Walter Bagehot · Public domain edition · 272 cards · 75 chapters
Walter Bagehot argues that the English Constitution's workings are obscured by the gap between its dignified and efficient parts, and that the 1867 Reform Act extended the franchise without settled public understanding. The deck covers his account of statesmen's duties, working-class voting power, and the Lords' relations with the Commons.
1 / 272
Chapter 1 · Question
Why does Bagehot say a contemporary writer on a living Constitution faces special difficulty?
WakeCards · wakecards.com · Big ideas. Quick review.
Chapter 1 · Answer
The author argues that a living Constitution is in constant change, so a contemporary writer cannot fix a definite beginning and end as an historical writer can. He must paint it as it stood at one time, or he will place side by side things never contemporaneous in reality. The difficulty grows because the other living Governments he compares it with are also changing, and in different ways.
WakeCards · wakecards.com · Big ideas. Quick review.
Arrow keys move between cards. Space or Enter flips.
All questions and answers
Every card in the deck, in reading order. Click a chapter to expand. The reviewer above uses the same content.
Section 11 cards
Why does Bagehot say a contemporary writer on a living Constitution faces special difficulty?
The author argues that a living Constitution is in constant change, so a contemporary writer cannot fix a definite beginning and end as an historical writer can. He must paint it as it stood at one time, or he will place side by side things never contemporaneous in reality. The difficulty grows because the other living Governments he compares it with are also changing, and in different ways.
Chapter 1
Section 34 cards
Why did the 1867 Reform Bill debates fail to inform the public?
Bagehot argues the debates were consumed by technicalities about ratepayers and compound householders, so nobody in the country understood what was being done. He recounts asking local Tories about the Bill and being told it could not be Radical because Bright opposed it. Party discipline also kept intelligent Conservatives and Liberals from speaking out against a measure their own leaders or constituencies constrained them to accept.
Chapter 3
How does Bagehot describe the Liberals' reaction to the 1867 Reform Bill?
The author argues that many intelligent Liberals were in consternation, knowing this was the most sweeping Reform Bill any Ministry had proposed. Yet they were unwilling to resist a Tory Bill for being too democratic, fearing they would be branded enemies of the people. Radicals who had long demanded household suffrage were more surprised than pleased, like a man pushing a door that suddenly opens and throws him forward.
Chapter 3
Why does Bagehot say the last election's experience is unhelpful?
He argues the circumstances were too exceptional. Gladstone's personal popularity, unseen since Pitt, acted as a guide to both constituencies and members, so candidates simply pledged to vote with him and voters chose on that basis. The remains of the old electoral organisation were also powerful, with old voters voting as told and new voters mostly following them, so the new system was barely tested.
Chapter 3
What responsibility does Bagehot assign to leading statesmen toward new voters?
The author argues statesmen must quietly guide new voters in using the franchise, since leading statesmen settle public conversation and party programmes. The common mind cannot choose its own political topics, only judge those brought before it. If statesmen raise questions that excite the lower orders, bind the poor as a class against the rich, or suggest government has an inexhaustible fund, they will vitiate the delicate experiment.
Chapter 3
Section 44 cards
Under what conditions do Bagehot's statesmen have the most discretion over which topics to address?
Bagehot argues statesmen have little discretion in excited states of the public mind, when public perturbation determines what is dealt with. In quiet times, however, statesmen have great power: when no fire is lit, they can settle what fire shall be lit. Since the new suffrage is to be tried in a quiet time, he says the responsibility of statesmen is great because their power is great too.
Chapter 4
How does Bagehot say principal statesmen should lead the public, and what tone should they avoid?
The author argues principal statesmen should lead the public rather than let the public lead them, though he limits this because they live by public favour. They should not adopt a pedantic, doctrinaire tone, which the English detest; a man who must formally assert superiority is unfit to guide. What is mostly needed is the manly utterance of clear conclusions, with light humorous illustrations if possible.
Chapter 4
What twofold danger does Bagehot foresee from the working man's casting vote?
Bagehot fears both parties will bid for the working man's support, promising to do as he likes and competing to execute his decisions, which he calls corrupting and worse for poor ignorant people: vox populi will be vox diaboli if worked that way. Conversely, he imagines questions raised that combine working men as a class, forcing the higher orders to concede measures or risk that combination.
Chapter 4
What does Bagehot say about a political combination of the lower classes, and how can it be averted?
The author argues a political combination of the lower classes, as such and for their own objects, is an evil of the first magnitude; a permanent combination would make them supreme, meaning the supremacy of ignorance over instruction and numbers over knowledge. This can only be averted by the greatest wisdom and foresight in the higher classes, who must remove every actual and seeming grievance and willingly concede every claim they can safely concede.
Chapter 4
Section 54 cards
What does Bagehot say the Reform Act of 1867 completed?
The author argues the Reform Act of 1867 unmistakably completed the effect begun but left unfinished by the Act of 1832. The middle-class element gained greatly from the second change, while the aristocratic element lost greatly. He claims the spirit of the present House of Commons is plutocratic, not aristocratic, with prominent statesmen mostly of substantial means connected to new trading wealth rather than ancient descent.
Chapter 5
Why were the full effects of the 1832 Reform Act postponed?
Bagehot argues the full effect of the 1832 Act was postponed because the statesmen who worked the new system had themselves been educated under the old one. Their predominant guidance lasted as long as the system they created. Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, and Lord Derby died or lost influence within a year or two of 1867, so the complete consequences on the Lords could not be seen while the Commons remained under aristocratic guidance.
Chapter 5
When does Bagehot say the House of Lords must yield to the Commons?
The author argues the House of Lords must yield whenever the opinion of the Commons is also the opinion of the nation and it is clear the nation has made up its mind. Whether the nation has decided is judged by all the circumstances of the case, in the common way practical questions are decided. He rejects a fixed mechanical test of repeated rejections, saying such a rule would have let the Lords reject the 1832 Reform Act and risked revolution.
Chapter 5
Why does Bagehot fear a dissension between the Lords and Commons?
Bagehot says as a theoretical writer he is exceedingly afraid of the ignorant multitude of the new constituencies and wants a compact power to resist it. But a dissension between Lords and Commons divides that resisting power, since the Commons mainly represents the plutocracy and the Lords the aristocracy. Their main interest is identical: preventing or mitigating rule by uneducated numbers. Quarrelling bids them against each other for their common opponent's aid.
Chapter 5
Section 64 cards
Why does Bagehot say the House of Lords' real social power exceeds its electioneering power?
The author argues rank works more on men singly than collectively: most Englishmen feel its influence but are somewhat ashamed of it, so in crowds they cheer anti-aristocratic speeches while privately favoring rank. Thus the Lords' overt electioneering power does not equal its real social power, which acts best in calm, in families, and with female influence present.
Chapter 6
What does Bagehot say would happen if the House of Peers were destroyed?
The author argues it would go in a storm that would not leave all else as it is. It would probably sweep away all legal titles and break up the system by which great family estates pass to the eldest son, since that system looks like injustice and would not stand in popular passion. A catastrophe leveling one would not spare the other.
Chapter 6
How does Bagehot think the House of Lords should exercise its great power?
The author argues it should act very timidly and cautiously, not offending the plutocracy whose headship it holds. Since the points it must yield are mostly minor, it should yield many great points rather than risk the bottom of its power — giving large donations out of income while keeping capital intact, as the Duke of Wellington guided the Lords for years.
Chapter 6
Why does Bagehot doubt life peerages can remedy a Lords–Commons contrast?
The author argues that to be effectual, life peerages must be very numerous, and the Lords will never consent to a very numerous life peerage without a storm — they must be in terror to do it. If the storm is strong enough for that, it likely sweeps away the hereditary principle entirely; politics should count on plain probabilities, not exceptional accidents.
Chapter 6
Section 71 cards
What two checks prevent abuse of the royal prerogative, and their limits?
The first is impeachment: a Minister advising a use of prerogative endangering the realm could be impeached for high treason, effectively for levying war against the Queen, and executed. This covers gross excesses but not bona fide errors of judgment. The second remedy is a change of Ministry, which works generally but has two defects: it may be only a punishment, not a remedy, and only the Commons can remove a Minister by censure.
Chapter 7
Section 84 cards
Why does Bagehot find the treaty-making arrangement prima facie ludicrous?
Bagehot argues that treaties are as important as most laws, yet Parliament must give elaborate assent to every word of a law while not being consulted even on the essence of a treaty. He notes the older Constitution may have justified this when power truly lay in the Crown and Parliament met seldom, but now real power rests with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, a committee appointed by Parliament.
Chapter 8
Under what conditions would Bagehot prefer treaties be submitted to Parliament?
Bagehot says he would see no advantage in the current arrangement if the two Chambers were sufficiently homogeneous and harmonious. If the administration had a fair, reasonable majority in both Houses—predisposed to think the Government right but not ready to find it so against facts—he would think it decidedly better that agreements with foreign powers be submitted to Parliament for understanding but real criticism.
Chapter 8
Why does Bagehot think an English majority would not vote for an exceedingly bad treaty?
Bagehot argues that in a country fit for Parliamentary institutions, partisanship never comes into manifest opposition to the plain national interest. A nation constantly attentive to public affairs would inflict the maximum Parliamentary penalty at the next and many future elections, breaking members' careers. So no English majority dare vote for an exceedingly bad treaty; it would rather desert its own leader than ensure its own ruin.
Chapter 8
What does Bagehot say about the current accountability of a Government negotiating a treaty?
Bagehot says the negotiating Government can hardly be said to be accountable to anyone. It is sure to face vague censure, and if criticized, the criticism will be bitter, sharp, and captious—made as an irresponsible objector would make it, not as a responsible statesman who may have to deal with the difficulty he creates. He quotes Benjamin Franklin on peace-makers being censured and cursed in this world.
Chapter 8
Section 94 cards
What does Bagehot say is wrong with parliamentary criticism of treaties already made?
Bagehot argues that because the treaty is already concluded and cannot be altered, discussion is unreal: what is said is often captious and ought not to be said, while material points go unsaid. The opposing party, if it takes office, will not face the difficulty the treaty cured, so party malice is unchecked. He claims this produces the most offensive criticism of foreign nations.
Chapter 9
What change does Bagehot propose for treaties, and what model does he cite?
Bagehot proposes requiring Parliament's assent to treaties before they are valid, so that real discussion with reasons for and against occurs prior to making them, analogous to explaining domestic proposals before they become laws. He notes the objection about secrecy could be met by secret session like the American Senate, though he himself would rather risk public debate.
Chapter 9
What three objections to prior parliamentary consent does Bagehot identify?
First, ministers might not always want to state clearly the motives behind foreign compacts, since treaties concern a third party, often a despotic country unused to discussion. Second, Parliament is not always sitting, so treaties might need an out-of-season session or delay. Third, requiring both Houses' consent would augment the power of the House of Lords, which may hold an opposition majority.
Chapter 9
Why does Bagehot think giving the House of Lords a veto over treaties is dangerous?
Bagehot argues the Lords cannot turn out a Ministry for making treaties, so it has no decisive weight now, but a veto would give it real weight. Unlike the Commons, where the Ministry has a majority that will generally agree to leaders' treaties, the Lords' majority may be, and lately has generally been, an opposition majority pledged to opposite views, like submitting a medieval architect's design to a classical committee.
Chapter 9
Section 104 cards
What procedure does Bagehot suggest for giving Parliament control over treaties?
Rather than requiring a formal vote on a treaty clause by clause, which would take too much time and cause needless changes to minor details, Bagehot suggests the treaty be laid on the table of both Houses for about fourteen days and acquire validity unless either House objects within that interval.
Chapter 10
Why does Bagehot think the Lords could be trusted with power over treaties?
Bagehot argues that in foreign policy there is no antagonism of interest between peers and non-peers, unlike domestic organic questions where peers may resist relinquishing power others seek. Being Englishmen, peers would likely share the nation's view on vital treaties, and if reluctant would face the same lesson as on exciting domestic legislation.
Chapter 10
What three circumstances make France's parliamentary republic experiment hard to judge, per Bagehot?
Bagehot says the trial is peculiar in three ways: it occurs in a nation with no aptitude, perhaps inaptitude, for parliamentary government, whose assemblies scream rather than discuss; the nation does not value Parliament and so cannot check it; and the polity copies only part of the British Constitution, lacking the executive's power to dissolve the Assembly.
Chapter 10
Why does Bagehot say the Assembly has not removed Thiers despite lacking a dissolution check?
Bagehot explains that the Assembly could not replace Thiers: he holds a monopoly of necessary reputation. Twenty years of Empire suppressed great political reputations, and among pre-Empire chiefs only Thiers was still physically able to govern a Parliament. At every crisis the Assembly fears that after Thiers 'the deluge,' so change remains practically impossible.
Chapter 10
Section 114 cards
How does Bagehot say Thiers's position differs from a Parliamentary Premier's?
The author argues Thiers is not the head of a party and boasts of it; being essential to all parties, he selects ministers from all parties and builds a Cabinet whose members agree with neither each other nor him. A Parliamentary Premier, by contrast, is brought in and maintained by a party, which demands offices in return for its support. Bagehot calls Thiers the exception of a moment, not a lasting example.
Chapter 11
What key defect does Bagehot identify in the American Presidential system versus the English?
