Aristotle argues that human happiness consists in virtuous activity, with practical wisdom and character mutually dependent. The deck covers his relation to politics, the inexactness of moral rules, the supreme good, intellectual virtues, and Book X’s account of pleasure.
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Chapter 1 · Question
How does Aristotle's Ethics relate to his Politics, according to the introduction?
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Chapter 1 · Answer
The introduction argues the Ethics and Politics are two halves of one treatise on Political Science. The Ethics studies the formation of character and moral education; the Politics asks what laws and institutions best secure good character. The Ethics' last chapter points forward to the Politics, though the actual order of enquiry is not adhered to.
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BOOK X4 cards
How does Aristotle's Ethics relate to his Politics, according to the introduction?
The introduction argues the Ethics and Politics are two halves of one treatise on Political Science. The Ethics studies the formation of character and moral education; the Politics asks what laws and institutions best secure good character. The Ethics' last chapter points forward to the Politics, though the actual order of enquiry is not adhered to.
Chapter 1
Why does Aristotle say practical moral rules lack exactness?
The introduction explains that human conduct is not governed by necessary, uniform laws, so practical rules state probabilities rather than certainties. They admit exceptions not because facts are complex but because facts vary unpredictably. A relative constancy of connection suffices as a guide to life. Aristotle holds a balance between reducing conduct to rigorous principles and denying all regularity.
Chapter 1
What does Aristotle identify as the supreme human good, and what does he reject?
The introduction states Aristotle identifies the supreme good with Happiness, the object of desire that all, wise and simple, agree in naming. He sets aside pleasure, political power and honour, superior gifts, and wealth as constituting man's end. He also rejects Plato's universal good as irrelevant to the enquiry, insisting the good must suit man's nature and be attainable by his efforts.
Chapter 1
In what does Aristotle hold human Happiness to consist?
The introduction says the author argues Happiness lies in activity or energising peculiar to man's given nature and circumstances. It is practical, not theoretical: the activity of a being who possesses and applies reason. It presupposes the developed, not merely natural, possession of relevant capacities, and requires other conditions such as length of life, wealth, and good luck.
Chapter 1
Book VI appears to have in view two aims: (1) to describe…3 cards
What two supreme forms of intellectual goodness does Aristotle distinguish?
Theoretical Wisdom, which apprehends the eternal laws of the universe and has no direct relation to human conduct, and Practical Wisdom, which is the master science of human life supplying the right rules of conduct. Practical wisdom formulates rules from practical experience, organises them into a system converging on happiness, and in its consummate form produces the right rule at once and can justify it by its connection with the end.
Chapter 2
How does Aristotle relate practical wisdom to goodness of character?
The author argues they are interdependent: true practical wisdom and true goodness of character are neither genuinely possible nor completely present without the other. A clear apprehension of the end is impossible except for a man whose character has been formed by discipline, arising only in one who has acquired moral virtue. Bad action and feeling blind the eye of the soul and corrupt the moral principle, and cleverness—the unscrupulous man's parody of wisdom—takes practical wisdom's place.
Chapter 2
How does Book X define pleasure and its relation to activity?
Pleasure is the natural concomitant and index of perfect activity, distinguishable but inseparable from it—described as the activity of a subject at its best acting upon an object at its best. It is therefore always and in itself a good, but its value rises and falls with that of the activity it accompanies, which it intensifies and perfects. Hence the highest and best pleasures accompany the highest and best activities.
Chapter 2
Book VII. Chapters 12 to 15. (Bekker.)4 cards
Why does Aristotle reject the claim that Pleasure is a process rather than an End?
The author argues Pleasure is wrongly called "a sensible process of production." He says it should be defined as the "unimpeded active working of the natural state." Not all Pleasures are processes or attended by one; some are active workings or even Ends, resulting from using our powers rather than coming to be something. The confusion arises because Pleasure is good in the highest sense, so people conflate active working with process.
Chapter 3
How does Aristotle answer the objection that some Pleasures are bad because pleasant things can harm health?
He compares it to saying healthful things are bad for business: in that sense both may be called bad, but this does not make them bad without qualification. The exercise of pure Intellect sometimes hurts health, yet what hinders Practical Wisdom is not the Pleasure peculiar to it but some Pleasure foreign to it. Pleasures from intellect or learning actually promote each other.
Chapter 3
How does Aristotle explain why bodily Pleasures seem more choice-worthy than others?
Bodily Pleasure drives out Pain, and because Pain is felt in excess people pursue Pleasure in excess as a remedy. Such remedies are violent, which is why they are pursued, since their impression comes from being seen beside their contrary. Some belong to a low nature, congenital or by custom; others are cures for deficiency, and it is better to have the healthy state originally than to acquire it.
Chapter 3
What does Aristotle conclude about whether the Chief Good can be some kind of Pleasure?
The author argues the Chief Good may be Pleasure of some kind, though most Pleasures may be low. Since each state can have unimpeded active working, and Pleasure is exactly this, it is choice-worthy. All men think the happy life pleasant and weave Pleasure into Happiness, reasonably, because Happiness is perfect and no impeded active working is perfect. The happy man still needs bodily, external goods and fortune.
Chapter 3
BOOK I4 cards
In this treatise, what three senses does the term 'Politics' bear?
The translator distinguishes three senses: first, the strict etymological sense 'the science of society,' including everything bearing on man's social well-being; second, 'moral philosophy,' which Aristotle explains in the Rhetoric and which concerns the moral training of the individual; third, 'the detail of civil government,' which Aristotle says was the most common acceptation of the term.
Chapter 4
According to the commentary, what are the two beginnings of every action?
Every action has two beginnings: the beginning of resolve (the motive, οὗ ἕνεκα) and the beginning of action (ὅθεν ἡ κινήσις). The motive is the major premiss of what Aristotle calls the practical syllogism; having considered how to attain the end, one resolves on a course, and that resolve begins the action.
Chapter 4
How does the commentary explain 'known to us' versus 'known absolutely'?
The translator first reads them as what may be known versus what we individually realise, so only principles we have received as true are 'known to us,' making good training in habits necessary before moral philosophy. He notes the terms are also used elsewhere for particulars and universals, and that adopting that sense gives greater unity to the passage, though 'principles' follows immediately.
Chapter 4
Why does Aristotle defer claiming that contemplation (theoria) is the highest happiness?
The commentary says Aristotle only allows at the close of the treatise that contemplation constitutes the highest happiness, because it is the exercise of the highest faculty, reason. He defers the statement because until the lower, moral nature has been reduced to perfect order, contemplation cannot have place; had it been held out from the first, men would attempt it at once without the trouble of self-discipline.
Chapter 4
BOOK II4 cards
For Aristotle, what is the genus of virtue and how is it acquired?
Virtue is a state or habit of character, not a mere capacity or feeling. The author argues nature supplies the capacity, but virtues come from habituation: we become just by doing just acts, courageous by doing courageous acts. Virtue is a settled disposition concerning choice, lying in a mean relative to us, determined by reason as the practically wise person would determine it.
Chapter 5
How does Aristotle's view of the passions differ from the Stoics'?
The author argues the Stoics would root out the passions entirely, plucking the blossom at once, while Aristotle would cultivate them, leaving the blossom to fall when the fruit is formed. Passions are a real part of our nature with their proper office; virtue regulates rather than extirpates them. In a perfected state emotion becomes rare through habituation, not suppression.
Chapter 5
What distinction does the commentary draw between praxis and pragma?
Praxis denotes the whole process from conception to performance, while pragma is only the result. The result may be right when the process is wrong, as when a murderer is killed by his accomplices, or the process good though the result wrong under erroneous impressions. No repetition of mere results forms a habit; habit comes from the whole activity.
Chapter 5
How does Aristotle treat pleasure, per the Iliad comparison?
The author argues Aristotle neither exalts pleasure as the Summum Bonum, as Eudoxus did, nor calls it wholly evil, as the Stoics did. Like the aged Trojan counsellors who admit Helen's beauty but send her home, Aristotle admits pleasure's charms while aware of their danger, resolving to deny himself: he feels her sweetness yet defies her thrall.
Chapter 5
BOOK III3 cards
Why can a man not be ignorant of his own motive of action?
The chapter explains that eneka primarily denotes cause-and-effect relation, and only derivatively designed causation or motive. Since it is the primary sense intended here, speaking of a man being ignorant of his own motive would be a contradiction in terms. The biblical bowman who killed the disguised king acted eneka ton apokteinai in the factual-result sense, not motive.
Chapter 6
How does the chapter describe the mental steps leading to a voluntary action?
The process begins with a Wish (boulesis), since deliberation concerns means to ends already supposed; then Deliberation, then Decision, then the definite extending of the mental hand toward the selected object. The last two constitute proairesis in its full meaning. Reason decides and communicates to the Will, which moves the bodily organs—as kings decided and announced for subjects to execute.
Chapter 6
What does the chapter say about how habits and circumstances relate to choice?
Habits are formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances, so we can only choose how we will act, not what circumstances we will have to act under. The chapter also compares moral decline to a stone once set in motion that cannot be recalled, citing Butler on a bound to imprudence beyond which no place for repentance remains.
Chapter 6
BOOK V4 cards
According to Aristotle, what three conditions make an act just or unjust in character?
The chapter states that to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice. All three elements are required for the full character of justice, not merely the outward performance of the act itself.
Chapter 7
How does Aristotle distinguish the good citizen from the good man?
The chapter explains two reasons they need not coincide: a good citizen does his best to carry out the constitution under which he lives, but that constitution may be faulty. Also, for the community it suffices that he does the facts of a good man, but for his own character he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his social orbit without revolving rightly on his own axis.
Chapter 7
What is the error in simple Reciprocation between a builder and a shoemaker?
The chapter's example shows that if the builder is to the shoemaker as 10 to 1, there must be the same ratio between the wares. Otherwise the shoemaker would get a house while the builder got only a pair of shoes, so the producer of the least valuable ware would get the most valuable. Before Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the ratio of equality between wares as between persons.
Chapter 7
How does Aristotle classify murder versus smuggling as unjust acts?
The chapter notes that murder is unjust by the law of nature, while smuggling is unjust by enactment. Any act referable to either head is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act materially unjust. This much may be decided without reference to the agent, distinguishing the act itself from the doer's character.
Chapter 7
BOOK VI4 cards
According to the commentary, what distinguishes a good moral choice from faulty action?
The author's notes explain that in every moral action the mind's machinery is assumed uninjured; a good moral choice requires Reason to have said Aye when it ought. Faulty action arises either when the machinery is perfect but wrongly directed (deliberate crime) or when Reason's direction is right but the Will does not follow, as with the akrates who sees the better but pursues the worse.
Chapter 8
How does the commentary describe the relationship between practical wisdom and the various branches of moral action?
The notes state that in every branch of moral action employing practical wisdom there are general principles and their application, but only some branches have distinct names. Practical wisdom applied to general principles of civil government is called Legislation; as administering particular functions it is called Government. In domestic management there are general rules and particular applications, yet the faculty has only one name, and likewise when self-interest is the object.
Chapter 8
What does the commentary say about induction and its validity?
The notes argue induction is not actual examination of all particular instances, which would reduce it to repeated simple apprehension; it is a bridging of a chasm, a branch of probable reasoning whose validity depends entirely on the quality of the particular mind performing it. Rapid induction marks genius, but its certainty is subjective, not objective, and its syllogistic exhibition is either nugatory or contains a literally false premiss.
Chapter 8
How does the commentary distinguish wisdom (sophia) from practical wisdom (phronesis)?
The notes describe them as different parts of one whole function: phronesis takes in conclusions drawn by strict reasoning from principles of a certain kind which nous supplies. A man might gain these principles by intuition and never reason from them, so sophia could exist independently of phronesis, but not the reverse. Put the two together, head to trunk, and you form the living being sophia.
Chapter 8
BOOK VII4 cards
How does Aristotle explain the incontinent man's choice of the sweet over the right maxim?
The author argues that self-indulgence acts directly on the animal nature and swamps the suggestions of Right Reason. Incontinent desire substitutes the minor premise "This is sweet" for "This is excess," which then suggests the self-indulgent maxim "All that is sweet is to be tasted," and by logical sequence proves the glass is to be tasted.
Chapter 9
What distinction does the chapter draw between the incontinent man and the self-indulgent man regarding maxims?
The incontinent man, an hour before temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim "All that is sweet is to be tasted" to "All excess is to be avoided." The self-indulgent man would. The incontinent man makes his moral choice to act rightly before trial, but at the moment of acting desire makes him contravene that choice.
Chapter 9
Why are actions of lust said to be more unjust than wrong actions done without pleasure?
The chapter's reasoning is that actions of lust are wrong actions done with pleasure; wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath; and what is more justly objects of wrath is more unjust. Hubris is introduced as the single instance from which the premise is proved inductively.
Chapter 9
What does the chapter say about the incontinent man's actions in relation to his moral choice?
Before the time of trial, the man deliberately makes his moral choice to act rightly, but at the moment of acting the powerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice. His Will does not act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason, so his actions are of the mixed kind.
Chapter 9
BOOK VIII4 cards
According to Aristotle, what three kinds of friendship exist, and what motivates each?
Aristotle distinguishes friendships based on utility, on pleasure, and on goodness. Utility friendships exist because each party gains some advantage; pleasure friendships because each enjoys the other's company or qualities; and good friendships because each loves the other for their good character. The first two are incidental and easily dissolved, while friendship based on goodness is complete, since it is grounded in the friend's character rather than in passing advantage or delight.
Chapter 10
Why does Aristotle consider friendship based on goodness both rare and enduring?
The author argues that good friendship is rare because such people are few, and it requires time and familiarity, since people cannot know each other's characters until they have shared experiences and grown accustomed to one another. Once formed, however, it endures as long as both remain good, and it is complete because each wishes the other well for the other's own sake, not for advantage or pleasure.
Chapter 10
How does Aristotle describe the friendship between unequals, such as a great man and a lesser one?
In friendships between unequals, the affection and benefits are not equal, and each party should receive in proportion to their worth. The author argues that the better or more useful person may rightly expect more affection than they give, while the good person can feel friendship only for and in proportion to the other's goodness. Unequal friendships can still endure if the affection is proportionate to merit.
Chapter 10
What does Aristotle say about the obligation to requite a kindness, and what does refusing to recognize it imply?
Aristotle holds that one who receives a favour or kindness is obliged to requite it, and that declining to recognize this obligation amounts to assuming one is not indebted at all. The chapter's note states that refusing to acknowledge the duty to return a favour is effectively to assume one was never the beneficiary. Friendship thus involves reciprocal giving and receiving, not one-sided advantage.
Chapter 10
BOOK IX3 cards
According to the chapter, what is the condition of the soul by nature, as illustrated by Fuller's innkeeper?
The chapter quotes Fuller comparing the soul to a lone chamberlain serving many guests at once: pride calls to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition upstairs, covetousness downstairs. The soul is described as by nature not only a servant but a slave unto sin, and vices are said to be as contrary to themselves as to virtue.
Chapter 11
What does the chapter say about the relation between a term's Second Intention and its First Intention?
Citing Whately's Logic, the chapter notes that in a few instances the Second Intention, or philosophical employment of a term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use. So the technical, philosophical sense of a term may cover more than its ordinary popular sense, though the chapter presents this as holding only in a few instances.
Chapter 11
What scriptural citation opens the chapter, and what does it assert about the Son of man?
The chapter opens with a quotation from Numbers xxiii. 19: 'Neither the Son of man, that He should repent.' The citation is presented as a heading or epigraph rather than developed argument, asserting that the Son of man does not repent, in contrast to the human mutability the chapter's other quotations dwell on.
Chapter 11
BOOK X4 cards
According to the chapter, what six kinds of movement does Aristotle identify?
The chapter lists six kinds of movement: generation (from not being to being), destruction (from being to not being), increase (from being to being more), diminution (from being to being less), change of place (from being here to being there), and alteration (from being in this way to being in that).
Chapter 12
How does the chapter describe pleasure's divisibility and duration?
The chapter states that pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation that it cannot be conceived as divisible or incomplete. The longest continued pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance of a stream of light.
Chapter 12
What example illustrates that alien pleasures can hinder action as much as proper pains?
The chapter says a man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the alien pleasures of reading a novel as by the proper pains of gout in the feet. Both the foreign pleasure and the bodily pain equally prevent the walk.
Chapter 12
How does the editor reconcile Aristotle's happiness with Bishop Butler's claim about knowledge?
Bishop Butler argues that knowledge is not our proper happiness, since it is the gaining, not the having, of it that entertains the mind. The editor reconciles this with Aristotle by suggesting Aristotle may mean the pursuit of knowledge is pleasanter the freer it is from minor hindrances attending on learning.
Chapter 12
Chapter I.4 cards
For Aristotle, what is the Chief Good, and why must it exist?
The Chief Good is the one End desired for its own sake, with a view to which everything else is desired. If nothing were chosen for a further end, desire would go on without limit and be unsatisfied and fruitless. So there must be some final End, and this is the best thing of all, the Chief Good.
Chapter 13
Why are the ends of master-arts more choice-worthy than those under them?
Actions, arts, and sciences range under one another, as bridle-making falls under horsemanship and military actions under the military art. In such cases the ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than the subordinate ends, because the subordinate arts are pursued with a view to the former. The author notes it makes no difference whether the acts of working are themselves the ends or something further beside them.
Chapter 13
Which science or faculty does Aristotle identify as the End of the most commanding and inclusive?
The author argues it is politikē, the political science, since it determines which sciences should exist in communities, which individuals learn them, and to what proficiency. Military art, domestic management, and Rhetoric range under it. Because it uses the other practical sciences and lays down rules of action and abstinence, its End includes the Ends of the rest, namely the Good of Man.
Chapter 13
Why is the young man not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, and who counts as young?
The young man lacks experience in the actions of life, which the subject presupposes and concerns, and he tends to follow the impulses of his passions, so he hears without profit since the end is practice, not mere knowledge. The author draws no distinction between young in years and youthful in temper: the defect comes from living at the beck and call of passion, not from time.
Chapter 13
Chapter I.4 cards
How do intellectual and moral excellence differ in origin, according to Aristotle?
Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of human Excellence: Intellectual and Moral. Intellectual excellence arises originally and grows mostly from teaching, and therefore needs experience and time. Moral excellence, by contrast, comes from custom—the Greek term for it being only a slight deflection from the term for custom.
Chapter 14
Why do moral virtues not arise in us merely by nature?
Aristotle argues that nothing existing by nature can be changed by custom: a stone naturally falling downward could never be trained by custom to rise, even if thrown up ten thousand times. So the virtues come neither by nature nor against nature; we are furnished by nature with a capacity to receive them and are perfected through custom.
Chapter 14
How do we acquire the virtues, and how does this compare to the senses and the arts?
With the bodily senses we receive the faculties first and exercise them afterward—we did not get sight by seeing often. But virtues, like the arts, are acquired by first performing single acts: men become builders by building and harp-players by playing, and likewise become just by doing just actions, self-mastered by self-mastery, and brave by brave actions.
Chapter 14
What role does habituation from childhood play, and how do lawgivers illustrate it?
Aristotle argues habits are produced from acts of working like them, so whether we are accustomed this way or that from childhood makes all the difference. He notes lawgivers make individual members good by habituation, which is every lawgiver's intention; failing in it means failing their intent, and herein lies the difference between a good and a bad Constitution.
Chapter 14
Chapter I.4 cards
How does Aristotle distinguish voluntary from involuntary actions?
Aristotle ties praise and blame to voluntary action, while involuntary action receives allowance and sometimes compassion. He divides involuntary actions into two kinds: those done on compulsion, where the origin is external and the agent contributes nothing, and those done through ignorance. He argues this distinction matters for legislators when assigning honours and punishments.
Chapter 15
Why are mixed actions like jettisoning cargo called voluntary?
Aristotle says such actions are mixed but most like voluntary ones. No one would throw goods overboard in the abstract, yet anyone sensible would do it for the safety of himself and his shipmates. Since the origin of the motion lies in the agent, he acts voluntarily at the time, though the act is involuntary in the abstract.
