgar, the Toulon squadron's escape forced close concentration on the Western Squadron, yet the approaching East and West Indies convoys made retaining the mass impossible beyond two days.
Chapter 59
Which three modern developments did the author say most modify commerce protection?
The author argues three go to the root of the problem: the abolition of privateering, the reduced range of action for all warships, and the development of wireless telegraphy. He notes other factors exist but treats these as fundamental, warning that no part of strategy is more difficult or error-prone for historical deduction given changes in shipping and naval material.
Chapter 59
Section 604 cards
Why does Corbett say cruisers can no longer 'infest' trade routes?
The author argues that reduced radius of action makes sustained pelagic raiding impractical: a cruiser's coal allows only short dashes or a few days' cruising, high-speed chases force early return, and manning or sinking prizes further drains speed and endurance. He concludes that 'infesting' the routes is sheer hyperbole, requiring more ships than any country but Britain could possess.
Chapter 60
How does wireless change the odds for a raiding cruiser?
Corbett argues that because most large merchantmen carry wireless, a raider cannot attack even one without risking summoning an adversary. Once located, every ship within wireless range can be warned and avoid her, forcing her to shift position constantly, which further reduces her staying power. This development, he says, greatly strengthens defence against attack.
Chapter 60
What was the old convoy system's supporting arrangement near defended areas?
Corbett explains that frigates 'on a cruise' did not patrol the great routes. Instead, where routes converged into a fertile danger zone, powerful cruisers and even battleship divisions were thrown forward from defended areas to meet convoys and reinforce escorts, with similar strengthening outward-bound. It was a system of outposts, not route patrol, sometimes extended at focal points like Finisterre and St. Vincent.
Chapter 60
Why does Corbett doubt convoys still pay under modern conditions?
He argues that reduced raiding feasibility, wireless warning, and greater choice of route—steam not bound by winds, less need for landfalls, and more distribution ports spreading trade—increase individual ships' chances of evasion and lessen the risk of dispensing with escort. He also notes cruisers available for attack likely cannot match sailing-era numbers relative to the vastly increased volume of trade.
Chapter 60
Section 614 cards
What two assumptions does Corbett identify behind the claim that larger trade means greater vulnerability?
Corbett says the argument rests on two questionable assumptions: first, that a sea Power's vulnerability through maritime trade is proportional to the volume of that trade; second, that the difficulty of defending sea-borne trade also scales with its volume, so more trade requires proportionally more protective force. He tests both against elementary principles and finds them theoretically unsound.
Chapter 61
According to Corbett, what actually measures a nation's vulnerability through its trade?
The author argues vulnerability is measured by the percentage of destruction an enemy can effect, not by absolute volume. Destroying five millions out of a hundred is felt no more than ordinary peacetime fluctuations; destroying fifty millions overthrows the trade equilibrium. To affect the war's issue, the impression on trade must be insupportable rather than merely annoying, seriously crippling finance or threatening national life.
Chapter 61
Why does Corbett conclude trade vulnerability is inversely, not directly, proportional to volume?
Corbett argues a cruiser's destructive power is always limited—by how many prizes it can physically handle in a given time—and this limit is more restricted in the future. Once that capacity is passed, further trade volume does not affect the issue. Given the low future capacity and the enormous volume of trade, the effective percentage impression must be relatively low, so greater volume makes an effective impression harder.
Chapter 61
What does Corbett say about the historical effect on an enemy who devotes his main effort to trade destruction?
Corbett says the broad indications run the other way: the greater the volume of trade, the less effective impression an enemy could make, even when devoting his whole naval energy to it. In every such case his own trade dwindled to nothing while ours continually increased. He adds that an enemy attacking trade systematically cannot simultaneously dispute command of the sea, so he must leave command to us.
Chapter 61
Section 624 cards
According to Corbett, what determines the force needed to defend trade?
The author argues that trade defence is proportioned not to the volume of trade but to the number and exposure of its terminals and focal points. These remain constant in number regardless of trade volume, and the force required varies with the enemy's base distribution and naval strength. He cites the War of 1812, when American ports as bases greatly increased the force needed in the North Atlantic while trade volume stayed the same.
Chapter 62
What two broad rules does Corbett formulate about trade vulnerability and attack?