The author argues the English Premier, chosen and removable by the preponderant legislative assembly, can rely on it and obtain legislation for his policy. The American President and Congress are elected in different ways at different times, with nothing binding them, so they continually disagree. Bagehot says this lack of union is the characteristic evil of the Presidential system.
Chapter 11
How does Bagehot use the Johnson impeachment to judge the American Constitution?
Bagehot says Johnson and the Assembly thwarted each other, and the House impeached him criminally hoping to remove him civilly. He calls this the most conclusive evidence against the American Constitution as a Constitution, since a hostile legislature and executive were so tied together the legislature tried in vain to rid itself of the executive. He adds the blame is praise to the American political character for bearing it.
Chapter 11
What does Bagehot call the distinguishing quality of Parliamentary versus Presidential government?
The author argues Parliamentary government features discussion at each stage of a public transaction, with the public attending, and Parliament able to turn out an administration and put in one that does as it likes. Presidential government, by contrast, often has no such discussion; when discussion occurs, government's fate doesn't turn on it, so the people don't attend, and the administration mostly does as it likes.
Chapter 11
Section 124 cards
Why does Bagehot say Parliament would never let an executive keep a large surplus?
The author argues taxation is so painful that in a sensitive community with strong organs of expression, maintaining a great surplus is excessively difficult. The Opposition calls it unnecessary, the cry echoes in every constituency, large meetings occur in great cities, and every MP is pressed by electors. He notes town and country alike dislike high taxes, so paying off debt via heavy taxes has never been possible in England.
Chapter 12
What happened when the post-Waterloo Government proposed keeping a surplus to reduce the debt?
Bagehot recounts that the Government, strong from ending the French war and from the glory of Waterloo, plus close boroughs and Treasury influence, proposed keeping a moderate surplus to reduce the debt. Even this the English Parliament would not endure. The administration had to yield; the income tax was abolished, the surplus vanished, and with it all chance of considerable debt reduction at that time.
Chapter 12
Why does Bagehot say America is less sensitive to taxes than England?
He attributes part of the difference to economical rather than political causes. America, he says, is not sensitive to taxes; no great country has perhaps ever been so unsensitive. In reality America is too rich: daily industry is too common, skilful, and productive for her to care much for fiscal burdens. She applies long-acquired science, skill, and trained labour to the richest soil and mines of new countries, producing untold wealth.
Chapter 12
What does Bagehot conclude about Presidential versus Parliamentary government regarding surpluses?
The author concludes that a Presidential government makes it much easier than a Parliamentary one to maintain a great surplus of income over expenditure. But it does not give the same facility for examining whether maintaining a surplus is good or not. Therefore it works blindly, maintaining surpluses when they do extreme harm just as much as when they are very beneficial.
Chapter 12
Section 133 cards
What does Bagehot say is the one financial defect of parliamentary government?
The author argues that parliamentary government may find it difficult to maintain a surplus revenue to discharge debt, since the constant discussion can produce evil as well as good. Presidential government escapes this defect, but at the cost of possibly maintaining a surplus on inexpedient as well as expedient occasions. In all other financial respects, Bagehot says, parliamentary government has an unmixed advantage through incessant discussion.
Chapter 13
How did the inconvertible currency affect foreign lending and England's view of the war?
Bagehot says old countries were frightened by the prospect of unlimited inconvertible paper and would not lend a shilling, so the Northern States raised no loans in Lombard Street. Because English commercial houses had no financial interest in giving sound reports, England was imperfectly informed of the war's progress and judged without her usual materials, not knowing she lacked them.
Chapter 13
How did the US manage taxation early in the Civil War, per Mr. Wells?
Congress avoided direct internal taxation at first, fearing discontent and lacking assessment machinery, and relied on indirect taxes on imports. Only four months after hostilities began did it apportion a $20,000,000 direct tax and a 3 per cent income tax on incomes over $800. Second-year internal receipts were under $42,000,000 against expenditures over $60,000,000 monthly; a Treasury estimate of $85,000,000 yielded only $37,000,000.
Chapter 13
Section 144 cards
What two errors does Bagehot identify in common descriptions of the English Constitution?
The author argues two prevailing descriptions are erroneous: first, that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are quite divided and entrusted to separate persons who cannot interfere with one another; second, that the Constitution's excellence lies in a balanced union of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, each sharing sovereignty so all three must assent. He calls this the theory of Checks and Balances.
Chapter 14
How does Bagehot divide the parts of a constitution, and what does each do?
The author argues constitutions should be divided into dignified parts, which excite and preserve the population's reverence, and efficient parts, by which government in fact works and rules. Every successful constitution must first gain authority and then use it: win loyalty and confidence, then employ that homage in governing. The dignified parts raise the army, though they do not win the battle.
Chapter 14
Why does Bagehot say the English Constitution's essential parts cannot simply be copied abroad?
The author argues the monarchical and aristocratic elements are accidents of a period and region, inherited from medieval Europe. The mystic reverence and religious allegiance essential to true monarchy are imaginative sentiments no legislature can manufacture; such semi-filial feelings are inherited, not made. He says you might as well adopt a father as make a monarchy, so the United States could not have become monarchical even by decree.
Chapter 14
What does Bagehot say about Parliamentary versus Presidential government on taxation?
The author argues that under a Parliamentary government the delay to tax would not have occurred, nor would the country's movement to obtain taxation have been necessary, and excessive taxation would not have been permitted. Parliament is delicately and quickly sensitive to public opinion, so the few who pay a bad tax make themselves heard. The American sort of taxation, taxing everything to see what it yields, could not have been tried.
Chapter 14
Section 154 cards
Why does Bagehot say the dignified parts of a constitution may be the least useful?
The author argues that because the lower orders are not absorbed in plain material utility but are moved by vague dreams of glory, empire, or nationality, the theatrical elements of government excite the most reverence. Such dignified parts are likely adjusted to the lowest orders, who care least and judge worst about what is useful, so they may be the least useful parts.
Chapter 15
What does Bagehot claim actually moves the ruder sort of men politically?
The author argues that the lower classes are not wholly absorbed in the useful; they dislike anything so poor. No orator impresses men by appealing to plain physical wants unless he can blame someone's tyranny, but thousands have impressed by appealing to vague dreams of glory, empire, or nationality. Such men will sacrifice everything, even themselves, for an idea transcending ordinary life.
Chapter 15
Why does Bagehot value traditional habit in an old constitution like England's?
The author argues the active voluntary part of man is very small and must be economised by sleepy habit, or energies are frittered away in petty improvements and men scatter so no two can act together in a crisis. Dull traditional habit guides most actions; yesterday's institutions are readiest, most influential, easiest to get obeyed, and inherit reverence that new ones must win.
Chapter 15
What does Bagehot's mountain metaphor illustrate about great communities?
The author argues great communities resemble great mountains, containing primary, secondary, and tertiary strata of human progress. The lower regions' characteristics resemble life of old times rather than the present life of the higher regions. A philosophy that does not continually remember these palpable differences will be radically false and misleading, leading men to expect what does not exist.
Chapter 15
Section 164 cards
What does Bagehot call the 'efficient secret' of the English Constitution?
The author argues the efficient secret is the close union and nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers, contrary to the traditional theory that the constitution's goodness lies in their entire separation. The connecting link is the Cabinet, a committee of the legislative body selected to be the executive body.
Chapter 16
How does Bagehot describe the Cabinet's definition and function?
The author argues a Cabinet is a board of control chosen by the legislature out of persons it trusts and knows, to rule the nation. He calls it a combining committee—a hyphen joining, a buckle fastening, the legislative part of the State to the executive part. In origin it belongs to the legislature; in functions it belongs to the executive.
Chapter 16
How is the English Prime Minister elected compared with the American first magistrate?
The author argues England has an elective first magistrate as truly as America, but the Prime Minister is not elected directly by the people—he is elected by the representatives of the people, an example of 'double election.' The legislature, chosen in name to make laws, in fact finds its principal business in making and keeping an executive.
Chapter 16
What limits a Prime Minister's independent choice when forming a Cabinet?
The author argues the Prime Minister chooses associates only among a charmed circle: most MPs' positions forbid invitation, while a few ensure it. Between the compulsory list he must take and the impossible list he cannot take, his independent choice is small—extending more to dividing Cabinet offices than choosing Ministers. Parliament and the nation have largely settled who takes the first places.
Chapter 16
Section 174 cards
What does Bagehot say is the most curious point about the Cabinet?
Bagehot argues that the most curious point about the Cabinet is how very little is known about it. Its meetings are secret in theory and in reality; by present practice no official minute is kept in ordinary cases, private notes are discouraged, and no Minister respecting political usage would read such a note to the House of Commons.
Chapter 17
How does Bagehot describe the Cabinet's power over the legislature?
Bagehot argues the Cabinet is a committee that can dissolve the assembly which appointed it. Though appointed by one Parliament, it can appeal to the next House of Commons. Theoretically the power to dissolve is entrusted to the sovereign, with vestiges of doubt whether the sovereign must always comply. Thus the executive can annihilate the legislature that created it.
Chapter 17
What distinguishes Presidential government from Cabinet government for Bagehot?
Bagehot argues that the specific quality of Presidential government is the independence of the legislative and executive powers: the President is elected by one process and the House of Representatives by another. By contrast, the precise principle of Cabinet government is the fusion and combination of those two powers.
Chapter 17
What problem does Bagehot identify when administrators are not the lawmakers?
Bagehot argues that if those who do the work are not those who make the laws, controversy arises: tax-imposers quarrel with tax-requirers. The executive is crippled by not getting needed laws, and the legislature is spoiled by acting without responsibility. The executive cannot execute what it decides, and the legislature is demoralised by liberty, suffering no effects of its own decisions.
Chapter 17
Section 184 cards
Under Bagehot's analysis, why can't the English Cabinet's tools of resignation and dissolution work in a Presidential State?
The author argues the legislature cannot be dissolved by the executive, and it does not heed a resignation because it has not to find the successor. So when opinion differs, legislature and executive are forced to fight each other, likely contending to the end of their respective terms.
Chapter 18
According to Bagehot, how does Cabinet government educate the nation while Presidential government does not?
The author argues Cabinet government makes debate the means by which statesmen advertise themselves for future and confirm themselves in present Governments, so everything worth saying will be said. Critical divisions preceded by fine discussions force the nation to hear all sides. Under Presidential government, debates are prologues without a play, since you cannot turn out the Government.
Chapter 18
Why does Bagehot claim American newspapers are worse than English ones?
The author argues the press suffers the same difficulty as the legislature: it can do nothing. A Washington newspaper can no more remove a President during his term than the Times can remove a lord mayor during his year. English papers gain motive to be good at political crises when an administration's fate is unfixed; American papers lack that motive.
Chapter 18
What evidence does Bagehot offer that Americans are 'not specially addicted to politics,' and what cause does he assign?
The author cites travellers in the Northern States noticing the nation was not specially addicted to politics and lacked a public opinion finished and chastened like England's. He rejects the 'Yankee race' explanation, arguing English people, without a motive to attend to politics, certainly would not attend either. Under a Presidential government the nation has no influence except at the electing moment.
Chapter 18
Section 194 cards
Why does Bagehot say presidential systems weaken the executive as well as the legislature?
Bagehot argues the separation of legislature and executive weakens the whole aggregate force of government, so both halves suffer. The executive is weakened plainly because a President may be hampered by the Parliament, whereas in England a strong Cabinet is itself, so to say, the legislature and can obtain concurrence in acts facilitating administration. Legislators' mixed motives—ambition, public welfare, making their will felt—urge them to oppose the executive.
Chapter 19
Why does Bagehot consider the American Electoral College a farce?
Bagehot argues the Electoral College was intended to let deputies exercise real discretion and independently select the President, but primary electors take too much interest. They elect a deputy only to vote for a named candidate; the deputy takes a ticket and drops it in an urn, never choosing or thinking of choosing. He is a mere messenger, since the real decision lies with those who chose him knowing what he would do.
Chapter 19
How does Bagehot distinguish the British House of Commons from the US Electoral College?
Bagehot concedes Commons members are mostly elected to vote for a particular Ministry, but calls this the capital distinction: the functions of the House of Commons are important and continuous. It does not dissolve after electing its ruler but watches, legislates, and seats and unseats ministries daily, making it a real electoral body. The Parliament of 1857, elected on the Palmerston ticket, dethroned Lord Palmerston within two years.
Chapter 19
Why did the American founders exclude the President's Ministers from Congress, according to Bagehot?
Bagehot says the founders wished to keep the legislative and executive branches absolutely distinct, believing such separation essential to a good constitution and present in the English one they admired. To maintain it effectually, excluding the President's Ministers from the legislature is essential; otherwise they become the executive and eclipse the President. A legislative chamber is greedy and covetous, and will take the administration if it can.
Chapter 19
Section 204 cards
Why does Bagehot say excluding legislators from office degrades public life?
The author argues that unless a legislator is sure of something more than speech and is incited by hope of action and chastened by the chance of responsibility, a first-rate man will not take the place or do much in it. A congress under a Presidential Constitution resembles a debating society adhering to an executive, which encourages idleness rather than noble ambition.
Chapter 20
What special advantage does Bagehot claim a Cabinet Constitution has in dangerous times?
The author argues it possesses a reserve of power fit for extreme exigencies: at a sudden emergency the chosen people can pick a ruler for the occasion, one who might not have been ruler before. Qualities like imperious will and rapid energy suit crises but are impediments in common times, so a Cabinet system can replace the pilot of the calm with the pilot of the storm.
