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The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Flashcards

The 1946 Manhattan District report describes the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, their casualties, destruction, and blast effects, and the target-selection and planning decisions behind them. This deck covers the report's findings on the missions, Japanese surrender, and postwar propaganda.

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Chapter 1 · Question

What were the primary purposes of the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group?

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Section 14 cards
  1. What were the primary purposes of the Manhattan Project Atomic Bomb Investigating Group?

    The mission's purposes, in order of importance, were: first, to make certain that no unusual hazards were present in the bombed cities; second, to secure all possible information concerning the effects of the bombs, both usual and unusual, particularly regarding radioactive effects on the targets or elsewhere. Groups for Hiroshima and Nagasaki were organized to accompany the first American troops into those cities.

    Chapter 1

  2. What did President Truman's August 6 statement say about the Hiroshima bomb's power?

    The President stated that an American airplane had dropped one bomb on Hiroshima and destroyed its usefulness to the enemy. He said the bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. and more than two thousand times the blast power of the British Grand Slam, which he called the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.

    Chapter 1

  3. According to the report, what were the casualties and destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

    At Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, at 8:15 A.M., more than 4 square miles were instantly and completely devastated; 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured. At Nagasaki on August 9 at 11:02 A.M., 1 1/2 square miles were totally destroyed, with 39,000 killed and 25,000 injured.

    Chapter 1

  4. When did the Japanese government request surrender, and under what terms?

    On August 10, the day after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, the Japanese government requested permission to surrender under the terms of the Potsdam declaration of July 26, which it had previously ignored. The report places this request the day after the second bombing.

    Chapter 1

Section 24 cards
  1. What propaganda campaign did Farrell initiate after the Hiroshima strike?

    General Farrell received War Department instructions the day after the Hiroshima strike to conduct a propaganda campaign against the Japanese Empire. It included leaflets, short-wave broadcasts every 15 minutes over radio Saipan, and a Japanese-language newspaper printed at Saipan with descriptions and photographs of the Hiroshima strike. The campaign ran until Japanese surrender negotiations began, by which time about 6,000,000 leaflets and many newspapers had been dropped.

    Chapter 2

  2. What caused casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki according to the report?

    The report attributes casualties to four causes: flash burns from almost instantaneous heat and light radiation at the moment of explosion; burns from fires caused by the explosion; mechanical injuries from collapsing buildings, flying debris, and persons hurled by blast pressure waves; and radiation injuries from instantaneous penetrating radiation resembling excessive X-ray exposure, nearly all occurring in the first second. No casualties resulted from persistent radioactivity of fission products or induced radioactivity.

    Chapter 2

  3. How did fire damage differ between Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

    In Hiroshima, fires sprang up simultaneously across the wide flat central area and combined into an immense fire storm, burning out almost everything not already destroyed by blast within roughly 4.4 square miles around the point directly under the explosion. Similar fires broke out in Nagasaki, but no devastating fire storm resulted because of the irregular shape of the city.

    Chapter 2

  4. What were the main conclusions about blast effects and equivalent TNT?

    The report concludes blast totally destroyed everything within a 1-mile radius in both cities except certain reinforced concrete frames. In Nagasaki, hills restricted spread so a smaller area was destroyed, though examination showed even greater blast effects than Hiroshima, with total destruction over about 3 square miles. The report estimates the TNT tonnage causing the same blast damage was approximately 20,000 tons, and the bombs performed exactly according to design regarding height of burst.

    Chapter 2

Section 34 cards
  1. When was the approximate date for the first atomic bomb use set, and what date was named?

    The approximate date was set in the fall of 1942, after the Army took over direction of and responsibility for the atomic bomb project. Under scientific assumptions that proved correct, the summer of 1945 was named as the most likely time when sufficient production would allow an atomic bomb to be constructed and used.