Chapter 15
When does Aristotle say such mixed actions earn praise or blame?
Aristotle argues men are praised when they endure disgrace or pain to secure great and honourable ends, and blamed when they endure very disgraceful things for no honourable object or a trifling one. For some acts no praise is given but allowance is made, namely when a person is overstrained beyond human nature or the limits of endurance.
Chapter 15
How does Aristotle refute the claim that pleasure compels us?
Aristotle finds it absurd to say pleasant and honourable things compel us merely because they are external motives. Those acting on compulsion act with pain, while those acting for pleasure or honour act with pleasure. He argues it is absurd to attribute actions to external things rather than to one's own capacity for being easily caught by them.
Chapter 15
Chapter I.4 cards
What is Liberality the mean state between, and what is its object-matter?
Liberality is the mean state concerned with Wealth, defined as all things whose worth is measured by money. Its excess is Prodigality and its defect Stinginess. The Liberal man is praised chiefly for giving rather than receiving, since giving to proper persons is more characteristic of virtue than receiving from proper sources or refraining from improper ones.
Chapter 16
According to the chapter, why is the Liberal man not easy to be rich?
The author argues the Liberal man neither receives nor keeps readily but lavishes, valuing wealth not for itself but for giving. Hence it is commonly charged against fortune that those most deserving to be rich are least so. This happens reasonably, since it is impossible to have wealth if one takes no care to have it.
Chapter 16
What conditions make a gift truly Liberal, and what motive drives it?
The Liberal man gives to proper persons, in right proportion, at right times, and with positive pleasure or at least without pain, from a motive of honour. Giving to improper people, or from another cause, or with pain, is not Liberality; pain signals he would prefer his wealth to the honourable action. He also receives from proper sources, as necessary, so he may have something to give.
Chapter 16
How does Liberality relate to a person's means rather than the amount given?
Liberality is a term of relation to a man's means: the Liberal-ness depends not on the amount given but on the moral state of the giver, who gives in proportion to his means. So the man who gives less may be more Liberal if he has less to give from. Those who inherited rather than acquired their means are thought more Liberal, since they never experienced want.
Chapter 16
Chapter I.3 cards
According to Aristotle, what do all men mean by the term Justice?
The author states that all men mean by Justice a moral state such that in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what is just, actually do it, and wish it. Injustice is similarly a moral state by which men do unjustly and wish what is unjust. He offers these as a sketched ground-work for the enquiry.
Chapter 17
How does Aristotle distinguish States from Faculties or Sciences?
The author argues that whereas the same Faculty or Science is thought to embrace contraries, a State will not. From health, for instance, the contrary acts are not done but only the healthy ones; a man is said to walk healthily when he walks as the healthy man would. So States, unlike Sciences, do not extend to opposite actions.
Chapter 17
How does Aristotle define the Just and the Unjust in terms of the Unjust man?
Aristotle identifies three senses of the Unjust man: he who violates the law, he who is a grasping man, and he who is unequal. Accordingly the Just man is the man who acts according to law and the equal man. So 'the Just' is the lawful and the equal, and 'the Unjust' the unlawful and the unequal.
Chapter 17
Chapter I.3 cards
What does Aristotle say is still needed after defining virtue as the mean according to Right Reason?
He says stating that the mean accords with Right Reason is true but indefinite, like telling someone to follow what medicine directs. What is further required is to lay down expressly what Right Reason is and what its definition is.
Chapter 18
What analogy does Aristotle use to show that 'according to Right Reason' is uninformative?
He compares it to answering a question about proper applications to the body by saying whatever the science of medicine and the physician directs. Such an answer is true but leaves the questioner no wiser, since it does not specify the actual rule.
Chapter 18
How does Aristotle describe the role of Right Reason in hitting the mean?
He likens it to a mark that a man with Reason keeps his eye fixed on, tightening or slacking his rope accordingly. There is a certain limit of the mean states in accordance with Right Reason, lying between excess and defect.
Chapter 18
Chapter I.4 cards
What three forms of what is to be avoided in moral character does Aristotle list?
Aristotle identifies three forms of what is to be avoided in respect of moral character: Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. The contraries he assigns are Virtue to Vice, Self-Control to Imperfect Self-Control, and Superhuman or heroical, godlike Virtue to Brutishness. He notes that brutes are neither virtuous nor vicious, nor are gods, but the godlike state is more precious than Virtue while the brutish differs in kind from Vice.
Chapter 19
How rare are the godlike and brutish characters, and where is brutishness found?
Aristotle says it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike, a term the Lacedaemonians use when they greatly admire a man, calling him seios aner. The brutish man is likewise rare. He states this character is found most among barbarians, and some cases are caused by disease or maiming; also men who exceed all ordinary measures in vice are designated by this opprobrious term.
Chapter 19
What method does Aristotle propose for treating Imperfect Self-Control and its kindred states?
Aristotle says we should adopt the same course as before: state the phenomena, then raise and discuss the difficulties that suggest themselves, and then exhibit, if possible, all the opinions held about these affections of moral character, or at least the greater part and the most important. He considers the matter sufficiently illustrated once the difficulties are solved and the most approved theories are left as a residuum.
Chapter 19
How does Aristotle distinguish Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control from Virtue and Vice?
Aristotle says we must speak of Imperfect Self-Control and its kindred faults of Softness and Luxury on one hand, and of Self-Control and Endurance on the other. He instructs that we should conceive of these not as being the same states exactly as Virtue and Vice respectively, nor again as differing in kind. So they are distinct from Virtue and Vice without being a different kind altogether.
Chapter 19
Chapter I.4 cards
Why does Aristotle say friendship is necessary for life?
The author argues no one would choose to live without friends even with all other goods, since prosperity is useless without people to do kindnesses for and is hard to preserve without friends; in poverty and adversity friends are thought the only refuge.
Chapter 20
How does friendship help the young, old, and those in their prime?
Friendship keeps the young from error, supplements the old in attention and action where weakness makes them deficient, and helps those in their prime toward noble deeds, since two together are better able to devise plans and carry them out, as Homer says.
Chapter 20
What evidence does Aristotle give that friendship is implanted by nature?
He points to natural affection between parent and offspring in humans and also in birds and most animals, goodwill among members of the same tribe and especially the same nation, and the closeness of kin and friendliness of man to man observed in travel.
Chapter 20
Why do legislators care more about friendship than justice?
The author argues friendship is the bond of social communities and legislators aim at unanimity, which resembles friendship, driving out faction as inimical. Where friendship exists justice is not required, yet the just still need friendship, and the most truly just is thought to partake of friendship's nature.
Chapter 20
Chapter I.2 cards
Why do love-based friendships often break up according to Aristotle?
Aristotle explains that in the Friendship of Love, the lover may love exceedingly yet have nothing worthy of Friendship, or a suitor may promise everything and perform nothing. Such friendships rest on pleasure or utility, and since the qualities loved are not permanent, the friendship dissolves when the motives cease. Friendship based on moral character, being independent and disinterested, is permanent.
Chapter 21
What does Aristotle say about the musician who promised payment by musical excellence?
Aristotle recounts a man who promised a musician payment rising with the excellence of his music, then claimed he had given pleasure for pleasure. Aristotle says if both had intended this it would be fine, but if one seeks amusement and the other gain, and only one gets his object, the dealing cannot be fair, since each fixes his mind on what he wants.
Chapter 21
Chapter I.4 cards
What role do Pleasure and Pain play in forming moral character, according to the chapter?
The chapter holds that liking and disliking what one ought is most important for forming good moral character, since these feelings extend through all of life and bias a person toward Virtue and Happiness. People train the young by guiding them with Pleasure and Pain as rudders, because men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.
Chapter 22
What two opposed views about Pleasure does the chapter identify?
Some call Pleasure the Chief Good, while others maintain it is exceedingly bad. The chapter says the latter may hold this from real conviction, or from a notion that it is better for life and conduct to denounce Pleasure even if it is not truly bad, since the mass of men are slaves of pleasure and should be drawn the other way to reach the mean.
Chapter 22
Why does the author suspect the policy of denouncing Pleasure even if it is not bad?
The author argues that in matters of feeling and action, theories are less convincing than facts. When such theories conflict with actual experience, they are despised and drag the truth down with them. Someone who denounces Pleasure but is seen pursuing it is thought to be backsliding, since the mass of men cannot make fine distinctions.
Chapter 22
Why does the author prefer real accounts of pleasure to merely theoretical ones?
The author argues that real accounts are most expedient not only for knowledge but for life and conduct. Because they are believed to harmonize with facts, they prevail with the wise to live in accordance with them. He then sets aside these considerations and turns to the current maxims respecting Pleasure.
Chapter 22
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What does the chapter say about sifting opinions and about reasoning from versus to principles?
The author says sifting all opinions would be fruitless, so it suffices to examine those most generally current or thought to have reason in them. He notes the difference between reasoning from principles and reasoning to principles, and says Plato rightly doubted which is the right road, comparing it to a racecourse run from the judges to the far end or vice versa.
Chapter 23
Why must a student of moral philosophy have been well trained in habits?
The author argues that since we must begin with what is known, and a principle is a matter of fact, one who would profit from studying nobleness, justice, and moral philosophy must already be well trained in habits. If the fact is clear, no further reason for it is needed. The well-trained either has principles or can receive them easily; one who can do neither is, per Hesiod, useless.
Chapter 23
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Why does Aristotle say the treatise on virtue is not mere speculation?
The author argues the inquiry is not merely to know what virtue is but to become virtuous; otherwise it would be useless. Therefore we must consider how to perform particular actions, since the quality of the habits formed depends on them. He adds that all statements about moral action must be made in outline only, not exactly, because such matters have no fixedness.
Chapter 24
How are virtues like courage and self-mastery spoiled and preserved?
The author holds that habits of virtue are spoiled by defect and excess, as health and strength are harmed by too much or too little training, food, and drink. The man who fears everything becomes a coward; he who fears nothing becomes rash. Likewise, tasting every pleasure loses self-control, while avoiding all pleasures dulls perception. The mean state preserves these habits.
Chapter 24
What test shows whether a virtuous habit has been formed?
The test is the pleasure or pain that follows the acts. He is perfected in self-mastery who not only abstains from bodily pleasures but is glad to do so; he who abstains but is sorry lacks self-mastery. Similarly, the brave man faces danger with positive pleasure or at least without pain, while the man who does it with pain is not brave.
Chapter 24
Why does Aristotle make pleasure and pain the object-matter of moral virtue?
The author argues we do bad things because of pleasure and decline right actions because of pain, citing Plato that men should be trained from childhood to take pleasure and pain from proper objects. Virtue concerns actions and feelings, and pleasure or pain follows each; habits are made vicious by pursuing or avoiding pleasures wrongly. He adds that fighting pleasure is harder than anger, per Heraclitus.
Chapter 24
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According to Aristotle, what distinguishes an involuntary action from a merely not-voluntary one?
Both are done by reason of ignorance, but Aristotle says only the involuntary is attended with pain and remorse. The man who acts through ignorance but feels no regret cannot be said to act with his will (since he did not know) nor against it (since he is not sorry). So the regretful agent is called involuntary, the unrepentant one not-voluntary.
Chapter 25
What difference does Aristotle draw between acting because of ignorance and acting with ignorance?
Aristotle says these differ: we do not usually assign ignorance as the cause of the drunken or angry man's actions, but rather the drunkenness or the anger. Such men act not knowingly, yet they act with ignorance rather than because of it. The cause of their action is the state they are in, not a lack of knowledge.
Chapter 25
Which kind of ignorance does Aristotle say constitutes depravity rather than involuntariness?
Aristotle argues that ignorance affecting moral choice constitutes depravity but not involuntariness, and the same for ignorance of principle, since men are blamed for that. Only ignorance of particular details—where the action and its circumstances lie—warrants compassion and allowance, because acting in ignorance of these is properly involuntary.
Chapter 25
What particular details of an action does Aristotle list, and which ignorance makes one most involuntary?
He lists who acts, what he is doing, with respect to what or in what, sometimes with what instrument, and with what result, plus how (e.g. softly or violently). No one in his senses is ignorant of the agent, being himself. He most counts as involuntary who was ignorant regarding the most important details—those in which the action consists, and the result.
Chapter 25
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How does Aristotle define Prodigality and Stinginess in terms of giving and receiving?
Aristotle says Prodigality is excess in giving and in forbearing to receive, and deficiency in receiving; Stinginess is deficiency in giving and excess in receiving, though in small things. Expenditure is classed under giving. So the two vices are contraries, each erring in two respects, but Stinginess errs in small matters.
Chapter 26
Why does Aristotle think the Prodigal man is superior to the Stingy man?
The author argues the Prodigal is superior because he does good to many while the Stingy man benefits no one, not even himself. The Prodigal already has the facts of the Liberal man—he gives and forbears to receive—only not in the right manner, so he may be cured by advancing years, want of means, or habituation. Stinginess, by contrast, is called incurable.
Chapter 26
According to Aristotle, why do most Prodigals also become stingy in receiving?
Aristotle explains that most Prodigals, wanting to spend but finding their means run short, are necessitated to get money from some other quarter. Because they care not for what is honourable, they receive recklessly and from all sources indifferently, desiring to give but not caring how or whence. Thus their giving is not Liberal, and they often enrich those who should be poor.
Chapter 26
What does Aristotle identify as the common characteristic of Stingy receivers, and who are his examples?
Their common characteristic is base-gaining: they submit to disgrace for the sake of gain, and that small. Examples include those in illiberal employments, brothel keepers, and usurers lending small sums at large interest. By contrast, those who receive great things from improper sources, like despots who sack cities and plunder temples, are called wicked, impious, and unjust, but not Stingy.
Chapter 26
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According to the chapter, what does the Law command regarding the virtues?
The Law commands the deeds of the brave man (not leaving the ranks, not flying, not throwing away arms), the self-mastering man (abstinence from adultery and wantonness), and the meek man (refraining from striking or abusive language). It commands some things and forbids others in respect of other virtues and vices, rightly if the law is good, somewhat inferior if extemporised.
Chapter 27
Why does the author call Justice perfect Virtue in a special sense?
The author argues Justice is perfect Virtue not simply but as exercised toward one's neighbour, because it is the practice of perfect Virtue. It is perfect because the just person can practise virtue toward others, not merely regulate his own conduct; many can manage personal virtue but fail in dealings with neighbours. Justice alone is thought a good to others since it relates immediately to another person.
Chapter 27
How does Justice differ from Virtue, and Injustice from Vice?
The author argues Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but co-extensive with Virtue, and the answering Injustice is not a part of Vice but co-extensive with Vice. They are really the same, but the point of view differs: in so far as it respects one's neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and such a moral state it is simply Virtue.
Chapter 27
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How does Aristotle divide the rational part of the soul?
Aristotle divides the rational part of the soul into two: the part by which we grasp things whose causes cannot be otherwise than they are, which he calls 'that which is apt to know,' and the part by which we grasp things that can be otherwise, called 'that which is apt to calculate.' He argues generically different objects require generically different soul-parts suited to them.
Chapter 28
What three functions in the soul does Aristotle say moral action and truth depend on?
Aristotle names three functions on which moral action and truth depend: Sense, Intellect, and Appetition (whether vague Desire or definite Will). He notes Sense originates no moral action, since brutes have sense but share in no moral action. Intellect and Will connect so that what affirmation and negation are in thought, pursuit and avoidance are in the will.
Chapter 28
What is moral choice, and why can past events not be its object?
Moral choice is will consequent on deliberation, involving both appetite and reason directed to a result; it is neither independent of intellect nor of moral character. Aristotle says nothing done and past can be chosen, since no one deliberates about what is past but only about what is future and can be influenced. He cites Agathon: only deity cannot undo what has been done.
Chapter 28
What is the work of the practical intellect, and how does it differ from the speculative?
Aristotle says truth and falsehood are the good and bad of the purely speculative intellect, which concerns neither action nor production. The practical intellect, mixed with will, has as its work the truth corresponding to right movement of the will. Intellect alone moves nothing unless directed to a result in moral action; production aims at something beyond itself, while acting well is an end in itself.
Chapter 28
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Why does Aristotle reject Socrates' denial of Imperfect Self-Control?
Aristotle says Socrates' account is at variance with plain facts. Socrates held no one acts against what is best while knowing it, but Aristotle replies that it is plain the man failing through passion does not suppose his acts right before passion takes hold. He therefore asks what kind of ignorance is involved, rather than denying the state exists.
Chapter 29
Why is it absurd to say Practical Wisdom opposes Imperfect Self-Control?
Aristotle finds the supposition absurd because it would make the same man unite Practical Wisdom and Imperfect Self-Control. No one would maintain Practical Wisdom voluntarily does very wrong. He adds that the mark of the practically wise man is aptitude to act on particular details, not mere knowledge of what is right, and he possesses the other virtues.
Chapter 29
Why does Aristotle say Self-Control is not always good?
He argues that if Self-Control means abiding by all opinions without exception, it can be bad, as in the case of a false opinion. Conversely, departing from all opinions can be good: Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes is praised for not abiding by what Ulysses persuaded him to, because he was pained at being guilty of falsehood.
Chapter 29
How can folly joined with Imperfect Self-Control produce good action?
Aristotle says it is conceivable that folly joined with Imperfect Self-Control may turn out goodness in a given case. Because of imperfect self-control a man acts against his notions, and his notion is that what is really good is bad and ought not to be done, so he eventually does what is good rather than what is bad.
Chapter 29
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What two opposing common sayings about likeness and friendship does Aristotle cite?
Some hold that likeness produces friendship, citing "Like will to like" and "Birds of a feather." Others hold the opposite, citing "Two of a trade never agree." Aristotle notes these disputed views before setting aside physical explanations in favor of questions about human character and feeling.
Chapter 30
Which thinkers does Aristotle cite for the view that contraries or difference produce friendship?
Euripides, in the lines about earth loving rain and heaven loving to fall on earth, and Heraclitus, who maintains that contrariety is expedient, that the best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things come into being through antagonism. Empedocles, by contrast, affirms that like aims at like.
Chapter 30
Why does Aristotle set aside the physical questions about friendship?
He says these physical enquiries are foreign to the present enquiry. Instead he will examine questions proper to man and concerning moral characters and feelings, such as whether friendship arises among all without distinction or is impossible for bad men, and whether there is one species of friendship or several.
Chapter 30
What argument does Aristotle reject about there being only one species of friendship?
Some argue there is but one species because friendship admits of degrees. Aristotle says this rests on insufficient proof, since things different in species also admit of degrees. He refers back to an earlier discussion of this point rather than repeating it here.
Chapter 30
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According to the chapter, which duty generally outranks unsolicited kindness to a companion?
The chapter states that requiting benefits is generally a higher duty than doing unsolicited kindnesses to one's companion; discharging a debt is more obligatory than giving to a companion. Yet the rule admits exceptions: if in a particular case the giving greatly preponderates as honourable or necessary, those considerations should sway us, since claims differ in amount and kind.
Chapter 31
What example does the chapter give where ransoming one's father may outrank repaying a ransomer?
The chapter raises the dilemma of one ransomed from robbers: should he ransom his ransomer in return, repay on demand, or ransom his own father? It concludes it would seem a man ought to ransom his father even in preference to himself, illustrating that the general rule of discharging debt can yield to what is more honourable or necessary.
Chapter 31
When does the chapter say a good man need not repay a loan from a bad man?
The chapter supposes a bad man lent to someone as being good, expecting repayment, while the good borrower has no hope of repayment from the bad man. Either the claim is genuinely unequal or only supposed to be, and in acting so people are not to be thought to act wrongly. All statements about feelings and actions are definite only in proportion as their object-matter is.
Chapter 31
What does the chapter say about honoring parents and elders?
The author argues we should support our parents before all others, as their debtors, and honor them as we honor the gods—but not all kinds of honor alike: not the same to father as mother, nor the honor due a scientist or general. To elders, the honor befitting their age: rising in their presence, yielding the way. To companions and brothers, frankness and sharing.
