The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 Flashcards
A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan · Public domain edition · 291 cards · 81 chapters
A. T. Mahan argues that naval strength has decisively shaped the rise and fall of nations, a factor he says historians have largely neglected. This deck covers his six conditions of sea power and his case studies of England, Holland, France, and the United States.
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Chapter 1 · Question
What does Mahan say historians generally have overlooked about sea power?
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Chapter 1 · Answer
The author argues historians have generally been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, lacking both special interest and special knowledge, so the profound determining influence of maritime strength on great issues has been overlooked. He says this is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power, and that general acknowledgment of its importance stays vague unless supported by analysis of specific instances.
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Introduction4 cards
What does Mahan say historians generally have overlooked about sea power?
The author argues historians have generally been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, lacking both special interest and special knowledge, so the profound determining influence of maritime strength on great issues has been overlooked. He says this is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power, and that general acknowledgment of its importance stays vague unless supported by analysis of specific instances.
Chapter 1
How does Mahan use the Hannibal-Napoleon parallel to illustrate his thesis?
Arnold and Creasy compared Hannibal's and Napoleon's defeats without noting that in both cases the victor held command of the sea. The author argues Roman sea control forced Hannibal's costly march through Gaul, let Roman legions move unmolested by water between Spain and Italy, and kept Hasdrubal's reinforcements from reaching Hannibal by sea, separating the Carthaginian armies at the decisive moment.
Chapter 1
What is the stated purpose and scope of Mahan's work?
The author states his object is to examine the general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon that history, estimating its influence on the course of history and the prosperity of nations. The period runs from 1660, when the sailing-ship era had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American Revolution, keeping maritime interests in the foreground without divorcing them from general history.
Chapter 1
How does Mahan describe the relation between naval and general history, and his own approach?
The author argues naval historians have troubled little about the connection between general history and their topic, mostly chronicling naval occurrences, though less so among the French than the English. He aims to put maritime interests in the foreground without divorcing them from their surroundings of cause and effect, and, writing as a naval officer in sympathy with his profession, digresses on policy, strategy, and tactics while avoiding technical language.
Chapter 1
CHAPTER I. (part 1)4 cards
According to Mahan, from what does the necessity of a navy in the restricted sense spring?
Mahan argues that the necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs from the existence of a peaceful shipping and disappears with it. The exception is a nation with aggressive tendencies that keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment. He applies this to the United States, saying that since it has no aggressive purposes and its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of its armed fleet is a strictly logical consequence.
Chapter 2
What three things does Mahan call the key to much of the history and policy of seaboard nations?
Mahan identifies three things: production, with the necessity of exchanging products; shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on; and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety. He says the key to much of the history, as well as the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea is found in these three things.
Chapter 2
What six principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations does Mahan enumerate?
Mahan lists six principal conditions: I. Geographical Position; II. Physical Conformation, including natural productions and climate; III. Extent of Territory; IV. Number of Population; V. Character of the People; and VI. Character of the Government, including national institutions. He presents this list as the framework for discussing the elements of sea power.
Chapter 2
Why does Mahan say England's geographical position was an advantage over France and Holland as a sea power?
Mahan argues England was neither forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek territory by land, so its aim was unified upon the sea. Holland's strength was early exhausted by keeping up a large army and costly wars for independence, while France's policy was constantly diverted from the sea to continental expansion. England also held interior positions and better ports, letting its fleets interpose against either enemy.
Chapter 2
CHAPTER I. (part 2)4 cards
What two examples does Mahan give of accessible harbors becoming a wartime weakness?
Mahan notes that numerous, deep harbors are a source of strength and wealth, but by their very accessibility they become a weakness in war if not properly defended. He cites the Dutch ascending the Thames in 1667 and burning a large fraction of the English navy within sight of London, and the 1814 occupation of the Chesapeake and destruction of Washington as a sharp lesson on undefended water-way approaches.
Chapter 3
Why did Mahan argue Holland was driven to the sea rather than drawn to it?
The author argues Holland was driven to the sea by necessity: a competent native authority estimated Dutch soil could not support more than one eighth of the inhabitants. Poverty of soil and an exposed coast drove the Dutch first to fishing; curing fish gave them export material, and their position between the Baltic, France, and the Mediterranean let them absorb most of Europe's carrying-trade.
Chapter 3
What happened to Dutch prosperity when war with England halted shipping in 1653-54?
Mahan reports that when the disastrous war with England lasted eighteen months and shipping stopped, the sources of revenue were almost dry: workshops closed, work suspended, the Zuyder Zee became a forest of masts, the country was full of beggars, grass grew in the streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted. A humiliating peace alone saved them from ruin.
Chapter 3
How does Mahan compare France's and the United States' turn from the sea?
The author argues France, a pleasant land producing more than its people needed, did not take to the sea eagerly after Richelieu ended civil war, while England's many wants drove her people abroad. He says this result has been reproduced in the United States: the centre of power is no longer on the seaboard, capital and labor favor the interior, and the frontiers are neglected and politically weak.
Chapter 3
CHAPTER I. (part 3)3 cards
What two measures of population does Mahan say matter for sea power?
Mahan argues it is not only the grand total population that counts, but the number following the sea, or at least readily available for employment on shipboard and for creating naval material. He illustrates with France, whose population exceeded England's yet whose sea power was inferior, because England's shipping and related callings supplied a reserve of seamen and craftsmen France could not match.
Chapter 4
What does Mahan mean by 'reserve strength' or 'staying power'?
Mahan means the capacity to keep a navy supplied and manned beyond its initial force: a large shipping industry employs not only crews but many workers in trades that make and repair naval material, and such kindred callings create an aptitude for the sea. He cites France in 1778, able to man fifty ships at once but never exceeding seventy-one, while England rose from difficulty manning forty to one hundred twenty by 1782.
Chapter 4
What does Mahan identify as the United States' deficiency in sea power?
Mahan argues the United States lacks a seafaring population proportionate to its coast-line and population, and that such a resource exists only in a national merchant shipping and its related industries, which at present scarcely exist. He adds that the crews' nationality matters little provided they are attached to the flag and the country's sea power can bring most of them back in wartime.
Chapter 4
CHAPTER I. (part 4)4 cards
According to Mahan, why did French nobility's contempt for trade harm commerce?
The author argues that the noble classes' inherited contempt for peaceful trade made commerce seem humiliating. In France, vanity and the prestige of the nobility set a seal of inferiority on trade, so rich merchants sought noble honors and then abandoned their lucrative professions. Louis XIV's ordinance under Colbert allowed nobles to invest in merchant ships without losing nobility, but Mahan says such prejudice is not readily effaced by ordinances.
Chapter 5
What two English traits does Mahan credit for England's colonial success?
Mahan says England's unique success as a colonizer lay chiefly in two national traits: the English colonist settles readily in the new country, identifies his interest with it, and has no restless eagerness to return home; and he instinctively seeks to develop the new country's resources in the broadest sense. Mahan contrasts this with the French, who looked back longingly, and the Spaniards, whose ambitions were too narrow.
Chapter 5
Why did Dutch colonies lack a principle of growth, according to Mahan?
Mahan says the Dutch planted many colonies by 1650, ahead of England, and their commercial origin was natural. But they sought only trade and commerce, not extension of empire, conquering only when forced and generally trading under local sovereigns' protection. This placid satisfaction with gain alone, without political ambition, kept colonies mere commercial dependencies on the mother-country and killed the natural principle of growth.
Chapter 5
How does Mahan describe England's early assertion of sea control under James I?
Mahan cites Richelieu's account: the Duke of Sully, minister of Henry IV, embarked at Calais under the French flag, and an English commander in the Channel ordered him to lower it. When Sully refused, three cannon-shot followed, and he yielded. Mahan calls this the most striking early sign of England's purpose to assert herself at all risks upon the sea, noting the flag honor was exacted under Cromwell as under the kings.
Chapter 5
CHAPTER I. (part 5)3 cards
What did England's policy steadily aim to do on the ocean?
The chapter states that England's policy steadily aimed at widening and strengthening the bases of her sway upon the ocean. This is contrasted with the other governments of Europe, which seemed blind to the dangers to be feared from her sea growth. The author presents this as a consistent English objective pursued while rivals failed to recognize the threat.
Chapter 6
How did England's trade with Spain operate, and what resulted?
English trade with Spain, wrung from Spanish necessities, was abused by an extensive and scarcely disguised smuggling system. When the exasperated Spanish government gave way to excesses in suppression, both the minister who counselled peace and the opposition urging war defended their positions by alleging the effects of either course upon England's sea power and honor.
Chapter 6
What historical lessons does the chapter say were forgotten?
The chapter says the miseries resulting from the overweening power of Spain in days long gone by seemed forgotten, and so were the more recent lessons of the bloody and costly wars provoked by the ambition and exaggerated power of Louis. The author argues the other European governments were blind to the dangers of England's sea growth.
Chapter 6
CHAPTER II.4 cards
What was the state of the European powers when Charles II and Louis XIV acceded in 1660?
The chapter surveys Europe in 1660: France under the young Louis XIV, Spain in decline, the Dutch United Provinces strong in commerce and colonies but divided by party, and England newly restored under Charles II. The accession of Charles II and Louis XIV was followed shortly by general wars, with Louis XIV emerging as the leading personality in Europe.
Chapter 7
What does Mahan say about soldiers commanding fleets?
The chapter discusses the practice of soldiers commanding fleets, prompted by the military merits of the opposing fleets in the Four Days' Battle. Mahan treats this as a point of debate rather than a settled rule, weighing the merits of the opposing fleets and the question of whether soldiers or seamen should command at sea.
Chapter 7
What happened at the Battle of Lowestoft in 1665?
The Battle of Lowestoft in 1665 was the first major fleet engagement of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The chapter also compares fire-ships with torpedo-cruisers, discusses the group formation, and lays out the order of battle for sailing-ships, using Lowestoft to illustrate how fleets were organized and fought in that era.
Chapter 7
How does Mahan assess commerce-destroying and the Peace of Breda?
The chapter closes with Ruyter in the Thames in 1667, the Peace of Breda in 1667, and a discussion of the military value of commerce-destroying. Mahan weighs commerce-destroying as a military instrument, treating its value as a question to be assessed rather than assumed, in the context of the Second Anglo-Dutch War's outcome.
Chapter 7
CHAPTER II. (part 1)4 cards
What did Louis XIV tell his ministers in March 1661 about governing?
Louis XIV announced he would henceforth be his own prime minister, ending the arrangement by which the late Cardinal Mazarin had governed affairs. He directed that no decree be sealed except by his orders, and ordered the secretaries of State and the superintendent of finances to sign nothing without his command. The author notes this personal government was maintained in fact as well as name for over half a century.
Chapter 8
What four lines of policy did Richelieu lay down for France?
The author lists four: internal union of the kingdom, appeasing or suppressing religious strife and centralizing authority in the king; resistance to the House of Austria, which carried alliance with Protestant German States and Holland; extension of France's boundaries eastward at Spain's expense; and creation of a great sea power to make head against England, again keeping the Dutch alliance in view.
Chapter 8
What happened to the Spanish navy at the 1639 battle with Tromp?
Tromp attacked the Spanish fleet carrying troops and provisions from Dunkirk, forcing part back into harbor. Joined by De Witt, he engaged the Spanish fleet of sixty-seven sail in the Straits of Dover. Oquendo's fleet allowed itself to be blockaded, and when Tromp attacked with ninety-six sail, the Spaniards cut cables in a fog; many ran aground or were sunk, captured, or driven on the French coast.
Chapter 8
How does the author describe Holland's commercial and sea power around 1660?
The author quotes a French author calling Holland the Phoenicia of modern times. Its merchant fleet alone numbered 10,000 sail and 168,000 seamen, supporting 260,000 inhabitants. The herring fishery supported nearly one fifth of Holland's population, producing 300,000 tons of salt-fish and over eight million francs yearly. The republic had taken most of Europe's carrying trade.
Chapter 8
CHAPTER II. (part 2)3 cards
Why did Charles II's personal preference for France fail to shape English policy?
Charles II hated Holland as a republic and was drawn to France by sympathy for absolute rule, possible Catholic bias, and Louis's money, which freed him from Parliament. Yet he had to reckon with the temper of his people, unlike Louis, and when danger became imminent he gave way before English national feeling, determined not to incur his father's fate or a second exile.
Chapter 9
How did the three fleets' ship construction differ around 1660-1672?
French ships had greater displacement relative to artillery and stores, so when fully loaded they kept a higher battery, and their hulls had better lines, following the systematic restoration of the French navy. Dutch ships, built for a shoal coast, were flatter-bottomed and of less draught, able to shelter among shoals but less weatherly and of lighter scantling than either rival.
Chapter 9
What two maritime mistakes does Mahan attribute to Louis XIV?
Mahan argues Louis, eager for land extension, promoted a marriage that led Portugal to cede Bombay and Tangiers to England, inviting England into the Mediterranean and forwarding her alliance with Portugal. Louis also obtained Dunkirk from Charles II for money, which Mahan calls inexcusable from the maritime view: a bridgehead into France became a privateer haven preying on English commerce.
Chapter 9
CHAPTER II. (part 3)4 cards
Why did the fire-ship disappear from fleets, according to the French officer quoted?
The French officer states the fire-ship vanished from open-sea engagements as naval artillery gained range, accuracy and rapidity; as ships gained better hull forms, steering and sail power to evade them; and as fleets adopted cautious tactics that avoided close quarters and left decisions to cannon. It also disappeared from fleets whose speed it delayed and evolutions it complicated, and shell firing hastened its end.
Chapter 10
What resemblance and differences does Mahan draw between fire-ships and torpedo-cruisers?
Mahan notes the terrible character of the attack, the small size of the attacking vessel, and the demands on the assailant's nerve as points of resemblance. Differences: the modern vessel is handled with comparative certainty, and torpedo injury is instantaneous—success or failure at once—whereas the fire-ship required time to effect total destruction rather than merely crippling the enemy ship.
Chapter 10
What arguments does Mahan raise against the group formation of ships?