    Chapter 3

  2. What did the July 16, 1945 New Mexico test conclusively prove?

    Not until the first full-scale test on July 16, 1945, in New Mexico was it conclusively proven that the theories, calculations, and engineering were correct and that the bomb would be successful. Between fall 1942 and June 1945, estimated probabilities of success had risen from about 60% to above 90%.

    Chapter 3

  3. What target-selection criteria followed from the bomb's expected blast and fire effects?

    Because the bomb was expected to cause the most damage by primary blast and next by fires, targets needed a large percentage of closely built frame buildings. The maximum blast effect was calculated to extend about 1 mile in radius, so targets needed a densely built-up area at least that size, high military strategic value, and a first target relatively untouched by previous bombing.

    Chapter 3

  4. Why did planners want to start the raids before September?

    Weather records showed no two successive good visual bombing days over Tokyo in five years. June was believed the worst month for visual bombing; conditions should improve slightly during July and August, then worsen again in September. Since good bombing conditions would occur rarely, intense plans and preparations were needed to secure accurate forecasts and use whatever good weather occurred, making it desirable to start before September.

    Chapter 3

Section 44 cards
  1. Why was Nagasaki's narrow industrial strip especially important?

    The city was one of southern Japan's largest seaports and had great wartime importance because of many and varied industries, including ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials. The narrow long strip attacked was of particular importance because of its industries, and the heavy built-up area was confined by terrain to less than 4 square miles of the city's roughly 35 square miles.

    Chapter 4

  2. What warning sequence preceded the Hiroshima bombing on August 6?

    About an hour before the 8:15 A.M. explosion, Japanese early warning radar detected approaching American aircraft, and an alert was given with radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, including Hiroshima. Near 8:00 A.M., the Hiroshima radar operator judged the incoming force very small, probably no more than three planes, and the air raid alert was lifted. A normal broadcast advised shelter if B-29s were actually sighted, but no raid was expected beyond reconnaissance.

    Chapter 4

  3. How did Tokyo first learn of the scale of the Hiroshima disaster?

    At 8:16 A.M., Tokyo's broadcasting control operator noticed the Hiroshima station had gone off the air, and about twenty minutes later the railroad telegraph center found the main line telegraph had stopped just north of Hiroshima. Confused reports reached General Staff headquarters, which sent a young officer to survey the damage; he saw the smoke cloud while still nearly 100 miles away. Tokyo's first real knowledge came from the White House public announcement sixteen hours after the bombing.

    Chapter 4

  4. What weather complications affected the Nagasaki mission?

    The second mission was not uneventful, unlike Hiroshima's almost routine first mission. The weaponeer, Comdr. F. L. Ashworth, U.S.N., described the night of take-off as one of tropical rain squalls with lightning, and the forecast told of storms all the way from the Marianas to the Empire. At the rendezvous off southeast Kyushu, one companion observation B-29 failed to arrive, apparently thrown off course by storms; the crew waited 30 minutes and proceeded without it.

    Chapter 4

Section 54 cards
  1. Why did the crew abandon the primary target and head for Nagasaki?

    The special instruments confirmed the bomb was ready, but the primary target was completely obscured by smoke and haze. The crew attempted three bombing runs without success, then with anti-aircraft fire bursting around them and enemy fighters approaching, they headed for their secondary target, Nagasaki.

    Chapter 5

  2. Which bomb was more effective, and what evidence showed it?

    It was not at first apparent to even trained observers which bomb was more effective, and Hiroshima looked worse in some respects. But detailed clues to blast pressure, such as squashed tin cans, dished metal plates, and bent or snapped poles, soon made it evident that the Nagasaki bomb had been much more effective, with a greater damage radius.

    Chapter 5

  3. How did the cities' topography affect the damage patterns?

    The report stresses that differences in shape and topography caused great differences in damage. Hiroshima lay on low, flat ground and was roughly circular; Nagasaki was cut up by hills and mountain spurs with no regular shape. In Hiroshima almost everything up to about one mile from X was destroyed except roughly 50 reinforced concrete buildings; in Nagasaki nearly everything within half a mile was destroyed, including heavy structures.