Chapter 31
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Why did Eudoxus consider Pleasure the Chief Good?
Eudoxus argued that all creatures, rational and irrational, aim at Pleasure, and since what is chosen is good and what all aim at is best for all, Pleasure must be the Chief Good. He added that Pain is avoided by all, that Pleasure is chosen for its own sake, and that it increases other goods. The author notes his views were accepted largely because of his excellent moral character.
Chapter 32
How does Plato's argument show Pleasure is not the Chief Good?
Plato argues that the life of Pleasure combined with Practical Wisdom is more choice-worthy than Pleasure alone. But the Chief Good cannot become more choice-worthy by addition, since it is already the best. Therefore simple Pleasure cannot be the Chief Good. The author endorses this reasoning, noting nothing that improves by combination with other goods can be the Chief Good.
Chapter 32
How does the author answer the charge that Pleasure is a Movement or Generation?
The author replies that swiftness and slowness belong to Movements, but one cannot be quickly in a state of Pleasure as one can walk quickly; only the change into Pleasure can be quick. Against Generation, he notes things resolve into their source, and if Pleasure were a Generation, Pain would be its Destruction. He also argues Pleasures like those from mathematics involve no prior lack.
Chapter 32
How does the author respond to the objection from disgraceful Pleasures?
The author offers several replies: disgraceful things are not really pleasant, only pleasant to the ill-disposed, as food seems sweet to the sick. Pleasures are choice-worthy but not those from base sources, as wealth is good but not from treason. Pleasures also differ in kind by their sources, and one cannot enjoy the just man's Pleasure without being just.
Chapter 32
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Why does Aristotle reject honour as the Chief Good?
The author argues honour is too superficial for the Chief Good because it is thought to rest with those who pay it rather than with the one who receives it. The Chief Good must be something that is our own and not easily taken away. He adds that men pursue honour to believe themselves good, seeking it from the wise and for virtue, which suggests virtue ranks higher than honour.
Chapter 33
Why is virtue not sufficient as the final end?
The author argues virtue is plainly not sufficiently final, since it is conceivable that a man possessed of virtue might sleep or be inactive all through his life, or suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes. No one would call such a man happy except for mere disputation's sake. So virtue, though higher than honour, still falls short of the Chief Good.
Chapter 33
Why does Aristotle reject wealth as the good being sought?
The author argues the life of money-making is one of constraint, and wealth manifestly is not the good we are seeking because it is for use, that is, for the sake of something further. The previously mentioned ends are better candidates since men rest content with them for their own sakes. Yet those too are not the objects of the search.
Chapter 33
Why does Aristotle deny a single universal Idea of good?
The author argues good is predicated in as many ways as there are categories—Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Time, Place—so it cannot be something common and universal and one in all, else it would be predicated in one category only. He also notes that things under one Idea fall under one science, yet many sciences handle goods even within a single category.
Chapter 33
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Why does Aristotle say the arts and the virtues are not parallel?
The author argues that products of art have their excellence in themselves, so it suffices that they be in a certain state when produced. Virtuous actions, by contrast, require the agent himself to be in a certain state: knowing what he does, choosing deliberately for the thing's own sake, and being stable and unapt to change.
Chapter 34
What three conditions must an agent meet for an action to count as virtuous?
He must first know what he is doing; second, choose the action with deliberate preference and for the thing's own sake; third, do it from a stable character not apt to change. Knowledge alone avails little or nothing for virtue, while the other requisites are all in all.
Chapter 34
How does Aristotle distinguish merely doing just acts from possessing justice?
Facts are called by the names of the habits when they are such as the just or self-mastering man would do. But the author argues that merely doing these facts does not make one possess the virtue; only he who also does them as the just and self-mastering man does them has it.
Chapter 34
What analogy does Aristotle use for people who philosophize instead of acting?
The author compares them to sick people who listen to the doctor with great attention but do nothing he tells them. Just as such patients cannot become well bodily, so those who merely talk and philosophize cannot become good mentally. Virtues are formed by doing the actions, not by taking refuge in talk.
Chapter 34
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What state lies between Envy and Malevolence, and how do the three differ?
Indignation against successful vice is the mean between Envy and Malevolence; all three concern pleasure and pain at what happens to one's neighbour. The right-feeling man is annoyed at undeserved success of others; the envious man is annoyed at all success; the malevolent falls short of annoyance and even rejoices at misfortune.
Chapter 35
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Why does the chapter reject calling actions from Anger or Lust involuntary?
The chapter argues it is absurd to class actions from Anger or Lust as involuntary. If so, no animal but man, and not even children, could act voluntarily. Also, anger is sometimes a duty and some things are bound to be lusted after, like health and learning. Involuntary actions are thought painful, while lustful ones are pleasant.
Chapter 36
What difference does the chapter say involuntariness makes between wrong acts from calculation and from anger?
The chapter asks how involuntariness makes any difference between wrong actions done from deliberate calculation and those done by reason of anger, since both ought to be avoided. It notes irrational feelings are thought just as natural to man as reason, so actions from Anger and Lust are such as belong to the individual.
Chapter 36
What two sources does the chapter give for involuntary action?
The chapter states that all involuntary action is either upon compulsion or by reason of ignorance. This twofold division frames the discussion, setting up the contrast with voluntary action, whose origination is in the agent with awareness of particulars. Actions from Anger or Lust are then argued not to belong among the involuntary.
Chapter 36
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How does Aristotle distinguish magnificence from liberality?
Both concern wealth, but magnificence applies only to expensive, large-scale expenditure, while liberality covers all transactions with wealth. Magnificence exceeds liberality in magnitude, being fitting expense on a large scale. The magnificent man is therefore liberal, but the liberal man is not thereby magnificent, since liberality does not require greatness of scale.
Chapter 37
Why can a poor man not be magnificent, according to Aristotle?
The author argues a poor man cannot be magnificent because he lacks the means to spend largely and yet becomingly. If he attempts it he is a fool, since the expenditure is out of proportion and contrary to propriety, and virtue requires acting rightly. Expenditure must be proportionate to the doer's rank and means, not merely to the work.
Chapter 37
What kinds of expenditure does Aristotle call honourable and magnificent?
Honourable expenditures include dedicatory offerings to the gods, furnishing temples, sacrifices, and everything relating to the Deity, plus public matters of honourable ambition such as furnishing a chorus splendidly, fitting out and maintaining a trireme, or giving a public feast. Private occasions like marriage also count. The magnificent man spends on the public good rather than on himself.
Chapter 37
How do the vulgar profuse man and the mean man both miss the mark?
The vulgar profuse man spends improperly: lavishing much where little is required, showing off out of taste, seeking admiration for wealth rather than honour, and spending little where he ought to spend much. The mean man is deficient everywhere, spoiling great effects for want of a trifle, contriving to spend least and lamenting the expense. Both are faulty but not disgraceful, being neither hurtful nor very unseemly.
Chapter 37
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How does Aristotle distinguish particular injustice from injustice coextensive with vice?
Aristotle argues particular injustice is a part of vice as a part is to a whole. Many vices make a man act unjustly without grasping more than his share—cowardice throws away a shield, ill-temper abuses, stinginess withholds aid. But the grasping act belongs to injustice specifically, since we blame it as some vice, showing a distinct Injustice related to lawless vice as part to whole.
Chapter 38
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How many faculties does Aristotle say the soul has for attaining truth?
Aristotle assumes five faculties whereby the soul attains truth in affirmation or negation: Art, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition. He explicitly excludes Supposition and Opinion because through these one may go wrong. This list sets up the chapter's subsequent discussion of the intellectual excellences.
Chapter 39
Why does Aristotle hold that the objects of Knowledge are necessary and eternal?
Aristotle argues that what we strictly know cannot be otherwise than it is, since things that can be otherwise become uncertain once they leave our actual observation. Whatever falls within Knowledge is therefore by necessity, and all things that exist necessarily are eternal, without beginning and indestructible.
Chapter 39
According to Aristotle, how is all teaching based on previous knowledge?
Aristotle says all Knowledge is thought teachable and its objects learnable, and all teaching rests on previous knowledge, as stated in the Analytics. There are two ways of teaching: Syllogism and Induction. Induction is the source of universal propositions, and Syllogism reasons from these universals, though syllogistic reasoning must ultimately derive its principles by Induction.
Chapter 39
When does a person strictly and properly know something, per Aristotle?
Aristotle defines Knowledge as a state or faculty apt to demonstrate syllogistically, as set out in the Analytics. A person strictly knows when he establishes his conclusion in a certain way and the principles are known to him; if the principles are not better known to him than the conclusion, his knowledge is merely accidental.
Chapter 39
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How does Aristotle distinguish the unrestrained man from the man of imperfect self-control?
The unrestrained man is led on with deliberate moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasure as it rises. The man of imperfect self-control does not think he ought to pursue it, but pursues it all the same. So they share the same object-matter, but differ in their relation to it, which is why only the latter is called imperfectly self-controlled.
Chapter 40
Why does Aristotle say acting against knowledge is not strange when the knowledge is not exercised?
Aristotle distinguishes two senses of knowing: having knowledge and using it. A man who acts wrongly while possessing but not exercising knowledge presents no anomaly, whereas acting against knowledge actually in operation would be strange. He compares those under passion to the asleep, mad, or drunk, whose state changes so that they have knowledge in a sense and also have it not.
Chapter 40
How does the practical syllogism explain a failure of self-control?
Action is analysed into a syllogism with a universal premise and a particular premise known by sense. One universal forbids tasting, while another says all sweet things are pleasant, with the minor premise 'this is sweet.' Desire moves the organs, so the man tastes. The desire, not the opinion, is contrary to right reason, and only accidentally is reason contravened.
Chapter 40
Why are brutes not considered imperfectly self-controlled, and how does this answer Socrates?
Brutes lack the power of conceiving universals, having only particular impressions, so they cannot be imperfectly self-controlled. The minor premise of a practical syllogism is a particular opinion known by sense, and the man under passion either lacks it or has it only as a drunk repeats verses. Thus the affection does not occur in the presence of proper knowledge, which is what Socrates sought.
Chapter 40
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What three causes give rise to friendship, and why are inanimate things excluded?
The three causes are the good, the pleasurable, and the useful, since the useful is that through which good or pleasure accrues. Inanimate things are excluded because there is no requital of affection and no wish for their good; a wine-lover merely wishes the wine kept safe for his own benefit, which the chapter calls ridiculous as friendship.
Chapter 41
Does each person love what is good absolutely or what is good to himself?
The chapter says each individual feels friendship toward what is good to himself, while abstractly the real good is the object. It resolves the tension by noting that people love what conveys the impression of being good to them, and this makes no real difference because what is truly good will also convey that impression.
Chapter 41
What does the chapter mean by 'Kindly' feeling, and what is missing from it?
When someone wishes good to another who does not reciprocate, people call them Kindly, since friendship is described as kindliness between persons who reciprocate it. But the chapter adds that the feeling must be mutually known, since many are kindly disposed toward people they have never seen but conceive to be amiable or useful.
Chapter 41
What two conditions complete the idea of friendship?
The chapter states that to complete the idea of friendship it is requisite that persons have kindly feelings toward one another, wish one another good from one of the aforementioned causes (good, pleasure, or use), and that these kindly feelings be mutually known. Without mutual knowledge, the chapter asks, how can one call them friends?
Chapter 41
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When may utility- or pleasure-based friendships rightly be dissolved?
The author argues that friendships grounded in utility or pleasure may be ended without blame once those qualities fail, since the parties were friends of the qualities rather than of each other. With the motive gone, it is reasonable for the sentiment to cease. Fault arises only if one party pretended to be attached for moral character while actually being attached for advantage or pleasure.
Chapter 42
What is the most common source of quarrels between friends, according to the chapter?
The author states that the most common source of quarrels is friends not being friends on the same grounds as they suppose themselves to be. If a man is deceived because he wrongly supposed he inspired friendship by his moral character, he has only himself to blame. But if the other party pretended, the deceived man may rightly find fault, more than with false coiners, given the greater worth of what was betrayed.
Chapter 42
Must one remain friends with a good man found to be a scoundrel?
The author argues no: friendship's object is the good, so there is no obligation to be a bad man's friend, nor ought one to be, since one should not love evil or become like the base. One need not break instantly in all cases, only where the friend is incurably depraved; if amendment is possible, one should help repair his moral character even more than his property.
Chapter 42
What should an improved friend do toward a former friend left behind?
The author argues that when one friend improves greatly and the other stays as he was, they cannot remain friends, since they no longer share pleasures or likes and dislikes and cannot live in intimacy. Yet the improved party should remember past intimacy and grant former friends some allowance, as we favor friends over strangers, provided the severance was not caused by excessive depravity.
Chapter 42
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Why does Aristotle deny that pleasure is a movement?
The author argues pleasure is complete at any moment, like an act of sight, lacking nothing that added time would supply. Movement, by contrast, takes place over a duration and has an end to accomplish; its parts are incomplete and specifically different from one another. Since pleasure is a whole, it cannot be a movement or a generation.
Chapter 43
How does Aristotle illustrate that parts of a movement differ in kind?
He uses house-building: fitting stones together, fluting a column, and constructing the temple as a whole are movements different in kind. The temple's construction is complete because it lacks nothing of the proposed result, while the basement or triglyph movements are incomplete, each being a movement of a part only.
Chapter 43
Why is walking not complete at any chosen moment?
The author argues that in walking, the whence and whither differ between the whole course and a portion, and between one portion and another. Crossing one line differs from crossing another, since a man crosses a line in a given place. So movement is not complete at any moment, but only, if at all, in the whole time requisite.
Chapter 43
What conclusion follows from pleasure being a whole?
Since pleasure's whole nature is complete at any given moment, it differs from movement and belongs to the class of things whole and complete. The author notes movement requires definite time, whereas the sensation of pleasure does not, since what exists at the present moment is a kind of whole. Thus pleasure is not a movement or generation.
Chapter 43
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In each action and art, what is the Chief Good?
The Chief Good in each is the End—that for the sake of which other things are done. In the healing art it is health, in the art military victory, in house-building a house, and in every action and moral choice the End, since men do everything else with a view to it. If there is one End of all things, that is the Good proposed by doing; if more than one, then those.
Chapter 44
What does Aristotle mean by the 'absolutely final' end?
The absolutely final is what is chosen always in itself and never with a view to anything else. Things pursued for themselves are more final than those pursued for something else, and things never chosen for an ulterior object are more final than those chosen both in themselves and for that object. The Chief Good must be something final of this kind.
Chapter 44
Why is Happiness thought to be the final good?
Happiness is chosen always for its own sake and never with a view to anything further. Honour, pleasure, intellect, and every excellence are chosen for their own sakes—we would choose them even if no result followed—but also with a view to happiness, conceiving that through them we shall be happy. No man chooses happiness with a view to them or to anything else.
Chapter 44
How does Aristotle define self-sufficiency as a mark of the final good?
Self-sufficiency is not for a single individual living a solitary life but for parents, children, wife, friends, and countrymen, since man is by nature adapted to social existence. Some limit must be fixed, left for later investigation. For now, the self-sufficient is 'which taken alone makes life choice-worthy, and to be in want of nothing,' and Happiness is thought to be of this kind.
Chapter 44
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What three kinds of things arise in the mind, and which is virtue?
The chapter lists three kinds: Feelings, Capacities, and States. Aristotle argues virtue must belong to one of these classes. Since he rules out Feelings and Capacities, he concludes virtue must be a State—the disposition in right of which we stand well or badly toward feelings such as anger.
Chapter 45
Why are Feelings not virtues or vices, according to Aristotle?
Aristotle gives several reasons: we are not called good or bad in right of feelings; we are neither praised nor blamed for merely feeling fear or anger, only for feeling in a particular way; feelings occur without moral choice, while virtues involve choice; and by feelings we are said to be moved, not disposed in a certain way.
Chapter 45
How does Aristotle distinguish a State from a Feeling regarding anger?
A State is the relation in which we stand to feelings, good or bad. With anger, we are in a wrong relation if too violent or too slack, but in a right relation if we hit the happy medium. Feelings themselves are what we are moved by; States are how we are disposed toward them.
Chapter 45
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How does Aristotle distinguish moral choice from voluntary action?
Moral choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive, since voluntary is the more comprehensive term. Children and other animals share in voluntary action but not in moral choice, and sudden actions are called voluntary but are not ascribed to moral choice. Aristotle concludes moral choice is the voluntary that has passed through a stage of previous deliberation.
Chapter 46
How does Aristotle distinguish wish from moral choice?
Wish may take impossibilities as objects, such as immortality, while moral choice cannot, since a man choosing impossibilities would be thought a fool. Wish may also concern things one cannot accomplish, like an actor's or athlete's success, but no man chooses such things, only what he believes he may procure. Further, wish has the End for its object, moral choice the means.
Chapter 46
Why is moral choice not the same as opinion?
Opinion ranges over eternal and impossible things as well as things in our power, and is divided into true and false, not good and bad as moral choice is. By choosing good and bad things we are constituted of a certain character, but by holding opinions we are not. We choose to take or avoid, but we opine what a thing is or how it is serviceable.
Chapter 46
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According to Aristotle, what is the object-matter of the Great-minded man?
Honour and dishonour are specially the object-matter of the Great-minded man, since honour is the greatest of external goods. He accepts great honour from good men moderately, perhaps even less than his due, but despises honour from ordinary people on trifling grounds, and likewise dishonour, because there can be no just ground for it in his case.
Chapter 47
How does Aristotle distinguish the Great-minded, Vain, and Small-minded characters?
The Great-minded man values himself highly and justly, estimating himself at his real worth. The Vain man values himself highly without just grounds, though the name is not applied to every case of undue self-estimation. The Small-minded man values himself below his real worth; the strongest case of this error is the man of great worth who underestimates himself.
Chapter 47
Why does Aristotle say it is hard to be truly Great-minded?
The author argues Great-mindedness is a kind of ornament of all the virtues, making them better and unable to exist without them. Since it requires thorough goodness and nobleness of character, and honour is the prize of virtue given to the good, a bad man cannot truly be Great-minded or deserving of honour.
Chapter 47
How does the Great-minded man behave toward kindnesses and favours?
He readily does kindnesses but is ashamed to receive them, since giving places one in superiority and receiving in inferiority. He greatly overpays any kindness done to him, remembers kindnesses he has done rather than received, asks favours not at all or very reluctantly, and bears himself loftily toward the great but affably toward people of middle station.
Chapter 47
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What is the relation between the unequal and the more, according to Aristotle?
Aristotle states that the unequal and the more are not identical but differ as part to whole: all more is unequal, but not all unequal is more. He uses this to show the particular unjust and injustice are other than, not the same as, the unjust and injustice co-extensive with vice—the latter being wholes, the former parts.
Chapter 48
Why does Aristotle say most lawful things result from virtue in its fullest sense?
Aristotle argues that the law enjoins living in accordance with each virtue and forbids living in accordance with each vice, so most lawful things naturally result from virtue in its fullest sense. He adds that the enactments producing virtue in all its bearings are those made respecting education for society.
Chapter 48
What open question does Aristotle raise about being a good man and a good citizen?
Aristotle defers to a future time the question of whether individual education—by which a man is simply good without reference to others—belongs to politics or some other science. He suggests it may not be the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen in every case.
Chapter 48
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How does Aristotle define Art in its strict and proper sense?
The author defines Art as "a state of mind, conjoined with true Reason, apt to Make." He argues that every Art is such a state and no such state exists without being an Art, since Architecture and other Arts fit this formula. Its absence is the same state conjoined with false Reason, and both deal with Contingent matter.
Chapter 49
Why are Making and Doing treated as distinct, and why does Art concern only Making?
Aristotle holds that Making and Doing are two different things, so the reasoned state apt to Do differs from the reasoned state apt to Make; neither is included in the other. Since Making and Doing are distinct, Art is concerned with Making, not Doing. He notes this distinction is shown in the exoteric treatise.