Mahan argues the group system introduces an artificial third command between admiral and captains, partly superseding supreme authority and partly fettering captains' discretion. When signals fail, a captain's duty to particular ships complicates his duty to his own ship and the fleet, giving those ships undue prominence. He notes the group formation failed the test of experience in old times, though a loose group order of sailing may have advantages.
Chapter 10
When did the close-hauled line-of-battle first become the adopted fighting order, and who gets credit?
Mahan says this war of 1665 is where the close-hauled line-of-battle is first undeniably adopted as the fleets' fighting order, though with eighty to a hundred ships the lines were imperfectly formed. Credit is generally given to the Duke of York, afterward James II, but Mahan says the question of who deserves it matters little compared with how long the adoption took.
Chapter 10
CHAPTER II. (part 4)4 cards
What strategic error did the English government make before fighting the Dutch?
The king divided the fleet: twenty ships under Prince Rupert went west to meet an approaching French squadron, while Monk took the remainder east against the Dutch. Mahan argues that dividing a fleet against a two-sided threat is an error unless one has overwhelming force, since each division risks being beaten separately—which happened here, as Monk's larger division was initially overwhelmed and had to retreat toward Rupert.
Chapter 11
How did Monk attack the larger Dutch fleet on June 11, 1666?
Monk, though inferior in numbers, kept the wind and stood along the Dutch line, leaving the right and centre out of cannon-shot until he came abreast of Tromp's leeward left squadron. With thirty-five ships he then bore down on Tromp, so only part of the superior Dutch force could engage. Mahan compares this grand-tactics move to Nelson at the Nile, noting the English lost more heavily but gained prestige.
Chapter 11
What criticism did the eyewitness make of Monk's handling of his line?
The eyewitness said English success and misfortunes alike came from being too scattered and extended in line, and that Monk's mistake was not keeping his ships better closed up. Mahan calls the remark just but the criticism scarcely so, since the opening out of a long column of sailing-ships was almost unavoidable—one of the chances Monk took in offering battle.
Chapter 11
What did Ruyter say and do when his subordinates acted independently on June 12?
When Tromp came aboard and seamen cheered, Ruyter said it was no time for rejoicing but for tears, since each squadron acted differently, in no line, huddled like sheep. The Dutch van's flag-officers had borne away, forcing Ruyter to imitate them to keep his squadron together. Mahan says this exposes the lack of subordination charged against Dutch officers, absent among the English.
Chapter 11
CHAPTER II. (part 5)4 cards
What did Mahan say replaced the pride of the military man in the English navy?
Mahan argues that in the English navy the pride of the seaman took the place of the pride of the military man. English officers valued what likened them to the merchant captain more than what made them akin to the soldier. In the French navy this was less general, owing to the more military spirit of the government and nobility, to whom officer rank was reserved.
Chapter 12
How did French and English officers differ in tactical skill, per Mahan?
Mahan argues the French officer, studious and systematic, treated tactical questions logically and prepared to handle fleets as a military man, not merely a seaman. In the American Revolutionary War, French officers inferior in seamanship met the English on more than equal terms in tactical skill and were practically superior in handling fleets, though that skill served mistaken strategic ends.
Chapter 12
What fatal policy did Charles II adopt in 1667, and with what result?
Mahan condemns Charles II's decision, urged by economy, to lay up his great ships and keep only a few frigates cruising, relying on preying on Dutch trade instead of fitting out mighty fleets. De Ruyter then sent sixty or seventy ships-of-the-line up the Thames, destroying ships at Chatham and in the Medway; the Peace of Breda followed.
Chapter 12
Why does Mahan say commerce-destroying war cannot stand alone?
Mahan argues guerre de course, though it injures enemy wealth and can be run cheaply by privateers, must be supported by a base: home ports or a solid outpost such as a distant dependency or powerful fleet. Without support, cruisers can only dash out briefly and their blows, though painful, cannot be fatal. He credits Cromwell's fleets, not commerce raiding, with shutting Dutch trade in port.
Chapter 12
CHAPTER II. (part 6)4 cards
What does Mahan say about the Civil War commerce cruisers like the Alabama?
Mahan argues their cruises were supported by the Union blockade, which left few ships for pursuit, and that even ten times as many cruisers would not have stopped the Union fleet. The direct and indirect injuries to individuals and the shipping industry did not influence or retard the outcome of the war; such injuries, unaccompanied by others, are more irritating than weakening.
Chapter 13
What alone strikes down a nation's money power at sea, according to Mahan?
Mahan argues it is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, however many, but possession of overbearing power on the sea that drives the enemy's flag from it or lets it appear only as a fugitive. This power controls the common highway of commerce and can only be exercised by great navies, less efficiently now than when the neutral flag lacked its present immunity.
Chapter 13
How does Mahan compare the South and North as sea powers in the Civil War?
Mahan writes that as a sea power the South occupied the place of France in the earlier wars, while the North resembled England. In the Confederacy the sufferers were not a class but the government and the nation at large, as in France. He credits the great Union fleets with powerfully modifying and hastening an end probably inevitable in any case.
Chapter 13
What does Mahan predict about 'effective blockade' in a future war between maritime nations?
Mahan suggests a nation with great sea power may try to interpret 'effective blockade' to suit its interests, claiming speed and ship disposition make a blockade effective at greater distances with fewer ships. The question would depend not on the weaker belligerent but on neutral powers, raising the issue of belligerent versus neutral rights; a vastly overpowering navy may carry its point, as England long refused to admit the neutral flag covering goods.
Chapter 13
CHAPTER III.4 cards
What was the purpose of the Triple Alliance of 1668?
The Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden was formed in response to Louis XIV's aggressions on the Spanish Netherlands. It angered Louis XIV, and the chapter notes that Leibnitz proposed to Louis that he seize Egypt instead. The alliance is presented as part of the diplomatic maneuvering that preceded the war of 1672-1674.
Chapter 14
What was the Dutch naval strategy in the war of 1672?
The chapter describes the Dutch naval strategy as defensive, aimed at protecting their coasts and trade against the combined English and French fleets. De Ruyter's tactical combinations are noted, but the chapter also stresses the inefficiency of Dutch naval administration, which hampered the execution of that strategy.
Chapter 14
What was the outcome and effect of the Battle of Solebay, 1672?
The Battle of Solebay in 1672 is treated with tactical comments in the chapter, and its effect on the course of the war is assessed. The chapter does not present it as a decisive victory; instead it weighs the battle's tactical handling and its limited influence on the wider war, which continued on land in Holland.
Chapter 14
How does the chapter characterize the French fleet's action at the Texel?
The chapter describes the naval battle of the Texel in 1673 and its effect upon the general war, then notes the equivocal action of the French fleet. It also remarks on the general ineffectiveness of maritime coalitions. The French conduct is presented as ambiguous rather than as straightforward support for their English allies.
Chapter 14
CHAPTER III. (part 1)3 cards
Why did the Dutch say France was 'good as a friend, but not as a neighbor'?
The United Provinces valued their traditional alliance with France but feared having so powerful a state on their border. Temple warned that if Flanders fell to Louis XIV, the Dutch would become merely a maritime province of France, and he urged England to reach an understanding with the Dutch against French domination of the Low Countries.
Chapter 15
What did Leibnitz's memorial propose to Louis XIV instead of attacking Holland?
Leibnitz urged France to make overseas expansion primary and continental expansion secondary, starting with the conquest of Egypt. He argued Egypt was easier than the United Provinces, that a repulse there would cost little, and that victory would bring command of Eastern trade, dominion of the seas, and the empire of the East. The memorial had no effect.
Chapter 15
How did the Dutch fleet use their coast and shoals strategically in the 1672 war?
Forced by desperate odds, the Dutch avoided meeting the enemy at sea except once at the start. Ruyter kept under cover of his islands or on ground the enemy dared not follow when the wind favored the allies, then turned and attacked when the wind served him. Mahan calls this a defensive-offensive use of a dangerous coast.
Chapter 15
CHAPTER III. (part 2)4 cards
What did Ruyter's attack at Solebay achieve for the Dutch?
The author states the substantial results of Solebay were wholly favorable to the Dutch. Ruyter's attack inflicted damage and caused an expenditure of ammunition that postponed the allied fleet's sailing for a month, a diversion important and vital given the United Provinces' desperate condition ashore. After this check, Ruyter also convoyed a Dutch merchant fleet safely to port.
Chapter 16
How did Muyden's survival affect Amsterdam's position?
Muyden, on the Zuyder Zee two hours from Amsterdam, held the key to the dykes enabling Amsterdam's protecting inundation and the key to its harbor, since North Sea ships to Amsterdam passed under its guns. A few straggling French soldiers were admitted amid panic but expelled. With Muyden saved and dykes open, Amsterdam gained time and kept free communication by sea.
Chapter 16
What was Ruyter's plan at the battle of the Texel?
Ruyter divided his fleet into three squadrons, sending a leading squadron of ten or twelve ships against the French while attacking the English centre and rear with the rest. The author notes this, by holding the French in check as at Solebay, let him engage the English on equal terms despite overall inferiority in numbers.
Chapter 16
What consequences did the Dutch draw from the Texel battle?
The author calls it a drawn fight but endorses the English naval historian's verdict that its consequences for the Dutch were exceedingly great: they opened their ports, which were entirely blocked up, and ended all thoughts of invasion by removing its possibility. The author attributes this to the prudence of the Dutch admiral.
Chapter 16
CHAPTER III. (part 3)4 cards
What did the peace of February 19, 1674 require of the Dutch?
The peace between England and the Provinces, signed February 19, 1674, required the Dutch to recognize the absolute supremacy of the English flag from Cape Finisterre in Spain to Norway, and to pay a war indemnity. England then remained neutral for the rest of the war, which Mahan says necessarily made England less maritime.
Chapter 17
Why did Louis XIV withdraw his navy from the ocean after England left the war?
The King of France judged his navy, in numbers or efficiency, unable to contend alone with Holland's fleet. He therefore withdrew it from the ocean and confined sea enterprises to the Mediterranean, with one or two half-privateering expeditions to the West Indies. Mahan notes this withdrawal, and the Dutch fleet reductions, made the war increasingly continental.
Chapter 17
What forces faced each other at the battle of Stromboli on January 8, 1676?
The French had twenty ships-of-the-line and six fire-ships under Duquesne; the Dutch had nineteen ships, one of them Spanish, and four fire-ships under De Ruyter. Mahan notes Dutch ships were as a rule inferior to English ones and yet more to French. A squall drove the Spanish galleys to shelter under Lipari, and the wind shift gave the French the weather-gage.
Chapter 17
How does Mahan connect Duquesne's attack at Stromboli to Clerk's theories?
Mahan says Stromboli partly anticipates the tactics Clerk described: the French sought the weather-gage and attacked with fury while the Dutch defended. Duquesne's line kept away together and ran down obliquely, so the assailant took enemy fire at disadvantage, the van arrived first, and confusion spread. Mahan notes this matched Clerk's later critique of parallel, ship-for-ship attacks.
Chapter 17
CHAPTER III. (part 4)4 cards
What did Holland lose in Europe and overseas at the Peace of Nimeguen?
Holland lost not a foot of ground in Europe; beyond the seas she lost only her colonies on the west coast of Africa and in Guiana. Mahan says she owed her safety and the final successful issue to her sea power, which delivered her in the hour of extreme danger and kept the general war alive, though the effort sapped her strength and later broke her down.
Chapter 18
What did Louis XIV's attitude toward Holland cost France, according to Mahan?
The author argues Louis drove the Dutch carrying-trade into English ships, let England settle Pennsylvania and Carolina peacefully and seize New York and New Jersey, and sacrificed France's growing commerce to buy English neutrality. Thus Louis gave England the first impulse toward the sea power Colbert had hoped for France, and England pressed rapidly into the front place.
Chapter 18
How does Mahan describe the French royal navy after the Peace of Nimeguen?
Mahan says the merchant shipping was stricken and the splendid growth of the royal navy, which excited England's jealousy, was like a tree without roots; it soon withered away under the blast of war. Protective tariffs had been lowered in favor of England and Holland, the two sea powers, and agriculture, commerce, manufactures, and colonies had all been smitten.
Chapter 18
What does the wreck of d'Estrées's squadron on the Aves Islands illustrate?
It illustrates the poor qualifications of French naval officers before experience made seamen of many of them. D'Estrées went to sea first in 1667 as a mature man but commanded an important squadron by 1672, with Duquesne under him. The flag-captain reports that the admiral preferred the opinions of servants and others over proper officers, and the whole squadron was lost on the rocks.
Chapter 18
CHAPTER IV.4 cards
What aggressive policy of Louis XIV triggered the formation of the League of Augsburg?
The chapter opens by describing Louis XIV's aggressive policy as the driver of the coalition against France. The League of Augsburg formed in response, and Louis then declared war against the Emperor of Germany, followed by war against the United Provinces. These moves set the stage for the English Revolution and the naval campaigns that followed.
Chapter 19
What was the outcome of the naval battle of Beachy Head in 1690?
The chapter treats Beachy Head (1690) as a French naval victory, with Tourville commanding, and discusses his military character in connection with it. The battle is presented as a notable French success at sea during the war of the League of Augsburg, though the chapter's larger argument concerns how sea power ultimately shaped the war's outcome.
Chapter 19
What happened to the French ships at the naval battle of La Hougue in 1692?
At La Hougue in 1692 the chapter describes the destruction of French ships, a significant reversal after earlier French successes such as Beachy Head. The event is paired in the text with the battle of the Boyne (1690) and the end of the struggle in Ireland, framing La Hougue as part of the wider turn in the war's naval fortunes.
Chapter 19
What does Mahan argue about the influence of sea power in this war?
The author argues that sea power exerted a decisive influence in the war of the League of Augsburg, and the chapter devotes a section to that theme. It also examines the attack and defence of commerce and the peculiar characteristics of French privateering, presenting commerce warfare as a distinctive feature of how the naval contest was fought.
Chapter 19
CHAPTER IV. (part 1)4 cards
How did Louis XIV expand French territory between 1679 and 1682?