    Chapter 5

  4. How did the Nagasaki bomb's effects reach farther than Hiroshima's?

    The report notes the damage radius was greater in Nagasaki. Roof tiles were melted by flash heat to 4,000 feet in Hiroshima but 6,500 feet in Nagasaki; flash ignition of dry combustible material reached 6,400 feet in Hiroshima and 10,000 feet in Nagasaki; and most Japanese homes were damaged up to 8,000 feet in Hiroshima and 10,500 feet in Nagasaki.

    Chapter 5

Section 64 cards
  1. How far from X did primary heat radiation start fires, and how far did roof damage extend?

    The chapter states that although many fire sources were hard to trace, fires are believed to have been started by primary heat radiation as far as 15,000 feet from X. Roof damage extended as far as 16,000 feet from X in Hiroshima and in Nagasaki. Building collapse was observed at the extreme range of 23,000 feet from X in Nagasaki.

    Chapter 6

  2. What proportion of buildings was destroyed or severely damaged in Hiroshima versus Nagasaki?

    In Hiroshima over 60,000 of 90,000 buildings were destroyed or severely damaged, over 67% of the city's structures. In Nagasaki, 14,000 of 52,000 residences (27%) were completely destroyed and 5,400 (10%) half destroyed; only 12% remained undamaged. The chapter notes Nagasaki's destruction was limited by the city's layout.

    Chapter 6

  3. Why did some steel and reinforced concrete frames survive close to X despite estimated peak pressures?

    Calculations showed surviving steel and reinforced concrete frames could not have withstood the estimated peak pressures against their total side and roof areas. They survived because windows were quickly knocked out and roofs and siding stripped off, reducing area and relieving pressure. This saved the frame but allowed severe interior damage and injuries; buildings without large panel openings were completely crushed.

    Chapter 6

  4. How did Hiroshima's utilities and transportation recover after the bombing?

    All utilities and transportation were disrupted for varying periods, but services were generally restored about as rapidly as the depleted population could use them. Through railroad service was in order on 8 August, and electric power was available in most surviving parts on 7 August, the day after the bombing. The reservoir was undamaged, nearly 2 miles from X, but 70,000 water pipe breaks occurred.

    Chapter 6

Section 74 cards
  1. Why did many concrete chimneys near X survive the blast?

    The chapter offers several explanations: concrete chimneys are roughly cylindrical and offer less wind resistance than flat building surfaces; modern chimneys were designed to withstand typhoon winds; recent chimneys and buildings may have been built to resist severe earthquake acceleration; and because the bombs exploded high in the air, nearby chimneys received more downward than lateral pressure, reducing the overturning moment.

    Chapter 7

  2. What did the British Mission predict for normal British houses at various distances?

    The British Mission to Japan applied its building-destruction observations to comparable British construction: up to 1,000 yards from X a similar bomb would cause complete collapse; up to 1 mile it would damage houses beyond repair; up to 1.5 miles it would render them uninhabitable without extensive repair, particularly to roof timbers; and up to 2.5 miles it would render them uninhabitable until first-aid repairs were carried out.

    Chapter 7

  3. What caused most fires in the two cities, and what was the Hiroshima fire storm?

    The chapter states most fires were of secondary origin, starting from electrical short-circuits, broken gas lines, overturned stoves, open fires, charcoal braziers, and lamps after blast collapse or damage; near X some fires came from instantaneous heat radiation igniting paper, straw, and dry cloth. In Hiroshima, inflowing air created a fire storm with winds of 30-40 mph, versus under 5 mph before the bombing, restricting the fire's perimeter but increasing damage and deaths inside it.

    Chapter 7

  4. How did the blast affect bridges, roads, and railroads?

    Bridge damage was on the whole slight compared with buildings, ranging from damaged railings to destruction of superstructures; some spans were shoved off piers into the river bed and steel plate girder bridges were badly buckled. No failures were attributed to inadequate design or structural weakness. Roads and railroad and street railway trackage sustained practically no primary damage; most railroad damage came from secondary causes like fires and bridge damage, and the height of the explosion probably explains the absence of direct damage.