The author formulates two rules: first, that the vulnerability of trade is in inverse ratio to its volume; second, that facility of attack means facility of defence. He argues the latter gains special emphasis from modern developments, since the speed and endurance needed for control come at the cost of armour and armament or increased size, and increasing size reduces numbers.
Chapter 62
How did the old East India trade defence system work before St. Helena?
Until about the end of the seventeenth century, long-range trade was expected to defend itself outside the home area, with East Indiamen retaining their armament as the last survival of this practice. Beyond the focal area of St. Helena, ships relied on their own resistance or escort from East Indian station relief ships. Proper escort generally went no farther outward-bound than St. Helena, returning with homeward-bound vessels gathered there.
Chapter 62
Why does Corbett say absolute protection of trade is impossible to seek?
The author argues no means can give trade absolute protection: war cannot be waged without losing ships, and aiming at invulnerability marches to economic ruin, cripples the power to sustain war, and seeks maritime despotism that would set every man's hand against us. He notes even in 1870 a leading naval Power at war with a non-naval enemy lost ships by capture, and Britain's trade was never invulnerable.
Chapter 62
Section 634 cards
What distinguishes naval arrangements for combined expeditions from those for trade convoys?
Corbett argues the fleet's duties do not end with protecting troops in transit, as with convoys, unless the destination is friendly. In the normal case of a hostile destination, the fleet is charged with further exacting duties of support. It is this intrusion of support duties that most sharply distinguishes combined operations from trade protection; otherwise the method of defence need not differ.
Chapter 63
What is the cardinal rule for attacking an enemy expedition?
The transports, not the escort, must be the primary objective of the fleet. The escort must be turned or contained, but never treated as a primary objective unless both turning and containing prove impracticable. Corbett notes this rule held even when the whole enemy battle strength guarded the transports, citing Nelson in 1798 containing rather than destroying the battle-squadron to strike the transports.
Chapter 63
Why can the navy alone not guarantee defence against small expeditions?
Corbett argues experience proves the navy cannot be sure of preventing an expedition's sailing or attacking it in transit, especially where open sea gives a free choice of route, as with French expeditions against Ireland. An adequate navy prevents invasion, but defence against expeditions must be supplemented by a home army able to ensure that expeditions small enough to evade the fleet do no effective harm when they land.
Chapter 63
What four elements constitute a combined expedition?
Corbett describes it as more complex and homogeneous than a convoy, with a fourfold constitution: firstly the army; secondly the transports and landing flotilla of flat-boats and steamboats for towing them, carried in or accompanying the transports; thirdly the 'Squadron in charge of transports,' including the escort proper and supporting flotilla of lighter craft for inshore work; and lastly the 'Covering squadron.'
Chapter 63
Section 644 cards
Why does Corbett say the fourfold constitution of a combined expedition is largely theoretical?
Because in practice the elements are seldom kept sharply distinct and are interwoven intricately; each element must to some extent discharge the functions of the others. The covering squadron may be indistinguishable from escort and support and may supply much of the landing flotilla and force, while the escort may also serve as transport and partly as supporting force. Corbett still argues the fourfold division has practical strategical value beyond defining functions.
Chapter 64
How did commerce protection differ from combined expeditions regarding the covering squadron?
In commerce protection the covering squadron had no place: the battle-fleet held definite terminal areas with no organic connection to convoys, which relied only on their own escort and reinforcements near terminal areas. But a convoy of transports forming part of a combined expedition against an enemy's country, requiring true combined operations, always had a covering battle-squadron provided, attached once operations began from the point of concentration.
Chapter 64
When could a covering squadron be dispensed with entirely, according to the chapter?
Only where the troops' destination was a friendly country and the line of passage was well protected by permanent blockades. Corbett cites expeditions assisting Portugal, treated exactly like commercial convoys. By contrast, Wolfe's expedition to Quebec, Amherst's to Louisburg, and West Indies expeditions always had a battle-squadron as an integral part in the theatre of operations. The Crimean troops first sent to friendly Gallipoli needed no covering squadron.
Chapter 64
What does the 1705 Barcelona episode illustrate about the covering squadron's paramount function?
Shovel was covering the amphibious siege from the French Toulon squadron. When Peterborough needed marines ashore for a coup de main, Shovel consented only on the express understanding that once his cruisers signaled the Toulon squadron putting to sea, the marines would be recalled regardless of land operations; Peterborough agreed. Corbett argues this shows the covering squadron's paramount function is preventing interference with the combined operations, with support duties not overshadowing it.