Chapter 20
Why can't a Presidential government respond to a quick crisis, according to Bagehot?
The author argues that at a quick crisis you cannot find the supreme people: Congress is elected for fixed periods and a President is immovable during his term, so everything is rigid, specified, and dated. Nothing can be quickened or retarded. He claims the first critical year of a war would be managed by a peace Premier, and vice versa.
Chapter 20
What does Bagehot mean by calling Lincoln's election 'government by an unknown quantity'?
The author argues the President is elected by processes that forbid choosing known men except at peculiar conjunctures, so if a crisis follows soon after, the crisis is superintended by an unknown. He notes Lincoln happened to be a man of eminent justness, but says success in a lottery is no argument for lotteries. He treats Vice-President Johnson's accession as an accident, not a necessary ingredient.
Chapter 20
Section 213 cards
Why does Bagehot say monarchy is a strong government?
The author argues monarchy is strong because it is intelligible: the mass of mankind can grasp the action of a single will but struggle with constitutions, assemblies, and parties. He claims people are governed by the weakness of their imaginations, so an easy idea like a king beats complex unseen arrangements. He cites the French choosing Louis Napoleon over an assembly.
Chapter 21
What does Bagehot say the English Monarchy uniquely combines?
The author argues the English Monarchy retains the feelings by which heroic kings governed rude ages and has added the feelings by which later Greek constitutions ruled refined ages. Because England progressed unequally, it contains both primitive barbarism and acquired civilisation; the Queen gives the many a comprehensible element while complex laws serve the inquiring few.
Chapter 21
Why does Bagehot say England needs the Queen more than a republic would?
The author argues England has no slaves to keep down by separate laws, but has whole classes unable to comprehend a constitution or feel attachment to impersonal laws. A republic offers only difficult ideas; a constitutional monarchy also offers an easy, comprehensible element for the vacant many, alongside complex notions for the inquiring few. He calls the Queen inestimable for this reason.
Chapter 21
Section 224 cards
Why does Bagehot say a royal family is politically useful?
The author argues a family on the throne brings sovereignty down to the level of petty life and sweetens politics with nice, pretty events. A princely marriage is, in his phrase, the brilliant edition of a universal fact, riveting mankind because it speaks to ordinary feeling. It introduces irrelevant facts into government, but facts that speak to men's bosoms and employ their thoughts.
Chapter 22
How does Bagehot contrast royalty with a republic?
He states that royalty is a government in which the nation's attention is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions, while a republic divides that attention between many people all doing uninteresting actions. He concludes that so long as the human heart is strong and the human reason weak, royalty will be strong because it appeals to diffused feeling, and republics weak because they appeal to the understanding.
Chapter 22
What problem did religious loyalty to the monarch cause before the Revolution?
Bagehot says the notion of local holiness in one part of the Constitution was mischievous while the Constitution was incomplete and every part needed full growth. The cavalier party held it was their duty to obey the king whatever he did, through passive obedience, calling him the Lord's anointed while Parliament, laws and press were merely human. An undue advantage was given to one part, so the progress of the whole was stayed.
Chapter 22
Why did the Hanoverian succession weaken religious loyalty to the Crown?
The author argues the Act of Settlement, which settled the crown on Princess Sophia's descendants and passed over Catholics, could not be popular. It could not be said the English owed obedience to the House of Hanover on any principle that did not concede the people's right to choose rulers and degrade monarchy into one expedient institution among many. So during George I. and George II. religious loyalty ceased to support the Crown.
Chapter 22
Section 234 cards
How does Bagehot characterize George III's political influence?
Bagehot calls George III a "consecrated obstruction": whatever he did carried a sanctity unlike anyone else's, yet he was commonly wrong. Though well-intentioned and diligent in business, his mind was small and his education limited, so he resisted what ought to be and prolonged what ought not to be. The author argues the monarchy then confirmed little except itself.
Chapter 23
Why does Bagehot say the monarchy now strengthens the whole Constitution?
Because its religious sanction enlists the credulous obedience of enormous masses on behalf of the entire political order. In George III's time, the monarchy lived aloof and absorbed all holiness into itself, leaving the rest of the polity justified only by bare expediency. Now the crown's latent, non-contentious character lets it bless the whole state rather than only itself.
Chapter 23
Why does Bagehot reject Sieyes' grand elector as a model?
Bagehot argues a newly created office inherits no reverence and is made holy by no religion, so it is too novel and artificial to attract reverence. Offering such inactive, pretend-sacred dignity to Napoleon—the most active man in France—compounded the absurdity. Real monarchy works because the monarch is aloof, untouched, and evidently does no wrong.
Chapter 23
Why does Bagehot think making the Prime Minister the social head would be dangerous?
The English are not pure philosophers and care about outward show. If the highest social rank were scrambled for in the House of Commons, low ambition and envy would increase fearfully, attracting clever and stupid base people alike. Newspapers already dignify public life above all others, so adding to a force already perilously great would multiply social adventurers.
Chapter 23
Section 242 cards
According to Bagehot, what is society's natural constitution if left to itself?
The author argues society, meaning the union of people for amusement and conversation, does not naturally need a head at all. Left to itself its constitution is aristocratical, not monarchical: it creates an "upper ten thousand" of persons and families of equal culture and spirit who tend to be much about a level, with no single person recognized by all as superior. He cites Greece, Italy, and American or colonial towns as examples.
Chapter 24
Why does Bagehot oppose making the English Court as splendid as the French?
The author argues the Emperor represents a different idea: he is not head of the State but IS the State, embodying equality, so magnifying him dwarfs others. English royalty is the opposite: if it advertised itself in society it would be pernicious, inciting others to come on rather than keeping them down. It is useful only while guarded and retired, not adding a showy example of expenditure.
Chapter 24
Section 254 cards
What two popular errors about the sovereign does Bagehot identify?
The author argues the popular theory of the English Constitution makes two mistakes about the sovereign. First, it treats the monarch as an "Estate of the Realm," a co-ordinate authority with the Lords and Commons, though the Queen has no legislative veto and must sign even her own death-warrant if both Houses unanimously send it. Second, it holds the Queen to be the executive, when the Prime Minister is really the principal executive and the sovereign only a cog in the mechanism.
Chapter 25
Why did the American framers mistake the king for the real executive?
Bagehot argues the American framers took their idea of the Constitution from the period when they encountered it. In the so-called Government of Lord North, George III was the Government: North was not only his appointee but his agent, carrying on a war he disapproved and hated because his sovereign approved it. So the Convention inevitably believed the King, from whom they had suffered, was the real executive, not the Minister, from whom they had not.
Chapter 25
What does Bagehot say about royal domestic virtue?
The author argues royalty cannot take credit for domestic excellence. George I, George II and William IV were not patterns of family merit, and George IV was a model of family demerit. A constitutional king faces more temptations and fewer suitable occupations than almost anyone; his duties are grave and formal but never exciting. Grave and careful men may have domestic virtues on the throne, but expecting eager temperaments to produce them is expecting grapes from thorns.
Chapter 25
How does constitutional royalty help in times of transition?
Bagehot argues the accession of a king favourable and pledged to Cabinet government is the greatest help in replacing absolute monarchy. New Cabinet government is weak in trouble: the Prime Minister's power rests too much on human reason and too little on human instinct. The hereditary monarch's traditional strength is then invaluable. He credits William III after 1688 and Victor Emmanuel in Italy, and says Louis Philippe's failure to make Guizot's tenure certain proved how great that reserve power is.
Chapter 25
Section 264 cards
Why does Bagehot say the Crown's secret prerogative, though a theoretical defect, is useful?
The author argues secrecy is essential to the utility of English royalty because royalty must be reverenced, and poking about it destroys reverence. A select committee on the Queen would end the charm; mystery is its life, and daylight must not be let in upon magic. Bringing the Queen into political combat would make her one combatant among many rather than an object of reverence for all.
Chapter 26
How did Liberal opinion about the Crown's hidden influence differ between George III and Queen Victoria?
Courtiers of both reigns agreed the royal influence was large, an accepted secret doctrine that the Crown does more than it seems. But Fox described George III's hidden influence as the agency of 'an infernal spirit', and it was dreaded by Liberal politicians. By Victoria's time, leading Liberals said their children might learn from history what was owed to the Queen and Prince Albert.
Chapter 26
Why does Bagehot dismiss the Queen's formal duties, such as signing military commissions, from the discussion?
The author argues the formal part contains no matter of policy and any clerk could sign it. George III read documents until Thurlow told him it was nonsense since he could not understand them. Military commissions fell thousands in arrears, with men receiving commissions years after leaving service. Bagehot calls heaping such routine on the sovereign childish, a remnant of George III's day.
Chapter 26
In Bagehot's stripped-down thought experiment, how would a House of Commons alone appoint a Premier?
He supposes the Commons, existing alone, appoints the Premier as railway shareholders choose a director. At each vacancy any member may nominate; after ten days or a fortnight, members vote and the Speaker counts, the largest number winning. Party organization would control the choice as now, since great parties outnumber petty minorities. The Premier serves during good behaviour or Parliament's pleasure, resigning on a want-of-confidence vote.
Chapter 26
Section 274 cards
How does Bagehot divide the course of representative government?
Bagehot divides the whole course of a representative Government into three stages: first, when a Ministry is appointed; next, during its continuance; last, when it ends. He proposes to examine the exact use of the Queen at each stage, and how the present form differs, for good or evil, from a simpler Cabinet government that might exist without her.
Chapter 27
When does the sovereign have real selection power over a Premier?
Bagehot argues the sovereign has sometimes a substantial selection when the predominant party is not agreed on its leader. If only two great parties exist and the larger is united behind a recognized Parliamentary leader, the sovereign must simply accept him, and Cabinet government runs without friction whether or not there is a Queen.
Chapter 27
Why would unroyal Cabinet government still produce a good Premier?
Bagehot argues a divided party has strong motives to select a very good leader, since its tenure depends on conduct and its judgment is its life. A Ministerial government is removable and carried on in the face of day; the Premier must meet the House of Commons in debate and pass a searching test, so a weak head would cost the party office.
Chapter 27
What danger does Bagehot see in the sovereign's judgment?
Bagehot argues the sovereign's judgment may be prejudiced, citing George III's personal antipathies over forty years, his discarding of Lord Chatham, and his refusal to let Pitt coalesce with Fox. He says George III preferred mediocrity, disliked high ability and great ideas, and that ordinary monarchs may prefer a commonplace man like Addington to a first-rate one like Pitt.
Chapter 27
Section 284 cards
Under Cabinet government with three parties, why is a satisfactory choice of Premier impossible?
Bagehot argues the numerically weakest party holds the casting vote, determining which of the other candidates is chosen, but it forfeits the right to vote for its own candidate. Such a choice rests on self-denial and can never be firm—it is liable to be revoked at any moment. He illustrates with 1858, when the Radicals kept Lord Derby in power, a union of opposites too marked to be durable.
Chapter 28
What single remedy does Bagehot give for the three-party defect in Cabinet government?
The moderate people of every party must combine to support the Government that on the whole suits every party best. Bagehot cites Lord Palmerston's administration, maintained by moderate Conservatives and moderate Radicals in coherent union with moderate Whigs. He calls this preservative self-denial the main force for satisfactory continuance of Parliamentary government, whether or not a king exists.
Chapter 28
What does Bagehot say a constitutional sovereign's greatest wisdom usually is?
Bagehot argues it is well-considered inaction. He notes the Queen and Prince Albert were far too wise to obtrude any selection between 1857 and 1859, seeing the world settling down without them. He adds a permanent reason: Parliament should feel its own responsibility, for if it expects the sovereign to find a Government, it will not find one itself.
Chapter 28
What defect of royal Cabinet government does Bagehot say the unroyal species escapes?
Where there is no Court there can be no evil influence from a Court. Bagehot cites Walpole relying on the king's mistress Madame de Walmoden, a writer noting the Marchioness of Conyngham's favour in George IV's time, and attributed influences on Italian changes of Government. Such sinister agencies are most effective when Parliament is perplexed and Cabinet government must be difficult.
Chapter 28
Section 294 cards
What three rights does Bagehot say a constitutional sovereign possesses?
Bagehot states that under a constitutional monarchy the sovereign has three rights: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn. He argues a king of great sense would want no others, since having only these enables him to use them with singular effect while leaving responsibility for measures with the Minister.
Chapter 29
Why does Bagehot reject a life governor who solely selects Ministers?
Bagehot argues such an officer would be an artificial encumbrance, since the most dignified post must be contested by the great political sections. Parties would not permit the most conspicuous station to be filled except at their pleasure, and the strongest party would select someone partial to them. He concludes it is absurd to choose by contested party election an impartial chooser of Ministers.
Chapter 29
What did the Queen's 1851 memorandum require of Lord Palmerston?
The memorandum required Palmerston to state distinctly what he proposed in a given case so the Queen could know what she was sanctioning; that once sanctioned, a measure not be arbitrarily altered or modified, which she would consider insincere toward the Crown and grounds for dismissal; and that she be kept informed of dealings with Foreign Ministers, receive despatches in good time, and get drafts early enough to study them.
Chapter 29
How does Bagehot compare the sovereign's experience to a permanent under-secretary's?