Chapter 49
What kinds of things fall outside the province of Art, according to the chapter?
The author states that Art deals with production and contrivance, seeing how things that may either be or not be can be produced, where the origin rests with the maker rather than the thing made. Things that exist or come into being necessarily, and things in the way of nature, are excluded because they are self-originating.
Chapter 49
In what sense are Art and Fortune concerned with the same things?
Aristotle says that since Making and Doing are distinct, Art concerns Making, and in a certain sense Art and Fortune are concerned with the same things. He cites Agathon's remark, "Art Fortune loves, and is of her beloved." Both are employed upon Contingent matter, which may exist otherwise than it actually does.
Chapter 49
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Why is Imperfect Self-Control 'simply' blamed as a vice, unlike excess in honour or gain?
Aristotle argues Imperfect Self-Control is blamed not merely as an error but as a vice, wholly or partially. Excesses regarding honour, gain, or anger are not so blamed because their objects are naturally choice-worthy, so the excess is wrong but the state is not a vice—only like one by analogy.
Chapter 50
Who does Aristotle say is more given up to his passions: the weakly desiring or the strongly desiring?
Aristotle argues the person who pursues excessive pleasures and avoids moderate pains while barely urged by desire is more entirely given up to his passions than one acting because his desire is very strong. He asks what the former would do with added youthful lust and violent pain from want of necessary pleasures.
Chapter 50
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For what do utility friends love each other, according to Aristotle?
Utility friends love one another not for the friend's character but for the good that arises to themselves from the other. Aristotle says such people have no real Friendship, only Friendship insofar as advantage results. Because utility is not permanent but constantly varying, these Friendships dissolve when the motive vanishes, since they existed only relative to those circumstances.
Chapter 51
Why does Aristotle think utility Friendship is common among the old?
The author argues that men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but what is profitable, so utility Friendship is thought to exist principally among the old, and among those in their prime or young who pursue profit. Such people have no intimate intercourse, since they are not even pleasurable to one another and desire society only when friends are profitable. Hospitality is commonly ranked with this kind.
Chapter 51
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According to the chapter, from what do friendly feelings toward friends seem to spring?
The chapter opens by claiming that the friendly feelings shown toward friends, and the marks by which Friendships are characterized, seem to have sprung out of those feelings which a person entertains toward himself. The good man is said to have toward himself all the marks people use to define a friend, and a friend is described as another Self.
Chapter 52
What marks define a friend, and how does the good man relate to them?
People define a friend as one who intends and does good to another for that other's sake, wishes the friend to live for his own sake, lives with him and chooses the same objects, and sympathizes in his sorrows and joys. The chapter says the good man has each of these toward himself, while others have them only insofar as they suppose themselves good.
Chapter 52
Why does the chapter say the wicked cannot be a friend even to themselves?
The chapter argues the wicked are at variance with themselves, lusting after things contrary to what they wish in cool reason, and are rent by faction within the soul. They hate and avoid life, seek company to escape themselves, and are full of remorse, so they have nothing in them to excite the sentiment of Friendship.
Chapter 52
What does the author conclude one should do, and why?
The author argues that since being unable to be a friend to oneself is exceedingly wretched, a man should flee from wickedness with all his might and strive to be good. The reason given is that thus he may be friends with himself and may come to be a friend to another.
Chapter 52
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How does Aristotle say pleasure perfects an activity?
The author argues pleasure perfects a working not as an inherent state but as a supervening finish, like bloom on people in their prime. It is not a cause in the way the faculty and object are, just as health and the physician are not causes of health in the same sense. Pleasure follows upon every act of working and completes it.
Chapter 53
Why does no one feel pleasure continuously, according to the chapter?
Because all human faculties are incapable of uninterrupted exertion, so people weary. Pleasure follows upon the act of working, so when working stops, pleasure does not arise. New things please at first because the mind works on them with powers at full tension; afterward the working becomes careless and the pleasure dulls.
Chapter 53
How do proper and foreign pleasures affect an activity?
The pleasure proper to a working increases it: people who enjoy geometry become better geometers and grasp points more completely. Foreign pleasures hinder other workings, as flute-lovers cannot attend to conversation when they hear a flute. Foreign pleasures act like the pain proper to a working, destroying it, though not in the same way.
Chapter 53
What is the measure of what is truly pleasant, and what is the Pleasure of Man?
The author argues the good man, insofar as he is good, is the measure: those are real pleasures which impress him as such. Depraved tastes find pleasant what is not really pleasant, only to them as so disposed. The Pleasures of Man are those perfecting the workings of the perfect and blessed man; others are secondary.
Chapter 53
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What is the human good, or Happiness, defined as in this chapter?
The author argues the Good of Man is "a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence," or, if Excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best and most perfect Excellence. This follows from identifying man's peculiar work as a working of the soul in accordance with reason, and a good man's work as doing this well and nobly.
Chapter 54
Why is mere life rejected as the work peculiar to man?
Mere life is rejected because it is shared with other beings: the life of nourishment and growth is shared even by vegetables, and the life of sensation is common to horses, oxen, and every animal. What remains as peculiar to man is the life of the Rational Nature apt to act, taken in the sense of actual working.
Chapter 54
Why must Happiness be added to a complete life (ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ)?
The author argues that as one swallow or one fine day does not make a spring, so one day or a short time does not make a man blessed and happy. Happiness as a working of the soul in accordance with Excellence must therefore extend over a complete life, not a brief period.
Chapter 54
How does the chapter say first principles are obtained, and why do they matter?
Some first principles are obtained by induction, some by perception, some by a course of habituation, and others in other ways. They must be well defined because they greatly influence what follows: the starting-point or principle is thought to be more than half the whole matter, and many points of enquiry come into view through it.
Chapter 54
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How does Aristotle distinguish the absolute mean from the mean relative to us?
The absolute mean is equidistant from both extremes and is one and the same for all, found by arithmetical proportion, like six between two and ten. The mean relative to us is neither too much nor too little for the particular individual, and is not the same for all: what suits Milo would be too much for a beginner athlete.
Chapter 55
With what is moral virtue concerned, and what counts as the mean in them?
Moral virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, where excess, defect, and the mean all occur. One may feel fear, confidence, lust, anger, compassion, and pleasure or pain too much or too little, and both are wrong; feeling them when one ought, on what occasions, toward whom, why, and as one should is the mean and the best state, which belongs to virtue.
Chapter 55
Why does Aristotle say excess and defect belong to vice and the mean to virtue?
He argues one can go wrong in many ways, since evil belongs to the infinite and good to the finite, as the Pythagoreans said, but right only in one way. So it is easy to miss the mark and hard to hit it, and the excess and defect belong to vice while the mean state belongs to virtue.
Chapter 55
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About what kinds of things does Aristotle say no one deliberates?
Aristotle excludes eternal things (the universe, the incommensurability of a square's diagonal and side), things that always happen the same way by necessity or nature (solstices, sunrise), variable events like drought and rain, fortuitous events like finding treasure, and human affairs outside our power, such as a Spartan deliberating on Scythian government. Deliberation is left for practical matters in our own power.
Chapter 56
Why does Aristotle say we deliberate about medicine and money-making more than exact sciences?
Aristotle argues we do not deliberate about exact and independent arts or sciences, such as writing characters, because we have no doubt how they should be done. We deliberate about matters usually done through our own agency but not invariably the same way, like healing or money-making. He adds that we deliberate more about arts than sciences because we more often doubt them, and more about piloting than gymnastics because it is less exactly determined.
Chapter 56
Does deliberation concern ends or means, according to Aristotle?
Aristotle states we deliberate not about Ends but about Means to Ends. A physician does not deliberate whether to cure, nor an orator whether to persuade, nor a statesman whether to produce a good constitution; having set the End, they examine how and through what means to accomplish it, comparing which means are easiest and most creditable, or tracing a single means back to the first cause. Deliberation is a search, and the last step in analysis is the first in construction.
Chapter 56
How does Aristotle define Moral Choice?
Aristotle says the same matter is the object of both Deliberation and Moral Choice, but the object of Moral Choice is separated off and definite, since it is what has been preferred after deliberation. Each person stops searching once the origination is brought up to himself, the governing principle that makes the choice. He compares this to Homer's old regal constitutions, where kings announced to the commonalty what they had already determined. Moral Choice is a grasping after something in our own power consequent upon Deliberation.
Chapter 56
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How does Aristotle distinguish the small-minded man from the vain man?
The small-minded man is genuinely worthy of good but deprives himself of his deserts through self-ignorance; he is thought a laggard rather than foolish. The vain man is foolish and self-ignorant, attempting honourable things as though worthy and then being detected, and he sets himself off by dress and carriage, wanting his good circumstances seen.
Chapter 57
Why does Aristotle say small-mindedness is worse than vanity?
Aristotle states that small-mindedness rather than vanity is opposed to great-mindedness, because it is more commonly met with and is worse. He also notes that these extremes are not thought vicious exactly but only mistaken, since they do no harm.
Chapter 57
What effect does self-underrating have on the small-minded man's aims?
Since men's aims are regulated by their supposed desert, the small-minded man, under a notion of his own want of desert, stands aloof from honourable actions and courses, and similarly from external goods. Aristotle says this opinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the character.
Chapter 57
Are the extremes of small-mindedness and vanity considered vicious?
No. Aristotle says these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only mistaken, for they do no harm. This contrasts with his treatment of the great-minded man, who is the mean, while the small-minded man is in the defect and the vain man in the excess.
Chapter 57
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What two species of Particular Justice does Aristotle distinguish?
Aristotle divides Particular Justice into two species: one concerned with distributions of honour, wealth, or other things shared among members of a social community, where one man may have an equal or unequal share compared with another; and the other Corrective, dealing with transactions between man and man.
Chapter 58
How does Aristotle divide corrective transactions into two parts?
Corrective transactions are divided into voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary ones include selling, buying, use, bail, borrowing, deposit, and hiring; they are called voluntary because the origination of these transactions is voluntary. Involuntary transactions are either secret or accompanied by open violence.
Chapter 58
Which involuntary transactions does Aristotle classify as secret?
Aristotle lists as involuntary transactions that effect secrecy: theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, kidnapping of slaves, assassination, and false witness. He distinguishes these from involuntary transactions accompanied by open violence, such as insult, bonds, death, plundering, maiming, foul language, and slanderous abuse.
Chapter 58
Which involuntary transactions involve open violence, per Aristotle?
Aristotle classifies as involuntary transactions accompanied by open violence: insult, bonds, death, plundering, maiming, foul language, and slanderous abuse. These contrast with the secret involuntary class—theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, slave kidnapping, assassination, and false witness.
Chapter 58
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How does Aristotle distinguish Practical Wisdom from Knowledge and Art?
Practical Wisdom cannot be Knowledge because its subject matter is contingent and deliberation concerns things that can be otherwise; Knowledge requires strict demonstrative reasoning. It cannot be Art because Doing and Making differ in kind: Making aims at something beyond itself, while in Doing the well-doing is itself the End.
Chapter 59
What is Aristotle's definition of Practical Wisdom?
Practical Wisdom is "a state of mind true, conjoined with Reason, and apt to Do, having for its object those things which are good or bad for Man." It belongs to the Opinionative (calculative or deliberative) part of the soul, since both Opinion and Practical Wisdom deal with contingent matter.
Chapter 59
Why does Aristotle call Pericles and statesmen Practically Wise?
They can see what is good for themselves and for men in general, and the same is said of those skilled in domestic management or civil government. Aristotle links self-mastery to Practical Wisdom etymologically, since it preserves the true notion of one's own interest.
Chapter 59
How do pleasure and pain affect Practical Wisdom, and how does it differ from Art?
Pleasure and pain corrupt only notions bearing on moral action, not truths like the triangle theorem; viciousness obscures the Principle, the final cause of moral action. Art admits degrees of excellence and deliberate error is preferable in Art, but not in Practical Wisdom, which also cannot be forgotten.
Chapter 59
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According to the chapter, what causes brutish or morbid states of character?
The chapter distinguishes brutish states, caused in some by disease or madness, from conditions produced by custom or by maiming and depraved natural tastes. It cites examples such as cannibalism among savage tribes, a man who sacrificed and ate his mother, and habits like nail-biting or eating coals and earth. Where nature or disease is truly the cause, the author says no one would call such men Imperfect in Self-Control.
Chapter 60
Why does Aristotle deny that mastering brutish inclinations counts as proper Self-Control?
He argues that having such inclinations is foreign to what is called Vice, just as Brutishness is. So a man mastering them is not properly Self-Controlled, nor is being mastered by them proper Imperfection of Self-Control, but only so by resemblance, as an ungovernable-tempered man fails in respect of anger but not simply. Excessive folly, cowardice, and irritability are either brutish or morbid.
Chapter 60
How does the chapter illustrate brutish and morbid cowardice and folly?
The author says the man naturally afraid of everything, even a mouse stirring, is cowardly after a brutish sort, while a man who feared a cat by reason of disease was in a morbid state. Of fools, those naturally destitute of Reason and living only by Sense are brutish, like some far-off barbarian tribes, while others made so by epileptic or frantic disease are in morbid states.
Chapter 60
What distinction does the chapter draw between having and yielding to an unnatural inclination?
The author says a man may merely have such an inclination without yielding to it—suppose Phalaris had restrained his unnatural desire to eat a child—or he may both have and yield to it. As Vice belonging to human nature is called Vice simply while the other is called brutish or morbid, so there is Brutish and Morbid Imperfection of Self-Control, but only the unqualified kind found in Man is entitled to the name.
Chapter 60
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What makes perfect friendship permanent, according to Aristotle?
Perfect friendship subsists between good men who wish each other's good for the other's sake, not as a mere result. Because it rests on goodness, which has a principle of permanence, the friendship lasts as long as they remain good. Each is also useful and pleasant to the other, so the friendship combines all the qualifications of friends.
Chapter 61
Why are perfect friendships rare, and what do they require besides goodness?
Aristotle says such friendships are probably rare because men of this kind are rare. Even granting the qualifications, time and intimacy are required: people cannot know one another until they have eaten the requisite quantity of salt together, nor be friends until each has been proved a fit object of friendship. A desire for friendship may arise quickly, but not friendship itself.
Chapter 61
How does Aristotle distinguish friendships of pleasure from friendships of utility?
Friendship based on pleasure is a copy of perfect friendship, since the good are pleasant to one another; that based on utility likewise, since the good are useful. Such friendships are most permanent when both parties get the same result from the same source. Those who are friends for advantage commonly part when the advantage ceases, for they never were friends of one another but of the advantage.
Chapter 61
What does Aristotle say about the lover and the beloved, and when does that friendship end?
In the friendship of a lover and the object of his affection, the two do not derive pleasure from the same causes: the lover from seeing the beloved, the beloved from receiving attentions. When the bloom of youth fades the friendship sometimes ceases, since the lover no longer takes pleasure in seeing and the beloved no longer receives attentions. Yet many continue friends if, being of similar tempers, they have come by custom to like one another's disposition.
Chapter 61
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Why does Aristotle deny that Happiness is merely a state or condition?
The author argues Happiness cannot be a mere State, since then it might belong to someone asleep all his life or fallen into great calamities. Instead it must be ranked among Workings, and specifically among those choice-worthy for their own sakes, since Happiness is self-sufficient and lacks nothing.
Chapter 63
Which actions does Aristotle call choice-worthy for their own sake?
Actions according to Virtue are choice-worthy in themselves, because doing what is noble and excellent is sought for its own sake alone, with nothing beyond the act of Working. Pleasant amusements are also chosen without further purpose, though people gain more harm than profit from them, neglecting their persons and property.
Chapter 63
Why does Aristotle reject amusement as the End of human life?
The author argues it is absurd for the End to be amusement, since we choose everything else with some further End, but Happiness is the End comprehending all others. Toiling all one's life for amusement is foolish and childish; amusement is like rest, and rest is adopted with a view to Working afterwards, so it is not an End.
Chapter 63
Why does Aristotle say bodily pleasures do not constitute Happiness?
The author argues any ordinary person or even a slave might enjoy bodily pleasures just as well as the best man, but no one supposes a slave shares Happiness except so far as it is implied in life. Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in Workings in the way of Excellence, as stated before.
Chapter 63
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How does Aristotle use the threefold division of goods to support his definition of Happiness?
Goods are commonly divided into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, and goods of the soul are called most properly and specially good. Aristotle notes that his definition makes Happiness the actions and workings of the soul, so his account agrees with this ancient and philosophically accepted opinion rather than placing Happiness among external goods.
Chapter 64
Why does Aristotle prefer Happiness as working rather than as a state or habit?
He says the difference between possessing the Chief Good and using it is no small matter. A state or habit may exist without producing any good, as in a sleeping or otherwise inactive person, but working necessarily acts and acts well. He compares life to the Olympic games: not the finest and strongest are crowned, but those who enter the lists and compete.
Chapter 64
What role does pleasure play in Aristotle's account of virtuous action and Happiness?
The virtuous person's life is pleasant in itself, since pleasure is a mental sensation and things are pleasant to those fond of them. Actions in accordance with virtue are pleasant by nature to lovers of nobleness, though the many disagree because their pleasures are not natural. Aristotle holds that no one is good who feels no pleasure in noble actions, so Happiness needs no pleasure added on.
Chapter 64
What external goods does Aristotle say Happiness requires, and why?
Aristotle says Happiness plainly needs external goods added, since without instruments it is impossible or at least not easy to do noble actions; friends, money, and political influence are instruments for many deeds. Deficiencies such as very ugly appearance, ill-birth, solitude, childlessness, or loss of good children or friends mar blessedness. Hence some rank good fortune with Happiness, others virtue.
Chapter 64
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How does Aristotle define virtue as a state of deliberate choice?
Virtue is a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean determined by reason, as the man of practical wisdom would determine. It is a middle state between excess and defect in feelings and actions; virtue finds and adopts the mean. In essence and definition it is a mean, but in reference to the chief good and excellence it is the highest state possible.
Chapter 65
Why can't certain actions like adultery, theft, and homicide admit a mean?
Some actions and feelings are named as immediately conveying badness, such as malevolence, shamelessness, envy, and in actions adultery, theft, homicide. These are blamed because they are in themselves bad, not because of too much or too little. In them you can never go right but must always be wrong; right and wrong do not depend on selecting a proper person, time, or manner.
Chapter 65
Why is there no mean, excess, or defect of faulty states themselves?
Just as perfected self-mastery and courage have no excess or defect because the mean is in one point of view the highest possible state, so neither can faulty states like acting unjustly, cowardice, or giving up control of passions have a mean, excess, or defect. However done they are wrong. You cannot have of excess and defect a mean state, nor of a mean state excess and defect.
Chapter 65
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What does Aristotle say about the man who grasps at small honour exactly as he should?
He has no proper name, and neither does the corresponding state of character. Aristotle notes that only the extremes are named: the one who exceeds is called ambitious, the one who falls short unambitious. The virtuous mean regarding small honour therefore remains unnamed, unlike Greatness of Soul, which concerns great honour.
Chapter 66
To what does Aristotle compare the unnamed virtue concerning small honour?
He compares it to Greatness of Soul as Liberality relates to Munificence, with the difference that it concerns a small amount of the same thing. Just as Liberality deals with small expenditure while Munificence deals with great, this state deals with small honour while Greatness of Soul deals with great honour.
Chapter 66
Why do people apply the names 'ambitious' and 'unambitious' to the virtuous character?
Because the mean is a disputed territory: those in either extreme lay claim to it. So the virtuous character is sometimes called ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and people commend now one, now the other. Aristotle says the reason for this will be given later in the treatise, and here moves on to the remaining virtues.
Chapter 66
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What two opinions does Aristotle report about the object of Wish?
Aristotle states that some hold the object of Wish is the real good, while others hold it is whatever impresses the mind with a notion of good. He then raises a difficulty for each: the first cannot explain the wrong chooser's wish, the second makes wishes merely relative and possibly contrary between people.