The chapter states Louis pursued expansion in peace as in war, claiming lands by ancient feudal ties, by implied surrender in treaties, by purchase, and by bare force backed with armed power. The most startling seizure was the imperial city of Strasburg on September 30, 1681; the same day Casale in Italy was sold to him by the Duke of Mantua. Both were strategically important, threatening Germany and Italy respectively in case of war.
Chapter 20
What was the League of Augsburg and when was it formed?
On July 9, 1686, a secret agreement was signed at Augsburg between the emperor, the kings of Spain and Sweden, and a number of German princes. Its object was at first defensive only against France, but it could readily be turned into an offensive alliance. This compact took the name of the League of Augsburg, and the general war that followed two years later was called the War of the League of Augsburg.
Chapter 20
Why did Louis XIV not stop William's expedition to England?
The French ambassador at the Hague and the navy minister repeatedly urged the king to stop the expedition with his sea power, which in the war's first years outnumbered the English and Dutch fleets combined. Louis refused, instead declaring war on Germany on September 24, 1688 and moving his armies toward the Rhine. The chapter says he remained faithful to the continental bias of his life, leaving the road open for Holland and England to unite under one ruler.
Chapter 20
What strategic sea-war points does the chapter draw from this conflict?
The chapter says the battles have much less tactical value than De Ruyter's. The chief strategic points are Louis's failure, despite decided sea superiority, to properly support James II in Ireland, and the gradual disappearance of the great French fleets because Louis could no longer maintain them given the expense of his chosen continental policy. A third, minor point is the large-scale commerce-destroying and privateering warfare as the fleets declined.
Chapter 20
CHAPTER IV. (part 2)3 cards
What tactical error does Mahan identify in Herbert's disposition at Beachy Head?
The author argues Herbert, refusing his rear to windward to stop the French doubling on it, left a great gap between centre and van. Mahan says he should instead have attacked as many rear ships as he could handle, refused his van to check the French van, and widened intervals between refused ships rather than opening a hole in the centre.
Chapter 21
Why does Mahan criticize Tourville's pursuit after Beachy Head?
Mahan argues an enemy beaten and in flight should be chased with ardor, keeping only enough order to preserve mutual support. Tourville instead kept the line-of-battle and slowed to his slowest ships. Mahan says this failure showed at the supreme moment of his career, and that the victory was most complete but not most decisive.
Chapter 21
What does Mahan say Tourville's caution at Beachy Head and his conduct at La Hougue had in common?
Mahan argues both came from the same trait: inability to assume a great responsibility. Tourville was brave, experienced, and scientifically minded, but not strong enough to bear the heaviest burdens. His caution in pursuit and his later sailing into near-certain destruction at La Hougue because he carried the king's order in his pocket sprang from one character flaw.
Chapter 21
CHAPTER IV. (part 3)4 cards
Why did the allied attacks on the French coast in this period accomplish little?
The author argues that these enterprises against the French coast effected little and did not significantly weaken the French armies, even as a diversion. He suggests the result might have differed had French ports been less well defended, or had French waterways opened into the country's heart like the Chesapeake, Delaware, and Southern sounds.
Chapter 22
How did the allied fleets affect Louis XIV's 1694 offensive against Spain?
When Louis XIV decided in 1694 to make war on Spain offensive, Tourville's fleet seconded the French armies and the reduction of Catalonia went rapidly. The approach of the allied navies in largely superior force caused Tourville to retire to Toulon, saving Barcelona. The allies then kept fleets on the Spanish coast and arrested the French advance until peace sentiment grew.
Chapter 22
Why did French commerce-destroying become most ruinous right after La Hougue?
Two causes combined: the allied fleet stayed together at Spithead for over two months gathering troops for a continental landing, leaving cruisers unmolested; and the French, unable to send their fleet out again that summer, let seamen take service in private ships, greatly increasing their numbers. The author notes English commerce suffered less the year before, when the French were masters at sea.
Chapter 22
What general conclusion does the author draw about commerce-destroying warfare?
The author argues that a cruising, commerce-destroying warfare, to be destructive, must be seconded by squadron warfare and divisions of ships-of-the-line, which force the enemy to unite his forces and let cruisers attempt his trade. Without such backing, the result will simply be the capture of the cruisers. He says the 1689-1697 results do not vitiate this conclusion.
Chapter 22
CHAPTER V.4 cards
What event triggered the War of the Spanish Succession?
The childless King of Spain willed the Spanish succession to the Duke of Anjou, a grandson of Louis XIV. Louis XIV accepted the bequests and seized towns in the Spanish Netherlands, prompting England, Holland, and Austria to form an offensive alliance, issue declarations of war, and proclaim Carlos III King of Spain.
Chapter 23
What was the outcome of the naval battle of Malaga in 1704?
The battle of Malaga was fought in 1704 between the English and French fleets. Mahan treats it within a naval war whose character he describes, and he links the period to the decay of the French navy. The chapter does not credit either side with a decisive tactical victory at Malaga.
Chapter 23
What did the allies seize in the Mediterranean during the war?
The English captured Gibraltar in 1704. The allies also seized Sardinia and Minorca as the land war progressed. These acquisitions reflected the allies' ability to project naval power into the Mediterranean against France and Spain.
Chapter 23
What did Mahan conclude about commerce-destroying as a naval strategy?
Mahan argues that sea power depends on both commerce and naval strength. He points to England's commercial prosperity alongside France's depressed condition, and he argues that commerce-destroying was ineffective, citing Duguay-Trouin's 1711 expedition against Rio de Janeiro as an example.
Chapter 23
CHAPTER V. (part 1)3 cards
What Spanish territories in Europe did Spain hold at the time of the Succession dispute?
Mahan lists Spain's European holdings as the Netherlands (now Belgium), Naples and the south of Italy, Milan and other northern provinces, and in the Mediterranean Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearic Isles. Corsica then belonged to Genoa. These possessions, plus vast American and Asian holdings, defined the strategic stakes of the succession.
Chapter 24
What did England and Holland object to regarding a Bourbon on the Spanish throne?
The English and Dutch objected to any extension of French power in the Spanish Netherlands and to French monopoly of trade with Spanish America, both feared results of a Bourbon accession. Their concern was commercial and maritime, not dynastic: the sea powers cared about trade privileges and naval position rather than who sat on the throne.
Chapter 24
What terms did the secret treaty of September 1701 set among the sea powers and Austria?
The allies agreed to conquer the Spanish Netherlands as a barrier against France, conquer Milan and Naples and Sicily for the emperor's security and for the navigation and commerce of English and Dutch subjects, and let the sea powers take Spanish Indies territories for themselves. None could treat separately, and they aimed to prevent union of France and Spain or French mastery of the Indies.
Chapter 24
CHAPTER V. (part 2)3 cards
Why did Rooke seize Gibraltar in 1704, and what did it cost him?
Rooke attacked Gibraltar because he heard it was insufficiently garrisoned, because it was of infinite importance as a port for the present war, and because its capture would reflect credit on the queen's arms. The place was bombarded and carried by an assault in boats. The attack expended fifteen thousand shot, leaving many allied ships without ammunition at Malaga.
Chapter 25
What historical significance does Mahan give the battle of Malaga?
Mahan argues Malaga has no military interest except as the first battle showing fully developed the wholly unscientific English method of attack by ship-for-ship, with no tactical combination. It marks the degeneracy from the able combinations of Monk, Ruyter, and Tourville to an epoch of mere seamanship. The fight lasted from ten to five but was entirely indecisive.
Chapter 25
How did sea power enable the allied capture of Barcelona in 1705?
Carlos III went to Catalonia with the allied fleet. The inferior French navy kept in port and the French army did not appear. Allied troops invested the town, aided by three thousand seamen and supported by supplies landed from the fleet, which served as both base of supplies and line of communications. Barcelona surrendered on October 9, and Catalonia welcomed Carlos.
Chapter 25
CHAPTER V. (part 3)4 cards
What did England gain commercially from the Peace of Utrecht, according to Mahan?
England gained the slave trade with Spanish America, which became a basis for extensive smuggling with those countries; commercial advantages from French cessions to Portugal in South America, since England controlled Portuguese trade by the treaty of 1703; valuable North American colonies; and favorable treaties of commerce with France and Spain. The author argues these commercial gains, not military positions alone, underpinned English sea power.
Chapter 26
What did Holland obtain from the War of the Spanish Succession?
Holland obtained nothing at sea—no colony, no station. By land she gained only military occupation of certain fortified places in the Austrian Netherlands, the 'barrier towns,' which added nothing to her revenue, population, or resources. The author argues the success was not worth the cost, and Holland's visible decline dates from the Peace of Utrecht.
Chapter 26
Why does Mahan say England became 'the' sea power after the war?
Mahan argues England's sea power lay in the union of a great navy and prosperous commerce, carefully fostered together—not in either alone. France had a great navy in 1688 that withered, and French commerce later was swept off the seas. After the War of the Spanish Succession, England alone was rich, with control of the sea and extensive shipping, so her gain was great and solid.
Chapter 26
What choice did France make in 1672, and why does it matter to Mahan?
Mahan says France, uniquely among great powers, had a free choice between land and sea expansion, having a long continental frontier plus seaboard on three seas. In 1672 she definitively chose expansion by land, despite Colbert having restored her finances so her king's revenue more than doubled England's. The author argues this choice shaped the contrasting fates of France and England.
Chapter 26
CHAPTER V. (part 4)4 cards
What losses did England and France each suffer in ships during the war, per the 1707 Lords committee report?
The report showed England had lost 30 ships-of-war and 1146 merchant-ships since the war's start, of which 300 were retaken, while England had taken or destroyed 80 French ships-of-war and 1346 merchantmen, plus 175 privateers. Mahan cites these figures to argue that a mere cruising warfare not based on large fleets cannot break down a great sea power.
Chapter 27
What was Duguay-Trouin's 1711 expedition against Rio Janeiro, and what were its terms and results?
Duguay-Trouin sailed with six ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, and over two thousand troops under a contract between the king and a private company: the king took one fifth of net profits and bore losses of wrecked vessels, while the company paid thirty francs for each soldier who died, was killed, or deserted. Rio was captured and ransomed for under four hundred thousand dollars plus five hundred cases of sugar; the company cleared about ninety-two percent.
Chapter 27
What did Mahan conclude about the limits of commerce-destroying cruisers like Jean Bart and Duguay-Trouin?
Mahan argues that despite the fame and skill of French commerce-destroyers—Jean Bart, Forbin, Du Casse, and above all Duguay-Trouin, whom he calls the equals of any the world has seen—their cruising warfare could not break down a great sea power. He states no argument is needed beyond the comparative ship-loss figures to show the inability of such a war, not based on large fleets, to defeat England.
Chapter 27
What eastern developments did Mahan say could have influenced the War of the Spanish Succession?
Mahan notes that while western Europe was at war, Sweden and Russia fought, Hungary revolted against Austria, and Turkey was drawn in at the end of 1710. He says had Turkey helped Hungary, it would have made a powerful diversion in favor of France, but she did not move—the English historian suggests fear of the English fleet deterred her—and Hungary was reduced. The Sweden-Russia war ended Swedish preponderance and brought Russia into European politics.
Chapter 27
CHAPTER VI.4 cards
What event in 1718 destroyed the Spanish navy and where?
The Spanish navy was destroyed off Cape Passaro in 1718 by the British fleet. This followed Spain's invasion of Sicily, which prompted the alliance of Austria, England, Holland, and France against Spain. The naval defeat contributed to the failure and dismissal of Alberoni's administration and Spain's eventual acceptance of terms.
Chapter 28
What was the nature of English trade in Spanish America before 1739?
English merchants carried on a contraband trade in Spanish America, smuggling goods into Spanish colonies in violation of Spanish commercial restrictions. Spain responded with illegal searches of English ships. These tensions between England and Spain over trade and search practices were among the troubles that eventually led to England declaring war against Spain in 1739.
Chapter 28
How did Walpole and Fleuri affect the outbreak of war?
Walpole struggled to preserve peace between England and Spain, while Fleuri administered France and oversaw growth of French commerce, including in the East Indies. Despite Walpole's efforts, England declared war against Spain in 1739. The chapter also notes the decay of the French navy during this period and the deaths of both Walpole and Fleuri.
Chapter 28
What territorial and dynastic changes followed the War of the Polish Succession?
The War of the Polish Succession led to the creation of the Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Bourbon family compact. France acquired Bar and Lorraine. These arrangements reshaped the European balance, strengthening Bourbon dynastic ties while France gained territory, developments the chapter places alongside the concurrent troubles between England and Spain.
Chapter 28
CHAPTER VI. (part 1)4 cards
What concessions did Regent Orleans offer Britain to secure the Triple Alliance of 1717?
Orleans, advised by Abbé Dubois, forbade French shipping to the South Seas under penalty of death, lowered duties on English coal, offered to compel the Pretender James III to withdraw beyond the Alps, and undertook to fill up the port at Mardyck. These concessions, except one, came at the expense of France's sea power and commercial interests, and induced England to sign the treaty in January 1717.
Chapter 29
What did Alberoni promise Philip V, and what hampered Spain's ambitions?
Alberoni promised to put Philip V in position to reconquer Sicily and Naples if granted five years of peace, working to rebuild revenues, navy, army, manufactures, commerce, and shipping. But Philip's ill-timed purpose to overthrow the regency of Orleans alienated France, forcing Alberoni to conciliate England and Holland instead—a blind policy for the two Bourbon kingdoms.
Chapter 29
What was the Quadruple Alliance arrangement, and how was Spain to be compensated?
England and France agreed to transfer Sicily from Savoy to Austria, giving Savoy Sardinia instead, and to compensate Spain with Parma and Tuscany in northern Italy, stipulating the emperor renounce his claim to the Spanish crown. Enforcement was to be by arms if necessary. Holland's accession gave it the name Quadruple Alliance; the offer to Spain reportedly included ceding Gibraltar.
Chapter 29
What happened to the Spanish navy at Cape Passaro in 1718?