Bagehot says the king has the advantage a permanent under-secretary holds over his Parliamentary superior: having shared in the proceedings of previous administrations. Those proceedings were part of his own life and memory, while a Parliamentary secretary only vaguely remembers something done under predecessors. A minister can silence a subordinate by superior dignity, but cannot so deal with his king, who is his social superior.
Chapter 29
Section 303 cards
Why could Prince Albert not rule Lord Palmerston?
The author argues Palmerston was far more experienced, remembered a generation of statesmen dead before Albert was born, and differed in temperament: Albert had a scholar's caution and elaborateness compared to Goethe, while Palmerston was half-Irish, half-English, with boisterous courage and an effectual but unrefined commonplace. Albert influenced Lord Malmesbury greatly but could not rule Palmerston.
Chapter 30
What legal power does the king hold over a Minister, and how did George III use it?
The king can dissolve Parliament and effectively tell his Minister another Parliament might send someone else. The author says George III used this at moments when the nation was likely to support him, making disliked Ministers tremble at the shadow of a possible successor, and he was hardly ever baffled in conflicts with the ablest men of his time.
Chapter 30
What does the author say a wise constitutional monarch does instead of aspiring to despotism?
The author argues the wish to be a despot marks an uncultivated mind, since facts are many and progress complicated; the notion of a far-seeing despotic statesman has no support, as Charlemagne's plans died with him, Richelieu's were mistaken, and Napoleon's gigantesque and frantic. A constitutional monarch instead sends Ministries memoranda of his reasons over years of discussion.
Chapter 30
Section 313 cards
Why does Bagehot doubt that hereditary constitutional monarchs can guide ministers effectively?
The author argues that ministers are among the ablest men of their time, trained by winning a seat, the ear, and the confidence of Parliament and colleagues. An hereditary monarch is merely an average man, sometimes clever, sometimes stupid, educated without struggle and never forced to rely on his own judgment, so he has little chance against such men.
Chapter 31
What does Bagehot say about England's historical record of constitutional sovereigns before the present reign?
The author argues that only during the present reign have the duties of a constitutional sovereign been well performed in England. The first two Georges were ignorant of English affairs; George III interfered constantly but did harm; George IV and William IV gave no steady guidance and were unfit to give it.
Chapter 31
What does Bagehot identify as the only fit material for a constitutional king?
The author argues the only fit material is a prince who begins to reign early, who in youth is superior to pleasure and willing to labour, and who by nature has a genius for discretion. Such kings, he says, are among God's greatest gifts but also among His rarest.
Chapter 31
Section 321 cards
According to Bagehot, what is the worst case of constitutional royal government?
The author argues the worst case is an active, meddling fool on the throne—a king who acts when he should not, never acts when he should, warns ministers against judicious measures, and encourages injudicious ones. Such a king may become the tool of favourites and mistresses, and a bad Court can degrade free government. He calls this 'corruptio optimi pessima.'
Chapter 32
Section 332 cards
According to Bagehot, why is office-worship weaker in England than on the Continent?
The author argues that in England only great offices requiring mind—permanent or Parliamentary—confer social prestige, while minor place is of no social use. A big grocer despises the exciseman, and the exciseman envies the grocer. Solid wealth tells where no artificial dignity is given to petty public functions, so a public-service clerk is considered 'nobody.'
Chapter 33
What two movements does Bagehot say have weakened aristocratic social prestige?
The author identifies the rise of industrial wealth in countless forms, which brings a competitor with generally more mind, and the aristocracy's own decline in means of standing out. Their power lies in theatrical exhibition and state, but society grows less stately. He quotes a satirist contrasting the last Duke of St. David's, who covered the north road with carriages, with the present Duke sneaking from a railway station in a brougham.
Chapter 33
Section 344 cards
What does Bagehot say is wrong with the literary theory of the House of Lords?
The literary theory holds that the Lords is a co-ordinate estate equal in rank and authority to the Commons, an aristocratic branch balancing the popular one. Bagehot calls this utterly false, arguing the British Constitution's capital excellence is an Upper House that has some authority but not equal authority to the Lower House.
Chapter 34
Why does Bagehot consider two co-equal Houses of distinct natures an evil?
Each House can stop all legislation, yet some legislation may be necessary, so the machine of government can stand still. He cites the Victorian Upper House disagreeing with the Lower Assembly, suspending most business, and says the American and Swiss Constitutions commit the same blunder, saved only by the discreetness of members.
Chapter 34
How did the Crown's power to create peers resolve the 1832 Reform Act standoff?
The House of Lords was as unwilling to concur as the Victorian Upper Chamber, but the Crown has authority to create new peers, and the king had promised the Ministry to create them. The Lords disliked the precedent and passed the bill; the power was not used, but its existence was as useful as its energy.
Chapter 34
What function has the House of Lords served since the Reform Act, according to Bagehot?
Before the Act it was a Chamber of Directors, with aristocratic influence so potent in the Commons that no serious breach of unity arose. Since the Act it has become a revising and suspending House: it can alter bills and reject bills on which the Commons is not yet in earnest, exercising a sort of hypothetical veto.
Chapter 34
Section 353 cards
What does Bagehot say the House of Lords' current powers amount to?
Bagehot describes the House of Lords as a chamber with, in most cases, a veto of delay and a power of revision, but with no other rights or powers. He presents this as the outcome of the historical process by which the Lords came to be what it now is, and then asks what use the Lords are under that arrangement.
Chapter 35
Why does Bagehot reject the idea that the Lords are a bulwark against revolution?
The author argues the common notion fails. The guiding members of the House know it must yield to a determined people, as the Reform Act and Corn Laws showed. A second chamber of notables is weak when the nation is vehement; in revolution only the sword and the people are real powers, and a pacific assembly of peers and lawyers cannot command the army.
Chapter 35
According to the duke's letter, how should the Lords' influence be exercised?
The letter's author says the great object is to assume the station and exercise the influence long held in the House of Lords, and asks whether this is attained by guiding the members' opinion and decision or by following it. He says he endeavored to guide their opinion and succeeded on remarkable occasions, but only by a good deal of management.
Chapter 35
Section 364 cards
What does Bagehot say the House of Lords actually indicates about revolution?
The author argues the House of Lords is not a bulwark against revolution but an index that revolution is unlikely. Because it rests on old deference and inveterate homage, its retained power shows that no desperate discontent or wild agency capable of great demolition exists in the country. He compares it to old leaves lingering on November trees, showing little frost and no wind.
Chapter 36
Why did Lord Grey find a second colonial assembly mischievous?
Grey had to introduce representative institutions into all capable colonies but found too few good people for two assemblies. The second assembly, chosen by the Crown or a higher property qualification, drew the best men out of the popular assembly, leaving it without its natural guides and leaders. The superior men were isolated and neutralized, so the Lower House did what it liked and democracy was strengthened rather than weakened.
Chapter 36
When would an Upper House be unnecessary and therefore pernicious, per Bagehot?
The author argues that with a perfect Lower House an Upper House would be scarcely of any value. An ideal House of Commons, always moderate, never passionate, full of men of leisure and never omitting slow steady forms, would need no revising chamber. Whatever is unnecessary in Government is pernicious, since an artificial addition to already complex machinery is sure to catch and clog the needful wheels.
Chapter 36
What two defects of the House of Commons make a revising chamber useful?
The author argues the Commons lacks leisure and is a fluctuating body subject to sudden turns and bursts of feeling as members change. Its life is distracting routine, with business from India, Jamaica, China and Schleswig-Holstein. Chance majorities on minor questions face no effectual control, and selfish combinations—said to be 200 'members for the railways'—can dominate. A second chamber of opposite composition may check such sinister interests and executive tyranny in minor measures.
Chapter 36
Section 374 cards
What does Bagehot call the most helpless exhibition of wasted legislative effort?
Bagehot describes a committee of the whole House on a bill of many clauses, with eager enemies trying to spoil it and various friends trying to mend it, as one of the most helpless exhibitions of helpless ingenuity and wasted mind. He compares an Act of Parliament to a marriage settlement made by majority vote of those concerned, including the unborn children.
Chapter 37
Why does Bagehot say the House of Lords is 'possible' as a revising chamber?
Bagehot argues the Lords has the greatest merit such a chamber can have: it is possible. He says it is incredibly difficult to get a revising assembly because it is hard to find a class of respected revisers. A federal senate embodies local feeling, which is older and stronger than common political feelings, but in common governments it is fatally difficult to make an unpopular entity powerful.
Chapter 37
What makes the House of Lords independent, according to Bagehot?
Bagehot says the Lords are independent because they have no constituency to fear or wheedle, they give social bribes rather than take them, and they have leisure to form a disinterested and cool judgment. He argues politics is the only occupation a peer has worth the name, so he may pursue it undistractedly.
Chapter 37
What is the first defect Bagehot identifies in the House of Lords?
Bagehot says the first defect is the emptiness of the chamber in ordinary business: perhaps ten peers present, possibly only six, with three the quorum. The mass of the House is nothing, which is why orators trained in the Commons detest speaking there. Lord Chatham called it the 'Tapestry,' and there is no 'sense' of the House because there is no life.
Chapter 37
Section 383 cards
What single error does Bagehot say the Lords' composition guards against?
Bagehot argues the Lords are too uniformly composed, being mostly wealthy landowners with that class's opinions, merits, and faults. Because of this uniformity, they guard against only one error: too quick change. They revise legislation according to the supposed interests and inherited opinions of that one class, making them biased rather than impartial revisers of what he calls the modern spirit.
Chapter 38
What evidence does Bagehot use to show the Lords were wrong about the modern spirit?
Bagehot argues free trade is the clearest test of the modern spirit because commerce, like war, has patent results: you make money or you do not. He says no one can doubt England is better off because of free trade, with more money diffused as one would wish. In this one unanswerable case, the modern spirit was right and the dubious Upper House, which would have rejected it, was wrong.
Chapter 38
Why does Bagehot think an hereditary chamber struggles to revise business legislation?
Bagehot argues an hereditary chamber of eldest sons picked by chance and history cannot be of more than common ability. He says a young lord with 30,000 pounds a year will not care much for the law of patents, passing tolls, or prisons, and has indifferent means to learn business. Administration is an art like painting; no book can teach its practice.
Chapter 38
Section 394 cards
Why does Bagehot say the aristocracy is inferior in business to the new class?
The author argues aristocrats are not raised amid money and administration, so business is foreign to them; a lord can hardly know it, just as one cannot learn agriculture in a park. The new class of highly cultivated men of business, trained to thought and business and able to leave business for ambition, is better suited to it.
Chapter 39
What exception does Bagehot make for the aristocracy's fitness?
The author argues diplomacy is the one business where the aristocracy retains a real advantage. Old-world diplomacy was largely carried on in drawing-rooms, and an ambassador is a spectacle as well as an agent, sent for show as well as substance. Aristocrats travel most, know foreign nations best, and are trained to the theatrical part of life.
Chapter 39
How does Bagehot assess the House of Lords' actual work?
The author argues the Lords work imperfectly and timidly. Most peers do none of their appointed work; a minority, though never larger or more earnest, do it well in Committees. Being only a section of the nation, the House fears the nation and hardly knows when to act on its own judgment, so a word from its leaders must rouse it.
Chapter 39
What does Bagehot predict about the new class of business men in politics?
The author argues this class is coming up, trained to thought, full of money, and trained to business. As he writes, two members have been appointed to considerable stations sure to lead to the Cabinet and power. They are few because they do not know their own strength; a few original men will show it can be done, and a crowd will follow.
Chapter 39
Section 401 cards
What proposal did the House of Lords reject, and who first proposed it?
The House of Lords rejected the proposal of Lord Palmerston's first Government to create peers for life. Bagehot calls the expedient 'almost perfect,' arguing it would have reformed the Lords without agitation. Lord Lyndhurst, using his recognized authority and a memorized speech of black-letter authorities, induced the House to reject it, so there are no life peers.
Chapter 40
Section 414 cards
What does Bagehot say is the first subsidiary function of the House of Lords?
The first subsidiary function is the faculty of criticising the executive. Bagehot argues the Lords is well suited to this because most members have nothing to lose or gain, hold fixed social positions, have no constituency, and rarely care about the minister of the day. He praises Lord Grey's criticism of late administrations as admirable and calls for many similar impartial, clear critics who take a supplemental, bystander's view.
Chapter 41
Why does Bagehot value life peers for the House of Lords?
Bagehot argues life peers would supply the higher, many-sided criticism the Lords needs, since every able critic stamps his own idiosyncratic view on his work. They would also let the Constitution use the Lords' speaking function more freely and variously, giving a larger command of able leisure and improving the Lords as a political pulpit by enlarging the list of its select preachers. He fears such peers will not soon appear.
Chapter 41
What does Bagehot say the House of Lords offers Cabinet members who speak there?
Bagehot says the Lords gives such members a voice and, what no competing plan gives, position. Leisured Cabinet members speak there with authority and power: they are equals of those they address, speak and reply as they choose, and address the House with the force and dignity of sure rank rather than the bated breath of subordinates. He notes Mr. Lowe called for a chief not exposed to the prodigious labour of attending the Commons.
Chapter 41
What danger does Bagehot identify for the House of Lords?
Bagehot says the Lords' danger is not assassination but atrophy, not abolition but decline. It is safe against rough destruction, but if most members neglect their duties, if all remain of one class and not quite the best, and if its doors shut out genius without a family or ability without 5,000 pounds a year, its power will diminish year by year and eventually vanish, as kingly power did.