Chapter 64
Section 654 cards
What tension defines the covering squadron's choice of position?
Corbett frames it as an option of difficulties: as a support unit it should be as near as possible to the objective, but as a covering force preventing enemy intrusion it should be as far away as possible, so as to engage an interfering force at the earliest moment. Certainty of favourable contact is usually found only in touch with the enemy's naval base or with one's own landing force.
Chapter 65
What vital principle must the covering squadron always preserve?
The author insists on the principle of independent existence: however great the need for support, the covering squadron should never become so deeply engaged with the landing force that it cannot disentangle itself to act as a purely naval unit in time to discharge its naval function. It must be able to act like a free field army covering a siege.
Chapter 65
When should the covering squadron station close to the army rather than the enemy base?
Corbett says the choice turns on the support the army likely needs: if surprise is impossible and serious military resistance expected, or coast defences are too strong for the transport squadron, the scale inclines toward a position close to the army. The same applies when strong support of men and boats is required, or amphibious operations beyond the landing are likely.
Chapter 65
How did torpedoes and mines complicate the Japanese covering position at Port Arthur?
The objective included both Port Arthur and its squadron, so the fleet had to hold off that squadron and prevent its escape, indicating close blockade. But close blockade requires a position out of night torpedo range, and the nearest such point lay behind the defences covering the disembarkation. Despite strategical conditions, the covering squadron was repeatedly forced back upon the army.
Chapter 65
Section 663 cards
Why did Admiral Togo's mining of Port Arthur cost the Japanese nothing?
The Japanese fixed defences lay so close to the enemy's base that mining the port entrance guaranteed the Russian exit would be slow enough for Togo to make contact from his defended anchorage before the Russians could get far to sea. Corbett notes that what would happen where no such position could be secured is another matter.
Chapter 66
What went wrong for Persano at Lissa in 1866?
Persano conducted the seizure of Lissa with his entire force, so practically all of it became involved in amphibious work. Tegethoff then put to sea and surprised him; with no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, Persano was decisively defeated by an inferior enemy. Corbett says British practice required an independent covering squadron.
Chapter 66
What did Maitland and Christian each ask battleships to provide?
Maitland, for Belleisle in 1800, asked for line-of-battle ships to furnish men for land operations, with frigates to blockade; St. Vincent gave him one more ship than requested. Christian, for the West Indies in 1795, needed ships of the line to man flat-boats and land guns, providing 2,000 men daily for a force of about 18,000.
Chapter 66
Section 674 cards
Why did Lord Barham object to the expedition's naval requirements?
As First Sea Lord, Barham (formerly Sir Charles Middleton) called the demands excessive, especially the strong escort, believing blockading squadrons could safeguard the transit. The author notes his opinion is not quite convincing, since he opposed the expedition from the start as radically unsound policy, preferring to husband the navy toward a two-Power standard and keep it concentrated for decisive action against Spain.
Chapter 67
How do army and navy preferences differ on choosing a landing place?
The army wants the landing as near the objective as possible—ideally one night's march—while avoiding enemy opposition before a footing is secured. The navy tends the opposite way: the farther from the enemy's strength, the surer the protection against naval interference, ideally out of torpedo range and allowing covering and transport squadrons to work in strategical independence. A joint Staff must reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency.
Chapter 67
What procedure does Corbett describe for resolving landing-place disputes?
The Army Staff presents the coast-line limits and preferred practicable landing points; the Naval Staff states how nearly it can comply, weighing protection difficulties, weather, currents and beach, plus possible gun-fire support. If they disagree, a balance-of-risk question arises for the higher Joint Staff, which decides based on whether the greater danger is from sea or land. Where enemy action at sea is uncertain, the admiral makes the final choice within the area.
Chapter 67
Why did Britain avoid a single commander-in-chief for combined expeditions?
Since Pitt the elder's time, the practice was not to place combined expeditions under one naval or military commander-in-chief empowered to decide between naval and military exigencies. The danger of friction between two commanders was judged small compared with the danger of a single commander erring through unfamiliarity with the other service's limitations. After Rochefort in 1757, commanders often made a joint coast-reconnaissance and settled matters amicably.