Byng's English fleet, after landing Austrian troops, sought the Spanish fleet and engaged it off Cape Passaro on August 11, 1718. The Spanish navy was practically annihilated, a few ships escaping into Valetta harbor. Mahan argues Byng's merit lay in readiness to assume responsibility rather than in disregarding the line-of-battle, since the enemy was inferior and disorderly.
Chapter 29
CHAPTER VI. (part 2)4 cards
What did Walpole order Admiral Hosier's fleet to do at Porto Bello, and with what result?
Walpole ordered the admiral at Porto Bello to blockade the Spanish galleon fleet strictly and not to fight. The long delay on the sickly coast killed between three and four thousand officers and men, including Admiral Hosier himself. The mortality shocked the nation and became one of the causes leading to Walpole's overthrow many years later, though his aim of avoiding formal war was reached.
Chapter 30
How did French merchant shipping change after Louis XIV's death, and what did a French historian claim it proved?
French merchant shipping grew from only three hundred vessels at the death of Louis XIV to eighteen hundred twenty years later. A French historian claims this refutes the deplorable prejudice that France is not fitted for sea commerce, the only commerce that indefinitely extends a nation's power with its sphere of activity. The growth followed peace and the removal of commercial restrictions, not government protection.
Chapter 30
What was Fleuri's policy toward the French navy, and how did French and English fleet sizes compare?
Fleuri inherited Louis XIV's continental focus and allowed the navy to decay more and more, even as private individuals revived French trade. The material force fell to fifty-four ships-of-the-line and frigates, mostly in bad condition. Even after five years of imminent war with England, France had but forty-five ships-of-the-line to England's ninety, foreshadowing the results of a quarter century of war.
Chapter 30
Why did Spain tighten enforcement against English colonial trade, and how did it go beyond lawful measures?
Spain's colonial trade system was narrow and exclusive, but it neglected to supply the colonies, so a great smuggling trade arose, carried on mainly by the English using their Asiento and annual-ship privileges. Spain revived obsolete regulations and watched English ships with guarda-costas, then went further: ships-of-war and guarda-costas stopped and searched English ships on the high seas, outside Spanish jurisdiction, in scenes of insult and violence.
Chapter 30
CHAPTER VI. (part 3)3 cards
What did Fleuri's squadron of twenty-two ships accomplish for Spain?
Fleuri, forced against his will to fit out a squadron under France's defensive alliance with Spain, did so "in niggardly fashion." The twenty-two ships convoyed to America the Spanish fleet assembled at Ferrol, and this reinforcement prevented the English from attacking. Mahan notes the squadron was sent reluctantly, reflecting Fleuri's preference for quiet and his neglect of the French navy.
Chapter 31
What did Fleuri realize after Walpole's overthrow about the French navy?
According to a French writer cited by Mahan, upon Walpole's overthrow Fleuri perceived his mistake in letting the navy decay. He knew the kings of Naples and Sardinia forsook the French alliance merely because an English squadron threatened to bombard Naples and Genoa and bring an army into Italy. For lack of this element of greatness, France swallowed humiliations and could only complain of English cruisers pillaging her commerce.
Chapter 31
How did France claim its ships could fight Spain's enemies while France stayed neutral?
By its defensive alliance, France bound itself to furnish a specified force to the Spanish fleet in certain wars. France claimed sending these succors was not hostility to England, so its ships-of-war serving with Spain were enemies while the French nation and its other forces remained neutrals with neutrality's privileges. England did not have to accept this, but practically conceded it until formal war came in 1744.
Chapter 31
CHAPTER VII.4 cards
What did the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748 exchange between Britain and France?
The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 ended the War of the Austrian Succession. Under its terms, Madras, which La Bourdonnais had reduced for France in the East Indies, was exchanged for Louisburg, which New England colonists had captured in 1745. Mahan treats this mutual restoration as a key result of the war and uses it to illustrate how sea power shaped the conflict's outcome.
Chapter 32
Why did the English navy fail at the naval battle off Toulon in 1744?
At the battle off Toulon in 1744 the English fleet failed to achieve a decisive result. Mahan attributes the failure to inefficient action by the English navy, and the chapter notes that courts-martial followed the action. The episode serves his broader argument that Britain's sea power was neutralized during this period by causes that kept naval strength from being used effectively.
Chapter 32
What does Mahan argue about the influence of sea power on the war's issue?
Mahan argues that sea power strongly influenced how the war between Britain, Spain, and France turned out. He identifies causes that concurred to neutralize England's sea power despite her naval strength, and he presents the war's results as evidence for his larger thesis that command and effective use of the sea decide maritime conflicts.
Chapter 32
What happened to the French colonial projects of Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in India?
In the East Indies, Dupleix and La Bourdonnais pursued French colonial projects, and La Bourdonnais reduced Madras in 1746. Mahan stresses the influence of sea power on Indian affairs, showing how naval strength bore on these colonial contests. Madras was later exchanged for Louisburg under the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.
Chapter 32
CHAPTER VII. (part 1)4 cards
What broad characteristic distinguished the great wars beginning in 1739 from earlier wars?
The author argues these wars embraced all four quarters of the world, with the great questions being dominion of the sea, control of distant countries, possession of colonies, and the wealth dependent on them. Yet great fleet engagements came only near the end, because the French government failed to recognize that the sea was the proper field of struggle.
Chapter 33
How did the English and French colonies in North America differ in character and strength?
The English colonies were self-governing, self-dependent free men, agricultural, commercial, and sea-faring, with all elements of sea power already developed. Canada's paternal, military, monkish government discouraged individual enterprise; colonists neglected commerce and agriculture for arms, hunting, and the fur trade. In 1750 Canada had 80,000 people against 1,200,000 in the English colonies.
Chapter 33
Why did the West Indies see most of the fleet actions in these wars?
The author says the islands had twofold value: military positions for a power controlling the sea, and commercial value in adding to one's own resources or diminishing the enemy's. War against them was war upon commerce, the islands like ships loaded with enemy wealth, changing hands and usually restored at peace. Each power holding a share drew fleets there, aided by unfavorable continental campaigning seasons.
Chapter 33
How did Dupleix and La Bourdonnais differ over French power in India?
Dupleix fixed his mind on building a great empire ruling over vassal native princes, showing tact and activity but a soaring imagination. La Bourdonnais held simpler, sounder views aiming at sea supremacy and dominion based on free, certain communication with home rather than Eastern intrigues. Their discord, the author argues, reflected France's hesitation between land and sea as the stay of power.
Chapter 33
CHAPTER VII. (part 2)3 cards
What did the English fleet and subsidy secure from the King of Sardinia in 1743?
Between the dangers of a French alliance and the advantages of an English one, the King of Sardinia was swayed by a subsidy and the promise of a strong English fleet in the Mediterranean. In return he agreed to enter the war with forty-five thousand men. The compact was signed in September 1743, showing England's sea power and wealth attaching him to the Austrian cause.
Chapter 34
What went wrong with the English rear division at the battle off Toulon?
The English rear was several miles to windward and astern, out of supporting distance. Its admiral was widely thought to bear ill-will toward Matthews; though he proved he made all sail to join, he did not attack later, pleading that the line-of-battle signal was flying alongside the signal to engage. The court-martial accepted this technical excuse, and the English advantage in numbers was reversed.
Chapter 34
What does Mahan say caused the English fiasco at Toulon?
Mahan argues it was not mere cowardice but unpreparedness of mind and lack of military efficiency among the captains, combined with bad leadership from a rude and domineering admiral and possible ill-will toward him. He draws the lesson that officers must stock their minds by studying the conditions of war in their own day, or be found unready and disgraced in battle.
Chapter 34
CHAPTER VII. (part 3)4 cards
Why did La Bourdonnais's early advantage in the Indian seas come to nothing?
The French company ordered him not to attack the English, hoping for neutrality between the companies in that distant region even though the nations were at war. The English company accepted the proffer while noting it could bind neither the home government nor the royal navy. The author says the advantage won by La Bourdonnais's forethought was thus lost, his hand stayed while he was first and long alone on the field.
Chapter 35
What was Dupleix's plan for establishing French power in India?
Dupleix aimed to bring India under French power by meddling in Indian politics: first as head of a foreign independent colony, and second as a vassal of the Great Mogul. His means were to divide and conquer, advance French lines through judicious alliances, and throw French courage and skill onto one side or the other. Pondicherry, though a poor harbor, suited these plans because its distance from Delhi let aggressive expansion go unmarked.
Chapter 35
What did the author identify as the decisive factor in the failure of Dupleix's schemes?
The author argues sea power was decisive, acting quietly and unperceived. He cites a French historian's judgment that naval inferiority was the principal cause arresting Dupleix's progress, since the French royal navy did not appear in the East Indies in his day. The author asks whether French fleets controlling the coasts instead of English ones would have let Dupleix's schemes utterly fail.
Chapter 35
How did the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle affect Madras and Louisburg?
One condition of the peace was that Madras be restored to the English in exchange for Louisburg, the prize won by the North American colonists and released by them as reluctantly as Madras was by Dupleix. The author judges the gain decidedly on Great Britain's side, since English maritime supremacy made Louisburg in her hands stronger than Madras held by the French. Native princes were astonished at Dupleix surrendering his spoil in the hour of victory.
Chapter 35
CHAPTER VIII.4 cards
Why did Byng's failure at Port Mahon end in his execution?
Byng sailed to relieve Port Mahon in 1756 but fought an indecisive action off Minorca, then returned to Gibraltar. He was relieved of command, tried by court-martial, and shot. The chapter presents his fate as the consequence of failing to press the relief of the besieged place.
Chapter 36
How did Hawke's 1759 encounter with the Brest fleet affect France's invasion plans?
Choiseul planned an invasion of England, but the Toulon fleet's disastrous encounter with Boscawen frustrated it. A project to invade Scotland followed, and when the Brest fleet sailed, Hawke fell in with and dispersed it in 1759. The chapter ties these naval defeats directly to the collapse of French invasion schemes.
Chapter 36
What role does the chapter assign to sea power in Clive's success in India?
The chapter describes Clive's victory at Plassey in 1757 and stresses the decisive influence of sea power upon the issues in India. Naval actions between Pocock and D'Aché in 1758 and 1759, plus the destitute condition of French naval stations there, led the French fleet to abandon the struggle and French power in India to fall.
Chapter 36
What does the chapter conclude about Britain's gains in the Seven Years' War?
The chapter attributes British success to maritime superiority, citing conquests on the seas and in North America, Europe, and the East and West Indies, along with the rapid conquest of French and Spanish colonies. It notes increased British commerce alongside losses to mercantile shipping, and a commanding position for Great Britain, while the French navy lay ruined.
Chapter 36
CHAPTER VIII. (part 1)3 cards
What unresolved issues did the peace ending the War of the Austrian Succession leave open?
The peace left undetermined England's claim of uninterrupted navigation in West Indian seas free from search, and left vague the boundaries between English and French colonies in the Ohio valley, toward Canada, and on the land side of Nova Scotia. Mahan argues that by this peace England surrendered the control of the sea she had won, so peace could not last.
Chapter 37
Why did the Ohio valley dispute matter strategically to the English and French?
English success would militarily separate Canada from Louisiana, while French occupation linking their two extremes would shut the English colonists between the Alleghany Mountains and the sea. Franklin wrote there was no repose for the thirteen colonies while the French mastered Canada. Mahan notes the home French government was blind to the colony's value and that it must be fought for.
Chapter 37
What happened between Britain and France at sea before war was formally declared in 1755?
Although no war was declared, Boscawen's squadron captured two French ships on June 8, 1755. Hawke was then ordered to seize French ships-of-the-line and later all French ships; by year's end three hundred trading vessels worth six million dollars were taken and six thousand French seamen imprisoned. War was not declared until six months later.
Chapter 37
CHAPTER VIII. (part 2)4 cards
What did the court-martial conclude about Byng, and what was his fate?
The court-martial expressly cleared Byng of cowardice or disaffection but found him guilty of not doing his utmost to defeat the French fleet or relieve the garrison at Mahon. Because the article of war prescribed death with no alternative, it felt compelled to sentence him to death. The king refused to pardon, and Byng was shot.
Chapter 38
How did the naval strength of England, France, and Spain compare in 1756?
In 1756 the French navy had sixty-three ships-of-the-line, of which forty-five were in fair condition, though equipments and artillery were deficient. Spain had forty-six ships-of-the-line, but the author doubts its worth matched its numbers. England had one hundred and thirty ships-of-the-line, and four years later one hundred and twenty actually in commission.
Chapter 38
What was England's fourfold plan for using her sea power?
England watched the French Atlantic ports, especially Brest, in force; made attacks on the Atlantic and Channel coasts with flying squadrons and small troop descents; kept a Mediterranean fleet near Gibraltar to block the Toulon fleet from reaching the Atlantic; and sent distant expeditions against French colonies in the West Indies, Africa, and the East Indies.
Chapter 38
Why did France refuse Montcalm's urgent requests for reinforcements?
The minister of war refused, replying that among other reasons it was too probable the English would intercept reinforcements on the way, and that the more France sent, the more England would be moved to send. The author concludes that the possession of Canada depended upon sea power.
Chapter 38
CHAPTER VIII. (part 3)4 cards
Why did Conflans decide to run into Quiberon Bay rather than fight at sea?
Conflans faced a west-northwest gale, a lee shore, and an enemy superior in numbers—Hawke's twenty-three ships-of-the-line plus Duff's four fifty-gun ships against his twenty-one. He determined to run for Quiberon Bay, trusting that Hawke would not dare follow into waters full of banks, shoals, and reefs. He hoped to enter first and haul up under the western shore, forcing any pursuer to leeward.
Chapter 39
What was the outcome of the battle of Quiberon Bay for the French fleet?
The French fleet was annihilated. One seventy-four sank when the sea swept in through opened lower-deck ports; another was sunk by Hawke's flagship; two struck their colors. Seven fled into the Vilaine, seven took refuge at Rochefort, one ran ashore near the Loire, and the 'Royal Sun' was run ashore to avoid capture. The fourteen survivors were divided, with the Vilaine ships escaping two at a time over fifteen months to two years.