    Chapter 7

Section 84 cards
  1. Why were Japanese fire breaks largely ineffective against atomic bombing fires?

    Aerial photographs show Japan built fire breaks in some cities between 10 June and 9 August 1945 to control large-scale fires. In general these breaks were not effective because fires started at so many locations simultaneously. They appear, however, to have helped prevent fires from spreading farther east into the main business and residential section of Nagasaki.

    Chapter 8

  2. Why is estimating total atomic-bomb casualties so difficult, and what are the Manhattan District's figures?

    Difficulties include destruction of hospitals, fire and police departments, and government agencies; confusion right after the explosion; uncertain pre-bomb populations; incomplete Japanese censuses; and fires that totally consumed many bodies. The Manhattan Engineer District's best figures: Hiroshima 255,000 pre-raid population, 66,000 dead, 69,000 injured, 135,000 total casualties; Nagasaki 195,000 pre-raid, 39,000 dead, 25,000 injured, 64,000 total.

    Chapter 8

  3. How did per-cent mortality change with distance from X, according to the British Mission?

    The British Mission to Japan, using a preliminary analysis of the Joint Medical-Atomic Bomb Investigating Commission study, calculated per-cent mortality at increasing distance from X: 93.0% at 0-1,000 feet, 92.0 at 1,000-2,000, 86.0 at 2,000-3,000, 69.0 at 3,000-4,000, 49.0 at 4,000-5,000, 31.5 at 5,000-6,000, 12.5 at 6,000-7,000, 1.3 at 7,000-8,000, 0.5 at 8,000-9,000, and 0.0 at 9,000-10,000 feet.

    Chapter 8

  4. How does an atomic explosion differ physically from a T.N.T. explosion?

    Beyond magnitude (about 20,000 tons of T.N.T. equivalent), an atomic explosion changes the identity of atoms, not just their arrangement, converting mass to energy per E = mc^2. Its pressure wave is far higher and lasts nearly a second versus milliseconds for a blockbuster. It also emits intense radiation, from long heat waves to gamma rays; gamma rays come from transformed atomic nuclei and are absent in T.N.T. explosions.

    Chapter 8

Section 93 cards
  1. Why are neutrons less damaging than gamma rays in this chapter?

    Neutrons are produced in the nuclear fission alongside gamma rays, but they have less damage effect because their intensity is smaller and they are strongly absorbed in air, so they penetrate only short distances from the explosion. At a thousand yards the neutron intensity is negligible.

    Chapter 9

  2. How did the atomic blast differ from ordinary high-explosive bombs in its pressure effects?

    The chapter lists three differences: a downward thrust because the bombs exploded well up in the air, mass distortion that could engulf and push over whole buildings, and a much longer positive pressure pulse. Because positive pulse duration scales roughly with the 1/3 power of charge size, nearly all failures occurred in the positive phase, with little damage from suction.

    Chapter 9

  3. What did Dr. Hans Bethe predict before the first test?

    The chapter notes that Dr. Hans Bethe, then a member of the Manhattan Engineer District on loan from Cornell University, predicted the existence and characteristics of the ball of fire months before the first test was carried out.

    Chapter 9

Section 104 cards
  1. How did flash heat and the pressure wave interact to affect thin wooden slats?

    The radiated flash heat ignited some objects, such as thin, dry wooden slats. Later, after a delay depending on their distance from X, the pressure blast that followed the flash radiation blew out those fires. The chapter presents this combination of flash ignition and comparatively slow pressure wave as one interesting feature of the explosions.