Chapter 41
Section 424 cards
What are the four functions Bagehot assigns to the House of Commons?
Bagehot lists the elective function (choosing and dismissing the Ministry), the expressive function (voicing the mind of the English people), the teaching function (a great council altering and instructing society), and the informing function (laying grievances before the nation). He adds legislation as a fifth, insisting it is not as important as executive management or political education.
Chapter 42
Why does Bagehot say the House of Commons' elective function is most important yet ignored?
He argues the elective function is now the House's most important duty, but the English tradition overlooks it. Newspapers and even close observers complain Parliament 'has done nothing this session' when little legislation passes. Bagehot says a Minister should reply that Parliament maintained him and carried on the Queen's Government, which was its greatest duty.
Chapter 42
How does Bagehot describe the proper relationship between a Minister and the House?
The relationship is incessant because the House can dismiss as well as elect. The Minister guides and the House follows, but he must choose his direction, begin the journey, and not flinch. Bagehot says a Minister who succumbs to the House, ostentatiously seeks its pleasure, or will not point out plain errors seldom thrives; a great assembly is spoiled by over-indulgence like a child.
Chapter 42
What does Bagehot mean by Parliament's informing function?
He compares it to the medieval office of informing the sovereign of grievances; now Parliament lays complaints before the nation, the present sovereign. A free nation, he argues, is rarely quick of apprehension and hears only its own side, since newspapers repeat what purchasers like. A great debate makes an opinion 'possible' and to be reckoned with, which Bagehot calls an immense achievement.
Chapter 42
Section 434 cards
Why does Bagehot deny the House of Commons a distinct financial function?
Bagehot argues that, on broad principle and setting aside legal technicalities, the Commons has no financial function different from its other legislation. It rules in both, and rules in both through the Cabinet. Financial legislation recurs yearly, but frequency of occurrence does not indicate a different nature or compel different treatment.
Chapter 43
What is the Commons' real peculiarity in finance, and what check does it create?
Bagehot says the Commons' financial peculiarity is now an exceptional disability, not a privilege: only the Minister can propose to tax, while on common subjects any member may propose anything. Because the Cabinet must fund whatever expenditure is sanctioned, even against its wish, it has the strongest motive to oppose extra outlay—the check on a spend-prone House.
Chapter 43
How does Bagehot describe government by the House of Commons?
The author argues we are ruled by the House of Commons, and calls government by a public meeting the oddest of all forms. He describes 658 persons from all parts of England, different in nature, interests, look, and language, sometimes few, sometimes many, never the same for an hour, mostly dull and half weary—yet ruling England, Scotland, Ireland, and much of Asia, Polynesia, and America.
Chapter 43
What illustration does Bagehot give of English gentlemen's helplessness when assembled suddenly?
Bagehot cites the Government's entrusting county quarter-sessions with combating cattle-plague. In most shire halls the scene was unsatisfactory: there was the greatest difficulty in getting any decision, let alone a right one. He describes a meeting where a complex resolution got wedged, amendments multiplied, one unsatisfying amendment carried, and the matter stood over—supporting the saying that a big meeting never does anything.
Chapter 43
Section 444 cards
According to Bagehot, what is the fundamental principle of Parliament regarding leaders?
Bagehot states the principle of Parliament is obedience to leaders: followers may change leaders, but must obey No. 1 while serving No. 1 and No. 2 after switching. The penalty for not obeying is impotence—not merely failing to do good, but being unable to do anything at all, since universal independent judgment would produce 657 amendments to every motion, none carried.
Chapter 44
Why does Bagehot argue party is of the essence of the House of Commons?
Bagehot argues that because the Commons is mainly an elective assembly, party is inherent in it. He claims there never was an election without a party, illustrating with elections even at asylums where rival orphans get placards and banners. Since the Commons lives in perpetual potential choice—able at any moment to choose or dismiss a ruler—party is bone of its bone and breath of its breath.
Chapter 44
How does the power to dissolve keep party members together?
Bagehot says leaders can no longer bribe with the vast patronage of the last century, but they can coerce by a threat more potent than any allurement: they can dissolve. He quotes Cobden, who never heard members say they were ready to vote for dissolution. Solid steady votes are collected by deferential attachment to leaders and maintained by fear that voting against them may cost you your own vote.
Chapter 44
Why does Bagehot say Parliament's party organization is permanently efficient despite being organized?
Bagehot argues the organization is efficient because it is not composed of warm partisans: the body is eager but the atoms are cool. Otherwise Parliamentary government would become sectarian, pushing orators' formulae to their limits. English partisans are Whigs, Radicals, or Tories but also common Englishmen, hard to work up to the dogmatic level, so leaders succeed by studied, illogical moderation—diluted abstract argument suited to men of business.
Chapter 44
Section 453 cards
Why does Bagehot say constituency government is the opposite of parliamentary government?
The author argues constituency feeling is the feeling of a dominant party, elicited, stimulated, and sometimes manufactured by the local political agent. Such opinion cannot be moderate, cannot be effectively discussed, and is formed far from the scene of action without penalty. Constituency government is thus the rule of immoderate persons judging in the last resort, rather than moderate persons judging in fear of a dissolution and conscious of an appeal.
Chapter 45
What does Bagehot claim an ultra-democratic Parliament elected by equal districts would look like?
The author argues such a Parliament could not be composed of moderate men. Agricultural districts would return an unmixed squirearchy controlled by parson and squire; town districts would send representatives of the lowest classes, split between genuine artisan members and 'members for the public-houses' chosen by corrupt machination. Members would speak two unintelligible languages, with two sorts of moral violence and one sort of immoral.
Chapter 45
How does Bagehot distinguish Mr. Hare's scheme from the ultra-democratic theory?
Bagehot says he does not rank Hare's scheme with the ultra-democrats and feels 'a feeling of romance' about it, since grave old lawyers and mature philosophers promise large results. He refuses to dismiss it as impracticable merely because it is new, noting a free people will not adopt institutions they do not understand. He would support it even if adopted only in 1966, urging popularisation by writing and small experiments.
Chapter 45
Section 464 cards
What distinguishes compulsory from voluntary constituencies?
Under compulsory constituencies the law defines which qualifications give a vote for a particular constituency, so electors are assigned by law. Under voluntary constituencies the law defines who may vote and leaves voters to group themselves as they choose, with the most numerous groups becoming the constituencies. Bagehot treats the simple voluntary form as best for judging the principle's merits and demerits.
Chapter 46
What main advantage does Bagehot grant voluntary constituencies?
Bagehot says the temptation is plain: under compulsory constituencies minority votes are thrown away, as when London Tories are represented only by Whigs. Under the voluntary system, minorities far exceeding 1000 could combine to form their own constituency and return a member. He adds that it would also settle disputes over constituency size and let admirers of a great man, such as Mill, form an appreciating constituency.
Chapter 46
Why does Bagehot reject voluntary constituencies?
The author argues they are inconsistent with the prerequisites of parliamentary government. Under the voluntary plan the crisis of politics becomes making the constituency rather than electing the member, turning constituency-making into a trade run by registration associations. Such organisation would mainly return party men, since member-makers seek subservience rather than independence, producing members bound tighter by party bands than any now.
Chapter 46
How does the American caucus illustrate Bagehot's objection?
Bagehot notes the plan intended citizens to vote for the statesman they liked best, but instead they vote for the ticket made by the caucus, which eliminates known men and settles on an unknown one against whom nothing can be alleged. He argues caucuses would be worse in English constituency-making, because America can occasionally fix on one known great man, while England could not choose 658.
Chapter 46
Section 474 cards
Why does Bagehot say voluntary constituencies would enslave MPs?
The author argues a voluntary constituency would be like a church with tenets: it would make its representative the messenger of its mandates and delegate of its determinations, watching to see doctrine is expounded and dismissing him if not. A good constituency enslaves him through its earnestness; a bad one, through its manipulators, enslaves him still more.
Chapter 47
How would voluntary constituencies affect Parliament's moderation and independence?
The author argues the House would become party politicians selected by and chained to a party committee, pledged to party violence, plus immoderate representatives for every 'ism' in England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate, judicious men, there would be a compound of all sorts of violence, destroying both the extrinsic independence and inherent moderation Parliament needs.
Chapter 47
Why would voluntary constituencies shorten Parliaments?
The author argues earnest, self-formed constituencies would demand frequent elections, unwilling to part with their virtue for long or see it used against their wishes. A seven-year Parliament chosen in one political period may last through a second and dissolve in a third; a law-made constituency endures this because it lacks collective earnestness, but a missionary constituency would object and enjoin annual elections.
Chapter 47
What does Bagehot mean by a government working 'well'?
He rejects philosophers, posterity, or external authority as judges. Free government is self-government, and the best is what the people think best; an imposed government like the English in India may be better but is not free. In a deferential nation votes may be weighed as well as counted, but the votes must decide; public opinion, as the nation will accept it, is the test.
Chapter 47
Section 484 cards
How does Bagehot defend Parliament's choosing of governments against the charge of instability?
Bagehot concedes that when public opinion is undecided and parties are nearly even, individual cupidity may make Parliament change appointees too often. But he argues Lord Palmerston's second Government shows these fears are exaggerated: when the nation's choice is fixed on a statesman, Parliament fixes on him too, since the same influence acts within and without. A government held by the 'common element' of like-minded men of unlike parties survives even an imperceptible majority.
Chapter 48
What is Bagehot's view of the manner of English legislation, as opposed to its essence?
Bagehot calls the manner of legislation 'detestable' and its machinery 'odious.' A committee of the whole House attempting to deal with the elaborate clauses of a long bill is, he says, a wretched specimen of severe but misplaced labour, sure to wedge in some irrelevant clause. Government by a public meeting displays its inherent defects. Yet he argues the essence of the legislature can be separated from its accidents: subject to two considerable defects, Parliament passes laws as the nation wishes.
Chapter 48
What is the first exception Bagehot gives to Parliament's satisfactory representation of the nation?
Bagehot argues Parliament leans too much to the opinions of the landed interest, citing the Cattle Plague Act, hurried through the House in a manner that savoured of despotism; the cotton or wine trade could not have obtained such aid so. He notes county members, the landed gentry's numbers and social cohesion, and that counties elect only landowners of their own county, which he calls absurd. He believes the excess matters little except on singular occasions.
Chapter 48
How does Bagehot contrast the landed interest with merchants and manufacturers in Parliament?
Bagehot says the landed gentry far surpass any other class in number, have intimate connections, shared schools, and know one another's families from boyhood, forming a society of the same kind of men who marry the same kind of women. Merchants and manufacturers are a motley race, educated variously or not at all, divided between self-made men and inherited wealth, with no bond of union or habits of intercourse. He wonders not that the landed interest is powerful but that it is not despotic.
Chapter 48
Section 494 cards
What structural defect does Bagehot identify in Parliament's representation of regions?
Bagehot argues Parliament gives too much weight to stationary, historically great regions and too little to growing industrial districts. Representation was fixed when Devonshire, Somersetshire, and Wiltshire were dominant; now modern trade and railways concentrate wealth and manufacture in the North. He calls it a grave objection that the constitution empowers regions of past greatness while refusing equal power to regions of present greatness.
Chapter 49
What does Bagehot claim is the real motive behind the cry for Parliamentary reform?
Bagehot argues, though he admits it is unpopular, that most of the demand for reform stems from inequality of representation. He says great capitalists like Mr. Bright sincerely believe they seek more power for working men, but in fact naturally want more power for themselves, resenting that a rich, able manufacturer should be less than a small stupid squire. He adds that uneasy classes without just power rashly clutch egalitarian notions.
Chapter 49
Why does Bagehot deny that excluding the working classes is a defect in this aspect of representation?
Bagehot states he does not consider the exclusion of the working classes from effectual representation a defect in this aspect of Parliamentary representation. His reason: the working classes contribute almost nothing to corporate public opinion, so their lack of influence in Parliament does not impair Parliament's coincidence with public opinion. They are left out in the representation, and also in the thing represented.
Chapter 49
What does Bagehot say about the aristocratic element in Parliament and the deferential instinct?
Bagehot denies that aristocratic descent impairs Parliament's accordance with public opinion. He says these families have no corporate character or common opinions distinct from other landed gentry; the English aristocracy have never been a caste apart. Keeping an aristocratic element in the useful part of the polity helps the dignified and efficient institutions match. The deferential instinct secures this: constituencies covet honourables, baronets, and real earls over a manufacturer's son.
Chapter 49
Section 504 cards
What does Bagehot say about the House of Commons' teaching function?
The author argues that, in general and on principle, the House of Commons does not teach the public as much as it might or as the public would wish. Teaching in Parliament must be popular, and to be popular it must be concrete, embodied, and short. The problem is to know the highest truth the people will bear and to preach that. He says Lord Palmerston did not do this, but preached a doctrine just below the national standard.
Chapter 50
How do English parliamentary debates compare with American and French ones, per Bagehot?
The author argues English parliamentary debates are the most instructive of any assembly. American Congressional debates have little teaching efficacy because presidential government lets the executive veto legislation and Congress cannot turn out the executive. French Chambers he calls suitable appendages to an Empire wanting despotism without its shame: a few permitted objectors speak eloquently, always truly and always vainly. English debates fill a space those auxiliary chambers cannot.
Chapter 50
What distinction does Bagehot draw between Parliament's teaching and informing functions?