Chapter 67
How does Aristotle resolve the dispute about the object of Wish?
He proposes that, abstractedly and by objective truth, the really good is the object of Wish, but to each individual it is whatever impresses his mind with a notion of good. Thus the good man wishes what is truly good, while the bad man may wish anything, as wholesome things differ for the healthy and the sick.
Chapter 67
Why does Aristotle call the good man the rule and measure?
He argues the good man judges each case correctly, and the notion conveyed to his mind is the true one. Fair and pleasant things vary with each state, and the good man's distinguishing characteristic is seeing the truth in every instance; he is, in fact, the rule and measure of these matters.
Chapter 67
How does pleasure deceive the multitude, according to Aristotle?
The multitude seem deceived by pleasure: though it is not really a good, it impresses their minds with the notion of goodness. So they choose what is pleasant as good and avoid pain as evil, mistaking the appearance of good for the real object of Wish.
Chapter 67
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What does Aristotle say the unnamed mean state regarding honour is praised as?
Aristotle says the mean state in regard to honour is praised, but it has no appropriate name. Since the extremes dispute it as unoccupied ground, it appears as a want of love of honour compared with Ambition, and as Ambition compared with the other extreme, or like both faults compared with both. He notes this is not a singular case among the virtues.
Chapter 68
How does Aristotle relate the virtue about honour to Great-mindedness?
Aristotle says Great-mindedness has great Honour as its object, while another virtue also concerns Honour and may seem to bear the same relation to Great-mindedness that Liberality bears to Magnificence. Both stand aloof from what is great but dispose us rightly toward moderate and small matters. So the lesser virtue handles ordinary honour as Liberality handles ordinary wealth.
Chapter 68
Why does Aristotle say the term 'lover of honour' is ambiguous?
Aristotle says 'lover of so-and-so' has several meanings, so 'lover of Honour' does not always denote the same quality. Used as commendation, it denotes loving honour more than the mass of men do; used for blame, it denotes loving honour more than a man should. The same term thus shifts between praise and blame depending on the comparison.
Chapter 68
What three states does Aristotle identify regarding the pursuit of Honour?
Aristotle says that in grasping after Honour there is the more than is right, the less than is right, and also the right amount, done from right sources and in right manner. We blame the lover of Honour for aiming at it more than he ought and from wrong sources, and blame the honour-averse person for not choosing honour even for what is noble.
Chapter 68
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For Aristotle, what does distributive justice require between persons and things?
The author argues the Just in distribution is a proportionate thing: the same ratio must hold between the persons as between the things distributed. If persons are not equal they must not have equal shares; quarrelling arises when equals get unequal shares or unequals get equal shares. The Just therefore implies at least four terms, two persons and two things.
Chapter 69
What kind of proportion does Aristotle say distributive justice uses, and why?
The author calls it geometrical proportion, since in it the whole is to the whole as each part to each part, and the ratio between the two pairs of terms is the same. It is not continual proportion, because the person and the thing do not combine into a single term. The Just is this proportionate; the Unjust is what violates it.
Chapter 69
According to the chapter, what do democrats, oligarchs, and aristocrats disagree about?
All agree that the Just in distributions should be according to some rate, but not what that rate is. The author reports that democrats favor freedom, oligarchs favor wealth, others favor nobleness of birth, and the aristocratic party favors virtue. So the dispute is over the criterion of desert, not over whether proportion should govern distribution.
Chapter 69
How does Aristotle describe the unjust man's share in good and bad things?
The author argues the unjust man is unequal and the Unjust violates the proportionate, producing a greater and a less. In actual transactions the one who acts unjustly takes the greater share of what is good and the victim the less. With bad things it reverses: the lesser evil counts as good, since it is more choice-worthy than the greater.
Chapter 69
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Why can't Knowledge grasp first principles?
The author argues Knowledge concerns universals and Necessary matter, and its objects must be derived from demonstrative reasoning. Since first principles are what all demonstration starts from, they cannot themselves be demonstrated. So the faculty that grasps first principles cannot be Knowledge, Art, or Practical Wisdom—Art and Practical Wisdom deal only with Contingent matter.
Chapter 70
Why are Art and Practical Wisdom excluded from first principles?
The author argues that Art and Practical Wisdom are exercised only upon Contingent matter—things that can be otherwise. First principles belong to Necessary matter, since they ground demonstrative reasoning. Because these two faculties deal with what is contingent, neither can be the faculty that takes in the first principles of what falls under Knowledge.
Chapter 70
What four faculties does the chapter list for attaining truth?
The chapter names Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition as the faculties whereby we always attain truth and are never deceived, whether dealing with Necessary or Contingent matter. Of these, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, and Science are ruled out as the faculty grasping first principles, leaving Intuition.
Chapter 70
What conclusion does the chapter reach about first principles?
Since the faculty taking in first principles cannot be Knowledge, Art, Practical Wisdom, or Science—the Scientific Man must in some cases depend on demonstrative reasoning—the author concludes it must be Intuition. Intuition is thus the faculty that grasps the first principles underlying demonstrative Knowledge.
Chapter 70
Chapter VI.4 cards
Why does Aristotle say Imperfect Self-Control over anger is less disgraceful than over lust?
The author argues anger in a way listens to Reason but mishears it, like servants rushing out before hearing the full order, so the angry person yields in a manner to Reason. Lust, by contrast, rushes to enjoyment as soon as Reason or Sense says a thing is sweet, obeying desire rather than Reason at all, and is therefore more disgraceful.
Chapter 71
Why does Aristotle consider anger more natural and excusable than excessive lust?
The author argues anger and irritability are more natural than lusts for unnecessary objects, just as natural desires are more excusable. He illustrates with the man who beat his father, saying the habit ran in the family, and the father who told his son to stop at the door, having dragged his own father only that far.
Chapter 71
Why is lust-driven Imperfect Self-Control more unjust than anger-driven, according to Aristotle?
The author argues characters are less unjust the less insidious they are. The angry man is open, not insidious, while lust is deceitful, linked to the 'weaver of deceits' and Homer's girdle that cheats the subtlest mind. Also, no one feels pain in being insolent, but acting through anger involves pain, and in anger there is no insolence.
Chapter 71
What is the object-matter of Perfected Self-Mastery and utter absence of Self-Control?
The author says the object-matter is bodily lusts and pleasures, but only those proper to the human race and natural in kind and degree. Brutish pleasures and those from maimings and diseases are excluded. Brutes are never called self-controlled or uncontrolled except metaphorically, since they lack moral choice and deliberation, differing from humans as madmen do.
Chapter 71
Chapter VI.3 cards
According to the chapter, what does prolonged absence do to friendship?
The chapter states that distance itself has no direct effect on friendship; it only prevents friends from acting it out. However, if the absence is protracted, it is thought to cause forgetfulness even of the friendship, citing the saying that want of intercourse destroys many friendships.
Chapter 72
Why does the chapter say the old and morose are unfit for friendship?
The author argues that the old and the morose are not calculated for friendship because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can spend days with what is positively painful or even not pleasurable. He grounds this in the human tendency to avoid pain and pursue pleasure.
Chapter 72
What does the chapter call the most characteristic mark of friends?
The chapter says nothing is so characteristic of friends as living with one another. It explains this by noting that the necessitous desire assistance and the happy desire companionship, the latter being the last people suited to solitary existence. People cannot spend time together unless mutually pleasurable and sharing the same objects, which belongs to the friendship of companionship.
Chapter 72
Chapter VI.4 cards
How does Aristotle distinguish Unity of Sentiment from Unity of Opinion?
Aristotle says Unity of Sentiment is not the same as Unity of Opinion, since agreement in opinion can exist even between people unacquainted with one another. Nor do men call people united in sentiment merely for agreeing on any point, such as astronomical science, since that has no connection with Friendship. Unity of Sentiment instead concerns matters of action, important matters of mutual or common interest.
Chapter 73
What kinds of objects does Unity of Sentiment concern, according to Aristotle?
Aristotle says Unity of Sentiment has for its object matters of action, and such of these as are important and of mutual, or in the case of single States common, interest. His examples include all agreeing in the choice of magistrates, forming an alliance with the Lacedæmonians, or appointing Pittacus ruler, supposing he himself was willing.
Chapter 73
Why does Aristotle say the good can have Unity of Sentiment but the bad cannot?
Aristotle argues the good have Unity of Sentiment toward themselves and one another because their wishes are steady and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what is just and expedient and aim at these in common. The bad can have it only to a very slight extent: they desire unfair advantage in profitable things while shirking labour for the common good, so each is jealous of and hinders his neighbour, the common good is lost, and they quarrel.
Chapter 73
What does Aristotle conclude about the nature of Unity of Sentiment?
Aristotle concludes that Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is also said to be, since it has for its object-matter things expedient and relating to life. He also connects it with Friendship generally, while noting it is not the same as Unity of Opinion, which can exist even between people unacquainted with one another.
Chapter 73
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According to Aristotle, which kind of working constitutes perfect Happiness?
The author argues perfect Happiness is the Contemplative Working of the best Principle in us—whether that Principle is Intellect or something else thought to rule and conceive noble and divine things. Its Working in accordance with its own proper Excellence is perfect Happiness, since the Intellect is the highest of our internal Principles and its subjects the highest of knowable things.
Chapter 74
Why does Aristotle say the contemplative life is most Self-Sufficient?
The author argues the man of science can contemplate even when quite alone, and the more he deserves that name the more able he is to do so; fellow-workers may help, but he is most Self-Sufficient. By contrast the just, brave, and self-mastered man need other people and occasions to exercise their virtues, so external goods and society are required for moral action.
Chapter 74
How does Aristotle rank contemplative Happiness against moral Happiness?
Contemplative Happiness is primary and divine; second in degree is the life in accordance with the other Excellence, the moral virtues, since those Workings—justice, courage, and the rest in contracts and services—are proper to man and bound up with the composite nature and passions. The author adds that the contemplative life needs external goods only to a small degree, or less than the moral life.
Chapter 74
What argument from the gods does Aristotle use for contemplative Happiness?
The author argues that since we conceive the gods as blessed and happy, attributing moral actions to them—contracts, deposits, facing dangers, giving money—makes them ridiculous and trivial. If a living being is not sleeping like Endymion, what remains but Contemplation? So the gods' Working is contemplative, and the human Working nearest akin to it is most capable of Happiness.
Chapter 74
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According to Aristotle, how might Happiness be acquired?
Aristotle raises whether Happiness can be learned, acquired by habituation or some other discipline, or comes by divine dispensation or chance. He suggests that if any good is a gift of the Gods, Happiness likely is, being the highest human good, but notes this belongs to another investigation. He argues that even if it comes through virtue and learning, it is still among the most Godlike things.
Chapter 75
Why does Aristotle argue Happiness is widely available rather than left to chance?
The author argues that if Happiness comes through learning and diligence, it can exist in all who are not maimed for virtue. He adds that if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, this itself supports the case, since things in nature and art, especially the best cause, are ordered in the best way possible. Leaving the greatest and noblest things to chance would be out of harmony with this.
Chapter 75
Why are neither animals nor children called happy?
Aristotle says no brute animal—ox, horse, or other—can partake in the working of the soul in accordance with virtue, so none is happy. A child is not happy either, because at a tender age he cannot yet perform such actions; if the term is applied, it is only by anticipation. Happiness requires, as stated, complete virtue and a complete life.
Chapter 75
Why does Aristotle say the most prosperous man may still not be called happy?
Aristotle holds that Happiness requires complete virtue and a complete life, since many changes and chances arise during a life. The most prosperous man may become involved in great misfortunes in old age, as the tale of Priam in the heroic poems shows. The man who has experienced such fortune and died in wretchedness, no man calls happy.
Chapter 75
VII. In respect of anger:3 cards
What names does Aristotle assign to the mean and extremes regarding anger?
Since these states lack proper names, Aristotle calls the virtuous mean state Meekness (the meek character), the excessive extreme Passionate with its faulty state Passionateness, and the deficient extreme Angerless with its defect Angerlessness. He coins these terms for clarity and intelligibility, noting the extremes are blameworthy while the mean is praiseworthy.
Chapter 76
What three other mean states does Aristotle mention, and how do they differ?
Aristotle mentions three further mean states that resemble each other but differ. They all concern intercourse of words and deeds. One has respect to truth in such intercourse; the other two concern what is pleasant, differing in that one relates to relaxation and amusement, and the other to all things occurring in daily life.
Chapter 76
Why does Aristotle say we must coin names for nameless mean states?
Aristotle observes that most of these mean states really have no proper names. Nevertheless, he says we must try, as in the other cases, to coin some for them for the sake of clearness and intelligibleness. This lets us better see that in all matters the mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor worthy of praise but of blame.
Chapter 76
Chapter VII.4 cards
According to Aristotle, why is virtue in our power?
The End is the object of Wish, while the means to the End are objects of Deliberation and Moral Choice. Actions regarding these means are voluntary, and the acts of working out the virtues are such actions. Therefore, since the actions constituting virtue are voluntary and originate in ourselves, virtue is in our power.
Chapter 77
How does Aristotle argue that vice is voluntary?
Wherever it is in our power to do something, it is also in our power to forbear, and vice versa. Since doing and forbearing what is creditable or the contrary is in our power, and these constitute being good or bad, good and vicious characters are in our power. Wickedness, the author argues, is voluntary.
Chapter 77
Why does Aristotle say drunkards receive double penalties?
The origin of the act lies in the man himself, since he might have avoided getting drunk, and the drunkenness is the cause of his ignorance. Similarly, those ignorant of legal regulations they are bound to know are chastised when neglect causes the ignorance, on the notion that they could have paid attention.
Chapter 77
What is Aristotle's reply to the claim that the End is given by nature?
Even if the End is given by nature, virtue is voluntary because the good man does the rest voluntarily, and vice is equally voluntary since the bad man's own agency attaches to his actions, even if not to the selection of the End. The author argues the cases of virtue and vice are exactly similar.
Chapter 77
Chapter VII.4 cards
How does Aristotle define the meek person's anger?
The meek person is angry at the right things, with the right people, in the right manner and time, and for the right length of time, as Reason directs. Aristotle says this character is praised, and is thought to err rather on the side of defect, since such a person is not apt to take revenge but rather makes allowances and forgives.
Chapter 78
Why does Aristotle blame the defect of angerlessness?
Those who are not angry at things at which they ought to be angry are thought foolish, and to have no perception and no tendency to avenge themselves, since they feel no anger. Aristotle adds that to bear with scurrility against oneself, and to let one's friends suffer it patiently, is a slavish thing.
Chapter 78
How do the passionate and the bitter-tempered differ?
The passionate are soon angry, with the wrong people and things and excessively, but soon cool again, which Aristotle calls the best point about them, since they do not repress anger but repay and are done. The bitter-tempered keep anger a long while because they repress it, and are reconciled only by revenge; otherwise the weight stays, making them nuisances to themselves and their best friends.
Chapter 78
Why does Aristotle oppose meekness to the excess rather than the defect?
Because the excess is of more common occurrence: human nature is more disposed to take than to forgo revenge. He also says the cross-grained are worse to live with than the too phlegmatic. Yet he notes it is hard to define exactly when anger is blameable, since the decision rests in particulars and with the Moral Sense.
Chapter 78
Chapter VII.4 cards
How does corrective justice differ in form from distributive justice?
Distributive justice follows the proportional relation: shares are divided from common property in the same ratio as the original contributions, and the unjust is what violates that proportion. Corrective justice, by contrast, is equal according to arithmetical proportion, not proportional. The law looks only at the injury, treating the parties as equal beforehand, regardless of whether a good man wronged a bad one or the reverse.
Chapter 79
What is the judge's role in corrective justice?
The author argues the judge restores equality: since the doing and suffering are divided into unequal shares, the judge takes from the gain (the greater part) the amount by which it exceeds the mean and adds it to the loss (the lesser part). Men seek a judge as one who is in the mean, and the just is a mean because the judge is.
Chapter 79
How does Aristotle derive 'loss' and 'gain' in corrective justice?
The terms come from voluntary exchange: having more than one's own is gaining, having less than one's original stock is losing, as in buying and selling. When the result is neither more nor less but exactly the same as before, people say they have their own and neither lose nor gain. Corrective justice is thus the mean between loss and gain in involuntary transactions.
Chapter 79
What does the etymology of the Greek terms for just and judge illustrate?
The author notes that the Greek word for just (dikaion) is treated as quasi-dichaion, 'in two parts,' and the word for judge (dikastes) as quasi dichastes, 'he who divides into two parts.' This supports the account that the judge makes things equal by dividing so that each party gets the equal, which is the mean between greater and less.
Chapter 79
Chapter VII.3 cards
How does Aristotle distinguish Science from Practical Wisdom in this chapter?
The author argues Science is the most accurate knowledge, combining Knowledge and Intuition of the most precious objects, and is the same always. Practical Wisdom, by contrast, varies because it concerns what is expedient for oneself. He notes some call brutes practically wise for their forethought about subsistence, and insists Science and politics cannot be identical.
Chapter 80
Why does Aristotle call Anaxagoras and Thales Scientific but not Practically Wise?
People call them Scientific because they know things out of the common run—wonderful, hard, and fine—but not Practically Wise, since they are seen to be ignorant of what concerns themselves. Their knowledge is useless because they do not seek what is good for them as men.
Chapter 80
What does Aristotle say about whether politics or Practical Wisdom is the highest?
He says it is absurd to suppose politics or Practical Wisdom is the highest unless it can be shown that Man is the most excellent of all that exists in the Universe. He adds that many other things are more Godlike in nature than Man, most obviously the elements composing the Universe.
Chapter 80
Chapter VII.3 cards
How does Aristotle distinguish the utterly self-indulgent man from the imperfectly self-controlled man?
The utterly destitute of Self-Control pursues excessive bodily pleasures from moral choice, for their own sake, and acts on a settled conviction; he feels no remorse and is therefore incurable, like a chronic disease. The imperfectly self-controlled man acts against Right Reason under passion without deliberate conviction; he feels remorse, can be persuaded otherwise, and is curable, like an acute disorder.
Chapter 81
Why does Aristotle rank Self-Control above Endurance?
Endurance consists in continued resistance to pain, while Self-Control consists in actual mastery over pleasure. Aristotle says continued resistance and actual mastery differ as not being conquered differs from conquering, and on that basis Self-Control is the more choice-worthy state. Softness is the vice opposed to Endurance, just as Imperfect Self-Control is opposed to Self-Control.
Chapter 81
Why is the imperfectly self-controlled man better than the utterly self-indulgent one, and how does Aristotle illustrate it?
In the imperfectly self-controlled man the highest part, the principle, is preserved, so he is not simply bad; he is overcome by passion without being convinced that unlimited pleasure is right. The utterly self-indulgent man's vice corrupts the principle itself. Aristotle compares the former to the Milesians, who are not fools but do what fools do, quoting Demodocus.
Chapter 81
Chapter VII.4 cards
Why can't one have many friends of the perfect kind, according to Aristotle?
Aristotle says perfect friendship cannot be shared with many, just as one cannot be in love with many at once: it is a state of excess that naturally has one object. Also, being greatly pleased with many at once is hard, finding many truly good people is hard, and such friendship requires experience and close intimacy, which is very difficult.
Chapter 82
How does Aristotle distinguish the friendship of the young from that of shopkeepers?
Of the two imperfect kinds, Aristotle says friendship based on pleasure most resembles the perfect kind, since both parties take pleasure in each other or the same objects; the young exemplify this because generous spirit is most found in them. Friendship based on advantage, by contrast, he calls the connecting link of shopkeepers.
Chapter 82
Why do the very happy and men in power seek pleasant friends?
The very happy need no profitable friends but do need pleasant ones to live intimately with, since no one could continuously bear what is painful. Men in power often use distinct friends, some useful and some pleasant, because the two are rarely united: they seek easy-pleasantry for pleasure and clever executors for business, qualities seldom found in one man.