    Chapter 10

  2. Why are peak-pressure estimates from crushed oil drums and cans considered low?

    The method assumes the blast pressure arrives instantaneously and collapses the can's walls inward, with air inside compressed adiabatically. Two uncertainties bias the result downward: some air rushes in through any opening and builds up internal pressure, and as outside pressure falls, trapped air cannot escape fast enough, so walls are blown back out somewhat. Estimates based on this method are therefore underestimated.

    Chapter 10

  3. What methods did investigators use to estimate peak blast pressures in the wrecked cities?

    Investigators used several ingenious methods: crushing of oil drums, gasoline cans, or other empty thin metal vessels with small openings; bending of steel flagpoles or lightning conductors away from the explosion, calculated from drag on a pole in an airstream; and overturning of memorial stones, using their dimensions and known wind-pressure data for flat surfaces. The resulting curves were checked against theoretical predictions and against readings from instruments dropped by parachute.

    Chapter 10

  4. How did Nagasaki's hills affect blast damage and explain its smaller devastated area?

    The author argues that shielding by Nagasaki's hills produced the smaller area of devastation there despite a bomb not less powerful. Hills gave effective shielding only where blast pressure was near the critical level for collapse. Houses in ravines pointing away from the explosion survived undamaged, while similar houses in ravines pointing toward it were greatly damaged; a hamlet about 8,000 feet from the center showed damage varying with a sharp hill's shadow.

    Chapter 10

Section 114 cards
  1. How does the area of flash-burn damage scale with energy compared to blast damage?

    The chapter states that the area of burn damage increases in proportion to the energy released, whereas the area of blast damage increases only with the two-thirds power of the energy. For a sufficiently large explosion, flash burn would therefore become the dominant cause of damage, though the chapter notes this reversal was not achieved in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.

    Chapter 11

  2. Why is flash burn described as a surface effect?

    The heat radiation lasts only a few thousandths of a second, so there is no time for energy falling on a surface to be dissipated by thermal diffusion. The surface of a person or object is raised to a very high temperature while immediately beneath the surface very little temperature rise occurs, making the burn a surface phenomenon.

    Chapter 11

  3. How did flash-burn shadows help determine the bomb's position and height?

    Radiant heat traveled only in straight lines, so intervening objects cast shadows where surfaces were shielded. Observers used these shadows to determine the direction toward the center of explosion from many points, locating it accurately. In some cases shadows indicated the height of burst, and a distinct penumbra occasionally allowed calculation of the fireball's diameter at maximum burning effect.

    Chapter 11

  4. How did fabric color affect the degree of flash burns?

    The chapter records instances where people wearing clothing of various colors received greatly varying burns, the degree depending on the color of the fabric over the skin. A shirt with light and dark gray stripes about 1/8 inch wide had the dark stripes completely burned out while the light stripes were undamaged; black-inked characters on paper were neatly burned out nearly 1 1/2 miles from X.

    Chapter 11

Section 124 cards
  1. What types of injuries did the atomic explosions cause, and which produced most casualties?

    The chapter lists four types: burns (from flash heat and from fires), mechanical injuries from collapsing buildings and debris, direct blast-pressure effects, and radiation injuries from instantaneous gamma rays and neutrons. Because many victims suffered multiple injuries, exact percentages cannot be assigned, but the chapter states that the greater part of casualties resulted from burns and mechanical injuries. Col. Warren estimated 7 percent or less of deaths resulted primarily from radiation disease.

    Chapter 12

  2. How did flash burns differ from flame burns in appearance and distribution?

    Flash burns showed marked redness almost immediately, with progressive skin changes over hours. After 50 days their distinctive feature was sharp limitation to exposed skin facing the explosion center, so a walking patient might be burned only on the outer arm nearest the center and the inner arm on the other side. Shielding generally protected skin, though burns through one clothing layer occurred near the center, sometimes through black but not white cloth.

    Chapter 12

  3. Did persistent radioactivity cause any injuries, and when did radiation exposure occur?

    No. Medical findings showed no person was injured by radioactivity who was not exposed to the actual explosion, and no injuries resulted from persistent radioactivity of any sort. The radiations causing injury came primarily within the first second after the explosion, with a few possibly later but all within the first minute. Radiation from scattered fission products and induced radioactivity near the center was definitely proved not to have caused casualties.