Chapter 67
Section 684 cards
How did Drake use a naval feint at San Domingo in 1585?
Corbett cites Drake's attack on San Domingo as the earliest modern precedent: while troops landed a night's march away, the bulk of the fleet moved before the place, kept it alarmed all night, and at dawn demonstrated a direct landing with boats under cover of its guns. The garrison moved out to meet the threat and was surprised in flank by the real landing force.
Chapter 68
How did Saunders's feint help Wolfe land at Quebec?
Saunders made a show of preparing to bombard Montcalm's lines below the city, then in the morning began demonstrating a landing of marines with the fleet's boats. This held Montcalm away from Wolfe's landing place until a secure footing was gained. Similar demonstrations above the city combined so that Wolfe penetrated the centre of the French position unopposed.
Chapter 68
Why does Corbett say feints are hard for defenders to detect?
Corbett argues amphibious forces have such secrecy and mobility that enemies struggle to distinguish real attacks from feints. Even during a landing, defenders cannot tell whether all troops land at one point if a demonstration occurs elsewhere; at Quebec, Montcalm only knew he faced the whole British force when face to face with Wolfe. Strategically, one cannot be sure a landing is an advance guard or a diversion.
Chapter 68
What does Corbett conclude about feints and command of the sea?
Corbett argues feints remain effective, and steam propulsion may make such operations easier than ever, though good railways in the descent theatre diminish their effect while mine-sweeping vessels offer a new instrument of demonstration. But where the enemy has a working command of the sea, the hazard is not reduced: until his hold is broken by purely naval action, combined work remains beyond legitimate risk of war.
Chapter 68
Section 694 cards
What two things does Major Strategy determine?
Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war. It includes (1) selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object, and (2) selection of the force to be used, meaning it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.
Chapter 69
What does Corbett call the deflection of strategy by politics?
The author argues the friction between politico-diplomatic and commercial-financial considerations is inherent in war and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease, but he argues it is really a vital factor in every strategical problem, since no question of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy.
Chapter 69
How does Corbett distinguish positive from negative objects?
A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves; a negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something. Where the object is positive, strategy is offensive; where the object is negative, strategy is defensive.
Chapter 69
What is the essence of the true defensive, and when is it useful?
True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike; its strength and essence is the counter-stroke, and a well-designed defensive threatens or conceals an attack. Except as preparation or cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use, since by defensive alone we can never acquire anything, only prevent the enemy acquiring.
Chapter 69
Section 704 cards
How does Corbett distinguish a diversion from an eccentric attack?
Corbett defines diversions as operations against an enemy outside his theatre of offensive operations, with a negative object: preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are true offensive movements with a positive object, aiming to acquire something from the enemy. Being the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions.
Chapter 70
Why should diversions be small, and what justifies them?
Corbett argues diversions should be small because the nearer they approach a real attack, the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own. Only their power to divert or contain a larger force justifies the breach of the law of concentration they involve. That power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, most developed in combined expeditions.
Chapter 70
What distinguishes a war with limited object from one with unlimited object?
Corbett classifies wars by their ulterior object. A limited war is where we merely seek to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions or interests, as in the Spanish-American War's aim of liberating Cuba. An unlimited war is where we seek to overthrow the enemy completely so he must agree to do our will, as in the Franco-German War.
Chapter 70
How does Corbett define a theatre of war versus a theatre of operations?
Corbett rejects the usual definition of the theatre of war as all territory where hostile parties may assail each other, since for an island power it must include sea areas. He prefers: the geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of the war and subordinate objects leading to them. A theatre of operations is the area, sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before securing the particular operation's object.
Chapter 70
Section 714 cards
According to Corbett, what does 'command of the sea' actually mean?
The author argues command of the sea means control of communications in which belligerents are adversely concerned, not occupation of territory. Since the sea cannot be owned or subsisted upon and neutrals cannot be excluded, Colomb's 'conquest of water territory' rests on a false analogy. Command of the sea can never be a war's ulterior object unless the war is purely maritime, though it may be a primary or immediate object.
Chapter 71
What three functions has the Fleet historically performed, apart from purely maritime wars?
Corbett lists three: preventing or securing alliances by deterring or persuading neutrals; protecting or destroying commerce; and furthering or hindering military operations ashore. He calls this the best working definition of Naval Strategy, emphasizing its connection with diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major strategy. These functions may be discharged by direct territorial attacks or by getting command of the sea.