Chapter 82
What does Aristotle say about friendship between a good man and a superior?
Aristotle states the good man unites pleasantness and usefulness, but he will not be a friend to a superior unless he is also that person's superior in goodness. Otherwise, being surpassed in one point, he cannot make things equal by a proportionate degree of friendship. Characters combining superiority of station and goodness are not common.
Chapter 82
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Why do benefactors feel more friendship for recipients than recipients feel for them?
The author argues the real cause is natural, not creditor-debtor calculation: benefactors love their recipients as their own work, since existence is choice-worthy and we exist by acting. The recipient's benefit is merely advantageous and passes away, while the benefactor's honourable action endures, so friendship attends the superior party in the benefaction.
Chapter 83
How does Aristotle compare benefactors to artisans and poets?
He compares benefactors to artisans who feel more affection for their own work than the work could feel for them, and especially to poets who love their poems as their own children. The object of kindness is the benefactor's own work, so the benefactor loves it more than it loves its creator.
Chapter 83
Why does Aristotle reject the creditor-debtor explanation of benefactor affection?
He notes it satisfies most people but is not parallel to real loans: creditors feel no affection for debtors, only a wish for their preservation for repayment. Benefactors, by contrast, feel friendship and love for recipients even when these neither are nor could ever be able to serve them in return.
Chapter 83
What role does labour play in how people value what they produce?
All people value most what cost them much labour: those who made their money are fonder of it than those who inherited it. Receiving kindness is unlaborious, doing it is laborious, which is why mothers are most fond of their offspring, their part in producing them being most laborious and their certainty of ownership greater.
Chapter 83
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What does Aristotle say a happy man needs besides contemplation?
Since happiness is a kind of contemplative speculation, but the subject is a man, Aristotle says external prosperity is also needed. Man's nature is not by itself sufficient for speculation; there must be health of body, nourishment, and tendance of all kinds. Yet he denies that many and great goods are required, since self-sufficiency and action do not consist in excess.
Chapter 84
How does Aristotle use Solon's picture of the happy man?
Aristotle says Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the happy: men moderately supplied with external goods, who have achieved the most noble deeds, and who have lived with perfect self-mastery. He adds that it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act as they ought, supporting his claim that happiness does not demand great wealth or power.
Chapter 84
What test does Aristotle propose for moral theories?
Aristotle says the opinions of the wise carry some weight, but truth in matters of moral action is judged from facts and from actual life, for therein rests the decision. He proposes examining statements by referring them to facts and actual life: accept them when they harmonize with facts, and treat them as mere theories when they are at variance.
Chapter 84
Why does Aristotle conclude the man of science is most happy?
He who works in accordance with and tends Pure Intellect seems best framed and dearest to the Gods. If the Gods care for human things, they would take pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves, and requite with kindness those who honor this most. The man of science chiefly combines all these, so he is dearest to the Gods and probably most happy.
Chapter 84
Chapter VIII.4 cards
Why does Aristotle reject making happiness depend on changes of fortune?
The author argues that making our sentence depend on fortune is wrong, since good and bad fortune constantly circle about the same people; we would then often call the same man happy and shortly after miserable, making him "chameleon-like, and based on rottenness." Instead, virtuous workings determine happiness, and these are more abiding even than the sciences.
Chapter 85
How do great misfortunes affect the happy man, according to Aristotle?
Small pieces of good or ill fortune do not affect the balance of life, but great and numerous misfortunes bruise and maim blessedness, bringing pain and hindering many acts of working. Still, nobleness shines through when a man bears many great mischances contentedly, not from insensitivity to pain but because he is noble and high-spirited.
Chapter 85
Can the truly good man ever become wretched?
No: since acts of working determine the character of life, no one of the blessed can become wretched, because he will never do hateful and mean things. The truly good and sensible man bears all fortunes becomingly, like a good general or shoemaker making the best of what he has. Aristotle adds he will not be blessed should he fall into fortunes like Priam's.
Chapter 85
What final definition of the happy man does Aristotle give?
He calls happy the man who works in the way of perfect virtue and is furnished with external goods sufficient for acting his part in the drama of life, during a complete life. He adds that such a man's death must be in keeping with such a life, since the future is dark and happiness is assumed to be an end and complete; such people we call blessed as Men.
Chapter 85
Chapter VIII.3 cards
How does Aristotle describe the mean's relation to the extremes?
Aristotle says all three states are opposed to one another: the extremes oppose the mean and each other, and the mean opposes both extremes. Just as the half is greater than the lesser portion and less than the greater, so the mean exceeds the defects and falls short of the excesses in feelings and actions. The brave man looks rash beside the coward and cowardly beside the rash man.
Chapter 86
Which is more contrary: the two extremes or an extreme and the mean?
The contrariety between the two extremes is greater than between either extreme and the mean, because the extremes are further from each other than from the mean. Aristotle compares this to the greater and less portions differing more from each other than either does from the exact half. Things furthest from one another are defined as contrary, so the further apart, the more contrary.
Chapter 86
Which extreme is most opposed to the mean, and why?
Sometimes the excess, sometimes the defect, is most opposed to the mean. To courage, cowardice (the defect) is opposed, not rashness; to self-mastery, total want of self-control (the excess) is opposed, not insensibility. Aristotle gives two reasons: the nearer extreme resembles the mean, so the farther one is counted contrary; and by our own constitution, we have a natural bias toward pleasures, making excess seem more contrary.
Chapter 86
Chapter VIII.2 cards
How does Aristotle distinguish voluntariness of particular actions from that of habits?
The author argues particular actions are voluntary from beginning to end, since we master them throughout, provided we know the particular details. Habits, by contrast, are voluntary only at their origination: the small incremental additions that build them are not cognisable, as with sicknesses. Still, habits count as voluntary because it rested with us to use our circumstances this way or that.
Chapter 87
According to the chapter, why are habits still voluntary despite limited control?
The author argues that although we master only the origination of habits, not each small accession that builds them, habits remain voluntary because it rested with us to use our circumstances this way or that. So the initial choice places the resulting habit within our power and makes it voluntary.
Chapter 87
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What two blameworthy extremes surround the unnamed social mean?
The Over-Complaisant, who agree to everything solely to give pleasure and never oppose, and the Cross and Contentious, who oppose everything and do not care whether they give pain. The praiseworthy mean between them lets pass what it ought and objects as it ought, but Aristotle notes this state has no name appropriated to it.
Chapter 88
How does the unnamed social virtue differ from Friendship?
It is most like Friendship, since the man who exhibits it resembles the amiable friend, but it differs in being independent of any feeling or strong affection for those among whom he mixes. He acts not from love or hatred but from natural disposition, treating known and unknown, intimate and stranger alike, only in each case as propriety requires, since it is not fitting to care alike for intimates and strangers.
Chapter 88
When will the man of the mean choose to give pain instead?
He aims to avoid pain and contribute pleasure, but always with reference to what is noble and expedient. When contributing pleasure would be dishonourable or hurtful, he will run counter and prefer to give pain. Likewise if agreeing involves unseemliness or harm to the doer while his opposition causes only slight pain, he will not agree. He also inflicts trifling pain for the sake of consequent pleasure.
Chapter 88
What distinguishes the Flatterer from the Over-Complaisant?
Both try to give pleasure, but the Over-Complaisant does so simply and disinterestedly, while the Flatterer does it to secure some profit in the way of wealth or the things wealth procures. Aristotle adds that the extremes appear opposed to one another because the mean has no appropriate name.
Chapter 88
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Why do the Pythagoreans' simple definition of justice as reciprocity fail?
The author argues simple reciprocity fits neither distributive nor corrective justice. An official who strikes a man should not simply be struck back, and one who strikes an official is not only struck but punished. The voluntariness or involuntariness of actions also makes a great difference, so exact retaliation cannot capture what justice requires.
Chapter 89
What role does demand play in exchange, according to the chapter?
The author argues demand is the real common bond of exchange: if parties were not in want, or not similarly in want of each other's wares, there would be no exchange or not the same one. Money exists by agreement as a representative of demand, and its Greek name nomisma reflects that it is so by custom or law, not by nature.
Chapter 89
How does money make exchange possible, and what is its weakness?
Money measures all things, making them commensurable and equalising excess and defect, so exchange and dealing can occur. It also serves as a security for future exchange, since one can bring it and receive goods later. But its purchasing power is not always the same and it is liable to depreciation, though it is more permanent than the commodities it represents.
Chapter 89
What must happen before a builder and shoemaker can justly exchange?
The author argues the terms must first be equalised proportionally, since one ware may be better than the other. Exchange requires a proportion like builder to shoemaker as shoes to house, and this proportion requires equality, which requires a common measure. Without proportionate equality the connection cannot stand and there is no just result.
Chapter 89
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According to Aristotle, why can't young men possess Practical Wisdom?
Practical Wisdom concerns particular facts, which are known from experience, and experience is produced only by length of time, which a young man has not. Young men can become geometricians and mathematicians because mathematics is grasped by abstraction, but the principles of science and natural philosophy must be gained by experiment, and young men talk of these without realising them.
Chapter 90
Which kind of knowledge does Aristotle say matters more for Practical Wisdom: general principles or particular details?
The author argues one should have both, but if only one, the knowledge of details rather than of principles. Practical Wisdom is apt to act, and action concerns details. Someone who knows light meats are wholesome but not which meats are light won't produce health; knowing that bird flesh is light and wholesome gives a better chance.
Chapter 90
How does Aristotle distinguish supreme and subordinate Practical Wisdom in politics?
Practical Wisdom and politikē are the same mental state viewed differently. Applied to a community, the supreme faculty is Legislation; the subordinate, concerned with details, is generally called politikē, and its functions are Action and Deliberation. Particular enactment is the ultimate issue of this branch, so people say these men alone really govern, as workmen relate to a master.
Chapter 90
What common opinion about self-interested Practical Wisdom does Aristotle question?
It is commonly thought that the man who knows and busies himself with his own concerns is the man of Practical Wisdom, while those who extend solicitude to society are meddlesome; Euripides' character voices this. The author argues it is just possible the individual's good cannot be secured independently of family or community, and managing one's own affairs is sometimes unclear and needs enquiry.
Chapter 90
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According to Aristotle, when is a person 'simply' entitled to be called self-controlled or incontinent?
Aristotle distinguishes what holds 'incidentally' from what holds 'per se' (or 'simply'). Incidentally, the self-controlled and incontinent person abide or fail to abide by conclusions and moral choice of any kind; but per se, the title belongs to the one who abides or fails to abide by true conclusions and right moral choice. He illustrates 'incidentally' with a man who chooses one thing for the sake of another.
Chapter 91
How does the 'Positive' character differ from the man of Self-Control?
The Positive (hard to persuade, not easily changed in conviction) resembles the self-controlled but differs in many points. The self-controlled man does not change because of passion and lust, yet when occasion requires he is easy to persuade; the Positive man does not change at the call of Reason, and many of this class take up desires and are led by pleasures. The Opinionated, Ignorant, and Bearish belong to this class.
Chapter 91
Why does Aristotle say the Opinionated resemble the incontinent rather than the self-controlled?
The Opinionated cling to their convictions from motives of pleasure and pain: they feel a kind of victory in not having their convictions changed, and are pained when their decrees are reversed. Because they abide by their opinions for the sake of that pleasure rather than by reason, Aristotle says they in fact rather resemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of Self-Control.
Chapter 91
Why is Neoptolemus not classed as utterly destitute of Self-Control?
Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes departs from his resolution, and pleasure was the motive, but it was a noble pleasure: being truthful seemed noble to him, and he had been persuaded by Ulysses to lie. Aristotle concludes that not everyone who acts from pleasure is utterly destitute of Self-Control, base, or incontinent—only the one who acts from the impulse of a base pleasure.
Chapter 91
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How do unequal friendships, such as parent-child or ruler-ruled, remain permanent and equitable?
The author argues each party must render what is owed: children to the authors of their being, parents to their offspring. The feeling of Friendship should be proportionate, with the better or more profitable party receiving a stronger feeling than he entertains, since when the feeling reaches a certain rate, equality in a sense is produced—which is thought requisite in Friendship.
Chapter 92
Does a friend wish his friend the very highest goods, such as becoming a god?
The author argues no, because if that wish were accomplished the friend would no longer have him as a friend, nor the good things he had, since friends are good things. Since a friend wishes good things for the friend's sake, he must wish the greatest good of which the friend as man is capable—though perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself most of all.
Chapter 92
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Why do people disparage 'lovers of Self'?
They apply the term to those who take the larger share of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures, gratifying the irrational part of the soul. Since the mass of mankind grasps after these as the best things, the name arose from the low and bad majority. The author says such people are justly reproached for this kind of self-love.
Chapter 93
What does Aristotle call the principle that most truly constitutes a man?
The author argues it is the Intellect, or the rationally authoritative principle. He notes that self-control is attributed according as Intellect controls, and that acts done with Reason are thought most truly one's own. Therefore the good man, who loves and obeys this principle, is most truly Self-loving.
Chapter 93
How can the good man sacrifice for friends and country and still be Self-loving?
He throws away money, honours, and opportunities, securing instead the noble (καλόν) for himself. He prefers a brief great joy to an enduring tame one, and one noble action to many trifling ones. In dying for friends he chooses great glory for himself, so he gives himself the greater good.
Chapter 93
In what sense is self-love right, and in what sense not?
The author argues it is right to be Self-loving in the sense of securing what is noble and honourable and obeying Intellect, since this benefits both oneself and others. It is not right in the vulgar sense of grabbing wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures, which harms oneself and one's neighbours.
Chapter 93
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According to the chapter, why is knowledge alone insufficient for virtue?
The author argues that in moral action the real end is practice, not mere speculation and knowledge. Talking and writing can stimulate generous youths and ground noble dispositions in principle, but they are powerless to guide the mass of men, who respond to fear and punishment rather than shame. Therefore one must strive to have and exert virtue, not merely know it.
Chapter 94
What does the chapter say about the roles of nature, custom, and teaching in forming character?
Some ascribe virtuous character to Nature, some to Custom, and some to Teaching. Nature's part does not rest with us but belongs to those truly fortunate by divine agency. Words and precept will not avail with all; the disciple's mind must first be prepared to like and dislike rightly, as soil must be prepared for seed, since passion yields not to Reason but to force.
Chapter 94
Why does the chapter prefer law over paternal rule for compelling virtue?
Paternal rule lacks strength and compulsory power, as does the rule of any one man unless he is a king. Law has power to compel because it is a declaration of Practical Wisdom and Intellect. People feel enmity toward fellow men who oppose their impulses, however rightly, but law is not hated though it enforces right rules.
Chapter 94
Why does the chapter say private training has advantages over public?
The author argues private training is more exact, as in medicine: a feverish man generally should rest and fast, but a particular case may differ, and a boxer fights each opponent differently. Each individual is best attended to privately and more likely to obtain what is expedient for him, though acquaintance with general rules still helps the true artist.
Chapter 94
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What notion does Aristotle call heartless and contrary to current opinion?
Aristotle calls it a very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions, to hold that the fortunes of descendants and friends generally contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead. He rejects this position before going on to argue that such fortunes do affect the dead, though only slightly.
Chapter 95
Why does Aristotle refuse minute distinctions about fortunes reaching the dead?
Aristotle says that since things which befall are many and differ in all kinds of ways, some touching more nearly and others less, going into minute particular distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task. He therefore says it may suffice to speak generally and in outline.
Chapter 95
What comparison does Aristotle draw between the dead and tragedy?
Aristotle says that whether those whom each suffering befalls are alive or dead makes much more difference than, in a tragedy, the presupposing or actual perpetration of the various crimes and horrors. He adds that we must account for this difference, and still more the doubt whether the dead really partake of any good or evil.
Chapter 95
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Why does Aristotle say it is hard to be good?
The author argues goodness is hard because hitting the mean in each case is difficult, like finding the center of a circle, which only an expert can do. Anyone can get angry or spend money, but doing so to the right person, in due proportion, at the right time, for the right object, and in the right manner is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.
Chapter 96
What practical method does Aristotle give for aiming at the mean?
The author advises first avoiding the extreme more contrary to the mean, following Calypso's advice to Ulysses to steer clear of smoke and surge, since one must choose the lesser evil. One should also consider one's own natural bias, ascertained from pleasure and pain, and force oneself in the contrary direction, like straightening bent timber.
Chapter 96
Why must we guard most against pleasure, according to Aristotle?
The author argues we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant and against pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of it. He says we should feel toward pleasure as the old counsellors felt toward Helen and send it away, so that we err the less. These precautions best help us attain the mean.
Chapter 96
How does Aristotle say blame and the mean are judged in particular cases?
The author says small deflections from what is right, on either side, are not blamed; only considerable ones are, since they cannot escape observation. But exactly how far one must err to incur blame is not easy to determine in words, nor are such matters of perception by the Moral Sense; these are matters of detail decided by the Moral Sense.
Chapter 96
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What is the object-matter of the Brave man, according to Aristotle?
The Brave man's object-matter is the greatest and most honourable fearful things, chiefly death in war. Aristotle argues that death is the greatest dread because it is the end of all things, but the Brave man faces death in the most honourable circumstances, namely war, confirmed by honours awarded in communities and by monarchs.
Chapter 97
Why is fearing disgrace noble while fearing poverty is not, for Aristotle?
Aristotle holds that fearing disgrace is right and noble, since he who fears it is a good man with a sense of honour, while he who does not fear it is shameless. By contrast, poverty, disease, and evils not proceeding from viciousness or one's own fault ought not to be feared, though fearlessness in these does not make a man Brave in the proper sense.
Chapter 97
How does the Brave man's fearlessness at sea differ from sailors'?
The Brave man is fearless at sea too, but not in the same way as sea-faring men. Sailors are light-hearted and hopeful by reason of their experience, while landsmen, though Brave, give themselves up for lost and shudder at such a death. Aristotle adds that Courage is exerted where one can do something to help oneself or where death would be honourable, neither of which attaches to drowning.
Chapter 97
What does Aristotle say about calling a man Brave for facing scourging or family insult?
Aristotle says a man is not a coward for fearing insult to his wife or children, or envy, or similar things, nor is he Brave for being bold when about to be scourged. Such cases are not the proper object-matter of Courage. He also notes the term is applied by similarity, since some timid in war are liberal and stout in facing loss of wealth.
Chapter 97
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What distinguishes the Braggart from the merely boastful fool, per Aristotle?
One who claims more than belongs to him without a special motive is like a base man but shows as a fool rather than a knave. If he exaggerates for honor or glory, as the Braggart does, he is less blameworthy; if for pecuniary gain, he is more unseemly. The Braggart is defined by purpose and moral state, not by power.
Chapter 98
Why does Aristotle say the Reserved person appears more refined?
The Reserved depreciate their own qualities and seem more refined because they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid grandeur. A common trait is denying current opinions, as Socrates did. Yet Aristotle notes Reserve can resemble Exaggeration, citing the Lacedæmonians' excessive plainness of dress, and that both excess and extreme deficiency partake of exaggeration.
Chapter 98
Which departure from truth does Aristotle consider worse, and why?
Since falsehood is low and blameable while truth is noble, both departures from strict truth are blameable, but especially the Exaggerator. Aristotle says the Exaggerator appears to be the worst character and is the one opposed to the Truthful man. The Reserved, by contrast, give an impression of refinement when practiced in moderation on non-obvious matters.
Chapter 98
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How does Aristotle distinguish Justice from the other virtues regarding the mean?
The author argues Justice is a mean state not in the same manner as the previously discussed virtues, but because it aims at producing the mean, while Injustice occupies both extremes. Justice is the moral state enabling the just man to practice the Just by moral choice and to divide goods proportionately between himself and another, or between two others.
Chapter 99
What is the definition of Justice as a moral state in this chapter?
Justice is the moral state in virtue of which the just man has the aptitude for practicing the Just through moral choice, and for making division between himself and another, or between two other men—not giving himself the greater and his neighbor the less of what is choice-worthy, nor the reverse of what is hurtful, but what is proportionately equal, and likewise when adjudging two other men's rights.