    Chapter 12

  4. What symptoms characterized radiation injury, and which was most spectacular?

    Japanese observations showed early symptoms resembling those of intensive roentgen therapy and of animals given large X-ray doses. Reported and observed symptoms included epilation (hair loss), petechiae and other hemorrhagic manifestations, oropharyngeal lesions, vomiting, diarrhea, and fever. Epilation was among the most spectacular findings: the crown was involved more than the sides, sometimes resembling a monk's tonsure, with total loss in extreme cases and regrowth beginning by 50 days in some.

    Chapter 12

Section 134 cards
  1. What bleeding abnormalities characterized radiation disease in bomb survivors?

    Petechiae appeared on limbs and pressure points, and large ecchymoses developed around needle punctures; partly healed wounds broke down and bled. Bleeding usually began from the gums and, in severe cases, came from every possible source. Retinal hemorrhages occurred in many patients, bleeding and coagulation times were prolonged, and platelets were characteristically reduced in number.

    Chapter 13

  2. How did mortality from radiation injury differ among the three severity groups?

    The chapter's table classifies patients as most severe, moderately severe, and mild. The most severe group showed nausea and vomiting within hours, then diarrhea, mouth and throat inflammation, fever, and rapid emaciation, with death around day 10 and mortality probably 100%. The moderately severe group died around day 31 with mortality probably 50%. Mild cases generally recovered unless complicated by poor health, injuries, or infection.

    Chapter 13

  3. When did radiation deaths begin, peak, and largely stop?

    The report concluded that persons exposed at detonation did show ionizing radiation effects, and some otherwise uninjured patients died. Deaths from radiation began about a week after exposure, reached a peak in 3 to 4 weeks, and practically ceased after 7 to 8 weeks.

    Chapter 13

  4. Did residual radioactivity harm people entering Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the bombs?

    The report concluded it did not. Calculated maximum doses from persistent radioactivity were 6 to 25 roentgens of gamma radiation at Hiroshima and 30 to 110 roentgens in a localized area of the Nishiyama District in Nagasaki, but only if one stayed at the highest-radioactivity point continuously for 6 weeks from the first hour. Persons entering afterward showed no radiation symptoms and normal blood counts.

    Chapter 13

Section 144 cards
  1. According to the British Mission, what survival chance did people in the open have at 3/4 mile from X?

    The British Mission estimated that people in the open had a 50% chance of surviving the effects of radiation at 3/4 of a mile from X. The chapter also states that radiation ultimately caused the death of the few persons not killed by other effects who were fully exposed up to about 1/2 mile from X.

    Chapter 14

  2. How did the atomic bombings change residents' reactions to single planes?

    The chapter states that persons accustomed to mass air raids had paid little heed to single planes or small groups of planes. After the atomic bombings, the appearance of a single plane caused more terror and disruption of normal life than the appearance of many hundreds of planes had ever caused before. The author notes the effect of this fear on future war can easily be conjectured.

    Chapter 14

  3. What did the atomic bomb accomplish regarding the war against Japan, per the chapter?

    The chapter states the atomic bomb did not alone win the war against Japan, but it most certainly ended it, saving the thousands of Allied lives that would have been lost in any combat invasion of Japan. This is the author's assessment, presented as a claim about the bomb's role rather than a detailed argument.

    Chapter 14

  4. What did Father Siemes initially think caused the blast at Nagatsuke?

    Father Siemes saw a garish light like magnesium, felt heat, then heard an explosion about ten seconds later as windows broke. He realized a bomb had burst and thought it exploded directly over or near their house. Later, seeing fires in the valley, he concluded an incendiary bomb with especially strong explosive action had gone off there.

    Chapter 14

Section 154 cards
  1. What did the priests conclude about the bomb's epicenter and its distance from them?