The author argues the teaching function brings true ideas before the nation and belongs to its highest minds. The informing (expressive) function brings only special ideas, grievances, and wishes of particular classes, and belongs to special minds. He insists the two must be separated in definition even though in life they often run together, since sometimes they are not found together and confusion results.
Chapter 50
Why does Bagehot favor admitting the working classes to representation?
The author argues ancestors gave constituencies a character so each trade had a spokesman, and the unsectional Parliament should know what each section thinks before deciding. Town artisans have gathered ideas and feelings, believe their interests are neglected, and should try to convince Parliament through their own advocates. The single unbending franchise of 1832 caused this difficulty. Until artisans have palpable advocates, the 'gross appearance' will keep producing diffused dissatisfaction.
Chapter 50
Section 514 cards
What three evils does Bagehot say a sudden change of Ministry produces?
The author argues it brings in new and untried persons to preside over policy, keeps present Ministers indifferent because they may be removed by events beyond their control, and may cause a mischievous change of policy. He claims continuity of mediocrity is often better than a hotch-podge of excellences, especially in rapidly changing fields like the instruments of war.
Chapter 51
What example does Bagehot give of a single refusal preventing a Government?
In 1847 Lord Grey would not join Lord John Russell's projected Government if Lord Palmerston was to be Foreign Secretary; Palmerston would be Foreign Secretary, so the Government was not formed. Bagehot says such cases are rare and need many concurrent circumstances, but refusals that impair or spoil a Government are very common.
Chapter 51
Why does Bagehot say new Ministers lack the best motive to learn their tasks?
The author argues that because a man knows events beyond his control, errors he did not share, and shifts of opinion may force him to leave his work midway and perhaps never return, he cannot feel the same interest in it. The last wave of party brought him there and the next may take him away; many old Ministers think more of the vicissitudes that make and unmake them than of office matters.
Chapter 51
What four replies does Bagehot offer to the objections against changing all Ministers at once?
He argues that such change is essential to Parliamentary government; that something like it happens in all elective Governments and worse happens under Presidential government; that it is not necessarily prejudicial but rather a prerequisite of good administration; and that the evident evils of English administration result not from what we have but from what we have not, namely deficiencies in other parts of the political and social state.
Chapter 51
Section 524 cards
Why does Bagehot say a predominant Parliament is worse than an ordinary despot?
The author argues a despot is limited by bodily capacity, pleasure, and the twelve hours in his day, so he delegates dull business. A Parliament, by contrast, is many men not at the top of the world, with unlimited time, unlimited vanity, and believed unlimited comprehension. Its pleasure is action and its life is work, so there is no limit to its curiosity or meddling.
Chapter 52
What did Sir Robert Peel's suggested list of questions illustrate?
Peel once suggested a list be taken of the questions asked of him in a single evening; they touched on roughly fifty subjects, with a thousand more that might have been added by parity of reason. Bagehot uses this to show Parliament's curiosity is boundless, and that as soon as one bore ends another begins, forcing the Minister to account for all branches of administration.
Chapter 52
How do rival parliamentary sections damage a department, according to Bagehot?
Fifty members may be zealous for one policy and fifty for another, dividing the department's action and spoiling its aims. When a department appears in a scrape, these sections seize the moment with speeches, documents, and statistics, comparing Britain unfavourably to America or Prussia. The newspapers amplify the scandal, which amuses the public, while the department's defence goes unread.
Chapter 52
Why is a department helpless in Parliament without an authorised official defender?
The author argues the wasps of the House fasten on a department because it is easy to sting and cannot sting back, and a small grain of complaint germinates into a crop. The Minister of the day is appealed to, though he never heard of the matter and does not care; pressure from supporters and the Secretary of the Treasury pushes him toward granting an inquiry.
Chapter 52
Section 534 cards
Why does Bagehot say departmental heads speaking in Parliament fails?
The author argues a great popular assembly trusts its own members, whom it sees daily and whose minds it can test, not an outside clerk. Such a speaker is an unfamiliar outsider, speaks under suspicion and without dignity, faces interrogation and cross-questioning, and his points are lost in quaestiunculae. Bagehot cites M. Guizot's own experience that the system is not effectual.
Chapter 53
Why would a permanent clerk speak poorly before Parliament?
Bagehot argues the clerk's habits form in the quiet of an office—red tape, placidity, deference from subordinates. In a public assembly he loses his head, says what he should not, gets hot and red, and feels like a culprit. Pestered by fuss and confounded by invective, he hates the House as the House dislikes him: an incompetent speaker before a hostile audience.
Chapter 53
What does the Parliamentary head do for a department?
The author argues the Parliamentary head is a protecting machine: he and the friends he brings stand between the department and the busybodies and crotchet-makers of the House and country. He studies the subject, compiles arguments and statistics, and defends the office, since his reputation and future promotion are at stake. He is known and heeded, so the House attends to him.
Chapter 53
How does the Parliamentary head secure votes against an attack?
After settling his speech, he tells the Secretary of the Treasury a motion is coming and asks for "your men." The Secretary checks the schedule, promises it shall be all right, and glides about speaking a word here and there. When the motion is made, steady faces sit behind the Treasury Bench, possibly a rising man defends the transaction, and the department wins by thirty-three.
Chapter 53
Section 544 cards
Why does Bagehot say the new Poor Law administration survived as long as it did?
The author argues it survived because the Whigs had created the Commission and felt bound as a party to protect it, giving it abnormal strength during an initial intellectual impetus. Once that support was spent, the Commissioners were left to their intrinsic weakness: no members represented them, only localities and corrupt interests. The Commission was dissolved and a Parliamentary head added.
Chapter 54
What does Bagehot claim the Poor Law example proves about independent central boards?
The author argues that an independent, unsheltered authority administering a public department always fails because Parliament pokes at it until it is impossible. He says the Poor Law's remaining goodness was preserved by having an official and party protector in the House of Commons, and that without this contrivance England would have drifted back to old Poor Law errors plus local meanness.
Chapter 54
Why does Bagehot say a changing Parliamentary head is necessary, and how does party organisation ensure it?
The author argues a head changing as the Ministry changes is a necessity of good Parliamentary government, and that party organisation naturally provides such heads. He contrasts America, where frequent elections make party organisation stronger and every office, great and minor, is refilled at each presidential change bringing a new party, with England, where only the greatest posts change.
Chapter 54
What defects does Bagehot attribute to bureaucracy, and why does he warn against imitating Prussia?
The author argues bureaucracy's defects are well known and inevitable given human nature over the long run. He notes a momentary English admiration for Prussian bureaucracy after Prussian triumphs, but says it does not please intelligent liberal Prussians, citing the Fortschritt Partei's aims: liberal administration against bigoted officials, and easy prosecution of guilty officials who currently fight citizens like armed men against the defenceless.
Chapter 54
Section 554 cards
According to Bagehot, what two opposing faults does bureaucracy tend toward?
Bagehot argues bureaucracy under-governs in quality while over-governing in quantity. The trained official cares more for routine than results, so the quality of government suffers; at the same time the official distrusts the untrained public and seeks to license, inspect, and interfere with every social interest, expanding official power and business rather than leaving free the energies of mankind.
Chapter 55
What does Bagehot claim about mixing special and non-special minds in business?
The author argues success depends on a due mixture of special and non-special minds—those attending to means and those attending to ends. He cites London joint-stock banks, run by a board mostly not trained in banking plus trained officers, which beat banks of pure bankers; and successful railways conducted by capitalists who buy skilled managers' services. This utility depends on the general minds being at the top, not the bottom.
Chapter 55
How does Bagehot use the Prussian military system as a warning?
Bagehot notes the Prussian system is now widely admired, yet sixty years earlier it pointed the moral against form: 'Frederic the Great lost the battle of Jena' because his system, good for his wants and times, was blindly continued into a different age. The 'dead and formal' Prussian system was then contrasted with the 'living' French one. He warns the current system's future may mirror its predecessor's.
Chapter 55
What does Bagehot say about the size and role of the functionary class in Germany and France?
Bagehot, quoting Laing, says the functionary class was meant as a new support of the throne—a third class attached by interest to kingly power, replacing nobility and capitalists in numbers. In France after Louis Philippe's expulsion, civil functionaries numbered 807,030, more than double the military. In Germany the class is proportionally more numerous due to the landwehr system and semi-feudal jurisdictions requiring more officials and paperwork.
Chapter 55
Section 564 cards
According to Bagehot, what is the primary function of a Parliamentary head of an office?
Bagehot argues the Parliamentary head is not the principal administrator but an extrinsic corrector and animator. He should question whether regulations still serve their end, as with fire precautions for wood ships now that iron ships are built. Only the head can get such questions answered; a junior clerk would be dismissed. The fresh outside mind counteracts a technical, self-absorbed office.
Chapter 56
What did Sir George Lewis say a Cabinet Minister's business is?
Lewis, bred in the permanent civil service and successful as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary, and Minister for War, said it is not the Cabinet Minister's business to work his department but to see that it is properly worked. If he does much, he probably does harm. The permanent staff can do the work better; he is only a bird of passage.
Chapter 56
Why does Bagehot argue frequent change of the Parliamentary official is an advantage?
Because the Minister's function is to bring outside sense and animation into contact with the inside world, and no single man perfectly represents outside sense. Impelling power and restraining wisdom rarely coexist, and long contact with the office would make him accept its ways, like the dyer's hand subdued to what it works in. So he must remain an outsider.
Chapter 56
How does Bagehot contrast Parliamentary and Presidential government on bureaucracy?
Bagehot argues the Presidential form, as worked in America, is incompatible with a skilled bureaucracy because the whole official class changes with party, and the single presidential election concentrates patronage. A President can credibly promise a specific post, intensifying corruption. No individual MP can promise place effectually, since his party may win while he remains powerless to give offices.
Chapter 56
Section 574 cards
Why does Bagehot say a Presidential Minister is harder to judge than a Parliamentary one?
Bagehot argues the President has the anomaly of parliamentary patronage without its corrective. At each party change he distributes principal offices to supporters, but a Presidential Minister can lurk unseen, need do nothing in public, and need not show for years whether he is wise or foolish. Parliament openly tests its members; a Presidential Minister is known only through actual contact or rare position.
Chapter 57
What does Bagehot claim is the administrative advantage of dictatorial or revolutionary government?
The author argues a dictator chosen by insurrection must be a man of consummate ability, since he cannot keep his place or even his life otherwise. He is active because negligence may cost him power or his head, and the state is strained to restrain and please the people at once. Bagehot admits such a despot is a better selector of administrators than a Parliament, with the keenest motives to choose well.
Chapter 57
Why does Bagehot say the English Government is not celebrated for administrative efficiency?
The author argues England attempts incalculably more than continental monarchies. It defends territories surpassing all Europe in magnitude, scattered across the globe, using volunteer recruits rather than forced service, while Prussia can command each man's time by law. He also notes the navy must keep large stocks while naval and military art are in transition, so accumulated ships and guns may be useless when tried.
Chapter 57
What two opposite criticisms of the Admiralty does Bagehot describe?
Bagehot says two cries go on side by side. One says there are not enough ships, no relief ships, no navy at all. The other says the ships and guns are all wrong, that the Admiralty built when it should have waited, heaping a curious museum of exploded inventions while giving nothing serviceable. Each cry defends the executive against the other, yet both blacken it together.
Chapter 57
Section 584 cards
What does Bagehot say about local independence and Parliamentary government?
The author argues that local independence has no necessary connection with Parliamentary government. The degree of local freedom desirable varies by circumstance, and a Parliamentary government may coexist with any degree of it. He insists we should not blame Parliamentary government as a general polity for the particular faults of England's local authorities, such as the guardians of the poor, though he says this happens daily.
Chapter 58
Why does Bagehot say foreign governments attract better officials than England?
The author argues that abroad a man under Government is a superior being, envied by almost everyone, so the Government easily picks the elite of the nation. In England there is no such superiority or feeling; people do not respect a stamp-office clerk or exciseman's assistant. Government cannot buy the best ability cheaply in pure honour, and mercantile opportunities lure away the most ambitious minds.
Chapter 58
What two causes does Bagehot give for poor English public administration?
The author identifies ignorance and the Constitution's 'dignified' parts. No polity can get more out of a nation than is in it, and a free government is government by persuasion, so the quality of persuaders and persuaded sets the result. He also argues that ornamental, imaginative elements retained for their attraction on a rude population diminish simple efficiency, like extra ornamental wheels in medieval clocks.
Chapter 58
How does Bagehot use the medieval clock to criticize dignified parts?
The author argues that the English Constitution, unlike a purely Parliamentary one, contains 'dignified' parts retained not for intrinsic use but for their imaginative attraction on an uncultured population. Such elements diminish simple efficiency, like ornamental wheels added to medieval clocks that showed the moon's age or made little figures emerge theatrically. Each new wheel is a source of friction and error, preventing accurate timekeeping.
Chapter 58
Section 593 cards
Why did England's three law courts expand into the whole sphere of litigation?
Bagehot says the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer each extended an originally narrow sphere into the entire sphere of litigation for the sake of fees. The old saying boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem was rendered in English as the mark of a good judge to augment the fees of his Court, his own income, and his subordinates'. The Treasury never asked for an account of these moneys, satisfied so long as it paid nothing.
Chapter 59
Why did the Chancellor of the Exchequer not answer for the Patent Office clerk's theft?