Chapter 71
How does Corbett distinguish general from local command of the sea?
General command exists when the enemy can no longer act dangerously against our lines of passage and communication or defend his own, practically when he cannot send squadrons to sea. It does not mean he can do nothing, only that he cannot seriously interfere. Local command means we can prevent enemy interference with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.
Chapter 71
Why is the state of disputed command the most important for practical strategy?
Corbett argues dispute is the normal condition, at least early in war and often throughout, lasting until one side can no longer send a squadron to sea. It is to the preponderating Navy's advantage to end dispute by seeking a decision, which explains the French tradition of avoiding decisive actions against England. General command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations.
Chapter 71
Section 724 cards
Why does Corbett say 'command of the sea' is too loose a term for strategy?
The author argues the phrase is too vague for strategical discussion and should be replaced for practical purposes with 'control of passage and communication.' The real question in planning an operation becomes not whether one has command of the sea, but whether the necessary lines of communication can be secured from obstruction by the enemy.
Chapter 72
How is permanent general control of the sea achieved, versus local and temporary control?
Permanent general control can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet through successful actions. Local and temporary control may be secured by a defensive action not necessarily entirely successful (containing), by forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion), or by superior concentration rendering the enemy's force in the special theatre impotent (masking or containing).
Chapter 72
What distinguishes close blockade from observation blockade in object and intention?
Close blockade aims to prevent the enemy putting to sea, usually to secure local or temporary control, with a primarily defensive intention to secure one's own line. Observation blockade occupies the common lines of communication to force the enemy to sea and seek a decision toward general control, with a primarily offensive intention to seize the enemy's line and compel him to expose himself recovering it.
Chapter 72
Why are maritime communications different from land lines, and what maxim follows?
At sea the great lines of communication of both belligerents tend to run parallel or be identical, whereas ashore they run roughly opposite. Since the lines are common, one cannot defend one's own without striking at the enemy's, so the obvious opening is to place the fleet where it controls the common lines. Hence the maxim that the proper place for fleets is off the enemy's coast, though the author notes this is not universally true, citing Togo.
Chapter 72
Section 734 cards
According to Corbett, what is usually the most effective way to force the enemy's fleet to action?
Corbett argues that nine times out of ten the most effective way of seeking out the enemy's fleet is not direct pursuit but seizing a position that controls communications vital to the enemy's plan of campaign. In 1704 Rooke could not seek out the Toulon fleet, yet by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him, not intentionally but through inevitable strategical law.
Chapter 73
Which naval actions does Corbett cite as outcomes of efforts to clear essential communications?
Corbett states that practically all great naval actions arose from efforts to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet. His examples are Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, and Tsushima. He also notes the great actions of the old Dutch wars occurred because England's geographical position placed her astride Dutch trade communications, forcing the Dutch to seek a decision against the English fleet.
Chapter 73
What two cautions does Corbett give for applying the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet?
Corbett gives two cautions. First, if you seek the enemy out with a superior force, you will probably find it where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost. Second, since the defensive is a stronger form of war than the offensive, it is prima facie better strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.
Chapter 73
How does Corbett distinguish major from minor strategy?
Corbett defines strategy as the art of directing force to the ends in view. Major Strategy deals with ulterior objects: the plan of the war, selection of primary objects, and the relative functions of naval and military forces, keeping touch with politics, diplomacy, commerce, and finance. Minor Strategy deals with plans of operations, selecting objectives and directing the force assigned, and may be naval, military, or combined.
Chapter 73
Section 744 cards
According to Corbett, what is the only certain test of whether an operation is offensive or defensive?
Corbett argues that the only certain test is the nature of the object: where the object is negative, strategy is defensive. Ulterior objects need not match the primary or secondary objects leading up to them. In the Russo-Japanese War the war's ulterior object was offensive, the fleet's ulterior object (covering the invasion) was defensive, and its primary object of destroying the Russian naval force was offensive.
Chapter 74
What advantages and disadvantages does Corbett assign to the Offensive and Defensive?
Corbett argues the Offensive, being positive in aim, is the more effective form and usually suits the stronger Power; it weakens as it advances by lengthening communications and tends toward unfamiliar ground. The Defensive, negative in aim, is more lasting since keeping what one has costs less than taking another's, and usually suits the weaker Power. Its advantages are proximity to base and repair, familiar ground, surprise by counter-attack, and advance organization; its disadvantages are mainly moral.