    The author states that they concluded the epicenter of the explosion was at the edge of the city near the Jokogawa Station, three kilometers away from their house. This conclusion was reached after the wounded arrived from the sections at the edge of the city, where they had seen the bright light and their houses had collapsed.

    Chapter 15

  2. How did Father Kopp describe his injuries and his reaction to the blast?

    Father Kopp returned about one o'clock, bleeding about the head and neck with a large burn on his right palm. Standing in front of the nunnery, he suddenly became aware of the light, felt a wave of heat, and a large blister formed on his hand. The windows were torn out by the blast, and he thought the bomb had fallen in his immediate vicinity.

    Chapter 15

  3. What did the author observe about Japanese initiative and organization after the bombing?

    The author argues that the Japanese displayed little initiative, preparedness, and organizational skill in preparation for catastrophes. He notes that many uninjured passersby rushed by in a purposeless manner, concerned only with their own families, and that rescue work was not carried out when cooperative effort could have saved something. When urged to help, however, they did everything willingly.

    Chapter 15

  4. What conditions did the rescue party encounter on their way into the city?

    The closer they got to the city, the greater the destruction and the harder it was to make their way. Houses at the edge were severely damaged, many collapsed or burned. Further in, almost all dwellings were damaged by fire, and where the city stood was a gigantic burned-out scar. Twice they were forced into the river by heat and smoke at street level.

    Chapter 15

Section 164 cards
  1. What injuries did Father Schiffer and the Father Superior suffer at the Parish House?

    Father Schiffer was buried beneath a portion of a wall and suffered a deep incised wound behind the ear, losing so much blood that his survival was in doubt. The Father Superior received a deep wound of the lower leg and most of the glass splinters in his back and lower extremity, from which he bled copiously. Both later rendered aid to others despite their wounds.

    Chapter 16

  2. Why did Fukai refuse to leave, and what happened to him?

    Fukai, the Mission secretary, was completely uninjured but out of his mind, refusing to leave the house because he did not want to survive the destruction of his fatherland. Father Kleinsorge dragged him out on his back and he was forcefully carried away. Later he refused to go further and remained behind; he was not heard from again.

    Chapter 16

  3. What happened when a group of soldiers encountered the priests on the road?

    The officer noticed they spoke a strange language, drew his sword, demanded to know who they were, and threatened to cut them down. Father Laures, Jr., seized his arm and explained they were German, and they quieted him. He had thought they might be Americans who had parachuted down, reflecting rumors of parachutists circulating in the city.

    Chapter 16

  4. How did a Japanese Protestant pastor help the wounded priests?

    The pastor brought up a boat and offered to take the wounded upstream where progress was easier. Father Schiffer's litter was lowered in first with two escorts, and the boat returned about half an hour later. The pastor then asked for help rescuing two children he had seen in the river; they were rescued with severe burns but soon suffered chills and died in the park.

    Chapter 16

Section 174 cards
  1. How long did the rescue expedition take, and how long was the trip normally?

    The rescue expedition took almost twelve hours, finally arriving at the Novitiate about half past four in the morning. The narrator notes that normally one could go back and forth to the city in two hours. The delay came from constructing a litter, the Father Superior's injuries, a ditch fall that broke the litter, and requisitioning a hand cart to wheel him the rest of the way.

    Chapter 17

  2. What did the narrator see by daylight that darkness had concealed?

    By daylight the narrator saw a waste of ashes and ruin as far as the eye could reach, with only burned-out building skeletons remaining. River banks were covered with dead and wounded, rising waters had partly covered some corpses, and naked burned cadavers were numerous on the broad street in Hakushima. Some wounded crawled under burnt-out autos and trams; frightfully injured forms beckoned and then collapsed.

    Chapter 17

  3. What happened to the family rescued by Fathers Tappe and Luhmer?

    The fathers had dug the family from a collapsed house about fifty meters off the road; the father was already dead, two girls were placed by the road, and the mother was still trapped under beams. Later, at Misasa Bridge, the family still lay there under a piece of tin shielding them from the sun. The cart was full, so the group gave them water and planned to return, but when they came back the family was gone.