Chapter 99
Why is Injustice described as both excess and defect?
Since the Unjust is excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, in violation of the proportionate, Injustice is both excess and defect because it aims at producing excess and defect: excess in one's own case of what is simply advantageous, and defect of what is hurtful; and in others' cases likewise, only the proportionate is violated in whichever direction the case requires.
Chapter 99
How does Aristotle relate just acting to acting unjustly and being acted unjustly?
The author states that, the abstract Just and Unjust having been defined, just acting is a mean between acting unjustly and being acted unjustly towards: the former being equivalent to having more, and the latter to having less. Of the Unjust act, the less is being acted unjustly towards, and the greater is acting unjustly towards others.
Chapter 99
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Why is Good Counsel not Knowledge, according to Aristotle?
Aristotle argues Good Counsel is not Knowledge because men do not enquire about what they already know, and Good Counsel is a kind of deliberation. The deliberating man is enquiring and calculating. Knowledge also cannot be called 'right' since it cannot be wrong, whereas Good Counsel is a rightness of deliberation.
Chapter 100
Why is Good Counsel not Opinion, and what is it instead?
Aristotle argues Good Counsel is not Opinion because Rightness of Opinion is Truth, and the object of opinion is already definitely marked out—opinion is a definite assertion, not a process of enquiry. Since whoever deliberates is engaged in enquiry and calculation, Good Counsel must be a rightness of Intellectual Operation, specifically a Rightness of deliberation.
Chapter 100
What distinguishes true Good Counsel from merely hitting the right result?
Aristotle argues that getting the right outcome by false reasoning, or through a fallacious middle term, is not yet Good Counsel, since you attain what you ought but not through proper means. The Rightness must concern what is expedient, with a proper end pursued in the right manner and at the right time.
Chapter 100
How does Aristotle define Good Counsel in relation to Practical Wisdom?
Since deliberating well is a quality of men possessed of Practical Wisdom, Aristotle concludes Good Counsel must be 'Rightness in respect of what conduces to a given End, of which Practical Wisdom is the true conception.' He also distinguishes general good counsel, which aims at the End in a general way, from particular good counsel, which aims at some particular End.
Chapter 100
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How does Aristotle distinguish the man of Self-Control from the man of Perfected Self-Mastery?
Both do nothing against Right Reason on the impulse of bodily pleasures. The difference: the man of Self-Control has bad desires but does not yield to them, while the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is so constituted that he does not even feel pleasure contrary to Reason. Aristotle notes people speak of the latter's 'Self-Control' only by similitude.
Chapter 101
To what does Aristotle compare the imperfectly self-controlled man and the bad man?
The imperfectly self-controlled man is like a community with admirable laws that does not act on them, echoing Anaxandrides' scoff about a State that willed but cared nought for laws. The bad man resembles one that acts on its laws, but the laws are bad. The former acts voluntarily with good moral choice, so he is only half bad.
Chapter 101
Which form of Imperfect Self-Control is more easily cured, and why?
The author argues that the form involving constitutionally strong passions is more easily cured than that of people who form resolutions and break them. Also, those so through habituation are more curable than those so by nature, since custom is easier to change than nature, though custom's resemblance to nature makes it hard; as Evenus says, practice long endures and becomes nature.
Chapter 101
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According to Aristotle, what do Friendship and Justice share?
The author argues Friendship and Justice have the same object-matter and subsist between the same persons: in every Communion there is thought to be some principle of Justice and also some Friendship. Friendship is co-extensive with the Communion because Justice is, which justifies the proverb that the goods of friends are common.
Chapter 102
How does the severity of injustice vary with Friendship?
The author argues that principles of Injustice differ by grade of Friendship, and wrongful acts are intensified when done to friends: it is worse to rob a companion than a mere fellow-citizen, to refuse help to a brother than a stranger, and to strike your father than anyone else. Justice naturally increases with the degree of Friendship, being between the same parties and of equal extent.
Chapter 102
What is the great Social Communion and what do other Communions aim at?
All cases of Communion are parts of the great Social one, since people associate for some advantage and to procure things needful for life. The great Social Communion is thought to have been associated, and continues, for the sake of some advantage — the point at which legislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally expedient. Other Communions aim at particular advantage.
Chapter 102
How does Aristotle classify pleasure-based Communions?
Some Communions are thought formed for pleasure's sake, such as those of bacchanals or club-fellows, aimed at Sacrifice or mere company. All these seem ranged under the great Social one, whose aim is not merely momentary expediency but life at all times; members institute sacrifices and assemblies to honour the gods and gain respite from toil combined with pleasure.
Chapter 102
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Why do some argue the happy man needs no friends?
Some claim the blessed and independent man has all good things and needs nothing further, since a friend is a second Self who procures what one cannot get alone. Hence the saying, "When Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?" The author calls this absurd, since friends are thought the greatest of external goods.
Chapter 103
What distinction resolves the apparent contradiction about friends?
The author argues the masses mean by friends those who are useful or pleasant. The happy man does not need these, having all good things already and a life already pleasurable. But he still needs good friends, since happiness is a kind of Working, and the actions of good friends are pleasurable to contemplate.
Chapter 103
Why is the happy man's life burthensome in solitude?
The author argues life is burthensome to a man in solitude, since it is not easy to work continuously alone, but easier in company with others. So the working, being pleasurable in itself, will be more continuous — a thing that should characterize the happy man. He also cites Theognis that virtue may be improved by living with the good.
Chapter 103
How does perceiving one's friend's existence relate to self-perception?
The author argues that perceiving that one lives is pleasant in itself, since life is naturally good. The good man is to his friend as a second Self, so as his own existence is choice-worthy, so is his friend's. One ought to be conscious of a friend's existence by living with him, sharing words and thoughts — not mere feeding together as in brutes.
Chapter 103
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Why does Aristotle say Happiness is not a thing praised but something higher?
Aristotle argues praise implies reference to a standard and applies to things praised for their kind or relation to something else, such as justice, courage, virtue, or strength. Happiness, being the best and most final good, is instead called blessed, as something more godlike and excellent—just as we call the gods blessed rather than praising them.
Chapter 104
What argument of Eudoxus about pleasure does Aristotle report, and on what ground?
Eudoxus argued that pleasure deserves the highest prize because, though it is one of the good things, it is not praised—which he took as a sign of superiority to things that are praised. He attributed the same superiority to a god and the Chief Good, since they are the standard to which everything else is referred.
Chapter 104
According to Aristotle, what does praise apply to, and what do encomia apply to?
Aristotle states that praise applies to virtue, because virtue makes men apt to do what is noble, while encomia apply to definite works of body or mind. He adds that pursuing this topic with exactness belongs more suitably to a regular treatise on encomia; for his purpose it suffices that Happiness is evidently something precious and final.
Chapter 104
Why does Aristotle say Happiness seems to be precious because it is a starting-point?
Aristotle argues that Happiness is a starting-point because with a view to it we do everything else that is done. Since the starting-point and cause of good things is assumed to be something precious and divine, Happiness, as that end, belongs to the class of things precious and final rather than praiseworthy.
Chapter 104
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According to Aristotle, what is the end or motive of the Brave man's actions?
The author argues the Brave man withstands fearful things and performs acts of Courage for the sake of honour, since Courage is honourable and the character of each person is determined by the End. The Brave man acts as right reason directs, choosing his line because to do so is honourable or not to do so is base.
Chapter 105
Why does Aristotle say suicide to escape pain is not the act of a Brave man?
The author argues that dying to escape poverty, the pangs of love, or anything simply painful is the act of a coward, not a Brave man. It is mere softness to fly from what is toilsome; the suicide braves the terrors of death not because it is honourable but to get out of the reach of evil.
Chapter 105
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How does Aristotle distinguish the tactful jester from the buffoon and the clownish man?
The man of Tact says and listens to what befits a gentleman, acting as a law to himself. The Buffoon cannot resist the ridiculous, sparing neither himself nor others to raise a laugh, saying things no refined man would say. The Clownish man is useless in such intercourse, contributing nothing jocose and being savage with all who do.
Chapter 106
What does Aristotle observe about decency by comparing Old and New Comedy?
The author argues Old Comedy made its fun from obscene talk, while New Comedy relies rather on innuendo, and he calls this no slight difference as regards decency. This illustrates his broader point that the jocularity of the gentleman differs from that of the vulgarian, and that of the educated from the uneducated.
Chapter 106
What limit does Aristotle place on the claim that a man will do what he will bear to hear?
He notes it is commonly held that a man will do what he will bear to hear, but limits this: a man will not do quite all he will hear. Jesting is a species of scurrility, and some points of scurrility are forbidden by law; so certain points of jesting should perhaps also be forbidden. The refined man is a law to himself.
Chapter 106
What three mean states does Aristotle say occur in life, and how do they differ?
The three mean states occur in life, and the object-matter of all is interchange of words and deeds. They differ in that one is concerned with truth, while the other two concern the pleasurable; of those two, one is conversant with the jocosities of life and the other with all other points of social intercourse.
Chapter 106
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According to the chapter, when does doing an unjust act fail to make one unjust in character?
The chapter says a person may act unjustly without having formed an unjust character: one may have stolen yet not be a thief, or committed adultery yet not be an adulterer. The key is whether the act proceeds from deliberate choice or from impulse of passion. Knowing the circumstances does not by itself settle the matter; the act is still unjust, but the character is not necessarily formed.
Chapter 107
Why does the chapter deny social justice between master and slave, or father and young child?
The author argues there is no possibility of injustice toward what is absolutely one's own. A slave, and a child of a certain age not yet separated into an independent being, is as it were part of a man's self, and no one chooses to hurt himself. Since social justice requires law and equality of ruling and being ruled, it cannot apply here. Justice is rather between husband and wife.
Chapter 107
How does the chapter distinguish natural justice from conventional justice?
Natural justice is that which has everywhere the same force and does not depend on being received or not. Conventional justice originally may be this way or that indifferently, but is fixed once enacted — for example a fixed ransom price, sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep, or special decrees like sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero. The author rejects the view that all justice is conventional because it varies by place.
Chapter 107
Why does the chapter say a ruler should not govern for himself, and what compensation is due him?
The author argues we do not let a man govern but Principle, because a man governs for himself and becomes a despot. The ruler is guardian of the Just and the Equal, so he has no peculiar personal advantage if just; he does not allot himself the larger share unless it falls to him proportionately. He therefore governs for others, and receives compensation in honour and privilege; where these are inadequate, rulers turn into despots.
Chapter 107
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How does Aristotle distinguish Judiciousness from Practical Wisdom?
Aristotle says both share the same object matter—things a person might doubt and deliberate about—but they are not identical. Practical Wisdom has the capacity for commanding and taking the initiative, since its end is what one should do or not do. Judiciousness is only apt to decide upon suggestions, employing the opinionative faculty to judge well what another enunciates.
Chapter 108
What is Judiciousness, and what is it not, according to Aristotle?
Judiciousness is neither Knowledge nor Opinion, since then everyone would be judicious, nor any specific science like medicine or geometry, because its object is not immutable things but things open to doubt and deliberation. It is not the having or attaining of Practical Wisdom, but employing the opinionative faculty to judge well matters within Practical Wisdom's province when another states them.
Chapter 108
What does Aristotle mean by γνώμη, and how does it relate to equity?
Aristotle defines γνώμη as the right judgment of the equitable man, the faculty by which we call people εὐγνώμονες or say they have γνώμη. Evidence is that we commonly say the equitable man tends to make allowance, and making allowance in certain cases is equitable. συγγνώμη, the word for allowance, is right γνώμη with a capacity for equitable decisions; "right" means that of the Truthful man.
Chapter 108
Why is Judiciousness compared to the act of learning (συνιέναι)?
Aristotle explains that just as learning is termed συνιέναι when a man uses his knowledge, so judiciousness consists in employing the opinionative faculty in judging concerning things within Practical Wisdom's province when another enunciates them—and not merely judging, but judging well, since εὐ and καλῶς mean the same. The Greek name derives from συνιέναι in learning, as μανθάνειν and συνιέναι are often used synonymously.
Chapter 108
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What limit does Aristotle set on the number of friends of utility and pleasure?
Aristotle holds that friends for use should not be numerous, since requiting many services is laborious and a whole life would not suffice; beyond what serves one's life they become officious hindrances to living well. Friends for pleasure need only be few, like sweetening in food. Friends for virtue, by contrast, may be as many as one can, within limits.
Chapter 110
Why does Aristotle say many friends are impossible for true friendship?
Aristotle argues there is a limited number of friends, perhaps the greatest number with whom one can keep up intimacy, since intimacy is a chief mark of friendship and cannot be divided among many. Friends must also be friends to one another if they live together, which is hard to find in many, and one cannot share many joys and sorrows at once.
Chapter 110
What comparison does Aristotle draw between limited friends and political community?
Aristotle compares the number of friends to the number needed for a political community: ten men cannot make one, and a hundred thousand is no longer a community. The number is not one definite figure but lies between certain extreme limits. Likewise friendship has a limited number, bounded by the possibility of intimacy.
Chapter 110
What does Aristotle observe about famous friendships and the over-complaisant?
Aristotle notes that few become friends in the way of companionship at one time, and all famous friendships of that kind are between two persons. Those who have many friends and meet everyone on intimate footing seem really friends to no one except in general society—the characters called over-complaisant. One can be a friend to many in mere society, but not many for virtue's sake.
Chapter 110
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How does Aristotle divide the Soul for his enquiry into Excellence?
The Soul consists of two parts, the Irrational and the Rational. Whether they are actually divided like body parts or only metaphysically two, being by nature inseparable like convex and concave, does not matter for his purpose. The Irrational is itself twofold: the vegetative part, which has no share of Reason, and the desiring or appetitive part, which partakes of Reason insofar as it obeys it.
Chapter 111
Why is the vegetative part of the Soul excluded from human Excellence?
The vegetative part is the cause of nourishment and growth, present in all things that receive nourishment, even embryos. Its Excellence is not peculiar to humans but common to other species. It is thought to work most during sleep, when good and bad men are least distinguishable, so that half of life shows no difference between the happy and the wretched. It is not naturally capable of the Excellence peculiarly human.
Chapter 111
How does the appetitive part relate to Reason, and what example shows the conflict?
The appetitive part partakes of Reason insofar as it is obedient and capable of submitting to its rule; admonition and rebuke indicate the Irrational is somehow persuaded by Reason. In the self-controlled man Reason is praised for exhorting aright, yet something else fights against it. Aristotle compares this to paralysed limbs borne aside contrary to the owner's will, though in the soul we do not see it.
Chapter 111
How does Aristotle classify the Excellences of Man?
Human Excellence is divided according to the twofold Rational/Irrational distinction into Intellectual and Moral. Intellectual Excellences include pure science, intelligence, and practical wisdom; Moral Excellences include liberality and perfected self-mastery. We do not call a man scientific or intelligent when speaking of his Moral character, but meek or self-masterful; the man of science is praised in right of his mental state.
Chapter 111
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What are the five dispositions commonly called courage but distinct from true courage?
The chapter lists five: the courage of citizenship (from shame and honor under law), compulsion by commanders, experience and skill in war, animal spirit or passion, and hopefulness or sanguineness; ignorance is added last as a fifth-like case resembling the hopeful. All bear the name of courage but differ from the true kind, which acts from a sense of honor and moral choice.
Chapter 112
Why does the chapter rank citizen courage closest to true courage?
Because it arises from virtue, a sense of shame, and a desire for what is noble, namely honor, and avoidance of disgrace. The author cites Homer's Diomed and Hector, whose fear of disgrace spurs them on. Yet those acting under compulsion from commanders rank lower, since they act from fear of pain, not shame, and a man should be brave from honor, not compulsion.
Chapter 112
Why are experienced regular troops not truly brave, according to the chapter?
Their confidence comes from skill and familiarity with war's details, letting them strike without suffering, like armed men against unarmed or trained athletes against amateurs. But when danger exceeds their means, they flee first, fearing death more than disgrace. The militia instead stand and fall, since flight seems disgraceful to them. The author notes Socrates thought courage was knowledge.
Chapter 112
How does the chapter distinguish animal spirit from true courage?
Animal spirit drives men and beasts to rush at danger, and the truly brave have much of it cooperating with their sense of honor. But wild beasts act from pain or fear, not from any view of the danger, and are not brave; otherwise hungry asses would be brave. Anger-driven fighters may fight well but are not truly brave, since they act from present feeling, not honor or reason.
Chapter 112
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Why does Aristotle deny that Shame is a Virtue?
The author argues Shame is a feeling, not a moral state: it is "a kind of fear of disgrace," and its physical effects (blushing) resemble fear of danger (turning pale), which marks a feeling rather than a state. Moreover, Shame is felt only at voluntary base actions, and a good man will never voluntarily do what is base.
Chapter 113
For which age does Aristotle say Shame is suitable, and why?
Only for youth. The young live at the beck and call of passion and do much that is wrong, so Shame acts on them as a check, and we praise young men who are shamefaced. But no one would praise an old man for it, since he ought not to do things that cause Shame.
Chapter 113
How does Aristotle argue Shame is only good "on a certain supposition"?
The author argues that Shame may be good hypothetically—"if a man should do such things, he would feel Shame"—but Virtues are good in themselves, not merely in supposed cases. That impudence is base does not make it good to do disgraceful things and feel Shame; a good man will never voluntarily do what is base.
Chapter 113
What does Aristotle conclude about Self-Control at the chapter's end?
He says Self-Control is not properly a Virtue but "a kind of mixed state," and defers the full account to a future Book. This pairs with his rejection of Shame as a Virtue: both are treated as something less than settled virtuous states.
Chapter 113
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According to Aristotle, when does an unjust act (as opposed to an unjust thing) come to be?
The chapter holds that an abstract Unjust exists by nature or ordinance, but an unjust act exists only when that principle is embodied in a voluntary action. If voluntariness is absent, there is something unjust in itself but not yet an unjust action; the agent is then just or unjust only accidentally.
Chapter 114
How does Aristotle define a voluntary action?
A voluntary action is one within the agent's power, done with knowledge and without ignorance of the person affected, the instrument used, and the probable result, and not done by accident or compulsion. His example: if another seizes your hand and strikes a third person, you do not act voluntarily, since it was not in your power to do or not do it.
Chapter 114
What distinguishes a misadventure from a mistake in Aristotle's account?
Both involve harm done through ignorance, but the origin differs. A misadventure occurs when the result comes about contrary to reasonable expectation and the cause is external to the agent. A mistake occurs when the result is not contrary to expectation and the origin of the cause rests with the agent himself, without viciousness.
Chapter 114
Why does Aristotle say acts done from anger are not from malice prepense?
The author argues that in anger the real originator is not the wrathful man but the one who provoked the wrath; the dispute concerns the justice of the case, not the fact. Such acts are unjust but do not make the doer a confirmed unjust or wicked person, since the harm did not arise from depravity. Only harm from deliberate choice marks a depraved character.
Chapter 114
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What do γνώμη, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition all have in common?
The chapter says all these mental states tend to the same object: the extremes, meaning particular details of moral action. Because of this shared focus, the same people are called Practically-Wise and Judicious. Judiciousness involves being disposed to make allowance, since considerations of equity are entertained by all good men alike in dealings with their fellows.
Chapter 115
How does the chapter distinguish the two kinds of Intuition?
Intuition grasps the extremes at both ends. The kind belonging to strict demonstrative reasoning grasps immutable, necessary first terms. The kind employed in practical matters grasps the extreme, the contingent, and the minor premiss, since minor premisses are the source of the Final Cause and universals are made up out of particulars. Grasping these requires Sense, in other words Practical Intuition.
Chapter 115
Why are γνώμη, Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition thought to be gifts of nature?
The chapter notes that no man is thought to be Scientific by nature, but men are thought to have γνώμη, Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition by nature. The proof offered is that we think these faculties follow even from particular ages: a given age has Practical Intuition and γνώμη, as if nature were the cause. Intuition is thus both beginning and end, since proofs are based on one kind of extreme and concern the other.