Chapter 39
What did Mahan argue was the significance of the battle of Quiberon Bay?
The author argues that with the destruction of the Brest fleet, all possibility of an invasion of England passed away. He calls the battle of November 20, 1759, the Trafalgar of this war. Though a blockade was maintained over the ships at the Vilaine and Rochefort, English fleets were now free to act against French and later Spanish colonies on a grander scale than ever before.
Chapter 39
How did the battle of Plassey and Bengal's fall relate to English sea power, per Mahan?
Clive won Plassey on June 23, 1757, against the nabob's fifteen thousand horse and thirty-five thousand foot with only three thousand men, one third English. Mahan argues that though Clive applied Dupleix's system, the foundation laid in Bengal could never have been kept or built upon had the English nation not controlled the sea, since a few European opponents could have reversed the balance.
Chapter 39
CHAPTER VIII. (part 4)4 cards
What was the outcome of the September 10, 1759 naval action between Pocock and D'Aché?
Pocock attacked with nine ships against D'Aché's eleven. The action was as indecisive as the two prior battles, though D'Aché retreated after a very bloody contest. Campbell notes the oddity that three pitched battles in eighteen months cost neither side a ship, yet the fruits of victory went to the weaker fleet: D'Aché soon sailed for the islands, leaving India to its fate.
Chapter 40
Why does the chapter criticize the Family Compact signed by France and Spain in 1761?
The author argues it was not honorable to the wisdom of the two governments. France's navy was ruined and commerce destroyed, while England had 120 ships-of-the-line and 70,000 seasoned seamen. Spain, with about fifty ships and a weak empire, risked most by war and needed longer neutrality. The secret clause bound Spain to declare war by May 1, 1762, if peace were not made.
Chapter 40
What strategic importance did Havana hold, and how was it captured?
Havana commanded the only passage by which treasure ships could sail from the Gulf of Mexico to Europe. Pocock's fleet of nineteen ships-of-the-line and ten thousand soldiers passed through the old Bahama channel, then besieged the city. The Moro Castle fell after forty days, and the city surrendered August 10, 1762, with twelve ships-of-the-line and £3,000,000 lost.
Chapter 40
How did England's sea power enable the capture of Manila in 1762?
With England already overcommitted, no troops or ships could be spared from home. Successes in India and control of the sea let Indian officials mount the expedition themselves. It sailed in August 1762, was supplied at neutral Malacca because the Dutch dared not refuse, and the Philippines surrendered in October with a four-million-dollar ransom.
Chapter 40
CHAPTER VIII. (part 5)3 cards
Why did Portugal keep its alliance with England despite Franco-Spanish pressure?
Portugal refused to abandon the alliance, calling it ancient and wholly defensive. France and Spain argued it was really offensive because English squadrons needed Portuguese ports and the wealth of Portuguese trade. The author notes that between the two arguments, the logic of situation and power prevailed: Portugal found England nearer and more dangerous than Spain, and stayed true to the alliance for generations.
Chapter 41
What did Pitt criticize about the Treaty of Paris?
Pitt argued that France was chiefly formidable as a maritime and commercial power, so gains against her there mattered most. He warned the treaty left France the possibility of reviving her navy. The author says these words, though illiberal, were strictly justifiable from the standpoint of sea power and the national jealousies of that age.
Chapter 41
What contrast does the author draw between the sea war's results and the continental war's outcome?
The continental peace restored the status quo ante bellum, after the King of Prussia estimated 180,000 of his soldiers lost out of five million subjects, with Russia, Austria, and France losing 460,000 combined. The author argues it is absurd to attribute this only to land-versus-sea differences, but concludes that states with good seaboard access should seek prosperity through sea commerce rather than unsettling existing political arrangements.
Chapter 41
CHAPTER VIII. (part 6)3 cards
What does Mahan say about naval operations far from coal stations?
The author argues that energetic naval operations distant from coal stations cannot be expected, because steam vessels' need for coal is more frequent, urgent, and peremptory than any need known to the sailing-ship. Coal dependence therefore limits how far a fleet can act from its supply points.
Chapter 42
What does Mahan say happens to distant coaling stations without a powerful navy?
The author argues it is vain to acquire distant coaling stations without maintaining a powerful navy, since such stations will simply fall into the hands of the enemy. Coaling stations and naval strength must go together; possession alone does not secure them.
Chapter 42
What does Mahan call the vainest of all delusions?
The author argues that the vainest of all delusions is expecting to bring down an enemy by commerce-destroying alone, with no coaling stations outside the national boundaries. Commerce-destroying by itself, unsupported by overseas coaling stations, cannot defeat an enemy.
Chapter 42
CHAPTER IX.4 cards
What event ended the period of peace and began the maritime war Mahan discusses?
The chapter covers the course of events from the Peace of Paris to 1778, when the breach between France and England over support of the American colonies led to maritime war consequent upon the American Revolution. The chapter culminates in the sailing of the British and French fleets and the Battle of Ushant in 1778.
Chapter 43
What did Louis XVI's instructions to French admirals emphasize, and what was the character of the 1778 war?
The chapter describes the naval policy of Louis XVI and his instructions to the French admirals, and characterizes the maritime war of 1778. It also notes the strength of the English navy at the time and the vital importance of the French fleet to the Americans, framing the conflict as one in which French naval support was essential to the American cause.
Chapter 43
Why was the French fleet vital to the Americans, and how did France support them before the treaty?
The chapter stresses the vital importance of the French fleet to the Americans and describes clandestine support of the Americans by France before the formal treaty between France and the Americans. It also notes American privateering. Together these show that French naval power and covert aid were central to the American position before open war with England.
Chapter 43
What does the chapter say about a naval commander-in-chief's position in battle?
The chapter closes with a section on the position of a naval commander-in-chief in battle, following its account of the Battle of Ushant in 1778. This discussion sits alongside the sailing of the British and French fleets and the broader characteristics of the maritime war, treating command responsibility as a distinct subject of analysis.
Chapter 43
CHAPTER IX. (part 1)4 cards
What did Choiseul see as France's chief enemy, and what alliance did he pursue?
Choiseul recognized England as the chief enemy and directed French efforts against her. After the invasion project was thwarted by Conflans's defeat, he sought to stir up Spain and gain her alliance, believing the combined seaboards of the two kingdoms could put afloat a navy to counterbalance England's. He also maintained the existing Austrian alliance but fixed his chief hopes on Spain.
Chapter 44
What was the state of the French navy by 1770, and what reforms did Choiseul make?
Thanks to the movement begun in 1761, there were forty ships-of-the-line in good condition at the end of the war; by 1770, when Choiseul was dismissed, the royal navy numbered sixty-four of the line and fifty frigates afloat, with filled arsenals and a stock of ship-timber. In 1767 he reorganized the fleet artillery, forming ten thousand gunners drilled weekly.
Chapter 44
What discipline problem did French officers' social equality create, according to the chapter?
The chapter says class-feeling among noble officers produced a sense of equality across very different grades, injuriously affecting subordination. Juniors argued, suggested, and disputed with superiors at critical moments; under Louis XVI. admiral, captain, officers, and midshipmen ate together and thee-and-thou'd each other, so inferiors gave opinions and chiefs sometimes yielded rather than make enemies.
Chapter 44
How did England respond to the Corsican cession and the Falkland Islands crisis?
On Corsica, England remonstrated and talked angrily, but only Sir Charles Saunders in the Commons urged war rather than consent; the chapter reads this as England not being ready or willing to fight. In 1770, after Spain seized Port Egmont, the people and Parliament were roused; England demanded restoration, commissioned ships, and pressed men, and Spain complied once Choiseul fell.
Chapter 44
CHAPTER IX. (part 2)4 cards
What did the French government's orders to its admirals require, according to the quoted passage?
The author quotes criticism that the French government, finding naval expenses excessive, ordered admirals to keep the sea as long as possible without pitched battles or costly brushes, and if forced to fight, to avoid decisive encounters. Admirals thus retreated when engagements turned serious, acquiring the habit of yielding the field to a bolder enemy—ruining moral force to save physical force.
Chapter 45
What did the First Lord of the Admiralty claim in November 1777 about England's navy?
He stated there were forty-two ships-of-the-line in commission in Great Britain, excluding foreign service, thirty-five completely manned and ready for sea at a moment's warning. He affirmed the navy was more than a match for the whole House of Bourbon, though the author notes this prospect was not realized: Keppel went to sea in June with only twenty ships.
Chapter 45
Why does the author argue the Hudson line was strategically decisive for the British?
The author argues that holding the Hudson with ships and supporting a marching army could have cut off New England from the western states, much as Union forces later split the Confederacy via the Mississippi. He notes the political effect would have exceeded the military, since the spirit of independence was strongest in New England.
Chapter 45
How did France support the American colonists before formally breaking with England?
France decided to give all possible support short of an actual break, furnishing money to Beaumarchais to establish a business house supplying warlike stores. France gave a million francs, Spain an equal sum, and Beaumarchais could buy from government arsenals. French officers passed into American service with little real hindrance, while French naval preparations continued.
Chapter 45
CHAPTER IX. (part 3)3 cards
What was the result of the battle of Ushant on July 27, 1778?
The first fleet action of the war was fought between thirty ships-of-the-line on each side under Keppel and D'Orvilliers. It was wholly indecisive: no ship was taken or sunk, and both fleets returned to their ports. It gained celebrity in England from public indignation at its lack of result and the naval and political controversy that followed.
Chapter 46
What question does the failure of the Duc de Chartres raise, and what practice did the French adopt?
His failure to wear in obedience to orders raises the still-debated question of the proper position for a naval commander-in-chief in action. From the centre the admiral sees both extremities equally; at the head he enforces orders by example. Toward the end of the war the French took him out of the line onto a frigate, and Lord Howe did likewise in 1778, though both later abandoned it.
Chapter 46
What does Mahan argue about admirals leading in person, citing Farragut?
Mahan argues Farragut's practice late in his career was to lead in person, and Farragut regretted yielding at Mobile to take second place. Mahan notes Farragut's battles were passages of fortifications under pilotage, not battles in the strict sense, imposing literal leadership on the commander. At Mobile both column leaders departed from his orders with disastrous results.
Chapter 46
CHAPTER IX. (part 4)2 cards
What reason does White give for Hood's hesitation to fire?
White suggests Hood feared that if he had prematurely brought on an action under those circumstances, he would have been held responsible for the results. The passage adds that Hood may also have been influenced by Rodney's bearing toward inferiors whose initiative displeased him, and that relations between the two men seem to have been strained.
Chapter 47
What does the incident reveal about discipline in Hood's division?
The passage says the incident is mentioned to show the state of discipline on board the ships of Sir Samuel Hood's division: Hood, though second in command, would not fire a single shot until directed to do so by his commander-in-chief. The author presents this as evidence of the division's strict obedience to the chain of command.
Chapter 47
CHAPTER X.4 cards
Why did D'Estaing's 1778 arrival in America fail to trap the British fleet?
D'Estaing sailed from Toulon for Delaware Bay, but the British were ordered to evacuate Philadelphia and Lord Howe moved with such rapidity that D'Estaing arrived too late. He followed Howe to New York, declined to attack there, and sailed for Newport; Howe followed him, and a storm dispersed both fleets. D'Estaing then took his fleet to Boston, while Howe's activity foiled him at every point.
Chapter 48
What happened at the naval battle of Grenada in 1779?
D'Estaing captured Grenada, and in the ensuing naval battle the English ships were crippled. Despite this advantage, D'Estaing failed to improve his success. The chapter attributes his neglect to reasons connected with French naval policy, which the author treats as a recurring limitation on French operations rather than a matter of chance.
Chapter 48
How does the chapter criticize British naval operations around Yorktown in 1781?
De Grasse sailed from Hayti for the Chesapeake and fought an action with the British fleet before Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in 1781. The chapter criticizes British naval operations in this campaign while praising the energy and address shown by De Grasse, and it stresses the difficulties of Great Britain's position in the war from 1778 onward.
Chapter 48
What does the chapter say about Washington's view of sea power?
The chapter closes by presenting Washington's opinions as to the influence of sea power upon the American contest. It also argues that Great Britain, holding a defensive position with inferior numbers, needed a vigorous initiative. These points tie the chapter's campaign narrative to the author's broader argument that control at sea shaped the war's outcome.
Chapter 48
CHAPTER X. (part 1)4 cards
Why did d'Estaing fail to attack New York in July 1778?
D'Estaing anchored south of Sandy Hook from July 11 to 22, sounding the bar. On July 22 a northeast wind and spring tide raised the water to thirty feet, and the fleet worked into position to cross. But the pilots discouraged him, his resolve failed, and he abandoned the attack and sailed south. The author argues this hesitation showed his inferiority as a military leader compared with Nelson and Farragut.
Chapter 49
What strategic advantage did Howe gain by his rapid movements in 1778?
Warned of d'Estaing's sailing, Howe assembled his fleet, evacuated Philadelphia, and reached Sandy Hook two days out, arriving ten days before d'Estaing at the Delaware. His presence barred New York, and his later arrival off Point Judith forced d'Estaing out of Newport, where the gale then damaged the French fleet. The author credits Howe's celerity and watchfulness with saving both New York and Rhode Island.
Chapter 49
How did Barrington secure Sta. Lucia against a much larger French fleet?
Barrington kept the troops aboard, sailed from Barbadoes on December 12, and anchored at Sta. Lucia on December 13; half the troops landed that afternoon and the rest the next morning. He warped transports inside the ships-of-war and anchored the fleet across the bay entrance, strengthening both ends. D'Estaing cannonaded twice at long range without anchoring, then attacked the troops and failed, retiring to Martinique.
Chapter 49
What does the author identify as the chief lesson of these fleet operations?
The author argues the lessons are strategic rather than tactical: the value of celerity and watchfulness combined with professional knowledge. Howe learned of his danger three weeks after d'Estaing sailed, yet still beat him to the Delaware, Sandy Hook, and Newport. The author also notes Howe's energy contrasted with his indolent brother, General Howe, and that his presence put him in the way of good luck.