Bagehot reports a Patent Office clerk stole fees, and people assumed the Chancellor of the Exchequer was responsible, as in France. But the Patent Office was under the Lord Chancellor, and the Court of Chancery was one of many institutions owing existence to free competition, so looking after the fees fell to the Lord Chancellor, who as an occupied judge could not. Bagehot adds that in the English system the Chancellor of the Exchequer is the enemy of the Exchequer.
Chapter 59
What anomalies does Bagehot identify in the office of the Lord Chancellor?
Bagehot argues the Lord Chancellor's office is a heap of anomalies: he is a judge, yet sits in the Cabinet and makes party speeches in the Lords, though it is contrary to obvious principle to entrust administration to a judge and grave that justice be kept clear of sinister temptations. He cites Lord Lyndhurst, a Tory politician who presided in the O'Connell case, and Lord Westbury, in chronic wrangle with the bishops, judging Essays and Reviews. The Lord Chancellor became a Cabinet Minister because, near the sovereign, he was high in court precedence, not from political theory.
Chapter 59
Section 604 cards
What does Bagehot say the Chancellor of the Exchequer requires from revenue heads when preparing a budget?
Bagehot states the Chancellor first requires from the responsible heads of the revenue department their estimates of public revenue on the preliminary hypothesis that no change is made and last year's taxes continue. If he later considers an alteration, he requires a report on that too. Bagehot cites this as the method followed in the most successful part of English administration, the Ways and Means part.
Chapter 60
What did Bagehot conclude about the need for a permanent responsible head in great administrative departments?
Bagehot says recent experience seems to show that in all great administrative departments there ought to be some one permanent responsible head through whom the changing Parliamentary chief always acts, from whom he learns everything, and to whom he communicates everything. He notes the daily work of the Exchequer is a trifle compared with the Admiralty or Home Office, so a single head is less necessary there, but the preponderance of evidence favors one such head in all offices of very great work.
Chapter 60
According to Bagehot, how does the English Constitution differ from the American on supreme authority?
Bagehot argues the English Constitution has only one authority for all sorts of matters, while the Americans thought they were imitating England by having one ultimate authority for one sort of matter and another for another. He says the Americans in fact retained the sovereignty of the separate States, since powers not delegated to the central Government are reserved to the States. He claims this enactment more determined the Union's history than any other single cause.
Chapter 60
What examples does Bagehot give of capital matters left to American State governments?
Bagehot says the Federal Government could not touch slavery, the domestic institution that divided the Union and at last set the halves to fight; that determining fact was reserved for minor jurisdictions. He also says the States fix the suffrage for the Federal House of Representatives, since each State fixes its own legislature's suffrage, and fix the electoral qualification for Presidential elections. Thus the primary element of free government depends on subordinate local bodies.
Chapter 60
Section 614 cards
Why did the framers of the American Constitution divide sovereign power?
The author argues the framers shrank from placing sovereign power anywhere because they feared it would generate tyranny. George III had been a tyrant to them, and they resolved not to create another. Accredited theories held that the English Constitution divided sovereign authority, so the Americans imitated this by splitting up theirs, resulting in no single deciding power.
Chapter 61
How does the Constitution divide legislative and administrative authority between Congress and the President?
Congress rules the law while the President rules the administration. The President may veto laws, but two-thirds of both Houses can overrule him. The author notes three separate repositories of legislative power in different cases: Congress and the President agreeing, the President effectively exerting his veto, and two-thirds of Congress overriding him. The President may be impeached for gross neglect but need not zealously execute disapproved laws.
Chapter 61
Where does the Constitution place authority over international policy and treaties?
The author states that supreme authority over international policy is not in the President, and still less in the House of Representatives, but in the Senate. The President can only make treaties provided two-thirds of Senators present concur. Sovereignty over the greatest international questions therefore sits in a different part of the State from ordinary administrative or legislative questions, placed by itself.
Chapter 61
How did precedent give the President power over paper money and war?
The framers placed grants of supplies exclusively in the House but, the author argues, forgot paper money. It has been held that the President may emit such money without consulting Congress, as part of the war power as commander-in-chief. Lincoln relied on this prerogative of emission rather than congressional grants. The author argues this gives the President power to continue a war without Congress's consent.
Chapter 61
Section 624 cards
According to Bagehot, what is the ultimate authority in the English Constitution?
The author argues the ultimate authority is a newly-elected House of Commons, which can despotically and finally resolve any question—administrative or legislative, war or tax, India, Ireland, or London. Though it may defer to the Lords' suspensive veto in minor matters, when freshly elected and sure of popular assent it is absolute, and it alone appoints and can remove the executive, ensuring its decrees are executed.
Chapter 62
How does Bagehot contrast the English and American Constitutions?
The author argues England is the type of simple constitutions, where ultimate power on all questions rests with the same persons, while America is the type of composite governments, dividing supreme power among many bodies and functionaries. He claims the Americans of 1787 thought they copied England but contrived a contrast, and that America's multiplicity of authorities only works because of the people's political genius, moderation, and regard for law.
Chapter 62
What are the 'safety-valve' and the 'regulator' in the English Constitution?
The author calls the safety-valve the executive head's power to overcome the second chamber's resistance by creating new peers—making a majority if he lacks one—letting popular will escape within the Constitution. The regulator is the power of dissolving the otherwise sovereign chamber, confided to the chief executive, enabling an appeal from Parliament No. 1 to Parliament No. 2 without impairing Parliament's authority as a species.
Chapter 62
What three defects does Bagehot attribute to a sovereign popular chamber?
The author lists three accusations against the popular branch as sovereign: first, caprice—the choosing chamber shifts from one Minister to another and maintains no administration; second, party organisation, the remedy for caprice, aggravates party violence and makes parliamentary government essentially sectarian, workable only when sects are cohesive; third, a Parliament has peculiar feelings, prejudices, and interests it may pursue against the nation's well-being, with its own selfishness.
Chapter 62
Section 634 cards
Why does Bagehot say a Premier is best suited to check Parliament's capricious choice of a Premier?
The author argues the Premier is the person most interested in maintaining his administration, so he will use the power of dissolution efficiently and dexterously. An extrinsic king creates difficulty because a capricious Parliament may hope his caprice coincides with theirs. He cites George III's assaults on his Governments, when Premiers were habitually deprived of due authority and intrigues were encouraged.
Chapter 63
How does Bagehot say a constitutional king can be invaluable against a zealot Premier?
The author argues that while close contact with affairs usually makes a Premier cease to be an immoderate partisan, a partisan to some extent he must be and a violent one he may be. A zealot Premier will not appeal to the nation but will follow his formulae, pushing narrow maxims to unpopular consequences. Then a constitutional king, such as Leopold the First was and Prince Albert might have been, can prevent Parliament from hurting the nation.
Chapter 63
What does Bagehot say about a Premier checking Parliament's selfishness and jobbery?
The author argues an extrinsic check is more efficient than an intrinsic one. A Premier made by Parliament may share its bad impulses or have made capital out of them. He will care most for the permanence of his own Ministry, so he will be disinclined to coarse unpopularity but inclined to mitigated jobbery: temporising, giving a seemly dress to unseemly matters, doing as much harm as contents the assembly without offending the nation.
Chapter 63
What price does Bagehot say is paid for the extrinsic authority of a colonial governor?
The author argues a colonial governor is a super-Parliamentary authority with wisdom different from the local Parliament, but the advantage is bought at a heavy price. The governor has no permanent interest in the colony, may have had to find it on a map, takes years to understand its parties, and is apt to be a slave to local prejudices near him. His first desire is not to get into a scrape with the Colonial Office.
Chapter 63
Section 644 cards
Why does Bagehot call a constitutional king a 'damaged common man'?
The author argues an hereditary king is at best an ordinary person, badly educated for business, unlikely to have a taste for it, and tempted toward pleasure from youth. He spends his youth as heir-apparent with no appointed work. Bagehot claims hereditary royal families also gather a corrupting 'taint' from their situation, hurting their judgments. Such a man is nearly sure not to be both clever and industrious.
Chapter 64
What does Bagehot say a king must do to dissolve Parliament effectively?
The author argues the king must perceive that Parliament is wrong and that the nation knows it is wrong. To judge this, a man must be at least a considerable statesman, with great natural vigour to grasp national policy and incessant industry to follow its involved detail. A man made common by nature and worse by life is unlikely to have both, and a palace life gives him poor judgment of public opinion.
Chapter 64
How does George III illustrate a worse case for royal dissolution power?
Bagehot says Parliament may be wiser than the people while the king agrees with the people. During the American war, Lord North and Parliament were averse to continuing it, but George III was madly eager to continue. The king could appeal from a wise, pacific Parliament to a sullen, warlike nation. Thus the constitutional check meant for Parliament's vices was misused to curb its wisdom.
Chapter 64
What happened when William IV dismissed the Whig administration in 1835?
Bagehot says the king's perception was right—the English people were wavering in allegiance to the Whigs—but his policy was wrong. He forced a premature Tory Government that failed, and the Crown's intervention actually helped the Whigs because it looked inconsistent with the liberties of the people. Bagehot calls this the last precedent for a royal onslaught on a Ministry, and it opposed right principles while aiding wrong ones.
Chapter 64
Section 654 cards
What does Bagehot call the one great vice of parliamentary government in an adult political nation?
The author argues it is the caprice of Parliament in choosing a Ministry. A nation can hardly control this choice, and it should not control it except within wide limits, because parliamentary judgment of an administration depends on matters Parliament sees close at hand that the distant nation does not. Where personality enters, capriciousness begins.
Chapter 65
According to Bagehot, where is the check of possible dissolution better placed, and why?
The author argues the imminent check of possible dissolution is better in the Premier than in the sovereign. By late practice, its use is yearly ebbing from the sovereign and centring in the Premier. The Queen can hardly now refuse a defeated Minister the chance of a dissolution, any more than she can dissolve during an undefeated one without his consent.
Chapter 65
How does the ordinary, habitual creation of peers modify the House of Lords?
The Crown creates a few peers year by year, gradually modifying the Lords' characteristic feeling. Bagehot notes the English peerage was reportedly more Whig than Tory, having been Tory thirty years earlier, because each continuously governing party used creations to suit its views. Additions similar in genus but different in species modified the compound without irritating the old original.
Chapter 65
How does Bagehot distinguish catastrophic peer creation from the ordinary kind?
Catastrophic creation of peers to swamp the Upper House is a power only for great occasions, when the object is immense and party strife unmitigated. The author argues it is best in an able, impartial exterior king rather than a Premier who must be somewhat partisan. But he asks whether such a monarch will happen to reign at the crisis.
Chapter 65
Section 664 cards
What two cases does Bagehot cite of a sudden peer creation changing the Lords' majority?
Bagehot cites Queen Anne's time, when Harley's Ministry made profuse and quick creations to turn a Whig majority into a Tory majority, and the case of William IV. during the Reform Bill crisis. He treats both as the only English cases approaching a catastrophic creation of peers, and uses them to argue that the peer-creating power should not rest on an hereditary sovereign's idiosyncrasies.
Chapter 66
What does Bagehot say happened when William IV. refused to create enough peers?
After the second reading passed without the promised peers, the king refused to create enough when Lord Lyndhurst carried a vital amendment meant to destroy the Reform Bill. Bagehot says this produced a tremendous crisis and nearly a revolution, calling it a striking example of well-meaning imbecility. He concludes the discretionary power would have been better in Lord Grey's hands.
Chapter 66
What legal check does Bagehot propose on creating an extraordinary number of peers?
Bagehot proposes that more than ten peers annually should not be created except on a vote of some large majority, suppose three-fourths of the Lower House. This would ensure the Premier does not use the reserve force as an ordinary force, that it is kept for a revolution rather than administration, and that he still has it to use when the whole nation fixedly wishes it.
Chapter 66
Why does Bagehot argue this seemingly impractical question matters for the world at large?
Bagehot says he looks beyond Queen Victoria and present-day Britain to the world and coming times. He argues a growing matter-of-factness, fed by business and physical science, tests institutions by results; new countries lack fixed sources of reverence and must create institutions that generate loyalty by conspicuous utility. He therefore treats the peer-creating question as practical, not remote.
Chapter 66
Section 674 cards
What does Bagehot say cabinet government requires beyond intelligence and virtue?
Bagehot argues that mental and moral qualities are necessary but far from sufficient. Cabinet government is government by a committee selected by the legislature, so it faces a double set of conditions: those essential to all elective governments (the genus) and those peculiar to this particular elective government (the species). Its prerequisites are many and rarely coexist, which is why cabinet government is rare.
Chapter 67
What is the first prerequisite of elective government, according to Bagehot?
Bagehot states the first prerequisite of elective government is the mutual confidence of the electors. Because we are used to being ruled by elected ministers, we assume everyone would accept it, but he insists this is one of the gravest things, not the simplest. It rests on instinctive, almost unconscious trust that a specified number of persons may choose rulers for us.
Chapter 67
How does Bagehot characterize semi-barbarous peoples' attitudes toward outsiders?
Bagehot describes the peculiar marks of semi-barbarous people as diffused distrust and indiscriminate suspicion. People rooted to their birthplace suspect the next parish for its differing usages and accent, suspect the next county more, and distrust remote counties entirely. Where locality is a passion and distant territories are blanks in the mind, concerted co-operation between remote regions becomes impossible, even on trivial matters.