Chapter 115
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Why does Aristotle say friends are more necessary in adversity but more honourable in prosperity?
In adversity friends are needed for help, so useful friends are wanted; in prosperity having friends is more honourable, since the prosperous want good men to live with and to benefit. The author argues the presence of friends is pleasant even in misfortune, as the grieved are comforted by friends' sympathy.
Chapter 117
What mixed effect does Aristotle attribute to friends' presence in misfortune?
Seeing friends is pleasant and, if the friend has tact, gives real comfort by look and word, since he knows the sufferer's temper. But perceiving that a friend grieves at one's misfortunes also causes pain, because everyone avoids being the cause of pain to friends. Hence manly men are cautious about involving friends in their pain.
Chapter 117
According to Aristotle, when should one call on friends in good fortune versus bad?
The author argues we should readily call friends in good fortune, since it is noble to be ready to do good to others, but reluctantly in bad fortune, making others share our ills as little as possible—hence 'I am unfortunate, let that suffice.' The best occasion is when friends can be of great use at small trouble to themselves.
Chapter 117
How does Aristotle say we should act toward friends in their misfortune versus their good fortune?
We should go to friends in misfortune unasked and with alacrity, since kindness is the friend's office, especially toward those in need who do not demand it as a right—this is more creditable and pleasant to both. In their good fortune we should go readily if we can forward it, but be backward in sharing it, since eagerness to receive advantage is not creditable.
Chapter 117
Chapter XII.4 cards
According to Aristotle, does courage relate equally to confidence and fear?
No. Aristotle says courage has boldness and fear as its object-matter, but not equally: objects of fear matter far more. The person undisturbed by fearful things and rightly related to them is more entitled to be called brave than one merely well-affected toward objects of confidence. Hence the brave are so termed for withstanding painful things.
Chapter 118
Why does Aristotle say courage is justly praised despite involving pain?
Because withstanding painful things is harder than abstaining from pleasant ones. The end of courage is pleasant, but surrounding circumstances obscure it, as in gymnastic games: boxers aim at the crown and honours, yet the blows and labour are painful, so the small object seems to lack pleasantness. Courage likewise involves pain and is praised for that reason.
Chapter 118
How does Aristotle describe the pain death causes the truly brave man?
Death and wounds are painful to the brave man and against his will, yet he endures them because it is honourable or because not doing so is dishonourable. The more complete his virtue and happiness, the more he is pained at death, since he consciously loses the greatest goods. He is not less brave for feeling this; he may be more so, choosing honour in war over keeping those goods.
Chapter 118
Whom does Aristotle suggest might make the best soldiers?
He suggests it may be those who are less truly brave but have no other good to care for, since they are ready to meet danger and barter their lives for small gain. This follows his remark that acting with pleasure does not belong to all virtues except insofar as a man realises the end of his actions.
Chapter 118
Chapter XII.4 cards
What must be added to the definition of being unjustly dealt with?
The author argues the definition is incomplete unless it adds that the hurt occurs against the wish of the person hurt. Hurting someone knowingly—knowing the person, the instrument, and the manner—is not enough. A person may voluntarily suffer what is in itself unjust, but no one can be unjustly dealt with voluntarily, since no one wishes to be hurt.
Chapter 119
Why does Aristotle deny that a man can be unjustly dealt with voluntarily?
He argues no man wishes to be hurt, not even the man who fails of self-control, since that man acts contrary to his wish and does not do what he thinks he ought. No one wishes for what he does not think to be good. So while a person may voluntarily suffer something unjust in itself, being unjustly dealt with always requires another person acting unjustly against his wish.
Chapter 119
How does the Glaucus and Diomed example illustrate voluntary suffering?
Homer tells of Glaucus giving Diomed armour of gold for brass, worth a hundred oxen for that worth nine. Aristotle uses this to show the giver is not unjustly dealt with, because the giving rests entirely with himself. Being unjustly dealt with does not rest with the sufferer; there must be some other person dealing unjustly toward him.
Chapter 119
Does Aristotle hold that all cases of being justly dealt with are voluntary?
No. He calls that position strange, since some people are certainly justly dealt with without their will. He distinguishes acting from suffering: doing things unjust in themselves is not identical with acting unjustly, nor is suffering them the same as being unjustly dealt with. It is impossible to be unjustly dealt with unless someone else acts unjustly, or justly dealt with unless someone else acts justly.
Chapter 119
Chapter XII.3 cards
How does Aristotle distinguish Cleverness from Practical Wisdom?
Cleverness is the faculty of doing and attaining whatever conduces to any given purpose; if the purpose is good it is praiseworthy, otherwise it implies willingness to do anything. Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness but is not without this power of adapting means to ends; it requires goodness, since vice distorts moral vision.
Chapter 120
What is the difference between Natural Virtue and Matured Virtue?
Natural Virtue is a disposition toward justice, self-mastery, and courage that people have from birth. Matured Virtue is Natural Virtue combined with an intellectual element, and it cannot be formed without Practical Wisdom. Children and brutes have natural states, but these are hurtful unless combined with intellect, like a strong body without sight.
Chapter 120
How does Aristotle's view of virtue differ from Socrates' view?
The author argues Socrates was partly right and partly wrong: wrong in thinking all the Virtues were merely intellectual Practical Wisdom, right in saying they are not independent of that faculty. Aristotle says the Virtues imply the possession of Reason, not that they are reasoning processes or instances of strict Knowledge.
Chapter 120
Chapter XII.4 cards
According to Aristotle, why do mothers feel stronger affection than fathers?
The author argues parents love children from birth while children love parents only later, once they attain intelligence or instinct. Parents know offspring more than offspring know their source, and the source is more closely bound to what it produces. These considerations, he says, show why mothers have greater strength of affection than fathers.
Chapter 121
Why does Aristotle rank spousal friendship above political community?
The author argues friendship between husband and wife exists by a law of nature, since humans are more disposed to pair than to associate in communities. The family is prior in time and more necessary than the community. Spouses divide works between them, each contributing what is peculiar to each into the common stock, making it both profitable and pleasurable.
Chapter 121
What makes fraternal friendship resemble companion friendship?
Brothers love one another as sprung from the same stock, their sameness with the common origin creating sameness with each other. Being brought up together and nearness of age greatly help friendship, since people like those of their own age and those used to one another become companions. The author notes this accounts for the resemblance between brotherly and companion friendship.
Chapter 121
How does Aristotle distinguish kindred friendship from civic or crew friendship?
All friendship is based on communion, but the author separates kindred and companion friendship from those of same city, tribe, or crew. The latter more peculiarly rest on communion because they plainly exist by some agreement expressed or implied; friendship of hospitality may be ranked among these. Kindred friendship instead depends on the parental relation.
Chapter 121
Chapter XII.4 cards
Why do lovers prize the sense of sight above the others, according to the chapter?
The chapter says lovers most prize seeing the beloved and choose this sense over the others because Love "is engendered in the eyes, with gazing fed." By analogy, intimacy is most choice-worthy to friends, since Friendship is communion. The author uses this comparison to explain why friends desire to spend time together and share activities.
Chapter 122
How does the chapter compare a man's relation to himself with his relation to a friend?
The chapter states that as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend. Since perceiving one's own existence is choice-worthy, it is likewise choice-worthy in respect of a friend. This supports the claim that intimacy is desirable for friends, because their Friendship is acted out in intimacy.
Chapter 122
What do friends do together, and why, according to the chapter?
Friends wish their friends to join in whatever each man thinks constitutes existence or for the sake of which he chooses life. So some drink together, others gamble, others join in gymnastics or hunting, others study philosophy together, spending their days in what they like best. They do this because they wish to be intimate with their friends and think these activities attain that object.
Chapter 122
How does the chapter contrast the Friendship of the wicked with that of the good?
The chapter says the Friendship of the wicked becomes depraved: being unstable, they share in what is bad and become depraved by being made like one another. The Friendship of the good is good and grows with their intercourse; they improve by repeated acts and mutual correction, receiving impress from one another in the points that give them pleasure.
Chapter 122
Chapter XIII.4 cards
Which pleasures are the object-matter of Perfected Self-Mastery and absence of self-control?
Bodily pleasures, and not even all of these. Pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell are excluded, except incidentally. The habits concern Touch and Taste, which brutes also share, and for that reason the author calls them servile and brutish. Taste is barely used, since the real enjoyment in eating, drinking, and grosser lusts comes from Touch.
Chapter 123
How does Aristotle distinguish natural from peculiar (acquired) desires?
Desire for food is natural, since everyone who really needs it desires food or drink; Homer says the young also desire intercourse. But desires for this or that particular kind are neither universal nor the same in all men, so conceiving them attaches to individuals. Still something is natural: different things please different men. In strictly natural desires few go wrong, and only by excess.
Chapter 123
Why is the man destitute of self-control pained, according to the chapter?
He desires pleasant things indiscriminately or those specially pleasant, and is impelled to choose them above all else. This involves pain not only when he misses his objects but in the very desiring, since all desire is accompanied by pain. The author calls it strange to be pained by reason of pleasure. The self-mastered man, by contrast, is not pained at the absence of such pleasures.
Chapter 123
How does the man of Perfected Self-Mastery stand toward pleasant things?
He is in the mean: he does not take pleasure in what delights the vicious man and rather dislikes it, nor in improper objects, nor greatly in any such class. He is not pained at their absence and desires them only in moderation, not more than he ought nor at improper times. He grasps at healthful pleasant things moderately, and regulates desires by right reason.
Chapter 123
Chapter XIII.2 cards
According to Aristotle, who commits the unjust act in a distribution—the distributor or the receiver?
The author argues it is the distributor who acts unjustly, not the person who receives the larger share. The mere fact of something unjust occurring does not constitute unjust action; what matters is voluntariness, and the origin of the action lies in the distributor, not the receiver. He compares this to inanimate objects or a slave acting on a master's orders: such things do things that are unjust without acting unjustly.
Chapter 124
Can a man deal unjustly with himself, and how does Aristotle resolve the apparent case of the equitable man?
Aristotle raises the case of a man who knowingly gives more to another than to himself, which seems like self-injustice, and notes moderate men are thought to do this since the equitable take less than their due. He answers that the case is not fairly stated: the man gains some other good, such as credit or the honourable, so he does get the larger share. Also, since he suffers nothing against his wish, he is not unjustly dealt with but only hurt.
Chapter 124
Chapter XIII.4 cards
In which kind of friendship does fault-finding most naturally arise, and why?
The author argues fault-finding arises either solely or most naturally in friendships of utility. Such friends use one another for advantage, so their requirements keep enlarging; they think they receive less than they deserve and blame the other, while the one doing kindnesses can never meet their demands. Friendships based on goodness or pleasure are far less prone to quarrels.
Chapter 125
What two kinds of advantage-friendship does the chapter distinguish, and which causes most complaints?
The chapter distinguishes the Legal kind, on specified conditions, either hand-to-hand tradesmanlike or by agreement with a quid pro quo, and the Moral kind, not on specified conditions, where a man gives as to a friend but still expects an equivalent or more. The most fruitful source of complaints is parties contracting obligations and not discharging them in the same line of friendship.
Chapter 125
How should one measure a kindness when utility is the motive, versus in friendships of goodness?
The author argues that in utility friendships the standard is the advantage conferred on the receiver, since he requested the kindness on the understanding of an equivalent; he should repay as much as he gained, or even more, as this is more creditable. In friendships based on goodness the question is never raised; there the doer's motive is the proper standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on motive.
Chapter 125
What mistake does the chapter say a receiver of a kindness may have made, and how should he act?
The author says one should first ascertain from whom one is receiving kindness and on what understanding, so as to accept it on that same understanding. If one received from someone not a friend and not acting disinterestedly, one should treat it as a kindness on specified terms and discharge the obligation, repaying if able; if unable, even the doer would not expect it.
Chapter 125
Chapter XIV.4 cards
Why does Aristotle say lack of Self-Control is more voluntary than Cowardice?
The author argues it is more voluntary because pleasure causes Self-Control's failure while pain causes Cowardice, and pleasure is an object of choice whereas pain is an object of avoidance. Pain deranges and spoils the victim's natural disposition, but pleasure has no such effect, so it is more voluntary and more justly open to reproach.
Chapter 126
How do particular acts and the formed habit differ in voluntariness for Cowardice and Self-Control?
For Cowardice, the confirmed habit is voluntary in a different way from the particular instances: the habit is painless, but particular acts derange the man by pain, so he throws away his arms and acts unseemly, which some even think exercises compulsion. For the man destitute of Self-Control the reverse holds: particular instances are quite voluntary, done with desire, but the general result is less voluntary, since no man desires to form the habit.
Chapter 126
Why does Aristotle apply the term 'unchastened-ness' to children's faults?
He notes the name is applied to children's faults because of a resemblance: whatever grasps after base things and is liable to great increase ought to be chastened, and desire and the child answer this most truly, since children live under the direction of desire and the grasping after what is pleasant is most prominent in them. He says it is evident the later in time gets the name from the earlier.
Chapter 126
What state of appetite defines Perfected Self-Mastery?
The appetitive principle must be accordant with Reason: both aim at what is right. The man of perfected self-mastery desires what he ought, in the right manner and at the right times, which is exactly what Reason directs. Appetite must be obedient and chastened, moderate and few, in no respect opposed to Reason; if great and violent, desires even expel Reason entirely.
Chapter 126
Chapter XIV.3 cards
Why do people wrongly think acting justly is easy?
The author argues people assume that because particular acts like striking a neighbor or giving money rest with oneself, acting justly must also be easy. But doing these acts with the right inward disposition is neither easy nor entirely in one's power. Knowing what is just from the laws is not the same as being just, since just actions must be done and distributed in a certain manner.
Chapter 127
How does Aristotle compare justice to medicine?
The author argues that knowing what is just and unjust is no great wisdom, just as knowing honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the knife is easy. The hard part is knowing how to administer these for health, to whom, and when—which amounts to being a physician. Likewise, just actions require doing and distributing them in a certain manner.
Chapter 127
Among whom does the province of abstract Justice lie, and why?
The author argues Justice's province lies among those who partake of what is abstractly good and can have too much or too little of it. Some beings, perhaps the gods, cannot have too much; others, the incurably wicked, find all things hurtful; others find them useful to a degree. For this reason the province of Justice is among Men.
Chapter 127
Chapter XIV.4 cards
In unequal friendships, what does each party claim is their due?
The superior party claims a greater share, arguing more is always awarded to the good man and that fruits should be proportional to works done, as in a money partnership. The needy or less virtuous party claims a good friend should help those in need. The author argues both claims are right, but not for the same thing: the superior should receive more respect, the needy more profit.
Chapter 128
How does Aristotle illustrate the respect-versus-profit principle in political communities?
He notes that one who gives no good to the common stock receives no honour, since honour is the property of the Public. It is not possible both to make money from the Public and receive honour too, because no one accepts less in every respect. So those who suffer money loss are awarded honour, while money goes to those who can be paid by gifts.
Chapter 128
Why may a father disown a son but not a son his father?
The author argues a son can never fully requite the benefits first conferred by his father, so he is always a debtor, and creditors may cast off debtors. Still, he adds it seems no father would utterly sever from a son except in extreme depravity, since natural friendship and the help a son might render make it unlike human nature.
Chapter 128
What does Aristotle say about requital in friendships of unequal parties?
The party advantaged in money or goodness should repay honour according to his power, since Friendship requires what is possible, not what is strictly due. This is not possible in all cases, as with honours paid to gods and parents, where no one could make the due return; so he is thought a good man who pays respect according to his ability.
Chapter 128
Chapter XV.4 cards
How does Aristotle reconcile Equity with Justice?
The author argues the Equitable is Just, not different in kind from the Just, but better than one form of it—namely the Just according to written law. Both are good, so the Equitable is the better of the two. The apparent contradiction dissolves once you see Equity corrects legal justice rather than opposing it.
Chapter 129
Why is law necessarily defective according to Aristotle?
Every law must be stated universally, but some matters cannot be spoken of rightly in universal terms. The law takes the generality of cases, aware of the error involved. The fault lies not in the law or lawgiver but in the nature of things, since the matter of all action is necessarily particular and variable.
Chapter 129
What is the nature of the Equitable, and how does the equitable man act?
The Equitable is a correction of Law where Law is defective by reason of its universality. The equitable man tends to choose and carry out these corrections, and is not apt to press the letter of the law on the worse side, but is content to waive his strict claims even when backed by law. Equity is a species of Justice.
Chapter 129
What analogy does Aristotle use for the rule of the undefined?
He compares it to the lead rule used to measure Lesbian building: the rule shifts according to the form of each stone, just as a special enactment fits the facts of each case. Since the subject matter is undefined, the rule governing it must itself be undefined, which is why not all things are according to law.
Chapter 129
Chapter XVI.4 cards
Why does Aristotle deny a man can be unjust to himself?
Aristotle argues justice and injustice always imply a plurality of persons: an unjust act requires a voluntary, deliberate, aggressive wrong done to another. Self-harm does to oneself and suffers the same thing at once, and it would also imply being unjustly dealt with by one's own consent, which he rejects. He adds one cannot seduce his own wife or steal his own property.
Chapter 130
How does Aristotle classify suicide in relation to the law and community?
The author argues the law does not bid a man kill himself, and what it does not bid it forbids. A man who kills himself from rage acts voluntarily against Right Reason, so he acts unjustly—but toward the Community, not himself, since no one can be unjustly dealt with with his own consent. The Community therefore punishes him with a certain infamy.
Chapter 130
What conditions must an unjust action satisfy, per Aristotle?
Aristotle states an unjust action must be voluntary, done of deliberate purpose, and aggressive. A man who hurts only because he has first suffered and is merely requiting the same is not thought to act unjustly. He also notes a man cannot act unjustly without the act falling under some particular crime, such as seduction, burglary, or theft.
Chapter 130
What distinction does Aristotle draw between the unjust man and unjust acts?
Aristotle distinguishes a man who only does unjust acts from one who is entirely bad. The unjust man is in a way bad, as the coward is, but not chargeable with badness in the full extent of the term. Because of this, such a person does not act unjustly in the strict sense, which bears on whether one can wrong oneself.
Chapter 130
Chapter XVII.4 cards
Which is worse in itself: doing injustice or suffering it, and why?
The author argues that doing injustice is the worse of the two, since it involves wickedness and is blameworthy, while being unjustly dealt by involves neither wickedness nor injustice. He notes that not all voluntary wrong implies injustice. Suffering injustice is least bad in itself, though accidentally it may be the greater evil, as a bruise could lead to capture and death.
Chapter 131
What analogy does the chapter use to show accidental evils can exceed intrinsic ones?
The chapter compares being unjustly dealt by to a pleurisy versus a bruise: pleurisy is called a greater physical evil, yet a bruise may accidentally be greater, as when a bruise from a fall causes one to be captured by the enemy and slain. Likewise suffering injustice is least bad in itself but may accidentally be the greater evil.
Chapter 131
In what sense does the chapter allow justice between parts of a person?
The author argues there may be justice metaphorically between certain parts of a person's nature, not justice of every kind but only such as belongs to master and slave or head of a family. Throughout the treatise the rational part of the Soul is viewed as distinct from the irrational, so justice between these parts is like that between ruler and ruled.
Chapter 131
Why is injustice toward oneself thought possible?
The chapter says injustice toward oneself is thought possible because a person can suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses really their own. On this basis there is thought to be a kind of justice between these parts mutually, as between ruler and ruled. The author presents this as the accepted account of distinctions regarding justice and the other moral virtues.
Chapter 131
Source and licence
Text used: Project Gutenberg eBook #8438 (Public domain in the United States). Generated from the full text; cards paraphrase the source.
Version: Public domain edition. Retrieved 2026-10-24. Cards reviewed 2026-10-24.
These cards paraphrase the text for study. They are not a substitute for reading the book, and they do not reproduce long passages.
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