Chapter 49
CHAPTER X. (part 2)4 cards
Why did D'Estaing decline to stretch ahead and place himself between Byron and the convoy?
He wrote home that his line was too much disordered to allow it, though Mahan finds it difficult to believe the attempt was hopeless given the relative power of motion in the two fleets. Mahan argues the third alternative—cutting off the three disabled ships—probably offered the greatest advantage, since it would separate the enemy's main body from the crippled ships and might provoke Byron into a hazardous attack.
Chapter 50
What does Ramatuelle claim justified French admirals preferring conquest of territory to taking ships?
Ramatuelle argues the French navy preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to the less real glory of taking a few ships, holding this closer to the true end of war: attacking the enemy in their possessions, the source of commercial wealth and maritime power. He cites Grenada, Yorktown, and St. Christopher as results of battles where the enemy was allowed to retreat undisturbed.
Chapter 50
Why does Mahan reject Ramatuelle's principle as applied to D'Estaing at Grenada?
Mahan argues the two cases are not alike: at Yorktown De Grasse's objective was Cornwallis's army, an organized force ashore, and he already held sea control through superior numbers. At Grenada D'Estaing's alternative objectives were the organized force afloat and a small island of no great military value. To hold the West Indies required a powerful seaport and control of the sea, which meant destroying the enemy's navy, not multiplying detachments.
Chapter 50
What happened to D'Estaing's expedition against Savannah, and what did it cost the Americans?
Arriving off Georgia on September 1, D'Estaing took the English unawares, but his lack of promptness again betrayed his good fortune: dallying before Savannah let conditions change, and the approach of bad weather pushed him into a premature assault. He fought at the head of his column but was bloodily repulsed; the siege was raised and he sailed for France, abandoning the Southern States and his project against New York.
Chapter 50
CHAPTER X. (part 3)3 cards
What did the captain of the Destin do at Rodney's battle, per French accounts?
French writers and Botta, likely drawing on French authorities but not found in English accounts, say Rodney marked a gap caused by a ship out of station and tried to break through. The captain of the Destin, seventy-four, pressed up under more sail and threw himself across the path of the English ninety-gun ship. Lapeyrouse-Bonfils praised this action as saving the fleet from almost certain defeat.
Chapter 51
Why did De Grasse decline to attack Hood's inferior fleet in April 1781?
After the four ships at Fort Royal joined him, De Grasse had twenty-four ships to Hood's eighteen and the windward position, yet would not attack. Mahan says fear of exposing his convoy prevented him from risking a serious engagement, and he contented himself with a distant cannonade. The author questions whether a policy or tradition justifying such conduct can be good.
Chapter 51
What risk did Rodney run by dividing his fleet in 1780?
Anxious about both North America and Jamaica and ignorant of De Guichen's destination, Rodney left half his fleet in the islands and sailed with the rest to New York, arriving September 12. Mahan calls the risk very great and scarcely justifiable: had De Guichen turned on Jamaica or New York, neither part could have withstood him. No ill effect followed, but two chances of disaster were run instead of one.
Chapter 51
CHAPTER X. (part 4)4 cards
Why did Graves fail to learn the contents of Rodney's despatches before August 16?
Graves was absent on a cruise to the eastward, hoping to intercept an important convoy, when Rodney's despatches arrived at New York. The senior officer there forwarded them at once, but the vessel carrying them was driven ashore by enemy cruisers. Graves only learned their contents upon returning to port on August 16. Hood's notice of his own coming was likewise intercepted.
Chapter 52
What did the two cruisers off the Chesapeake fail to do, and with what consequence?
They had been ordered to keep under way but were both at anchor under Cape Henry when De Grasse appeared, cutting off their escape; one was captured and the other driven up York River. Mahan says no single circumstance contributed more to the general result, since Graves thereby lost all-important information about French numbers.
Chapter 52
What does Mahan say would have followed had Graves captured De Barras's squadron?
Quoting sober strategic comment, Mahan says it would have greatly paralyzed the besieging army, which had its siege train aboard, if not prevented its operations altogether. It would have roughly equalized the two fleets in numbers, arrested French progress in the West Indies for the next year, and might have created discord between the French and Americans.
Chapter 52
What does Mahan identify as England's core strategic problem, and what does he prescribe?
The author argues England, as an empire, was everywhere outmatched by the number of her exposed points and stood on the defensive, which he calls militarily false. He prescribes deciding which possessions mattered most, frankly abandoning what could not be held, concentrating defense, and using the navy offensively, since from such a position there is no salvation except by action vigorous almost to desperation.
Chapter 52
CHAPTER X. (part 5)4 cards
What did Washington call the navy's role in the contest?
Writing to his Excellency, Washington insists on the indispensable necessity of a maritime force giving absolute ascendency in the seas, and states that whatever efforts land armies make, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest. He repeats to Lafayette that no land force can act decisively unless accompanied by maritime superiority.
Chapter 53
What did Washington say could have happened with two more months of de Grasse?
Washington writes to Lafayette that no doubt existed in any man's mind of the total extirpation of the British force in the Carolinas and Georgia, if Count de Grasse could have extended his co-operation two months longer. He offers this without a tedious display of reasoning, as proof that the next campaign depended absolutely on naval force.
Chapter 53
What does Mahan conclude about commerce-destroying from this chapter?
Mahan observes that the American cause was reduced to straits despite the great and admitted losses of British commerce inflicted by allied cruisers and American privateers. This fact, and the small results of a general war dominated by the idea of commerce-destroying, show strongly the secondary and indecisive effect of such a policy upon the great issues of war.
Chapter 53
What misfortunes did Washington attribute to d'Estaing's long passage?
In an August 1778 letter, Washington calls the long passage a capital misfortune: had even one of common length occurred, Lord Howe with the British ships and transports in the Delaware must have fallen, and Clinton's troops might have shared Burgoyne's fate. He also cites the unfavorable discovery at the Hook, which defeated the New York enterprise and delayed sounding the bar.
Chapter 53
CHAPTER XI.3 cards
How did Rodney's 1780 voyage affect Gibraltar and the Spanish squadron of Langara?
Rodney sailed with supplies for Gibraltar, defeated the Spanish squadron of Langara, and relieved the place. The chapter also notes that the allies captured a great British convoy in the same period, showing that success and loss ran together. Mahan uses these episodes to weigh how sea power was actually employed by each side.
Chapter 54
What happened to the grand allied attack on Gibraltar in 1782?
The allied fleets assembled at Algesiras and launched a grand attack on Gibraltar in 1782, which failed. Lord Howe then succeeded in revictualling Gibraltar, and an action took place between his fleet and that of the allies. Earlier, in 1782, Port Mahon also fell, which the chapter lists among the year's events.
Chapter 54
What does Mahan argue about the proper use of naval forces?
The author argues that the conduct of the war of 1778 by the English government and the influence of sea power must be judged by the proper use of naval forces. He treats the abortive allied cruises and missed opportunities as lessons in how sea power should be directed toward decisive results rather than wasted.
Chapter 54
CHAPTER XI.3 cards
What three objectives did the allies pursue against England in Europe, and which succeeded?
The allies had three objectives, each with England on the defensive: England itself (involving destruction of the Channel fleet before invasion), the reduction of Gibraltar, and the capture of Minorca. Only the last met with success. Thrice England was threatened by a largely superior fleet and thrice the threat fell harmless; thrice Gibraltar was reduced to straits and thrice relieved by English seamen despite overpowering odds.
Chapter 55
What four declarations made up Russia's Armed Neutrality of 1780?
First, neutral vessels could sail not only to unblockaded ports but between ports of a belligerent, maintaining its coasting trade. Second, enemy property was safe aboard neutral vessels — 'free ships make free goods.' Third, no articles are contraband except arms, equipments, and munitions of war, ruling out naval stores and provisions unless belonging to a belligerent government. Fourth, blockades bind only with adequate naval force stationed close to the port.
Chapter 55
What was the principal effect of the Armed Neutrality on the war?
When the States-General resolved to sign the declarations, England declared war on the Dutch, ordering Rodney to seize Dutch West India and South American possessions and sending similar orders to the East Indies. The principal effect was thus to add the colonies and commerce of Holland to the prey of English cruisers; the additional enemy was of small account, since geography blocked junction of the Dutch fleet with England's other enemies.
Chapter 55
CHAPTER XII.3 cards
Why did the French squadron under Comte d'Orves accomplish nothing in India?
The French government neglected India, while England was at war with Mysore and the Mahrattas. Comte d'Orves arrived with a squadron, effected nothing, and returned to the Isle of France. Mahan uses this failure to contrast with Suffren's later campaign, which he treats as the brilliant exception to French neglect of the Indian theater.
Chapter 56
What did Suffren do at the Cape Verde Islands in 1781?
Sailing from Brest with five ships-of-the-line, Suffren attacked an English squadron in the Cape Verde Islands in 1781. Mahan analyzes the conduct and results of this attack, and credits Suffren with saving the Cape Colony from the English before he reached the Isle of France and took chief command of the French fleet.
Chapter 56
What did Suffren do after being ordered from home to leave the Indian coast?
Suffren refused to obey orders from home to leave the Indian coast, showing firmness and insight. He also kept his fleet active despite destitute conditions, supplying its wants and communicating with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore. Mahan treats this refusal and self-reliance as marks of his distinguishing military qualities.
Chapter 56
CHAPTER XII. (part 1)4 cards
Why did Suffren attack the English at Porto Praya instead of racing to the Cape?
Suffren judged that destroying Johnstone's squadron would "cut off the root" of the English expedition, secure French superiority in India, and still prevent the English from reaching the Cape first. Mahan argues the prompt decision to fight was right, since the enemy was surprised and at disadvantage, though it departed from usual French navy policy.
Chapter 57
What went wrong with Suffren's captains at Porto Praya?
The Hannibal's captain had not cleared for action, decks cluttered with water-casks, so she took fire without replying for a time. The Artésien's captain was killed before anchoring and his ship drifted out of action. The two rear ships came up late and stayed too far off. Mahan says this failure cannot be imputed to Suffren as a fault.
Chapter 57
What opportunity was lost when D'Orves refused to aid Hyder Ali?
In January 1781 D'Orves's French squadron appeared off the coast while the English fleet was at Bombay. Hyder Ali asked for aid against Cuddalore, which, deprived of sea support and surrounded by natives, must have fallen. D'Orves refused and returned to the Isle of France. Mahan states a great opportunity had been lost.
Chapter 57
What does Mahan identify as Suffren's greatest merit?
Mahan argues Suffren's transcendent merit was recognizing the English fleets as the proper enemy to be attacked first and always when there was any show of equality. Attack, not defence, was the road to sea power; the way to secure ulterior objects was not economizing his own ships but destroying the enemy's.
Chapter 57
CHAPTER XII. (part 2)4 cards
Why did Suffren move toward Trincomalee, according to Mahan?
Mahan explains that Trincomalee's natural advantages made it an evident object of importance to Suffren, and Hughes understood this. Moving there created a threat bound to draw Hughes out of port. Also, the war between Hyder Ali and the English made it imperative for Suffren to seize a mainland port to land his three thousand troops and obtain food supplies.
Chapter 58
What position did Mahan say favored the weaker fleet on the open sea?
Mahan states that since a fleet on the open sea cannot secure advantages of ground, the position favoring the weaker was to windward, giving choice of time and some choice of method of attack—the offensive position used defensively. The leeward position left the weaker fleet no choice but to run or accept action on its adversary's terms.
Chapter 58
How did Hughes profit from the French squadron's dispersal on February 15?
At daylight Hughes found the French warships about twelve miles east and the transports nine miles southwest, a dispersal Mahan attributes to the carelessness of the French frigates. Hughes chased the convoy, knowing the line-of-battle ships must follow. His copper-bottomed ships captured six enemy vessels, five of which were English prizes; the sixth carried three hundred troops and military stores.
Chapter 58
What did Suffren's letter to Tromelin reveal about his strategic priorities?
Suffren wrote that the capture of Trincomalee, Negapatam, and perhaps all Ceylon should make them wish for a general action. Mahan says this reveals Suffren's appreciation that the Indian seas demanded first disabling the hostile fleet, then capturing strategic ports—reversing common French maxims that put the port first and the fleet second.
Chapter 58
CHAPTER XII. (part 3)3 cards
What was Suffren's actual intended plan of attack, according to Chevalier?
Suffren meant to follow the usual practice: form line parallel to the enemy, bear down together, and engage ship to ship. He added one simple combination—his twelfth ship, having no opponent, was to engage the rear English ship on her lee side, placing her between two fires. Mahan says nothing indicates he planned a concentration on the van and centre.
Chapter 59
Why does Mahan say attacking the van is tactically inferior to attacking the rear?
Mahan argues that concentrating on the van and centre is inferior to a like effort on the centre and rear of a column, especially for sailing vessels in the light, baffling airs of the monsoon season. Only a dead calm could keep the rear out of action. Nelson, despite contempt for the Spaniards, threw his weight on the rear at Trafalgar.
Chapter 59
How did Hughes's decision to avoid battle before the engagement reflect French rather than English naval policy?
Hughes resolved neither to seek nor shun the enemy but to go directly to Trincomalee to land troops and supplies. Mahan says this subordinated attacking the enemy's fleet to the mission in hand—the French policy. Public and professional opinion strongly held that attacking the enemy's fleet was an English admiral's first duty, and Hughes had reason to regret the neglect.
Chapter 59
CHAPTER XII. (part 4)4 cards
Why did Suffren send Captain de Cillart home after the battle?
Suffren removed Cillart from command and sent him home after Cillart hauled down his flag while his ship was still engaged, then resumed fire when his sails filled. The king cashiered him. Mahan notes that Cillart condemned himself by his own defense, and that the French juniors' refusal to be bound by his surrender might be excused, though scrupulous good faith would demand deliverance come from other hands.
Chapter 60
How did Hughes's delay affect the fate of Trincomalee?