Chapter 74
What does Corbett mean by saying true Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike?
Corbett argues that assuming the defensive does not necessarily mean feeling too weak to attack; it may mean using the defensive to force enemy movements that enable a harder blow. A well-designed defensive threatens or conceals an attack, as when the French in 1756 threatened our coasts while concealing their attack on Minorca. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack where he exposes himself to a counter-stroke; Clausewitz calls it 'a shield of blows.'
Chapter 74
How does Corbett say the defensive serves concentration, and what is his maxim for a defensive campaign?
Corbett argues the defensive's most important function is covering, buttressing, and intensifying the main attack; without it the principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed, since assuming the defensive in minor theatres reduces forces there to minimum security and frees maximum strength for the main theatre. His maxim: if not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become so, by inducing the enemy to weaken himself or by developing new forces or securing allies.
Chapter 74
Section 754 cards
What distinguishes a diversion from an eccentric attack?
Diversions have a negative object: preventing the enemy from doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are true offensive movements with a positive object: acquiring something from the enemy. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions. Corbett illustrates with the 1815 raid on Washington (diversion, about 4,000 men, to aid Canada's defence) versus New Orleans (eccentric attack, 15,000–20,000 men, to gain the Mississippi).
Chapter 75
How does Corbett define limited versus unlimited war?
A war with limited object aims only to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions or interests; Corbett's example is the Spanish-American War, fought to liberate Cuba. A war with unlimited object aims to overthrow the enemy completely so that, to avoid destruction, he must agree to do our will and become subservient; his example is the Franco-German War.
Chapter 75
What is the difference between an objective and an object?
An object is the end of a system of operations, the concern of the general staff or director of the war. An objective is the end of some particular movement or operation, the concern of the officer in command, and is always subordinate to some object. An objective is a point to take from the enemy, prevent his occupying, or part of his strength to destroy—never something already possessed.
Chapter 75
What are interior lines and how do they differ from exterior lines?
We hold interior lines when our position in a theatre of operations lets us reach its chief objective points or forces more quickly than the enemy can move to defend or assist them; such a position is an interior position. Exterior lines and exterior positions are the converse. Corbett also notes a plan of war determines theatres of operation, and within each, the lines of operation and objectives.
Chapter 75
Section 763 cards
How does Corbett define naval strategy and its object?
Corbett defines naval strategy as the art of conducting the major operations of the fleet, whose object is "passage and communication": the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy. He stresses this differs from the military idea of occupying territory, since the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership.
Chapter 76
What three functions has the fleet historically performed, apart from purely maritime wars?
Corbett lists three: first, furthering or hindering military operations ashore; second, protecting or destroying commerce; third, preventing or securing alliances by deterring or persuading neutrals about entering the war. He illustrates the third with Rooke's operations to secure Savoy and Portugal, and Nelson's to maintain the Kingdom of Naples alliance.
Chapter 76
Why does Corbett say it benefits the preponderating navy to end the state of dispute?
The state of dispute is the normal condition, especially early in war, and lasts until one side can no longer send a squadron to sea. Corbett argues it is to the advantage of the preponderating navy to end this state by seeking a decision, which explains the French tradition of avoiding decisive actions when at war with England.
Chapter 76
Section 774 cards
What two kinds of control of the sea does Corbett distinguish, and how is each secured?
Corbett distinguishes permanent general control, which can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet through successful actions, from local and temporary control, which may be secured by an action not necessarily entirely successful (containing), by diversion inducing concentration elsewhere, by superior concentration rendering the enemy's force impotent (masking or containing), or by blockade.
Chapter 77
How does close blockade differ from commercial blockade in purpose and capability?
Close blockade aims to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from putting to sea, securing local control for non-naval purposes, as the Japanese did off Port Arthur in 1904. Commercial blockade aims to stop floating commerce entering or leaving the harbour; its force could not stop a squadron of battleships or cruisers, and it would not be instituted outside a fortified military port or one holding a strong naval force.
Chapter 77
Why is close blockade harder today, and what courtesy is shown to neutral armed ships?