    Chapter 17

  4. How long did it take for the first official rescue party to appear?

    More than thirty hours had gone by until the first official rescue party appeared on the scene. The narrator notes that no rescue parties were in evidence during the group's own trips past the dead and wounded in Hakushima. The group itself took fifty refugees into care, most wounded, some with dangerous burns, and Father Rektor treated wounds with the few medicaments they could gather.

    Chapter 17

Section 184 cards
  1. According to the chapter, how did the bomb's blast and fires destroy Hiroshima?

    The bomb exploded over the city center at 8:15, and almost the entire city was destroyed at a single blow; only small outlying southern and eastern districts escaped complete destruction. Small Japanese houses within a five-kilometer diameter—holding 99% of the city—collapsed or were blown up, burying occupants. Heat from the center created a whirlwind that spread fire throughout the city.

    Chapter 18

  2. What casualty figures does the chapter give for Hiroshima?

    Survivors placed the dead at at least 100,000 out of a population of 400,000. Official statistics recorded 70,000 dead up to September 1st, not counting the missing, plus 130,000 wounded, among them 43,500 severely wounded. The author's own estimates from known groups suggest 100,000 dead is not too high.

    Chapter 18

  3. Why does the author argue many wounded died who might have been saved?

    The author argues thousands who died later could doubtless have been rescued with proper treatment and care, but rescue work on this scale had not been envisioned. Since the whole city was knocked out at once, all emergency preparations were lost, and none had been made for outlying districts. Many also died weakened by under-nourishment and lacking strength to recover.

    Chapter 18

  4. What did the commission conclude about gamma rays and radiation sickness?

    A commission established the thesis that gamma rays were given out at the explosion, injuring internal organs in a manner resembling Roentgen irradiation, which produces a diminution in white corpuscles. The author notes Father Kleinsorge and Father Cieslik, unburned but near the center, weakened about fourteen days later; a physician diagnosed leucopania. The author opines their undernourished, weakened condition was partly responsible.

    Chapter 18

Section 194 cards
  1. How did the Japanese people in this account react to the atomic bombings?

    The author reports hearing no outbursts against the Americans and no evidence of a vengeful spirit; the Japanese bore the blow as part of the fortunes of war, something to be borne without complaint. He notes relatively little hatred toward the Allies among the people, though the press stirred up such feelings, and that American technical skill came to be admired.

    Chapter 19

  2. What anecdote illustrates Japanese nationalistic pride after the bombing?

    A few days after the atomic bombing, the university secretary told the author's group that the Japanese were ready to destroy San Francisco with an equally effective bomb. The author judged it dubious the secretary believed this; he wanted to impress foreigners that Japan could make similar discoveries. The Japanese also hinted the bomb's principle was a Japanese discovery, blocked only by lack of raw materials.

    Chapter 19

  3. What two positions did the group debate on the ethics of using the bomb?

    Some considered the bomb in the same category as poison gas and opposed its use on a civilian population. Others held that in total war as carried on in Japan there was no difference between civilians and soldiers, and that the bomb was an effective force tending to end bloodshed, warning Japan to surrender and avoid total destruction.

    Chapter 19

  4. What is the author's own position on the ethics of total war?

    The author argues that he who supports total war in principle cannot complain of war against civilians. He then asks whether total war in its present form is justifiable even when it serves a just purpose, and whether its material and spiritual evils far exceed any good that might result. He calls on moralists to answer this question clearly.

    Chapter 19

Source and licence

Text used: Project Gutenberg eBook #685 (Public domain in the United States). Generated from the full text; cards paraphrase the source.

Version: Public domain edition. Retrieved 2026-11-19. Cards reviewed 2026-11-19.

These cards paraphrase the text for study. They are not a substitute for reading the book, and they do not reproduce long passages.

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