While Suffren took Trincomalee in late August 1782, Hughes stayed at anchor repairing. Mahan argues that had Hughes shown Suffren's energy he could have gained the few days that decided the place and fought to save it; Hughes's own reports say his ships were nearly fitted by August 12, yet he did not sail until the 20th. The loss forced him to abandon the east coast.
Chapter 60
What contrast does Mahan draw between the two admirals' resources for repairs?
After the June 6 action Hughes found spars, cordage, stores and provisions at Madras, while Suffren at Cuddalore found nothing. Suffren needed nineteen new topmasts plus lower masts, yards, rigging and sails; he stripped frigates and prizes, sent ships to the Straits of Malacca, and tore down houses for lumber, all in an open roadstead near the enemy. Mahan credits this activity for the success at Trincomalee.
Chapter 60
What principle does Mahan state about the fleet versus seaports?
After Trincomalee surrendered, Suffren re-embarked his guns and men and left a garrison strong enough to hold the port, refusing to burden his ships with its defense. Mahan argues seaports should defend themselves; the fleet's sphere is the open sea, its object offence rather than defence, and its objective the enemy's shipping wherever it can be found.
Chapter 60
CHAPTER XII. (part 5)3 cards
Why did Suffren choose Achem over Trincomalee as a base?
Trincomalee was strategically strong and safe from English attack, but it was sickly during the monsoon and doubtful whether needed provisions could be obtained there. Achem, on the west end of Sumatra, was healthy, could supply provisions, and its position relative to the northeast monsoon would let ships regain the Coromandel coast sooner than those at Bombay.
Chapter 61
How did the capture of French convoys affect Bussy's mission to India?
Bussy sailed from Cadiz in November 1781 with two ships-of-the-line, expecting a convoy from Brest. That convoy was captured, with only two vessels escaping to him. A second convoy of eighteen transports was also intercepted: two of four warships and ten transports were taken, the rest returning to Brest. These losses left Bussy stranded at the Isle of France and delayed his junction with Suffren.
Chapter 61
How did the battle of June 20, 1783, end and what was its effect?
Suffren attacked with fifteen ships against Hughes's eighteen; fire opened at quarter-past four P.M. and lasted until half-past six. Losses were nearly equal, but the English abandoned both the field of battle and their army, returning to Madras. Suffren anchored before Cuddalore, relieving the invested French army. The British general's supply-ships fled and could not return, leaving his army in great embarrassment until news of peace arrived on June 29.
Chapter 61
CHAPTER XII. (part 6)4 cards
What does Mahan say about the axiom that fleets should not turn their side to the enemy?
Mahan remarks that this principle seems too self-evident to need emphasis, yet questions whether naval men generally carry it in their stock of axioms. He notes that ships in the action turned their side to the enemy instead of approaching him, illustrating how a supposedly obvious rule of tactics can be neglected in practice.
Chapter 62
How do British and French accounts differ on why the two rears were separated?
The British account, from Captain Alms's memoir in the Naval Chronicle, holds that the enemy's rear was so far to leeward that British rear ships could not close without breaking their own line, even with a favorable wind. Mahan says such contradictions are common and need not be reconciled except for a particular purpose, and judges Alms's account probably correct.
Chapter 62
What happened when Hughes demanded the struck Sévère be delivered to him?
It was seen from Suffren's ship that the Sévère's flag was down, but it was supposed the ensign halliards had been shot away. The next day Hughes sent the captain of the Sultan to demand delivery of the ship that had struck; the demand could not be complied with. Troude says the Sultan, hove-to to take possession, received the French ship's whole fire without replying.
Chapter 62
What did Suffren write privately about his achievements after promotion?
In a private letter of September 13, 1783, Suffren told his correspondent that since becoming commodore and rear-admiral, what he had done was worth infinitely more than before. He ranked the end of the campaign, from March to end of June, above anything done in the navy since he entered it, though the squadron was endangered and the army lost.
Chapter 62
CHAPTER XIII.4 cards
Why did the maritime struggle shift to the West Indies after Yorktown?
After the surrender of Yorktown, the maritime struggle was transferred from the American continent to the West Indies. De Grasse sailed for the islands, and in January 1782 a French expedition was mounted against the island of St. Christopher, while Hood attempted to relieve the garrison. The chapter traces these operations through the battle of the Saints in April 1782.
Chapter 63
How did Hood use the anchorage De Grasse abandoned at St. Christopher?
During the manoeuvres between the two fleets, an action occurred between De Grasse and Hood. Hood then seized the anchorage left by De Grasse. De Grasse attacked Hood at that anchorage, but Hood maintained his position. Despite this, the garrison and the island surrendered. The chapter weighs the merits of Hood's action and criticizes De Grasse's conduct.
Chapter 63
What did Rodney accomplish at the battle of the Saints on April 12, 1782?
Rodney broke the French line and captured the French commander-in-chief along with five ships-of-the-line. The chapter details the action and analyzes the effects of Rodney's manoeuvre, including the tactical bearing of improvements in naval equipment. It also examines Rodney's failure to pursue the French fleet, his stated reasons, and the probable effect of that failure on the conditions of peace.
Chapter 63
How does the chapter assess the impact of the April 12 battle on the war?
The chapter treats the view that this battle decided the war as exaggerated. It examines Rodney's failure to pursue the French fleet, his reasons and the actual conditions, and the probable effect of that failure on the conditions of peace. It also covers the court-martial of French officers, its findings, De Grasse's appeal, his rebuke by the king, and the later deaths of De Grasse, Rodney, and Hood.
Chapter 63
CHAPTER XIII. (part 1)4 cards
Why did Mahan say the American war hinged on control of the sea?
The author argues that the physical geography of a long seaboard with estuaries penetrating deep inland made movement by water easier than by land, so the military question hinged on control of the sea and how it was used. He cites Howe's 1777 move to the Chesapeake instead of supporting Burgoyne, which opened the way to Saratoga.
Chapter 64
What plan did Hood intend against the French at St. Kitt's?
Hood intended to appear at daylight in battle order and fall upon the French eastern ships, filing by them with his whole fleet to concentrate fire on a few, then wear and tack to keep circling past the chosen ships. The plan was balked when a lieutenant hove-to a frigate at night, which was run down, delaying the fleet.
Chapter 64
How did Hood seize the anchorage at St. Kitt's from De Grasse?
After his first plan failed, Hood formed the bolder intention of seizing the anchorage De Grasse had left. At noon the English formed line and headed north for Basse Terre; the French stood for them, pressing the English rear. The Canada, Resolution, and Bedford covered the gap, and the English anchored one by one under fire, taking the position.
Chapter 64
Why was De Grasse's January 26 attack on Hood's anchored line faulty?
De Grasse attacked in a single column of twenty-nine ships against a carefully arranged line, which Mahan calls faulty in the extreme. Hood's flank was covered by shore, his rear by ships en potence, and his anchored ships with springs could train broadsides widely. Each French ship passed along the line, receiving every ship's fire in gallant but ineffectual monotony.
Chapter 64
CHAPTER XIII. (part 2)3 cards
What did Mahan identify as De Grasse's great blunder after the April 9 action?
The author argues De Grasse should have crushed the separated English division under Hood with his superior numbers instead of letting the chance pass. Mahan says a tight grip on a few simple principles—that the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor and true objective—would have saved him this blunder, though he notes it made De Grasse an exception to French naval practice.
Chapter 65
What was the combined French and Spanish objective for 1782, and what was Rodney charged to prevent?
The object of united French and Spanish efforts that year was the conquest of Jamaica. Fifty ships-of-the-line and twenty thousand troops were expected to unite at Cap Français in Hayti, with De Grasse commanding the combined fleets. Rodney was charged to prevent the junction, intercepting De Grasse as he collected troops and supplies in Martinique for the rendezvous.
Chapter 65
What did the French court-martial rule about De Grasse's conduct on April 9?
The court-martial laid down the French doctrine that persisting in engaging with only part of the fleet could be considered an act of prudence by the admiral, dictated by the ulterior projects of the campaign. Mahan notes a French professional writer countered that if an attack were made at all, it would be more prudent to make it in force.
Chapter 65
CHAPTER XIII. (part 3)4 cards
What did Mahan identify as the natural results of Rodney's breaking through the French line?
Mahan lists three results: (1) the gain of the wind, with the power of offensive action; (2) concentration of fire upon a part of the enemy's order; and (3) the introduction of confusion and division into the French fleet, which might and did become very great, offering the opportunity of further tactical advantage.
Chapter 66
Was Rodney's breakthrough of the French line a premeditated plan?
No. Mahan states the celebrated stroke was due not to previous intention but to a shift of wind throwing the French ships out of order and widening the gaps between them; the gap Rodney's group penetrated was widened further by the Diadème being taken aback. The son of Sir Charles Douglas produced evidence that the suggestion came from Douglas, and Rodney consented with difficulty.
Chapter 66
Why did the French keep at half cannon-range on April 9, according to De Vaudreuil?
To neutralize the English advantage in carronades and other light-weight, large-calibre guns, which told heavily in close action but were useless at greater distances. De Vaudreuil expressly states that if he had come within reach of the carronades his ships would have been quickly unrigged. Mahan judges his tactics excellent if the object was to prevent pursuit.
Chapter 66
What tactical advantage did the French fleet hold over the English at the Battle of the Saints?
Mahan notes the French had finer ships and, class for class, heavier armaments; Sir Charles Douglas estimated the thirty-three French were superior in weight of battery to the thirty-six English by the force of four 84-gun ships, and La Gravière admits the generally heavier calibre of French cannon. Better construction and greater draught let French ships sail and beat better, though coppering was less general in France.
Chapter 66
CHAPTER XIV.4 cards
What does Mahan say distinguishes an 'object' from an 'objective' in studying a war?
Mahan draws a distinction between "object" and "objective" as successive steps in the critical study of a war. The chapter's outline lists this distinction among the analytical tools applied to the purely maritime war of 1778, separating the aims of the belligerents from the concrete points against which forces are directed.
Chapter 68
Why does Mahan stress communications in the war of 1778?
Mahan argues that the bases abroad were generally deficient in resources, which increased the importance of communications between them. The navies are described as the guardians of those communications, and he notes the need for intermediate ports between Europe and India.
Chapter 68
How does Mahan characterize the naval policy of the allies in 1778?
Mahan describes the coalition's counsels as divergent, with "ulterior objects" pulling them apart. He argues the allied navies systematically assumed a defensive attitude, and he warns of the dangers of that line of action, including the glamour of commerce-destroying.
Chapter 68
What position did England occupy in the naval war of 1778, and what did Mahan say it required?
Mahan states England was upon the defensive in 1778, with its fleet inferior in numbers to the allies, and that this made wise and vigorous action necessary. He also notes the failure to fortify naval bases affected the navy, and that the distribution of the British navy exposed it to being outnumbered at many points.
Chapter 68
XIV. (part 1)4 cards
What was England's chief military advantage during the period Mahan examines?
The author argues England's uncontrolled dominion of the seas was by long odds the chief military factor determining the final issue. This sea power, built silently rather than through clashes of arms, rested on trade, colonies, and fleets, and by 1739 England's navy outnumbered the combined navies of Spain and France, a disproportion that grew over the following quarter century of war.
Chapter 69
How did England's subsidy system and Pitt's policy shape its European role?
England used subsidies to sustain its continental allies, whose efforts would have been crippled without that money, while its fleets drove enemies off the sea and from possessions like Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Havana, and Manila. Pitt condemned the 1763 peace because it left France the possibility of reviving her navy, arguing France was chiefly formidable as a maritime and commercial power.
Chapter 69
Why does Mahan call the American Revolution a mistake in terms of sea power?
The author argues the war was a great mistake from the standpoint of sea power, though the government blundered into it insensibly. The colonies were too large, populous, and distant to hold by force if powerful nations helped them, and France and Spain were sure to seek revenge. Had the colonies been thirteen islands, English sea power would have settled it quickly.
Chapter 69
How did the Dutch Republic's government weaken its sea power?
The United Provinces were a commercial aristocracy averse to war and its costs, with each maritime province keeping its own fleet and admiralty amid jealousies, partly offset by Holland's dominance. After De Witt's death and William of Orange's land-focused policy, the navy declined; at Utrecht Holland gained no sea resources, colonies, or commerce, and ceased to be a great sea power.
Chapter 69
XIV. (part 2)3 cards
What condition was the French navy in by 1756, according to the chapter?
France had only forty-five ships-of-the-line while England had nearly one hundred and thirty. When the forty-five were to be armed, there was found to be neither material nor rigging nor supplies, not even enough artillery. A French writer quoted by Mahan blamed lack of system in government, frequent unjust promotions, universal discontent, money and intrigue replacing merit, and boundless waste of state revenues and dockyards.
Chapter 70
How did France recover its navy after the humiliation of 1760-1763?
Popular feeling, directed by the government, produced the cry that the navy must be restored. Cities, corporations, and private subscribers donated ships; ports buzzed with building and repair. Arsenals were replenished, artillery reorganized, and ten thousand trained gunners drilled and maintained. The Académie de Marine, founded in 1752 and reorganized, spurred research; its first director, Bigot de Morogues, wrote an original treatise on naval tactics. Mahan says this systematic effort of twenty years bore fruit in the American war.
Chapter 70
What did Mahan identify as the flaw in French naval conduct during the American war?
Though the twenty-year effort bore fruit and French honor was generally maintained, Mahan concludes that inexperience compared with the English, jealousy within the noble officer corps toward men of different antecedents, and above all the traditions of three-quarters of a century prevented French admirals from reaping positive advantages. He argues the government's habit of teaching officers to save ships and economize material contradicted Monk's principle that the nation which would rule the sea must always attack.
Chapter 70
XIV. (part 3)3 cards
What two kinds of distant naval establishments does Mahan say warlike preparation requires?
Mahan states that warlike preparation must include maintaining suitable naval stations in distant parts of the world where armed shipping follows commerce. Their protection may rest on direct military force, as with Gibraltar and Malta, or on a friendly surrounding population, as the American colonists once were to England and the Australian colonists presumably are now. Friendly backing plus reasonable military provision, combined with decided preponderance at sea, makes a scattered empire like England's secure.