Submarines and torpedo craft force blockading ships to remain further from the port, requiring inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; greater space means slower concentration and more ships of all natures, and the enemy can emerge regardless of weather, so not a single craft may escape. Neutral armed ships are usually allowed to enter and leave as a courtesy, but this is not a right and may be refused by force.
Chapter 77
What does Corbett mean by concentration, and how does he apply Clausewitz's maxim at sea?
Corbett cites Clausewitz's maxim to keep forces together, but argues it does not mean massing everything in one place; rather, forces should be disposed so they can unite readily at will. Since it is harder at sea to predict the decisive point but quicker to concentrate there, the rule is to dispose forces so they can concentrate in time once the point is determined, while concealing that point from the enemy.
Chapter 77
Section 784 cards
How do lines of communication differ between land and sea warfare?
On land, each belligerent's lines of communication tend to run in roughly opposite directions until they meet at the theatre of operations or objective. At sea, the reverse is often true: the great lines of either belligerent frequently run parallel or are even identical, as in a war with Germany over the Eastern Mediterranean, America, or South Africa, and in Britain's imperial wars with France.
Chapter 78
Why does Corbett call the shared-communications problem the controlling influence of maritime warfare?
The author argues this peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare, since nearly all current maxims of naval strategy trace to the pressure it exerts on naval thought. It underlies the fundamental difference between military and naval strategy and explains much error and confusion from applying land-warfare principles at sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of communications and operations against them.
Chapter 78
Why can't naval commanders simply avoid striking enemy communications as on land?
On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that we usually cannot do so without exposing our own. At sea, when the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. So the obvious opening is to get the fleet into a position controlling the common lines, unless defeated or evaded.
Chapter 78
What does Corbett say is the true maxim regarding the enemy's fleet?
The author argues the true maxim is that the primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet can render them unsafe it must be put out of action. The enemy's fleet usually is in that position but not always, as Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky showed. Corbett prefers seeking contact in the most certain and favourable manner over merely seeking out the fleet.
Chapter 78
Section 794 cards
What does Corbett list as the two broad categories of war?
Corbett distinguishes Limited War, treated at pages 41, 46, 51-59, 72-87 and 313, from Unlimited War, treated at pages 40-51 and 60-71. He also sets out a 'Real War' concept at page 25. The index shows these categories frame his whole theoretical scheme, alongside the theory of war at pages 15-30 and 107-52.
Chapter 79
Which naval maxims does the index attribute to Corbett's study?
The index lists maxims including 'Conquest of water territory' (93), 'Enemy's coast our frontier' (93), 'Eyes of the fleet' (112, 117, 120-21), 'Fleet in being' (224, 231), 'The sea is all one' (103), and 'Seeking out the enemy's fleet' (102, 156, 161, 164, 167-68, 170-71, 174, 180, 203, 324, 344-45).
Chapter 79
Which theorists and commanders does the index link to Corbett's theory of war?
The index connects Clausewitz (pages 79-80, 85, 330-31) and his theory (25, 27-29, 41-46, 51-56, 60-61, 73-74, 76-77, 311, 341), plus Jomini (28-30, 42, 45-47, 51-52, 56, 60, 74, 85), Moltke (27, 51, 55, 73-74), and General von Caemmerer (76-77). It also notes Clausewitz's service (23-24) and his war plans (44).
Chapter 79
What topics does the index group under command and communications at sea?
The index lists 'Command at sea, theory of' (91-106, 165-66), 'Commerce prevention' (95), 'Communications, maritime' (94, 165, 315-16, 335) with a 'common theory of' (100-102, 118), and 'Covering squadron' (283, 286-88, 291). It also lists 'Light squadrons' (125) and 'Observation squadrons' (125) as related entries.
Chapter 79
Section 802 cards
What is the format of the text in Section 80?
Section 80 is the index of the book, not narrative prose. It lists alphabetized entries with page numbers, including wars such as the Seven Years' War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Spanish-American War, plus names like Wellington and Wolfe, and places like the West Indies and the Yellow Sea.
Chapter 80
Which individuals are indexed in Section 80 and on what pages?
The index lists Commodore Sir John B. Warren at page 235, the Duke of Wellington with references at 36, 56, 61, 65, 83, and 105, and General Wolfe at 70, 200, 285, and 301-302. These are name entries pointing to where each figure appears in the main text.
Chapter 80
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