Chapter 67
Why does Bagehot say new colonial communities reject constitutional royalty?
Bagehot argues new communities, shaped by struggle with the wilderness, develop a literal, prosaic turn of mind demanding obvious utility in all institutions. They see the Queen's secret mystery and the Prince of Wales's happy inaction as European in limitation and mediaeval in origin. He concludes they need not adopt presidential government's division of powers; they may obtain English-style sovereignty under unroyal parliamentary government.
Chapter 67
Section 684 cards
Why does Bagehot say the indirect, hidden nature of election is beneficial?
The author argues that because the process of election is indirect, gradual, and latent, people scarcely perceive the immense political trust they place in each other. He compares it to mercantile credit, which seems natural and obvious to those who give it. A bald explanation of choosing a first magistrate would seem queer or eccentric, so the hidden process makes political trust easier to sustain.
Chapter 68
What does Bagehot claim the poorer and ignorant classes believe about the Queen?
The author argues that the poorer and more ignorant classes really believe the Queen governs. They cannot grasp the recondite difference between 'reigning' and 'governing'; the words and ideas needed do not exist in their dialect or minds. They fancy they are governed by an hereditary Queen by the grace of God, when they are really governed by a Cabinet and Parliament chosen by themselves.
Chapter 68
What does Bagehot mean by 'rationality' as a condition of elective government?
The author defines rationality as a power involving intelligence but distinct from it: a whole people electing rulers must be able to form a distinct conception of distant objects. The 'divinity' surrounding a king prevents steady conception of him, making people deify him in sentiment. This illusion prevents election of rulers but renders unelected rulers possible; only in later, wider, colder times is a palpably chosen ruler even possible.
Chapter 68
Why was the early English Parliament valued more as a preservative than a legislative body?
The author argues Parliament's prominent functions were not always legislative; it was rather a preservative body. The custom of the realm could not be altered without Parliament's consent, so people felt sure it would not be altered except in grave, peculiar cases. Its valued use was less to alter law than to prevent alteration. In early societies it matters more that law be fixed than good, since such ages covet fixity.
Chapter 68
Section 694 cards
According to Bagehot, what two conditions are needed for a Cabinet government to be fit?
Bagehot states the conditions of fitness are two: first, you must get a good legislature, and next, you must keep it good. He insists these are not so nearly connected as might be thought at first sight, and that getting a good legislature is the harder and primary difficulty, to which keeping it is evidently secondary.
Chapter 69
Why does Bagehot say a legislature with too little business becomes dangerous?
Bagehot argues a legislature needs a sufficient supply of substantial business; if you employ the best men to do nearly nothing, they will quarrel about that nothing. Where great questions end, little parties begin. A happy community with few laws to make may see its legislature quarrel over elective business, producing a succession of feeble administrations instead of a sufficient body of men long enough in power to prove their sufficiency.
Chapter 69
Which two kinds of nations does Bagehot say can elect a good Parliament?
Bagehot names two kinds. The first is a nation where the mass of the people are intelligent and comfortable, with no honest poverty, diffused education, and common political intelligence, roughly realised in the North American colonies and the free States of the Union. He presents this as the first kind but does not complete the enumeration in this chapter, moving instead to discuss the structure of such equal communities.
Chapter 69
What does Bagehot say about social democracy in an early agricultural colony?
Bagehot argues that in the early ages of an agricultural colony, whether you have political democracy or not, social democracy you must have, for nature makes it, not you. Attempts to transplant a graduated English society always failed at the first step: the rude classes felt equal to or better than the delicate classes, shifted for themselves, and left the gentle-folks to shift for themselves.
Chapter 69
Section 704 cards
According to Bagehot, what kind of nation is required for Cabinet government to work?
Bagehot argues Cabinet government is only possible in what he calls "deferential nations," where the numerical majority is willing to delegate its power of choosing rulers to a select, educated minority. This majority abdicates in favor of its elite and consents to obey whoever that elite confides in, acknowledging an educated minority as secondary electors—choosers of government—at once competent and unresisted.
Chapter 70
What does Bagehot say the English masses actually defer to, rather than to their rulers?
Bagehot argues the English masses defer not so much to their rulers as to the "theatrical show" of society—pomp of great men, spectacle of beautiful women, wealth and enjoyment displayed. Their imagination is bowed down; they feel unequal to the life revealed to them. Courts and aristocracies possess visibility, which rules the multitude, and the Queen is the climax of this play.
Chapter 70
Who does Bagehot identify as the real rulers versus the apparent rulers of England?
Bagehot argues the apparent rulers are like imposing personages of a splendid procession—it is by them the mob are influenced and they whom spectators cheer. The real rulers are secreted in second-rate carriages; no one cares for or asks about them, yet they are obeyed implicitly and unconsciously by reason of the splendour of those who eclipsed and preceded them.
Chapter 70
Why does Bagehot claim a deferential community suits Cabinet government better than a democratic one?
Bagehot argues a deferential community is more suited to political excellence: the highest classes can rule in it, and as such must have more political ability than lower classes. A life of labour, incomplete education, and monotonous occupation cannot create as much flexible thought as a life of leisure and long culture. A country of respectful poor is more fitted for the best government than one where every man thinks he is as good as every other.
Chapter 70
Section 714 cards
According to Bagehot, why is a deferential nation so hard to found?
The author argues respect is traditional, given to what is known to be old rather than to what is proved good. In a new colony where merit may be equal and no traditional marks of fitness exist, deference to higher culture could only be yielded upon proof of its existence and political value—proof nearly impossible to give so as to satisfy persons of less culture.
Chapter 71
Why does Bagehot call a deferential community of ignorant people an unstable equilibrium?
He borrows the mechanics image of a cone balanced on its point: once pushed, it departs farther and falls. So if the ignorant but respectful masses are once permitted to begin to rule, deference is lost for ever. Demagogues and newspapers will tell them their rule beats the fallen aristocracy's, and a people never hears censure of itself.
Chapter 71
What two adjuncts does Bagehot say always accompanied early royalty?
Drawing on Homer's Greece and imagining it elsewhere, he names the 'old men'—the council or boule whose debates the king used to learn what he could and ought to do—and the agora, which he prefers to call the tentative assembly. The king announced his will in form but in reality felt his way, reading cheers versus hollow murmurs.
Chapter 71
What fatal defect does Bagehot find in this early polity?
Reverential associations transmit by one law—inheritance, clinging to the line of god-descended kings—while the capacity to govern transmits by another. Soon that line produces a child, an idiot, or someone otherwise incapable. Then liberty thrives under weak princes: the listening assembly begins to speak, and the council to enjoin rather than advise.
Chapter 71
Section 724 cards
How does Bagehot compare the development of Greek and English constitutions?
Bagehot argues both early Greeks and Romans developed republics out of the appendages of monarchy, and English history followed the same substance with a different form. England's growth was slower and longer because of its larger scale, distinct races subject to royal superstition, and the need for a strong executive during the transition from monarchy to republic.
Chapter 72
What was the function of the medieval Parliament according to Bagehot?
Bagehot argues the medieval Parliament was an 'expressive' body rather than a ruling one. Its function was to tell the king what the nation wished him to do, guide him by new wisdom and especially by new facts—their own feelings as part of the people. From this the king learned what the nation would endure; if he much mistook it, there was a rebellion.
Chapter 72
Why did the ante-Tudor Parliament's power decline so suddenly?
Bagehot explains that confusion fostered the Parliament's rapid growth and confusion destroyed it. Feudal society rested on aristocratic force headed by the high nobility, but the great barons killed themselves out in the Wars of the Roses. By Bosworth many of the greatest combatants were gone, leaving Henry VII a kingdom with a Parliament to advise but scarcely one to control.
Chapter 72
Why does Bagehot call ante-Tudor Parliaments 'unsymmetrical realities'?
Bagehot contrasts them with symmetrical 'shams' like the French Empire's assemblies, elected by universal suffrage and ballot in equal-looking districts. English Parliaments were elected anyhow: sheriffs had licence in sending writs, and boroughs scrambled for the franchise. Yet there was a real desire to know national opinion because kings needed the nation's aid, so these were bona-fide counsellors, not manufactured assemblies.
Chapter 72
Section 734 cards
According to Bagehot, what was the nature of most important enactments in the ante-Tudor period?
The author argues that many important enactments of that period were declaratory acts. They did not profess to enjoin by inherent authority what the law should be in future, but to state and mark what the law already was. They were declarations of immemorial custom rather than precepts of new duties, reflecting a system in which the king consulted Lords and Commons before altering the common law.
Chapter 73
How does Bagehot respond to Sir James Mackintosh's claim about Magna Charta and taxation?
Bagehot rejects Mackintosh's claim that Magna Charta converted the right of taxation into the shield of liberty. He argues the liberty existed before, and the right to be taxed was an efflorescence and instance of it, not a cause. The right of self-taxation would have been a dead letter without the armed force and aristocratic organisation compelling the king to make a treaty.
Chapter 73
What did Bagehot identify as the driving energy behind the growth of Parliament from Henry VIII to Charles I?
The author argues the energy was the growth of the English middle class, in its most inclusive sense, animated by Protestantism. He endorses Macaulay's view that political causes alone would not have provoked such resistance without religious theory. A strong Evangelic and anti-Papal spirit entered the middle sort of Englishmen, adding ideal warmth and fervour to their existing force and substance.
Chapter 73
Why does Bagehot call the Revolution of 1688 the 'minimum of a revolution,' and what weakness followed?
In law it only changed the dynasty, which is why Bagehot calls it the minimum of a revolution; but precisely for that reason it was the greatest shock to the common multitude, who see the dynasty and nothing else. The aristocracy held the deferential classes together only imperfectly and uneasily, and crude prejudice swayed for years. Until George III, government suffered attrition from a competitive sovereign.
Chapter 73
Section 744 cards
According to Bagehot, what did the mass of English people misunderstand about government?
The author argues the higher and more educated portion of the English people had come to comprehend constitutional government, but the mass did not. They looked to the sovereign as the Government, and to the sovereign only. These people were carried forward by the magic of the aristocracy, principally through the influence of the great Whig families; without that aid, reason or liberty would never have held them.
Chapter 74
What did many believe George IV would do on becoming Prince Regent in 1810?
When George III. became insane in 1810, everyone believed George IV., on assuming power as Prince Regent, would turn out Mr. Perceval's Government and empower the Whig leaders Lord Grey or Lord Grenville to form another. The Tory Ministry was carrying on a successful war of existence against Napoleon, but the people's fancy that George IV. was a Whig outweighed the need for unchanged Government. He kept the Ministry he found.
Chapter 74
How does Bagehot contrast English attitudes toward the executive with American and French ones?
The author argues the English people dislike the executive government, unlike the Americans, who conceive of it as one of their appointed agents and see no invasion of freedom when the sovereign people interferes with itself. The French and Swiss think similarly. Bagehot says material necessities require a strong executive, and a free nation should not be jealous of it, but English history of resistance to the executive has reversed that feeling.
Chapter 74
Why does Bagehot say the Corporation of London was historically important despite its present faults?
The author argues the Corporation of London, though an educated Englishman now connects it with hereditary abuses, unaccounted revenues, and squalid parishes, was for centuries a bulwark of English liberty. The support of the near and organised capital gave the Long Parliament vigour found nowhere else; leading patriots took refuge in the City, and its committee at Guildhall came closest to an English sitting in permanence.
Chapter 74
Section 754 cards
Why did De Tocqueville defend corporations, according to Bagehot?
Bagehot says De Tocqueville maintained the English were not merely historically excusable but politically judicious in this matter, founding a "culte of corporations." Bagehot explains this was natural in France, where there is scarcely any power of self-organisation, the prefet must be asked on every subject, and a solitary thinker was repelled from one exaggeration into the opposite one he did not know.
Chapter 75
Why does Bagehot say England need not fear delegating power to outlying bodies?
Bagehot argues that in England, where business is in the air and a vigilance committee can be organised on every abuse and an executive committee for every remedy, we need not care how much power is delegated to outlying bodies or kept for the central body. As a matter of political instruction, which was De Tocqueville's point, England has had the instruction municipalities could give and is grown up.
Chapter 75
How does Bagehot view political anomalies, and with what reservation?
Bagehot says he does not fully sympathise with the horror of anomalies haunting some critics, and regards a political anomaly as a scientific physician regards a rare disease: an "interesting case" that may still teach us. But subject to that saving remark, he admits and maintains the Constitution is full of curious oddities, impeding and mischievous, which ought to be struck out.
Chapter 75
What does Bagehot's footnote say about how well the real government is concealed?
Bagehot's footnote claims the real government is so well concealed that if you tell a cabman to drive to "Downing Street," he most likely will never have heard of it and will not know where to take you. Bagehot concludes it is only a "disguised republic," illustrating the co-existence of a Queen's seeming prerogative and a Downing Street's real government.
Chapter 75
Source and licence
Text used: Project Gutenberg eBook #4351 (Public domain in the United States). Generated from the full text; cards paraphrase the source.
Version: Public domain edition. Retrieved 2026-11-19. Cards reviewed 2026-11-19.
These cards paraphrase the text for study. They are not a substitute for reading the book, and they do not reproduce long passages.
Turn your own notes into cards
Upload a PDF, Word, or text file and get question-and-answer cards for closed-notes practice. Five cards are free, no signup.