Chapter 71
What does Mahan say about the United States lacking colonies and military stations?
Mahan argues the United States has no colonies and is unlikely to acquire them, and that its people's feeling about purely military stations was expressed by an English naval historian who called military governments repugnant to a trading people. Without foreign establishments, colonial or military, Mahan says U.S. warships in war will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores, so resting-places for coal and repair become a first duty.
Chapter 71
What does Mahan say about the United States' three links of sea power after the Civil War?
Mahan argues government action since the Civil War has been directed solely at the first link, internal development and great production with self-sufficingness. Besides having no colonies, the intermediate link of peaceful shipping and its interests is now likewise lacking, so the United States has only one link of the three. He says a purely military navy without merchant shipping is doubtful, since Louis XIV's navy, having no root, withered away.
Chapter 71
CHAPTER XIV. (part 1)4 cards
Why does Mahan call the War of 1778 unique among wars?
The author argues it was purely a maritime war: the allied Bourbon kingdoms avoided continental entanglements, and there was an approach to equality on the sea not seen since Tourville's day. The disputed objects lay mostly outside Europe, with Gibraltar the sole continental exception, and its isolation kept other powers from being drawn in.
Chapter 72
What were Britain's objects in the War of 1778?
Britain sought to prevent a break in the foreign possessions on which her greatness was thought to depend, having taken up arms to keep forcible control of colonies whose willing adhesion had departed. The author argues England was strictly on the defensive as to objects: she feared losing much and at best hoped to keep what she had.
Chapter 72
What objects did France and Spain pursue in the war?
France aimed at the English West Indies, control of India, and eventual American independence after sufficient diversion; she renounced claims to the continent but stipulated freedom to conquer West India islands. Spain sought recovery of Minorca, Gibraltar, and Jamaica, and the Floridas. The author says both aimed at maritime and political superiority over England.
Chapter 72
How does Mahan distinguish 'object' from 'objective' in war?
The object is what a belligerent government wishes to obtain; the objective is the end upon which military operations are actually directed, which may differ. He says analysis requires stating each side's objects, judging whether the objective best compasses them, then studying the movements approaching it—an outline of main lines before exhaustive detail.
Chapter 72
CHAPTER XIV. (part 2)1 cards
Why did Mahan consider colonial bases deficient in strategic value?
Mahan says that, speaking generally, the overseas bases lacked resources: naval and military stores, equipment, and largely provisions for sea use had to be sent from the mother countries. Boston and Havana were partial exceptions, but both lay distant from the principal theatres. This made protecting and intercepting supply convoys a strategic question second only to destroying ships-of-war.
Chapter 73
CHAPTER XIV. (part 3)2 cards
What was Mahan's recommended strategy for England against France's navy?
The author argues England's key hope was to find and strike down the enemy's navy in its home ports, where it was most certainly found and most easily met just after leaving. This dictated policy in the Napoleonic wars: blockading fleets before French arsenals, keeping the enemy under observation while hardening British crews by rigorous cruising, rather than distributing ships-of-the-line worldwide to be beaten in detail.
Chapter 74
How does Mahan criticize England's dispositions in America and the West Indies?
The author argues England's American dispositions were faulty: New York and Narragansett Bay were left weak, and the army at New York was twice divided, to the Chesapeake and Georgia, lengthening sea communications and naval detachments while weakening the decisive European theater. In the West Indies, holding small islands demanded sea predominance; with only equal or inferior fleets on station, England lost most islands one by one by sudden attack.
Chapter 74
CHAPTER XIV. (part 4)4 cards
What was the cardinal strategic fault Mahan identifies in the allies' naval policy?
The author argues the allies' cardinal fault was pursuing "ulterior objects": fixing their eyes on the ends they desired, such as Gibraltar or West Indian islands, blinded them to the means needed to attain them. Though on the offensive with superior numbers, their fleets remained habitually defensive, never seriously seeking to destroy the English navy on which everything depended.
Chapter 75
What single exception does Mahan give to the allied navies' defensive attitude?
Mahan states that, with the single brilliant exception of Suffren, the allied navies avoided or accepted action but never imposed it. He notes the French in particular had many opportunities in the West Indies but never sought to attack the English fleet directly, the force upon which all else depended.
Chapter 75
What does Mahan conclude about commerce-destroying as a primary strategy?
The author argues that commerce-destroying is a most important secondary operation but, as a primary measure sufficient to crush an enemy, is probably a dangerous delusion, especially against a nation with a widespread healthy commerce and a powerful navy like Britain. Only military command of the sea, won by fighting and overcoming the enemy's navy, can make such an attack fatal.
Chapter 75
What did the 1783 peace settlements leave undecided, according to Mahan?
The preliminaries were signed at Versailles January 20, 1783, with American independence conceded earlier. Britain recovered most West India islands except Tobago, gave up Sta. Lucia, the Floridas, and Minorca. Mahan comments that these arrangements were trivial in themselves and their permanence would depend wholly on the balance of sea power, since nothing conclusive about command of the seas had been settled.
Chapter 75
CHAPTER XIV. (part 5)4 cards
What did Mahan claim about Dupleix's ambitions in India?
The author argues Dupleix advanced French power in India through ambition and policy, seizing Madras and defending Pondicherry, but was ultimately foiled by a lack of sea power. He also quarreled with La Bourdonnais and was recalled to France.
Chapter 76
How does Mahan characterize commerce-destroying as a strategy?
The author treats commerce-destroying, or cruising warfare, as a strategic question dependent on geographical position and a near base or powerful fleets. He argues it injures the nation relying on it, citing Charles II's use as a disastrous substitute for great fleets, and warns against mistaken conclusions drawn from American privateering in 1812 and Confederate cruisers.
Chapter 76
What role did De Grasse play at Yorktown?
De Grasse sailed from Brest for the West Indies, then determined to go to Chesapeake Bay, anchoring in Lynnhaven Bay. He skillfully managed his fleet when opposed by Graves, and his thorough action contributed to the results at Yorktown. He later declined to remain longer in the United States and returned to the West Indies.
Chapter 76
What does Mahan say about colonies and sea power?
The author argues a navy is essential to the security of colonies, and colonies in turn support sea power. He notes the growth of the English colonial system, the loss of French and Spanish colonies, and that colonial expansion was the characteristic motive of wars from 1739 to 1783.
Chapter 76
CHAPTER XIV. (part 6)4 cards
What does Mahan's index record about the French navy's condition between 1713 and 1760?
The chapter's index entries record a decay in number and condition of the French navy from 1713 to 1760, citing pages 74-76, 209, 216, 244, 252, 259, 260, 279, 280, 288, 291, 311 and 312. A revival is then noted from 1760, with the navy's restoration at pages 76-78 and 331-333, and numbers given for 1761 and 1770.
Chapter 77
How does the chapter characterize Ruyter among seventeenth-century naval officers?
The chapter calls Ruyter the greatest naval officer of the seventeenth century. It records that he commanded at the Four Days' Battle, was badly supported by his officers, destroyed English shipping in the Thames, and commanded at Solebay, Schoneveldt and the Texel. He was sent to the Mediterranean with inadequate force, fought at Stromboli and Agosta, and was killed at Agosta.
Chapter 77
What happened to Louisburg and Madras in the peace of 1748?
Louisburg, on Cape Breton Island, had been taken by New England colonists and was restored to France at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Madras, capital of a British presidency in India, had been taken by the French and was exchanged for Louisburg at the peace of 1748. Louisburg was later taken by Boscawen.
Chapter 77
What does the chapter say about the strategic value of Rhode Island?
The chapter lists Rhode Island as occupied by the English in the American Revolution, attacked by French and Americans, evacuated by the English, and then occupied by the French, whose position there is described. It cites the strategic value of Rhode Island at pages 519 and 529-530, and notes Rodney's opinion as to its evacuation.
Chapter 77
CHAPTER XIV. (part 7)4 cards
What does Mahan say about Walpole's peace policy and its outcome?
The author argues Walpole pursued a peace policy and used naval demonstrations, but his struggle with England's war party and Fleuri's betrayal of his confidence left him forced into war with Spain and driven from office. Mahan also notes Walpole's neutrality caused Austria to lose the Two Sicilies.
Chapter 78
How does Mahan assess Washington's views on sea power in the American Revolution?
Mahan cites Washington's opinion on the Hudson line, his comments on D'Estaing's cruise, his despatches to De Grasse, and his meeting with Rochambeau whose deliberations shaped the march from New York to Virginia. Mahan presents Washington's opinions as evidence of sea power's influence on the Revolution.
Chapter 78
What does the index show about William III's naval policy and career?
William III became ruler of Holland and later King of England after his expedition to England. Mahan links him to a general naval policy across many pages, notes the difficulties of his position, his going to Ireland, his victory at the Boyne, and his death.
Chapter 78
Which wars does the index list, and what does it say about the Second Punic War?
The index lists the Second Punic War and its influence of sea power, the second and third Anglo-Dutch wars, the League of Augsburg, the Spanish Succession, the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War, and the American Revolution and Maritime War of 1778. It credits the Second Punic War with showing sea power's influence.
Chapter 78
XXI. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782 486 (part 1)4 cards
According to Mahan, why is studying sailing-ship naval history still valuable?
The author argues that although weapons and steam power have changed naval war, history reveals constant principles of maritime war that remain universally applicable. Sailing-ship experience offers real lessons, whereas steam navies have made no decisive history yet, so theories about future naval warfare are almost wholly presumptive.
Chapter 79
What tactical advantages and drawbacks did Mahan assign to the weather-gage?
The weather-gage conferred the power to give or refuse battle at will and the offensive advantage of choosing the method of attack. Its drawbacks included irregularity in the order, exposure to raking or enfilading fire, and sacrifice of part or all of the assailant's artillery-fire while approaching. The lee-gage could not attack and had to receive battle on the enemy's terms.
Chapter 79
Why did the English seek the weather-gage and the French the lee-gage?
Mahan states the English ordinarily chose the weather-gage because their steady policy was to assail and destroy the enemy. The French sought the lee-gage because it let them cripple the enemy as he approached, evade decisive encounters, and preserve their ships, subordinating the navy to other military considerations and economizing their fleet.
Chapter 79
How did De Guichen change tactics after recognizing Rodney's intention?
In the first of their three actions De Guichen took the lee-gage, but after recognizing Rodney's purpose to use the wind for a formidable concentration on part of the enemy line, he manoeuvred for the weather-gage, not to attack but to refuse action except on his own terms. Mahan notes speed, not wind, now confers that power.
Chapter 79
XXI. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782 486 (part 2)4 cards
According to Mahan, what strategic principle did Nelson's victory at the Nile illustrate?
The author argues the Nile victory embodied the principle of striking at the enemy's line of communication: Egypt's enterprise depended on keeping communications with France open, and destroying the naval force that alone could assure them determined the final failure. Mahan says the same principle is valid in his own day and would be equally so in the age of the galley, sailing-ship, or steamer.
Chapter 80
How does Mahan reinterpret the strategic significance of Trafalgar?
Mahan argues Trafalgar was not an isolated event but the final act of a great strategic drama spanning a year or more, pitting Napoleon against Nelson. He says it was not Villeneuve who failed but Napoleon who was vanquished, not Nelson who won but England that was saved, because Napoleon's combinations failed while Nelson's intuitions and activity kept the English fleet on the enemy's track.
Chapter 80
What alternative strategy does Mahan suggest the allies might have used against Gibraltar?
Mahan raises the purely naval-strategic question of whether Gibraltar would have been more surely recovered by controlling the English Channel, attacking the British fleet even in its harbors, and threatening England with invasion and annihilation of commerce, rather than by far greater efforts against a distant, strong outpost. He notes the English were sensitive to invasion fears, and that England likely would not have traded Gibraltar for other foreign possessions, though she might have yielded it to save her firesides and capital.
Chapter 80
What limits does Mahan place on the meaning of Roman control of the sea in the Second Punic War?
Mahan argues control of the sea does not prevent an enemy's single ships or small squadrons from slipping out of port, crossing frequented waters, raiding coasts, or entering blockaded harbors; history shows such evasions are always possible to the weaker party. So Bomilcar's landings and Hannibal's safe withdrawal to Africa do not prove Carthage could have sent Hannibal constant support. Mahan concludes Roman sea power forbade the sustained, secure communications Hannibal needed, kept Macedonia out of Italy, but did not stop Carthage's diversion in Sicily.
Chapter 80
XXI. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782 486 (part 3)4 cards
What does Mahan say about the influence of sea power on history?
The author argues that sea power is a principal determining factor in historical outcomes and should not be omitted from accounts of an era's results. He insists, however, that it is as defective to omit it as it would be absurd to claim for it exclusive influence. He also says its influence has been overlooked because naval men are a race apart, misunderstood by most writers.
Chapter 81
How does Mahan distinguish naval strategy from military strategy?
Mahan cites a recent French author who says the usual definition of strategy—confined to actual or immediate scenes of war—is too narrow for naval strategy. Naval strategy, he says, is as necessary in peace as in war, and in peace may win decisive victories by occupying excellent coastal positions through purchase or treaty, making permanent an occupation that began as transient.
Chapter 81
What was Nelson's role in foiling Napoleon's Trafalgar campaign?
The note says Napoleon aimed to unite French fleets from Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort with Spanish ships in the West Indies, then return to cover an invasion. Nelson's Mediterranean command watched Toulon. Though he initially misjudged and delayed pursuit, his tenacity in chasing 'his fleet' helped foil the plan. Mahan credits the Brest blockade as well as Nelson's pursuit.
Chapter 81
What did Jomini say about improvements in firearms and war?
Mahan quotes Jomini, who was asked in Paris near the end of 1851 whether recent firearms improvements would greatly modify warfare. Jomini replied they would probably influence the details of tactics, but that in great strategic operations and grand combinations of battles, victory would still result from principles that led great generals of all ages to success, from Alexander and Caesar to Frederick and Napoleon.
Chapter 81
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